










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/77745 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Nijnanten, M.T. van 
Title: Parties under pressure : explaining choices made by parties in the wake of heavy 
electoral defeat 
Issue Date: 2019-09-12 
 
Parties under pressure
Explaining choices made by parties in the wake of heavy electoral
defeat
Cover design:
Roald van Hoof, grafisch vormgever.
Typesetting:
Martijn van Nijnanten using LYX and LATEX.
Printing:
Print Service Ede
© 2019 Martijn van Nijnanten. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission
from the proprietor.
Parties under pressure




de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen donderdag 12 september 2019
klokke 16:15
door
Martijn Theodore van Nijnanten
geboren te Leiden in 1991.
Promotor: Prof. dr. R.A. Koole
Co-promotor: Dr. M.S. Spirova
Promotiecommissie:
Prof. dr. J.J.M. van Holsteijn
Prof. dr. W.J.M. Voermans
Dr. C.M.C. van Vonno
Prof dr. G. Voerman, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Prof. dr. T. Bale, Queen Mary University of London
Contents i
Contents
List of Figures v
List of Tables vii
1 Parties under pressure: introduction 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The puzzle: the black box of party change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Increasing volatility, increasing pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Contents of this dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Parties and party change: state of the field 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Party change in general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 Why study party change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Party change and historical neo-institutionalism . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.3 Delineating party change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Gradual party change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Shock-induced party change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Conclusion: Towards a new theory of shocks and change . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Reinforce or Extend? A new model of shock-induced change 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Electoral shocks and critical junctures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Constructing the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Whether to change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5 How to change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5.1 Reinforce or extend? The two strategies elaborated. . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5.1.1 The organisational dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5.1.2 The programmatic dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.1.3 The tactical dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.2 Internal characteristics: electoral base attachment and ideological
attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5.2.1 Electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5.2.2 Ideological attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5.2.3 Relative importance of various internal factors . . . . . . . 51
3.5.3 A functional alternative: the identity of defectors . . . . . . . . . . 53
ii Martijn van Nijnanten - Parties under Pressure
3.5.4 External environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.4.1 Electoral system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5.5 The final strategy and recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.6 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4 Methodology and Case Selection 61
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 The Comparative and Case Study Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Case selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.1 Selecting two countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.2 Selecting the parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4 Archival research: opportunities and limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4.1 Sources per case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4.1.1 The British Labour Party, 1983-1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4.1.2 The British Liberal Party, 1970-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4.1.3 The Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal, 1994-2002 . . . 75
4.4.1.4 The Dutch Democrats ’66, 1982-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.2 Comparability of the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.5 Operationalisation of key variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5.1 The reinforcement and extension strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5.1.1 Measuring organisational change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.1.2 Measuring programmatic change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.5.1.3 Measuring tactical change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.2 Electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.3 Ideological attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5.4 Identity of defectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.5 External factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.5.1 Electoral system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.6 Conclusion: testing the propositions and the importance of sequence . . . . 89
5 The Christian Democratic Appeal, 1994-2002 91
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 The CDA in 1994: setting the stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.1 Electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2.2 Ideological Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2.4 Overview and expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 The 1994 General Election defeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 The recovery strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.1 Strong foundations? 1994-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.1.1 Organisational changes, 1994-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.1.2 Programmatic changes 1994-1998: the strength of ideology 109
5.4.1.3 Tactical Changes, 1994-1998: the advent of marketing . . 112
Contents iii
5.4.2 Sticking to the plan: 1998-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.2.1 Towards OMOV: Organisational changes, 1998-2002 . . . 115
5.4.2.2 Programmatic changes, 1998-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.2.3 Tactical changes, 1998-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 Conclusion: True colours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6 The Labour Party, 1983-1992 127
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2 The Labour Party in 1983: setting the stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.2.1 Electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2.2 Ideological Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2.4 Overview and expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.3 The 1983 General Election defeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4 The recovery strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.4.1 First hesitant steps: 1983-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.4.1.1 Organisational changes, 1983-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.4.1.2 Programmatic changes 1983-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.4.1.3 Tactical Changes, 1983-1987: from red flag to red rose . . 143
6.4.2 Blatant Electoralism, 1987-1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.4.2.1 Organisational changes, 1987-1992: the continued battle
for OMOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.4.2.2 Programmatic changes, 1987-1992: the Policy Review . . . 148
6.4.2.3 Tactical changes, 1987-1992: continued broadening . . . . 151
6.5 Conclusion: The inexorable march of New Labour? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7 Democrats 66, 1982-1989 157
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.2 D66 in 1982: setting the stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.2.1 Electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.2.2 Ideological Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.2.4 Overview and expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.3 The 1982 General Election defeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.4 The recovery strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.4.1 Towards different politics, 1982-1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.4.1.1 Organisational changes, 1982-1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.4.1.2 Programmatic changes, 1983-1987: Different politics . . . 173
7.4.1.3 Tactical Changes, 1982-1986: same votes as before . . . . 176
7.4.2 Consolidation, 1986-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.4.2.1 Organisational changes, 1986-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.4.2.2 Programmatic changes, 1986-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.4.2.3 Tactical changes, 1986-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
iv Martijn van Nijnanten - Parties under Pressure
8 The Liberal Party, 1970-1974 191
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.2 The Liberal Party in 1970: setting the stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.2.1 Electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
8.2.2 Ideological Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
8.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.2.4 Overview and expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.3 The 1970 General Election defeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.4 The recovery strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
8.4.1 Organisational changes, 1970-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
8.4.2 Programmatic changes 1970-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
8.4.3 Tactical Changes, 1970-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
8.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
9 Comparative Analysis 213
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
9.2 Examining the propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
9.2.1 Proposition 1: relative size of the defeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
9.2.2 Proposition 2: learning effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
9.2.3 Proposition 3: the impact of electoral base attachment . . . . . . . 218
9.2.4 Proposition 4: the role of ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
9.2.5 Propositions 5a through 5c: differential impacts . . . . . . . . . . . 223
9.2.6 Proposition 6: electoral system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
9.3 General validation of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
9.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
10 Conclusion and discussion 237
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
10.2 Conclusion and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
10.2.1 What have we learned? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
10.2.2 Contribution to the debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244





List of Figures v
List of Figures
1.1 Number of parties losing more than 33% of their votes or seats, 1945-2017 6
3.1 Overview of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 The ’whether’-stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 The ’how’-stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1 Electoral performance of the CDA, 1977-1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.1 Electoral performance of the Labour Party, 1966-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.1 Electoral performance of D66, 1967-1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
8.1 Electoral performance of the Liberal Party, 1951-1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

List of Tables vii
List of Tables
3.1 Changes associated with the extension and reinforcement strategies . . . . 42
3.2 Summary of propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 Test of the main propositions using four focused comparisons; expected
recovery strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Years post-1945 in which British parties lost at least 33% of votes or seats 68
4.3 Years post-1945 in which Dutch parties lost at least 33% of votes or seats . 69
4.4 Summary of the case selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Overview of primary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.6 Organisational components of the reinforcement and extension strategies . 80
4.7 Programmatic components of the reinforcement and extension strategies . 81
4.8 Tactical components of the reinforcement and extension strategies . . . . . 83
4.9 Operationalisation of electoral base attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 Overview of the Independent Variables: the CDA in 1994 . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2 Overview of the CDA recovery strategy, 1994-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.1 Overview of the Independent Variables: the Labour Party in 1983 . . . . . 135
6.2 Overview of the Labour Party recovery strategy, 1983-1992 . . . . . . . . . 153
7.1 Overview of the Independent Variables: D66 in 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.2 Overview of the D66 recovery strategy, 1982-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.1 Overview of the Independent Variables: the Liberal Party in 1970 . . . . . 199
8.2 Overview of the Liberal Party recovery strategy, 1970-1974 . . . . . . . . . 210
9.1 Case-by-case summary of findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
9.2 Summary of propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
9.3 Percentage of votes and seats lost in crisis election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
9.4 Previous shock defeats at 33% vote or seat loss threshold . . . . . . . . . . 218
9.5 First-cycle recovery strategy and electoral base attachment per party . . . 219
9.6 First-cycle recovery strategy and ideological attachment per party . . . . . 222
9.7 First-cycle organisational strategy and electoral base attachment per party 224
9.8 First-cycle tactical strategy and electoral base attachment per party . . . . 226
9.9 First-cycle programmatic strategy and ideological attachment per party . . 228
9.10 Electoral system and recovery strategies over two electoral cycles . . . . . . 229
9.11 Identity of defectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Chapter 1. Parties under pressure: introduction 1
1 Parties under pressure:
introduction
1.1 Introduction
That parties are under pressure is not a new theme in political science. Since the 1980s,
there has been a lively debate over whether or not political parties as a form of po-
litical organisation are in crisis.1 Certainly, the challenges faced by political parties are
increasing: electoral volatility has risen, membership numbers have declined and they are
challenged by the rise of competitors who claim to stand in opposition to “old” party poli-
tics. These central institutions of many democracies find themselves put under increasing
stress. Though the electoral challenges parties are faced with are not new, they are in-
creasing in number. At almost every election, one or more parties will find themselves
with severe losses of votes, seats or both.
And yet, parties have persisted. Their capacity to do so is related in the literature to
their capacity for change, allowing them to adapt to the circumstances.2 It is this way
of reacting to a changing political reality that is the subject of this dissertation. The
central question it aims to answer is as follows: how do political parties respond to an
external shock in the form of heavy electoral defeat, and why do different parties respond
in different ways? In seeking to answer this question, this dissertation can be placed in
a broader literature on party change which sees party change as the result of external
shocks: dramatic events resulting from a change in the external environment, forcing
the party to change.3 The theories in this broader literature on party change following
external shock, however, do not provide the conceptual and theoretical tools needed to
analyse parties put under pressure by heavy electoral defeat and distinguish between
various ways in which parties change as a result. This thesis takes a new institutionalist
approach in which internal characteristics such as a party’s relationship to its electoral
base and its ideological commitments as well as external factors such as the impact of
electoral systems play important roles. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the literature
by starting to construct the required framework, and in doing so further political science’s
understanding of the antecedents of party change in general.
1. E.g. K. Lawson and P. H. Merkl, eds., When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organisations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); H. Daalder, “A Crisis of Party?,” Scandinavian Political
Studies 15, no. 4 (1992): 269–288; P. Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997).
2. E.g. Mair, Party System Change, 89.
3. E.g. A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, trans. from the Italian by M. Silver
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1982]); R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated Theory
of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 259–287.
2 Martijn van Nijnanten - Parties under Pressure
This introductory chapter introduces the research puzzle in more detail. Section 1.2
outlines the research puzzle and presents an argument for its theoretical relevance, arguing
that the current literature pays insufficient systematic attention to this phenomenon. It
also looks ahead to a more detailed discussion of the literature later in this dissertation
in briefly considering why this might be the case. The main focus of section 1.3 shall
be to discuss the rise in electoral volatility that has occurred in Western democracies.
In particular, it will be argued that heavy electoral defeat is becoming a routine feature
of parliamentary elections, presenting the study’s societal relevance. Finally, section 1.4
presents an overview of the contents of this dissertation.
1.2 The puzzle: the black box of party change
The study of party change is a subset of a larger field of theoretical development in the so-
cial sciences, focusing on organisational and institutional change. A central characteristic
that the social sciences accord to institutions and organisations is a certain permanence:
they become imbued with value that extends beyond their original instrumental purpose
and makes their survival a goal onto itself. This was also one of the early insights in
the literature on political parties. Michels, in his classic study on political parties, notes
the way in which political organisations displace their earlier idealistic goals with simple
endeavour for the survival of the organisation itself.4
Looking at parties this way, it is easy to see how change itself becomes a target for
explanation. If political parties are institutions and their chief aim is survival, then how
is it that their programme, ideology, organisation and strategy changes over time? The
literature has taken two different approaches to explain this. The first, most numerous
category of studies views change as the result of gradual changes in the external environ-
ment, progressing more or less through a succession of party types.5 The second school is
concerned with sharp, marked external shocks which cause parties to change.6
Both bodies of literature suffer from a similar problem: the same process of party
change takes different forms in different circumstances. In other words: the process
between the changes in the environment that cause party change and the ultimate party
change involves many intervening steps, which can explain why most parties change due
to these factors, but not all of them to the same extent and in the same way. In a manner
of speaking often employed in situations with a similar problem: there is a black box over
the intervening causal process between the causes and the outcome of the process, which
4. R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democ-
racy, trans. from the German by E. Paul and C. Paul (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978 [1915]), 373.
5. E.g. M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans.
from the French by B. North and R. North (London: Methuen, 1954 [1951]), 63; O. Kirchheimer, “The
Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in Political Parties and Political Development,
ed. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 185; R. S. Katz and
P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel
Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 8; A. Krouwel, “Otto Kirchheimer and the Catch-All Party,” West
European Politics 26, no. 2 (2003): 23–40; A. Krouwel, Party Transformations in European Democracies
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 5.
6. E.g. Panebianco, Political Parties, 242; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals
and Party Change,” 265.
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is hard for researchers to look in on.7
And yet, without opening the black box, the party change literature will keep struggling
with the problem of expressing such a complex causal relationship too simply. In the
literature on the evolution of party types, the tendency to overgeneralise and declare one
party type dominant without regard to diversity across parties and party system has often
been diagnosed.8 Expectations of dominant party types have more often than not failed to
materialise. The ‘external shocks literature’ suffers from a related issue: here, theory gets
stuck at the stage of demonstrating a link between an external shock and change,9 but
often fails to take account of the various different forms that belong to this same category
of change. In both cases, it is the same problem underlying these issues: the black box
of party change, obscuring the complex causal interplay that links its antecedents to its
outcome.
The case study, with its qualitative focus and ability to look in detail at causal processes,
is the method par excellence to deal with the black box. And it has, in the literature on
external shocks in particular, spawned a rich tradition of single-case studies employing the
same model.10 Yet in all these case studies, it is rarely acknowledged that the party change
explained in the one is of a different kind than the party change discussed in the other.
Without acknowledging this diversity of outcomes within the overall category of party
change, the black box cannot be fully opened to understand why party change occurs in
different forms in different circumstances. In other words: in one set of circumstances,
some changes can be present and some absent, and in others this may be exactly the other
way round. A framework needs to be developed to understand the different varieties of
party change and why one occurs in one party and another in another.
This is the main research puzzle this dissertation is intended to address. It is situated
within the literature on external shocks because the sharp environmental changes produc-
ing party change offer the greatest potential to observe the workings of party change up
close, but there is nothing to suggest that a similar reasoning, once refined, cannot also be
applied to the more ‘gradualist’ literature. Within the broader literature on party change,
this dissertation focuses on electoral shocks for various reasons. First, there seems to be
general agreement that electoral defeat is a form of external shock.11 Second, unlike other
forms of shock, it is easily observed, since the results of elections are public.
In this way, this chapter arrives at a two-part research question, both parts of which
can ultimately be traced back to solving the research puzzle of the black box. The first
7. W. C. Müller, “Inside the Black Box: A Confrontation of Party Executive Behaviour and Theories
of Party Organizational Change,” Party Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 295.
8. R. A. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party,” Party
Politics 2, no. 4 (1996): 508; R. A. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij: Veranderende
Partijorganisatie in Nederland 1960-1990 (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1992), 406-407; A. Krouwel, “The
Catch-All Party in Western Europe, 1945-1990: A Study in Arrested Development” (PhD diss., Free
University of Amsterdam, 1999), 204.
9. R. Harmel et al., “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis,”
West European Politics 18, no. 1 (1995): 1–33.
10. E.g. Müller, “Inside the Black Box”; F. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’:
External Shocks, Party Change and the Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats During ‘Purple
Hague’, 1994-8,” Party Politics 13, no. 1 (2007): 69–87.
11. Panebianco, Political Parties, 243; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and
Party Change,” 281.
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part concerns the need to acknowledge and map out in a structured way the diversity
of outcomes within the category of party change: how do political parties respond to an
external shock in the form of heavy electoral defeat? This is a prerequisite of furthering
the research agenda on party change. So far, case studies have each taken a different view
of party change, allowing them to explain the outcome in one case but not necessarily
to extrapolate them to others. To do so, a comparative small-N study with a single
conceptual and heuristic toolbox is needed. The second part of the research question, and
the most important one, deals directly with the complex causal process linking an electoral
defeat and party change: why do different political parties respond in different ways?
Having observed that certain parties respond to these sharp changes in the environment
in different ways, the question is why.
Formulating an answer to the first part of the research question requires the development
of a new conceptual vocabulary and a heuristic model that can function as a starting point
for theory-building. Since the existing models in the literature on shocks and change are
only intended to explain the occurrence and extent of change, a new model is needed to get
at the factors causing the several varieties of change. The focus on electoral shocks helps
formulate this model in terms of the goal of the process: electoral recovery. Necessarily
of course, this new model should then be tested on multiple cases in a qualitative way, so
as to examine whether it can actually help to explain the presence or absence of certain
types of changes in various cases.
In this way, the discussion naturally arrives at the second part of the research question.
Previous case studies have, as noted above, often suffered from the problem of focusing
too much on the idiosyncrasies of each case rather than on a general understanding and
explanation of the phenomenon of party change itself. The best way to try to remedy this
is a comparative small-N research design. By combining the detailed focused comparison
of the case study method with a comparative design intended to account for the various
differences across cases, the model can be put to a first test and further refined into a full
theoretical model.
Addressing this problem can contribute knowledge to broader fields of the literature
than just the focus on party change following electoral shocks. The literature on the
evolution of party types suffers from a similar problem of presuming too easily (and too
often wrongly) that certain developments observed will eventually lead to a new dominant
party type emerging across different environments.12 The difference between the two fields
of study is not that large, since the same type of causes occur in both, being changes in
the external environment in which parties operate. Once a framework has been developed
to explain different outcomes after external shocks, some of the factors that are part of
it can potentially also be applied to more gradual environmental changes. By starting
with the marked changes produced by external shocks, it might be possible to explain the
variation in more subtle and gradual changes as well.
The potential theoretical contribution can be broadened even further. It has been noted
briefly in section 1.1 above that political parties have had a number of obituaries in the
literature, each of which was subsequently proven wrong by their surprising resilience.
12. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel?,” 508; Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 406-407;
Krouwel, “The Catch-All Party in Western Europe, 1945-1990,” 204.
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A useful idea about this resilience is that this is the result of the capacity of political
parties to adapt to changing circumstances.13 By looking at what happens when parties
are put under pressure, we can also learn something about the way this capacity to adapt
exists on the individual party level. In doing so, a deeper understanding of party change
in parties under pressure also contributes to a deeper understanding of political parties
themselves and the way in which they adapt to various changes in the social environment.
1.3 Increasing volatility, increasing pressure
The relevance of the research puzzle is not just a matter of furthering the research agenda
on party change – it might also be an issue of societal importance. As noted in the in-
troduction to this chapter, parties nowadays appear to face increasing challenges, mainly
as a result of electoral volatility. These pressures result from the oft-observed process of
partisan de-alignment in many Western democracies: party identification, which has for
long been a defining influence on electoral behaviour, is declining among the electorate.
Parties are faced not only with decreasing memberships14 and the entry of new competi-
tors15, but above all by an increasing instability in their shares of the vote, born from a
decline in the number of voters who would more or less automatically vote for them.
The consequence of this is that heavy electoral defeat is more common today than it has
been in the past. This can, first and foremost, be seen in the levels of electoral volatility
in Western Europe. Although Bartolini and Mair found that on average, volatility was
still lower than in the ‘freezing’ inter-war period,16 Mair also noted in 1992 that several
European democracies were experiencing increased volatility.17 Emmanuele and Chiara-
monte found two decades later that ‘unstable’ elections have occurred disproportionately
in recent years, increasing from one third pre-1991 to half of the cases after that year.18
In addition, they note that strings of these elections have occurred in eleven different
Western European democracies, most of them in this period.19
To further illustrate this, figure 1.1 displays the number of electoral defeats that can
be qualified as heavy defeats in European countries.20 As a rule of thumb, a loss of at
least one third of a party’s previous votes and/or seats was considered a heavy electoral
defeat. This same rule of thumb will be employed later on in this dissertation to delineate
the universe of cases of heavy electoral defeat, and will be justified in chapter four. For
13. See Mair, Party System Change, 89.
14. P. Mair and I. van Biezen, “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000,” Party
Politics 7, no. 1 (2001): 5–21.
15. R. Harmel and J. D. Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis,”
International Political Science Review 6, no. 4 (1985): 501–523; B. Meguid, Party Competition Between
Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
16. S. Bartolini and P. Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability (1990), 120.
17. Mair, Party System Change, 81.
18. V. Emmanuele and A. Chiaramonte, “Party system volatility, regeneration and de-
institutionalization in Western Europe (1945-2015),” Party Politics 23, no. 4 (2017): 382.
19. Ibid., 384.
20. Only parties which had been present in the previous legislature were considered. This is a necessary
restriction to make, since the disadvantage of having to meet an electoral threshold that has not been
met before makes the vote of non-represented parties subject to more fluctuations of its own.
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now, it suffices to say that it is a significant enough loss to seriously damage a party’s
future electoral potential should the party not take serious action to address the crisis. In
Britain and the Netherlands, the two countries under study in this dissertation, not an
election has been held since the 1990s without a party losing heavily in this way. Indeed,
this is the case for much if not all of Europe. Even where there is no party at all that
suffers a loss of this magnitude at an election, this is more often the exception rather than
the rule. Interestingly, the graph suggests that in most post-communist countries, this
kind of instability of party vote and seat shares appears to be structural.
The societal relevance of this study now becomes clear: political parties, a vital part
of many democratic systems, are under increasing electoral pressure. Past studies have
provided ample evidence for the popular wisdom that parties are forced to change by
electoral defeat of a certain magnitude. Yet to understand the ways in which parties will
develop in the future under these challenging circumstances, a more detailed consideration
of party change following heavy electoral defeat is needed. It is not enough to know that
parties change as a result of a heavy electoral defeat, though it is certainly comforting to
know that the popular wisdom in this case is correct. In order to say anything meaningful
about the impact this increasing pressure will have on political parties, the debate needs
to go further than that, considering the different ways in which parties can develop.
Opening up the black box is therefore not just a matter of theoretical importance; it
contributes to a vital and ongoing debate about the continuing relevance and changing
practices of political parties. By informing thinking about the way in which parties act and
change themselves when put under pressure, the future of these important actors in our
democratic systems may be put in sharper focus. By relating important developments such
as the differentiation of party membership21, the extension of the franchise in leadership
elections to registered supporters and the downplaying of ideology22 to the environmental
challenges faced by each party, the future of these important actors in our democratic
systems may be put in sharper focus.
1.4 Contents of this dissertation
This chapter has set out the research puzzle to be addressed in this dissertation. In
the following chapters of this dissertation, the approach broadly outlined above will be
expanded upon. Chapter two contains a review of the literature on political parties in
general and party change in particular. In particular, it further explores the problem
of the black box in the ‘party shocks literature’ and goes into more detail, arguing the
need for a new theoretical model of party shocks and party change. Developing a new
model alongside heuristic tools and the conceptual vocabulary required is the focus of the
third chapter of this dissertation. Two strategies are derived from the ultimate need to
compensate for the loss of electoral potential after an electoral shock: the reinforcement
strategy, bringing the party closer to its roots in order to reach out to those supporters
21. E.g. S. E. Scarrow, Multi-Speed Membership Parties: Evidence and Implications, 2014, Paper pre-
pared for “Contemporary Meanings of Party Membership”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Sala-
manca, Spain, April 10-15, 2014.
22. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” 190.
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that deserted it and those like them; and the extension strategy, broadening the party’s
base with measures that often move away from its roots. The argument that will be
presented in this chapter with regard to the two strategies is that internal institutional
characteristics of each party, particularly their attachment to their electoral base and their
ideology, and external factors such as the electoral system, combine to influence the choice
of strategy and the ultimate form of party change. It concludes by presenting a number
of testable propositions. Having formulated these, this dissertation continues in chapter
four by operationalising the major variables and outlining a comparative research design
consisting of four parties which have suffered a crisis in the past to test these propositions.
The main body of this dissertation consists of five empirical chapters. Using evidence
from the archival records of each party, chapters five through eight present an in-depth
account of the response of each of the four parties up to two electoral cycles following
a heavy electoral defeat, structured along the lines of the model. After discussing the
Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal’s response to its 1994 defeat in chapter five and the
British Labour Party’s transformation between 1983 and 1992 in chapter six, the analysis
will turn towards the Netherlands’ Democrats 66 between 1982 and 1989. Finally, the
British Liberal Party’s recovery process between 1970 and 1974 will be discussed. Each
of these chapters attempt to explain the course each of these parties have taken in crisis.
The evidence from these cases is then combined and synthesised in chapter nine. Through
this comparative analysis, each of the propositions formulated in chapter three will then
be put to the test, allowing judgment of the performance of the model. In chapter ten,
finally, the overall conclusions of this dissertation will be formulated and suggestions made
for future research.
The common thread that may be found running through all the chapters of this disser-
tation, binding them together, is how indebted political parties are to their history. Where
previous entries into the ‘shocks literature’ cast the process of change as a power struggle,
the image that emerges from this study is that it is more than that: it is also a continuous
conversation with the party’s own past. Through a process of path-dependency, the way
in which the party’s social base and its ideology have been viewed in the past very much
affects the party at the new critical juncture that is initiated by the electoral crisis. In
practice, veering away from this past is difficult even in such a challenging situation. This
is the major argument of this dissertation: a party under pressure is forced to show its
true colours. It has to (re)consider the basic essentials of its existence: what is the party
and who is it for? As it will be shown, it is these questions that structure the debate on
the path to electoral recovery, rather than more rational and functionalist considerations,
such as the identity of the defectors.
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2 Parties and party change: state of
the field
2.1 Introduction
The evolution of political parties is one of the most expansive subject areas in the body of
political science literature. This is no wonder: in a modern context, political parties form
one of the essential parts of democratic systems. With their important functions for elite
recruitment, structuring public opinion and formulating policy, political parties play an
essential role in modern democracies. It is therefore no surprise that since the rise of mass
political parties, political scientists have sought to understand the way in which this vital
democratic institution develops. They found that as the nature of modern democracy
changed, political parties were likely to adapt and change with the times, giving rise to
an entire literature on party change.1
The aim of this chapter is twofold and unfolds roughly in this order. First, it seeks to
give an outline and overview of the general literature on political parties as it developed,
specifically the literature on party change. Second, it seeks to make clear the position
and relevance of the current study to the debate. With regard to this second aim, the
argument that will be presented is that debate on party change following external shocks
has more or less arrived at a stalemate, since the prevailing theories are not equipped to
go into the specifics of what can and cannot be expected to change. Therefore, it will
be argued towards the end of this chapter that a new theory of party change following
electoral shocks is required to resolve these problems.
This chapter starts by defining the population, quickly sketching three aspects of po-
litical parties which together make up the way political parties are understood in this
study (section 2.2). The chapter then moves on to a discussion of party change in general
(section 2.3). This section identifies two major bodies of the literature on party change
– one on gradual party change, the other on party change induced by external shocks -,
highlighting some common characteristics and problems associated with the party change
literature as a whole. These two bodies of literature shall be discussed separately in sec-
tions 2.4 and 2.5. It will then be argued, in conclusion (section 2.6) why a new model of
party change following external shocks, specifically electoral shocks, is needed to further
our insight into why some parties develop in certain directions and other parties in others.
1. E.g. M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans.
from the French by B. North and R. North (London: Methuen, 1954 [1951]); R. Harmel and K. Janda,
“An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994):
259–287; R. S. Katz and P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the
Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 5–28.
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2.2 Parties
Though there is now general agreement that “democracy has become unthinkable save in
terms of political parties”2, there is considerably less agreement on what exactly a political
party is. The debate on the proper definition of political parties will not be rehashed here,
since it only serves to delineate the population to which this study applies.3 However, for
the sake of clarity, this dissertation employs the minimum definition of parties as developed
by Sartori: “a party is any political group identified by an official label that presents
at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates
for public office.”4 As Sartori notes, such a definition is best suited to the purpose of
delineating the class of objects we are talking about.5 It should be emphasised that this
is its only purpose: parties do more than just participating at elections, but it is only
the participation at elections that defines all parties and sets them apart from other
organisations.6
Since this definition considers any official organisation that competes at elections under
a common label with a fair chance of securing a seat a party, it nicely suits our study, which
is after all concerned with the effects of electoral competition on parties. To delineate
the population with which this study is concerned, therefore, it is more than sufficient.
However, this study is also concerned with party change, specifically changes to a party’s
essential character and operations. Since parties do much more than run candidates for
election, the minimal definition does not suffice for this purpose. Following Von Beyme,
we propose to resolve this by referring to party functions, or what parties do, in addition
to what they are.7
These functions should be seen as somewhat broader than simply electoral. It is true
that all parties have in common an effort to place candidates in public office, but they
also have different essential functions and characteristics which if changed would undoubt-
edly constitute meaningful party change. Here broader functional definitions of parties
can help, such as the one given by Von Beyme which identifies four functions: a pro-
grammatical or ideological function, an interest aggregation function, a mobilization or
socialization function and an elite recruitment or government formation function.8 These
also fit counterparts in the American literature, such as the one given by Chambers: “nom-
inating; electioneering; shaping opinion; mediating among groups, “brokerage”, or finding
formulas of agreement; managing government; and supplying connections between the
branches of government”.9 From these functions and the minimal definition, four essential
characteristics of any particular party can be distilled: its organisation, electoral strategy,
2. As famously expressed in E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart /
Winston, 1942).
3. See for example G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge:




7. K. Von Beyme, Politische Parteien in westlichen Demokratien (München: Piper, 1984), 25.
8. Ibid.
9. W.N. Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 45.
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its ideological or policy programme and the personal composition of its elite and of the
slate of candidates it seeks to place in office. These four essential characteristics, while
not determining the extent of the population, do serve to define a way of looking at the
essentials of parties.
A last consideration that will be explored further below in our discussion of party change
is that this study sees parties not just as organisations but as institutions. Rather than
just organised forms of behaviour, parties are organised forms of behaviour imbued with
value. This has been present since some of the earliest contributions to the literature:
Michels observed a related process of goal displacement.10 As the organizational needs of
a party forced it to organize to obtain its original goals, eventually the organization itself
would become more important than these goals.11 According to Michels, this led to the
displacement of the original goal of socialist parties in overthrowing capitalism with the
mere survival of the party itself. This argument offers an important insight into political
parties: their survival becomes a priority in and of itself since their existence is valued by
their adherents.
2.3 Party change in general
This dissertation is mainly concerned with how parties change. Parties have changed a
great deal between their origins in the 19th century and the present day. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the literature on political parties has considered issues of party change
even before the term itself was attached to it. Some of the most influential works in the
general literature on political parties, without using the phrase, concern themselves with
issues of party change. This is because of their focus on the evolution and development of
political parties as a class of organisations, seeking to explain why parties at any partic-
ular time were constituted as they were and predicting how they would develop further.
Any comprehensive treatment of political parties must unavoidably address how parties
have shaped up over time.12
The early literature on the historical development of parties naturally developed into
works that focused on gradual party change. These works highlight the evolutionary
character of party change, stipulating that parties adapt gradually to changes in their
environment. It is characterised in large part by focusing on the notion of party types
pioneered by Duverger, with various types of parties succeeding each other over the course
of history.13 This body of literature on gradual change will be discussed in more detail in
section 2.4 below. A more recent body of literature makes a different argument, arguing
that party change is the result of external shocks. These short, sharp shocks of environ-
mental pressure force a break in the normal resistance of parties to change. This part of
10. R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democ-
racy, trans. from the German by E. Paul and C. Paul (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978 [1915]), 373.
11. Michels, Political Parties, 373; see also M. Ostrogorski, La Démocratie et les Partis Politiques (Paris:
Calmann-Lévy, 1912), 642.
12. E.g. Ostrogorski, La Démocratie et les Partis Politiques; Michels, Political Parties; Duverger, Polit-
ical Parties; Von Beyme, Politische Parteien in westlichen Demokratien; L. D. Epstein, Political Parties
in Western Democracies (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1967).
13. Duverger, Political Parties, 63.
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the literature is comparatively smaller, and will be the subject of section 2.5 below.
Before moving on to detailed discussion of these two different bodies of literature, section
2.3.1. through 2.3.3. shall discuss various characteristics and problems common to the
entire field of party change. A first commonality is that both bodies of literature have
a similar view about the origins of party change. In both parts of the literature, factors
external to the party are involved in causing the party to change. In the gradualist body
of literature, this takes the form of the evolving structure of society. An example is the
use of universal suffrage to explain the rise of the mass party type.14 External shocks are
more dramatic and shorter episodes of external pressures, such as electoral defeat, which
is the focus of this study.15
This need to invoke the external environment as a cause for change is the result of
the nature of parties as institutions. As parties are organisations imbued with value
and their survival is valued highly, they are not likely to change of their own accord.16
This resistance to change which is a main characteristic of institutions and therefore of
political parties makes it hard to explain change in political parties without reference to
some external factor, since changes in the internal dynamic to produce party change must
be explained somehow.17
2.3.1 Why study party change?
Studying party change is important because of the central position of parties in modern
democratic systems. Unsurprisingly, normative judgments are often made as a result of
empirical observations on the development of political parties. These normative judgments
go back to the beginning of empirical research on political parties, when the desirability
of their emergence was still a discussion. In observing the development of political parties
into permanent organisations, Ostrogorski combined observation of the empirical reality
of parties with fierce criticism of the way they enforced discipline and became vehicles
for power.18 The kind of parties criticised by Ostrogorski and Michels resembles the mass
party type of a well-disciplined and centralised party with a class of professional politicians
running it, even though they extrapolated this to respectively party and organisation in
general.19 In a similar vein, the elaboration of party types such as the catch-all party and
the cartel party (see section 2.4 below) has gone hand in hand with warnings about what
they might mean for the nature of democracy and the relationship between parties and
voters.20
14. Duverger, Political Parties, 66.
15. A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, trans. from the Italian by M. Silver
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1982]), 242; R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated
Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 265.
16. Cf. Michels, Political Parties, 373.
17. Cf. Panebianco, Political Parties, 242.
18. Ostrogorski, La Démocratie et les Partis Politiques, 619ff.
19. Ostrogorski, La Démocratie et les Partis Politiques, 619ff. Michels, Political Parties.
20. O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in Political Parties
and Political Development, ed. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966), 200; R. S. Katz and P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the
Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 115.
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Studies of party change have also engaged with claims that political parties have been
experiencing a ‘crisis of party’. These claims often centered around social changes that
shifted the linkage function of political parties.21 Among others, rising electoral volatility
as a result of partisan dealignment22 and declining memberships of political parties in
Western democracies23 were observed. These large-scale electoral changes were the subject
of several works in the literature which also deal with party change.24
The problem with the ‘crisis of party’ genre, as observed among others by Mair, was
that while these developments did occur, parties survived.25 Daalder as well as Mair imply
that this may be the result of a normative bias.26 Political parties proved a resilient
institution.27 In general, the consensus appears to be that part of the explanation for the
survival of political parties as a category of institutions in Western Democracies is exactly
their capacity for change. Rose and Mackie already noted this when they described their
trade-off between internal and external pressures, stating that adaptation was “a necessary
condition of survival”.28 Mair, in a sceptical lecture on the entire idea of a crisis of party,
observed that parties had a remarkable capacity to adapt that enabled them to survive.29
In other words: the reason for the continuity of political parties is their capacity to change.
Naturally, this makes party change a highly important subject of inquiry.
2.3.2 Party change and historical neo-institutionalism
Indeed, it could be argued that the nature of parties as institutions makes it harder to
explain change tout court. This is the first problem shared by the entire literature on
party change. After all, if political parties are institutions and institutions are resistant
to change, then it becomes easier to explain the persistence of political parties than the
ways in which they have changed. This problem was described in more general terms by
Hall and Taylor in their discussion of the new institutionalisms: under the assumptions
of neo-institutionalist narratives, institutions are defined by stability, but if so, why do
they change?30
21. R. S. Katz, “Party as linkage: a vestigial function?,” European Journal of Political Research 18, no.
1 (1990): 158-159; Katz and Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy,” 8;
R. A. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics
2, no. 4 (1996): 509.
22. See Mair, Party System Change, 77.
23. See P. Mair and I. van Biezen, “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000,”
Party Politics 7, no. 1 (2001): 5–21.
24. E.g. P. Mair, W. Müller, and F. Plasser, eds., Political Parties and Electoral Change: Party Responses
to Electoral Markets (London: SAGE, 2004).
25. Mair, Party System Change, 89.
26. H. Daalder, “A Crisis of Party?,” Scandinavian Political Studies 15, no. 4 (1992): 285; Mair, Party
System Change, 88.
27. See for example K. Lawson and P. H. Merkl, eds., When Parties Prosper: the Uses of Electoral
Success (Boulder: Lynne Riener, 2007), 1.
28. R. Rose and T. T. Mackie, “Do parties persist or fail? The big trade-off facing organizations,”
in When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations, ed. K. Lawson and P. Merkl (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 534.
29. Mair, Party System Change, 89.
30. P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, “Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political
Studies 44 (1996): 937.
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In the social sciences, the new historical institutionalism provides an important concep-
tual and theoretical vocabulary with which to think about the complex process of change.
A central concept in this literature is path-dependency, a concept originating from the
study of technological change in history that David described as “one damn thing follows
another”.31 On a somewhat deeper conceptual level, path-dependency is usually conceived
as a process by which previous events exert influence on the eventual outcomes of a pro-
cess.32
Though the concept is useful in politics especially because of the complexity of the
subject matter, some have rightly pointed out that it was never really clearly conceptu-
alised.33 Pierson himself offers a particularly useful and explicit characterisation of path-
dependence as a process of increasing returns, where each step along a path increases
the cost of turning away from it.34 This is particularly useful to the analysis of political
institutions, as it helps arrive at a way of thinking about how path-dependence impacts
upon political processes in terms of cost-benefit.
The accompanying concept is that of the critical juncture or the punctuated equilibrium.
The two resemble each other in important ways but are nevertheless distinct concepts.
A state of punctuated equilibrium appears as a more formal concept. In this view, the
development of institutions is marked by long periods of stable equilibrium, punctuated
by shocks that throw the system off-balance and cause rapid change.35 This view, though
popular, has also been noted to employ rather strong assumptions: “institutions explain
everything until they explain nothing”, without a middle way.36
Like punctuated equilibrium, critical junctures appear as crucial periods of change
spurred by crisis which occur in different ways in different cases.37 Specifically, in historical
sociology and economic history, critical junctures are presented as small, contingent events
that trigger large path-dependent processes, such as the invention of the steam engine that
sparked the Industrial Revolution first in England rather than in another country which
may have had similar structural conditions.38 Such macrohistorical analyses often seek to
explain large changes occurring in different ways across different countries.39
In one such macrohistorical work Collier and Collier give a very useful elaboration of
31. P. A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” The American Economic Review 75, no. 2
(1985): 332.
32. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” 332; R. Berins Collier and D. Collier, Shaping
the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 27; Hall and Taylor, “Political science and the Three New
Institutionalisms,” 941.
33. E.g. P. Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” American Political
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–267.
34. Ibid., 252-253.
35. S. D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 1
(1988): 79.
36. K. Thelen and S. Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Structuring
Politics. Historical Unilateralism in Comparative Analysis, ed. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, and F. Longstreth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 15.
37. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 29-30.
38. J. Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (2000): 536-
537.
39. For a classic in political science that falls within this category, see S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds.,
Party Systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967).
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the concept which mitigates several of the problems with punctuated equilibrium.40 The
prior conditions still maintain some relevance to the outcome, and the outcome of the
causal process is not stable per se but is made stable by mechanisms of reproduction that
represent ongoing political and institutional processes.41
However, Capoccia and Kelemen have argued that the macrohistorical perspective on
critical junctures is not necessarily a good fit for other fields of institutional analysis.42
This is partly because these studies, by seeking to explain historical outcomes using the
critical juncture framework, often explicitly or implicitly define them with reference to
their outcome of change.43 While Capoccia and Kelemen agree that critical junctures are
the ‘genetic’ moments of path-dependence, i.e. the way they originate, they point out
that the outcome may also be a restoration of the status quo.44 They therefore define
critical junctures more specifically as "relatively short periods of time during which there
is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of
interest" and during which there is a greater and broader scope for change.45 Since this
study focuses not so much on why parties have turned out the way they have (the historical
outcome) but on why parties in crisis act as they do (the process), this is the more useful
definition for the purposes of this dissertation.
Path-dependence arguments generally represent continuity, since it conditions current
outcomes on past actions, while critical juncture or punctuated equilibrium arguments
represent the possibility of change. Especially where path-dependence is produced by
institutions in a given society, this can produce periods of continuity.46 Nevertheless, such
a reading is too simplistic. In Collier and Collier’s study on labour relations in Latin
America, path-dependence arguments are used to get at complex causal processes and to
account for the fact that similar causes lead to different outcomes in different countries.47
This is also a strength of the path-dependence concept noted by Hall and Taylor.48
There is a broader field of organisational literature to consider. Political parties are
not the only organisations or institutions where explaining change presents a problem. A
wider field of organisational and political sociology has sought to address this central issue:
institutions have something permanent about them and exist in a state of equilibrium,
so why and how exactly do they change? Perhaps for this reason, Wilson has described
particular processes of political organisational change, but has not gone into much detail
about its antecedents.49
Broader organisational theories do offer explanations of change and choices made in the
40. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 30.
41. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 31; See also Mahoney, “Path Dependence in His-
torical Sociology,” 537.
42. G. Capoccia and R.D. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and Counter-
factuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 342.
43. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 30; Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical
Sociology,” 513-514.
44. Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 342; 352.
45. Ibid., 348-349.
46. Hall and Taylor, “Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 942.
47. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 29.
48. Hall and Taylor, “Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 941.
49. J. Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 205-211.
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process of change, albeit on small aspects of the concept of change. One such study is
Fligstein’s study of the diffusion of diversification in American industry, in which he argues
that the adoption of changes depended on the willingness of industry elites to change and,
more importantly, on the example of leading firms.50 Relevant to our later discussion of
shock, he also uses the concept of an organisational field to suggest that change is most
likely when the usual structure and pecking order of the field are disrupted.51 Others
have cast the decision to innovate as a cost-benefit analysis. March and Simon state that
organisations do not even search for alternative courses of action if the present course of
action is satisfactory.52 Even if they state that this is not due to any sort of resistance to
change and that if a better course of action presents itself at any point an organisation
will change, this focus on the high costs of change is something they have in common with
those who believe organisations are resistant to change.53
2.3.3 Delineating party change
A second problem common to the entire party change literature is the question of what
is and is not to be seen as party change. If one zooms in closely enough, parties change
constantly. From one election to the next, slogans, policies and slates of candidates change,
but this is not usually what the term party change means. Instead, party change as it is
generally understood refers to a profound change to the party’s essentials. According to
Mair, this is exactly the problem with speaking of party change in individual parties –
how does one know conclusively when a party has changed?54 His solution is not to look
at change in individual parties, but rather at change in party systems.55 In the body of
literature concerned with gradual party change, scholars have often followed this advice
and looked at change across party systems as a whole rather than at individual parties.
Some related fields of study do not experience this problem. There is a wealth of studies
on party platform change, which is studied using the available data on party manifestos.56
This is also one of the fields of party change research that have recently seen the most
activity. The earliest part of this literature focused mostly on environmental explanations
50. N. Fligstein, “The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An Institutional Account of the
Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919-1979,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational
Analysis, ed. W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
334-335.
51. Ibid., 313.
52. J. March and H. Simon, Organizations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 194.
53. Ibid.
54. Mair, Party System Change, 49.
55. Ibid., 51.
56. Such as A. Volkens et al., The Manifesto Data Collection: Manifesto Project
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR) (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2018).
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such as shifts in voter positions57 and the shifts of other parties58. More recently, internal
factors such as the relative importance of office59 and the power of party activists have
been added to the list of explanations60. These studies employ statistical analysis of
manifesto data to measure the response of parties to changes in the environment.
2.4 Gradual party change
As already briefly touched upon in the discussion above, a large volume of studies that
treats party change as a gradual process is concerned with a succession of party types
representing broad changes in the nature of political parties. Party types constitute
broad categories of parties based largely on the way they interact with society and the
state.61 Duverger’s typology of political parties in particular has been very influential.62
His concepts of the top-down, loosely-organised cadre party founded by notables and the
bottom-up, highly-organised mass party that emerged after universal suffrage have been
incorporated in most of the successive contributions to the literature. Much like Duverger
himself did with the mass party, these contributions to the literature usually posited that
one party type would displace earlier types, leading to a sort of linear succession of party
types.63
This part of the literature is also marked by successive claims that one party type would
become dominant. This started with Duverger himself, who argued that the (left-wing)
mass party enjoyed a competitive advantage due to being better-suited to the demands of
modern politics and society, and would eventually become dominant.64 It was criticized
among others by Epstein, who claimed that the trend had not materialized and that in
fact, rather the opposite was the case: a ‘contagion from the right’ marked by declining
membership numbers and increasing focus on campaigning and communications which
would lead to looser organisations.65 Defending Duverger, Seiler proposed a perspective
in which he reinterpreted these contagion theories as adaptation to new circumstances
57. J. Adams et al., “Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to
Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?,” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (2004): 589–
610; J. Adams et al., “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes
and Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998,” American Journal
of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 513–529; J. Adams, A.B. Haupt, and H. Stoll, “What Moves Parties?
The Role of Public Opinion and Global Economic Conditions in Western Europe,” Comparative Political
Studies 42, no. 5 (2008): 611–639.
58. J. Adams and Z. Somer-Topcu, “Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties’ Policy
Shifts: Spatial Theory and Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies,”
British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 4 (2009): 825–846.
59. G. Schumacher et al., “How Aspiration to Office Conditions the Impact of Government Participation
on Party Platform Change,” American Journal of Political Science, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http:
//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12174/abstract.
60. Ibid.
61. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel?,” 509; Katz and Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization
and Party Democracy,” 6.
62. Duverger, Political Parties.
63. Ibid., xvii; 64-65; 427.
64. Ibid., xvii; 427.
65. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 257.
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without destroying previous forms.66 For example, cadre parties did not disappear as a
type and become mass parties; they merely adopted a more rigid form of organization.
This resulted in a new typology of party types charting the ways in which mass and cadre
parties have developed from their origins.67
Epstein’s account of contagion from the right shares some of its logic with a highly
influential addition to the expanding scheme of party types. Kirchheimer added a new
party type known as the catch-all party.68 Rather than going back to the cadre party, as
Epstein more or less claimed, Kirchheimer argued that parties of all kinds were devel-
oping away from their origins.69 He observed that parties were reducing their ideological
baggage, strengthening their top leadership, de-emphasising their classe gardée, reducing
the influence of individual members and securing access to a variety of interest groups.70
He attributed this to the blurring of class divisions in post-war societies, which increas-
ingly led parties to regard their ideological heritage as baggage. As a result, these parties
“exchanged effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral suc-
cess”.71 Von Beyme made similar observations to Kirchheimer, observing that parties were
accumulating more functions than in the past alongside processes of de-ideologisation, ero-
sion of ties to social ‘pillars’ and a greater focus on the party elites.72
A third influential party type is the cartel party.73 Observing how the decreasing number
of party member had made parties vulnerable, Katz and Mair proposed that parties had
captured the state for support with the use of state subventions.74 In effect, they argue,
the differences in resources between winners and losers of election have become smaller.75
The resulting “cartel parties” basically helped secure eachother’s existence through inter-
party collusion and through capture of the state.76 This proposed new party type has had
its detractors, with criticism focusing among others on the conceptual confusion between
the party level and the systemic level77 and the alarming consequences for the quality of
representation the theory foresees.78
The key thing to take away from the body of literature on party types is the focus
on macro-level developments in the party system with largely structural antecedents.
What these contributions, and others like them which will not be discussed extensively
in this chapter, such as the electoral-professional party79 and the business-firm party80,
66. D.-L. Seiler, De la Compairason des Partis Politiques (Paris: Economica, 1986), 198.
67. Ibid., 245.




72. Von Beyme, Politische Parteien in westlichen Demokratien, 430-434.




77. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel?,” 508.
78. H. Enroth, “Cartelization versus representation? On a misconception in contemporary party theory,”
Party Politics 23, no. 2 (2017): 132.
79. Panebianco, Political Parties, 264.
80. J. Hopkin and C. Paolucci, “The Business Firm Model of Party Organisation. Cases from Spain and
Italy,” European Journal of Political Research 35 (1999): 307–339.
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have in common is that they signal certain large developments in the overall structure
of parties and party competition, which they then proceed to explain with reference to
social developments. They focus on how parties in the plural change, or rather, on how
party as a concept changes, and why. The developments they describe are gradual and
cumulative, the result of a slow-moving adaptation to social circumstances.
The problem with this, of course, is that this particular body of literature is rather
deterministic and assumes a dialectic in which one dominant party type displaces the
previous one. Previous authors have convincingly argued, with reference to deviations in
individual countries, that it is too simple to assume that a single dominant party type
will materialise in all countries.81 Koole observes that this deterministic approach is not a
very fruitful avenue for research, stating that it has so far produced only high-level studies
trying to demonstrate a switch in the dominant paradigm, as it were, and idiosyncratic
studies of individual parties that do or do not comply with what should be the dominant
type.82 Therefore, it might be more fruitful for party research to focus on “. . . why,
and under what circumstances, a certain category of parties develop in one direction and
another category in another.”83 This is essentially a problem of complex causality that
can be addressed by path-dependence arguments, with special regard to the importance
of sequence.84
Krouwel can be said to have done this (although without the path-dependence argu-
ment), splitting the development of political parties over time into their electoral, pro-
grammatic and organisational dimensions using various indicators.85 One has to wonder,
however, whether the question Koole posed can be answered by observing various party
types at the macro-level in this way.86 Since research is mostly taking place on the sys-
tem level, what stands out are logically the system-wide trends that lead to the kind of
literature that has developed so far on party types. Yet when describing these trends,
there is the risk that has demonstrably affected the body of literature on party types
of extrapolating the development wrongly to the entire population, leading to a kind of
‘dominant type versus exceptions’ literature.87
In order to get at the reasons why certain parties develop in certain ways and others
in others, the analysis needs to be taken into the individual party level. Additionally,
it needs to be able to point out the sequence of events that leads to change. This is
where insights on external shocks, which will be considered below, could be relevant to
the further development of the literature as a whole. If we assume, based on the insights
of organisational and institutional theory, that change is not something that just happens
when we are looking at an institution like a political party, then it also follows that changes
happen most when parties are put under pressure.
81. Krouwel, “Otto Kirchheimer and the Catch-All Party”; Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kader-
partij, 204.
82. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel?,” 520.
83. Ibid.
84. Hall and Taylor, “Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 941.
85. A. Krouwel, Party Transformations in European Democracies (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2012), 32.
86. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel?,” 520.
87. This problem was also observed by Daalder, “A Crisis of Party?,” 285.
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In this way, furthering the body of literature on external shocks might be the way
forward for the literature on party change. By observing the moments that theoretically
would force parties to make the most dramatic adjustments, much can potentially be
learned about the reasons for the development of certain parties in certain directions and
others in other directions. This is what this study intends by studying parties after a
heavy electoral defeat – by looking closely at the reasons parties had to take actions that
lead to party change, we can perhaps start to bring the overall development of political
parties more sharply into focus.
2.5 Shock-induced party change
It has already been observed that the conception of parties as institutions makes it easier
to explain their persistence than their change. The point of departure of the part of the
literature concerned with external shocks is exactly this: that parties, being institutions,
are inherently conservative and resistant to change. The theorists in this field seek to
explain why parties make large changes, primarily to their organisational structure, and
as a related question, why the internal balance of power in parties shifts. This body
of literature hinges on two major contributions: those of Panebianco and Harmel and
Janda.88
Panebianco presents one of the more extensive treatments of the question of party
organisational change in his Political Parties: Organization and Power. In doing so,
he sums up various earlier debates occurring in the literature about changes in political
parties. First, he engages the idea that parties must necessarily develop in a certain
way, concluding that there are in fact many paths to change.89 This is very relevant to
the assumptions inherent in the research question posed in chapter one: after all, the
very question of how parties change is only relevant if the direction is not predetermined
simply by their being political parties. In a second discussion, Panebianco considers the
intentionality of change and the problem of unintended effects.90 He strikes a middle way
here – changes are intentional but can also have unintended consequences.91
Most importantly, Panebianco treats one of the major questions of the organisational
change literature: whether the origins of change are endogenous or exogenous.92 In ef-
fect, he argues, neither is sufficient: purely endogenous origins cannot explain the shift
of power that produced them, while purely exogenous origins run into the problem that
organisational change does not always occur even when the environment changes. The
model Panebianco proposes combines the two: something in the environment changes,
challenging and ultimately discrediting and displacing the party’s dominant elite, usher-
ing in a new dominant coalition which then restructures the organisation.93 Relevant to
88. Panebianco, Political Parties; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party
Change.”
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the topic of this dissertation, electoral defeat is named as a prime example of such an
environmental crisis.94
Harmel and Janda build on the theory of shock-induced change introduced by Panebianco
by bringing in the concept of party goals.95 The attribution of certain goals to parties is
not new: after all, Ostrogorski and Michels had already observed a process of goal dis-
placement.96 Likewise, rational choice theory has variously assumed that parties seek to
maximise votes97, or to attain office98 or concrete policy goals99. Building on these three
goals, Strøm and Müller offer a vision in which parties are after a mixture of these goals
and are forced to compromise between them.100 This is analytically useful, if imperfect
because it generally takes votes to enact policy or gain office. They acknowledge this by
stating that votes as a goal only serve the purpose of obtaining something else, which
is a useful thought.101 However, precisely this interconnectedness of the different party
goals makes it very difficult to distinguish what a party’s goal is in practice. A party can
pursue a policy it thinks will gain it votes or office, and yet claim to do so for reasons of
the policy itself, or seek to gain votes to pursue its policy by moderating it a little.
By bringing in this concept of party goals, Harmel and Janda offer an account of how an
external shock works to force party change.102 They assume that each party has a ‘primary
goal’: either policy, office, votes or maximizing internal democracy.103 This allows a higher
level of detail in thinking about the extent of party change to be expected.104 Roughly
speaking, when this primary goal is affected, pressures towards party change are higher.105
There are therefore two ways in which party change can occur in the Harmel and Janda
model: power-oriented changes to consolidate or preserve the power of a dominant faction
or goal-oriented changes to pursue the party’s primary goal when the party’s performance
is unsatisfactory.106 While it is largely left implicit, therefore, Harmel and Janda also add
the element of varying extents of party change to existing party change models. This is
not without important consequences for analyses based on their model, as shall be argued
later.
Several scholars have operationalised and tested the propositions offered by Harmel
and Janda.107 A first quantitative analysis by the authors themselves and others found
94. Ibid., 243.
95. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 272-273.
96. Ostrogorski, La Démocratie et les Partis Politiques, 642; Michels, Political Parties, 373.
97. A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 21.
98. W. H. Riker, The theory of political coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
99. R. Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (1970); A. De Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation,
with a foreword by Amsterdam (Elsevier, 1973).
100. K. Strøm and W. C. Müller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” in Policy, Office or Votes: How
Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, ed. K. Strøm and W. C. Müller (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13.
101. Ibid., 9.




106. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278; See for
Panebianco’s account of power-oriented change Panebianco, Political Parties, 245.
107. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 279-283.
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support for the model’s most enduring contribution: party change does not just happen.108
Environmental shocks did not automatically lead to party change without internal changes
accompanying them. The study did not test the propositions on party goals, however,
showing how tricky their operationalisation remains.109 A study zooming in on party
manifestos (and therefore related to the party platform change literature) also showed
that the more disastrous an electoral defeat, the more likely a party was to undertake a
drastic change of identity as expressed in their manifestos.110 Albeit limited, this offers
some support to the hypothesis on party goals, since as Strøm and Müller argued, votes
mediate office and policy goals.111
However, as Müller observed, the general analysis, while thorough, was not really suited
to finding actual causal relationships.112 Indeed, the analysis can only go so far as to find
correlations that may indicate causal relationships. This is, in essence, an instance of the
‘black box’ problem. We know roughly what cause and effect are: in this case, internal and
external factors lead to party change, or at least coincide with it. However, we cannot be
sure what happens in between, and it seems logical to use qualitative analysis, specifically
case studies, to mitigate it.113 In this context, it is worth mentioning Bale’s study of the
Conservative Party since 1945. He concludes that of the three major drivers of change
he studies (defeat, leadership or dominant faction), defeat tended to have a big effect,
but that leadership was also important and bigger defeats did not always bring bigger
changes. His conclusions in general reveal a high degree of complexity and he ends by
rightly cautioning fellow scholars that party change is inherently complex.114
Applying the Harmel and Janda model to the case of the Socialist Party of Austria,
Müller found support for the model and noted in particular the strength of leadership
change as an explanatory variable.115 He was less sure about the effect of electoral defeat,
but attributed this, according to the model, to the party having an office goal. Similarly,
Bille found that although leadership change did not always lead to party change, it itself
did conform to the expectation that losing office rather than losing votes was the most
important shock to the case of the Danish Social Democrats.116 The model has also more
recently been more or less successfully applied to cases as wide-ranging as the strategy
shift by Palestine’s Hamas117 and the merger that resulted in the Conservative Party of
108. R. Harmel et al., “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis,”
West European Politics 18, no. 1 (1995): 17.
109. Ibid., 2-8.
110. K. Janda et al., “Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos,” Party Politics 1, no.
2 (1995): 189.
111. Strøm and Müller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” 9.
112. W. C. Müller, “Inside the Black Box: A Confrontation of Party Executive Behaviour and Theories
of Party Organizational Change,” Party Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 295.
113. Ibid., 295. To go into more detail on why case studies are more suited to this task is beyond the
scope of this chapter, but will be treated more thoroughly in chapter four.
114. T. Bale, The Conservatives Since 1945: the Drivers of Party Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), 313-317.
115. Müller, “Inside the Black Box,” 308-309.
116. L. Bille, “Leadership Change and Party Change: The Case of the Danish Social Democratic Party,
1960-95,” Party Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 389.
117. F. Løvlie, “Explaining Hamas’s Changing Electoral Strategy, 1996-2006,” Government and Opposi-
tion 48, no. 4 (2013): 570–593.
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Canada118.
What stands out in the body of case studies applying the Harmel and Janda model is the
wide range of developments they attempt to explain. Some authors seem to be content
to explain the occurrence of change119 or to explain a certain phenomenon120. This is
significant because things get complicated and potentially problematic when authors get
specific about the extent and type of changes expected.
Duncan’s analysis of the Dutch CDA’s 1994 defeat using the Harmel and Janda model
is more structured and comprehensive than most studies in describing the changes.121
Duncan’s insistence on looking at changes in four subfields – leadership, strategy, organi-
sation and programme – lead him to reveal an important puzzle posing a challenge to the
Harmel and Janda model. In the case of the CDA, Duncan encounters a puzzling absence
of programmatic change in circumstances that, according to the propositions formulated
by Harmel and Janda, should lead to drastic changes across the board.122 Significantly,
this leads him to conclude that not only is the focus on a single goal evidently too sim-
ple, but that other factors such as the electoral system need to be incorporated in the
model.123
Still in use decades after its first formulation, the most-cited contribution of the model
is that it is wrong to assume that “party changes just happen or must happen”, and
with good reason.124 Its multi-facetted understanding of the causes of party change as
circumstances overcoming the resistance of all large organisations to change has been
rightly influential. The idea that parties change most abruptly when their primary goals
are threatened has found ample support in these case studies (see above). That parties
change after an external shock seems to have been demonstrated sufficiently.
However, the flipside of all this is that after the formulation of the Harmel and Janda
model, theory development on external shocks seems to have stalled. In part, problems
such as those felt in Duncan’s study of the CDA can be regarded as the result of over-
stretching the model. After all, this particular model was not intended and therefore not
constructed to explain which types of party change will occur, only to test and demon-
strate that party change occurs after shocks and that more severe shocks lead to more
extensive change.125 The model simply cannot explain why the CDA after 1994 did not
change its programme (in Duncan’s view) but did change its organisation.126 And if the
external shocks angle is to be used to gain further insight on the way different parties
change in different ways, this has to be addressed.
118. E. Bélanger and J.-F. Godbout, “Why Do Parties Merge? The Case of the Conservative Party of
Canada,” Parliamentary Affairs 63, no. 1 (2010): 41–65.
119. Bille, “Leadership Change and Party Change”; Müller, “Inside the Black Box.”
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121. F. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’: External Shocks, Party Change and the
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The problems could very well be due to a linear and unidirectional definition of party
change as change away from the party’s origins. It has already been discussed how this
is a problem in the body of literature concerned with party types, where the prevailing
tendency has been to describe a succession of dominant party types.127 But it is also part of
the problem demonstrated in Duncan’s case study. He notes continuity in the ideological
or programmatic area, but at the same time there had been considerable activity in that
area.128 In light of concerns about the party’s loss of identity which he also notes, this
begs the question whether the situation is actually one of continuity or of change back
towards the party’s prior identity.129 The model presented and tested in this dissertation
will seek to address both of these problems with past contributions to the debate on
external shocks.
Before moving on to the conclusion of this review of the literature, it should be noted
that the idea that parties change as a result of shocks appeared in a different form in
the wake of what is called the Great Recession in the first half of the 21st century (by
analogy to the Great Depression a century earlier). Treating the Great Recession like
a shock (but not explicitly in the tradition of this particular party literature), Bremer
has tried to measure its impact on the development of parties and party systems in
Europe, naming it a “critical juncture”.130 He concludes that the European centre-left had
responded to the crisis in an unusual way relative to other party families by at the same
time reaffirming the need for fiscal prudence and repudiating the economic agenda. They
did not, as expected, uniformly shift left. In a similar study on stances towards European
integration in Southern Europe, Charalambous et al. found that parties had increased
competition over the issue of European integration as a result of the Great Recession, but
interestingly, that this development was not mirrored among legislators.131 These studies
are interesting because they show the important effect of shocks from outside the party
system on the development of political parties within the system.
Using another crisis, Meyer and Schoen showed that parties also anticipate the effects
of a policy crisis, and studied the effects on electoral behaviour of the Fukushima nuclear
disaster.132 In a similar vein, Kim and Solt found that in addition to electoral shocks, the
fall of the Berlin wall also caused parties to relabel.133 However, there is always the risk
of treating a crisis of this variety as a shock in a category all by itself, which diminishes
the generalisability of findings. Especially given the role the European Union and its
institutions played in the politics of the Great Recession in Europe, it remains to be seen
if insights from these studies can be applied beyond Europe.
127. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems”; Katz and Mair, “Changing
Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy”; Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel?”
128. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 78-81.
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parties in Europe,” Party Politics 24, no. 1 (2018): 35.
131. G. Charalambous, N. Conti, and A. Pedrazzini, “The political contestation of European integration
in Southern Europe: Friction Among and Within Parties,” Party Politics 24, no. 1 (2018): 48.
132. M. Meyer and H. Schoen, “Avoiding vote loss by changing policy positions: the Fukushima disaster,
party responses, and the German electorate,” Party Politics 23, no. 4 (2017): 431.
133. M. Kim and F. Solt, “The dynamics of party relabelling: Why do parties change names?,” Party
Politics 23, no. 4 (2017): 444.
Chapter 2. Parties and party change: state of the field 25
2.6 Conclusion: Towards a new theory of shocks and
change
As we have seen, the political science literature on party change has proven very proficient
at explaining broad patterns of gradual party change as well as the occurrence of party
change in general after external shocks. In some fields, such as programmatic, organi-
zational and leadership changes, the causes of specific types of change are the subject
matter of an extensive literature of their own. The two bodies of party change literature
are largely complementary: contributions based on party types tend to be better-suited to
explaining organizational change, while research on external shocks and change accounts
for faster-moving areas of change such as programmatic and leadership changes.
As has also been argued above, the body of literature on external shocks has so far
provided evidence that shocks of various kind do lead to some sort of party change.
It seems plausible that the most abrupt changes take place when a party is put under
extended pressure. However, party scholars are faced with a problem when attempting to
further refine the theory to account for the multitude of different ways in which parties,
once they have decided on the need to change, do change themselves in response to an
external shock. The quantitative study reported by Harmel et al. did not touch on this
at all, lumping programmatic and organizational variables together,134 and the single-
case studies have either confined themselves to specific modes of change (implicitly or
explicitly) or ran into problems explaining the absence of changes in one particular area.
They rarely have defined precisely in which areas they would expect changes to occur,
with the exception of Duncan’s study on the CDA.
In addition, without defining precisely where change is to be expected, there is always
a risk of running afoul of Mair’s problem with identifying party change.135 If change is
confined to party organization, but programmatic change is lacking, to what extent has
the party still changed substantially after a shock? Part of the challenge of Duncan’s
CDA case study is that he considered the programme to be such an important part of the
substance of the CDA that he was confounded by its seeming absence.136 In other words:
without programmatic change, he could not be entirely sure of the extent of change in
the party.
The aim of this dissertation in terms of its contribution to this literature on party
shocks and party change is to offer more clarity on why certain parties favour certain
changes while others favour others. To do so, it needs a model which adds another step.
The existing models stop at the need for and consequently presence of change. A new
theoretical model is necessary to explain the choices that follow next: in which areas, and
more importantly in which direction, will the changes be made? Therefore, it will need to
move away from the common perception of change as being one-directional away from the
party’s identity and roots, and move towards a concept of change that can also involve
the intensification or renewal of a party’s prior commitments. In doing so, it also brings
back in the concept of path-dependency as an explanatory factor determining the type of
134. Harmel et al., “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change,” 8.
135. Mair, Party System Change, 49.
136. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 83.
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change.
The next chapter aims to construct a heuristic model that functions as the starting point
for building such a theoretical model. This model seeks to combine the demonstrated
strengths of the shock theory models in explaining whether a party will change, while
recognizing the variety of internal and external factors that can lead to party change with
a more specific understanding of dimensions of change in particular parties. In doing so,
it intends to take a next step in understanding how shocks cause parties to change.
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3 Reinforce or Extend? A new
model of shock-induced change
3.1 Introduction
As the previous chapter has shown, shocks can definitely be said to induce party change.
However, development of the theory has stalled. It was not designed to account for
the presence or absence of specific changes in a systematic way. Therefore, the theory
thus far is insufficient to further our understanding of the way parties change after a
shock. The current chapter represents the first step in formulating a theoretical model
that can account for the presence or absence of specific changes. The aim is to develop
the conceptual vocabulary and heuristic devices necessary to start thinking about why
parties make different decisions following an electoral shock. The model developed in
this chapter, therefore, functions both as a tentative theoretical model and as a broader
heuristic model intended to further understanding of the topic. This is important at this
early stage of theorising, as insights derived in this latter way may be used to further
refine the model and develop it into a full theoretical model.
The model proposed here is a critical juncture model. It views the period of crisis
following an electoral shock as a moment of heightened contingency.1 During this period,
the range of available options becomes broader and the choices of actors therefore more
important. This matches the idea that the occurrence of an external shock can cause
further-reaching change than would be possible during normal competition. Instead of
a minor programmatic adjustment, a party in crisis could contemplate an ideological
overhaul, for example. The electoral shock causes a period of uncertainty and higher
stakes: a critical juncture.
In addition, the model borrows elements from Collier and Collier.2 To summarise the
discussion in the previous chapter: the model sees the crisis as a similar critical juncture
unfolding in different ways across different cases. The previous conditions produce an
electoral shock, which causes a critical juncture. The legacy of this critical juncture
is built through causal mechanisms of production and reproduction, in the case of this
study a core recovery strategy and changes following from that strategy. All the while,
the previous conditions that produced the shock remain present in the form of path-
dependence and impact on the process. The concept of critical juncture is a good point
of departure to build a model addressing the issues of party change which, after all, are
1. Cf. G. Capoccia and R.D. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and Coun-
terfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 348-349.
2. R. Berins Collier and D. Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement
and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 30.
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caused by complex causality: it has been demonstrated that shocks lead to change across
cases, but different mechanisms intervening between the cause and this general outcome
also produce different varieties of change. This is the type of challenge the Collier and
Collier model was built to address.3
In section 3.2, the relationship between shocks and critical junctures will be discussed.
The justification for limiting this project to electoral shocks will also be explained. Section
3.3 moves to the central theoretical workings of the new model, conceptualising the choices
made in a crisis as a choice between appealing to core and non-core voters. Section 3.4,
with the help of the literature on external shocks, seeks to provide for the theoretical
possibility that change does not occur. Section 3.5 presents the essence of the model
and gives a conceptualisation of the major independent and dependent variables used in
the model, formulating a number of propositions based on the model that will form the
basis of the tests of the model conducted in this dissertation. Section 3.6. offers a brief
concluding view.
3.2 Electoral shocks and critical junctures
This study treats electoral shocks as the causes of critical junctures. This term stems from
historical institutionalism and is invoked to explain institutional change after a crisis. It
is often juxtaposed with path-dependency and considered somewhat equivalent to the
concept of punctuated equilibrium. According to the formulation by Collier and Collier,
a critical juncture is the result of a crisis or cleavage and leads to mechanisms of production
and reproduction of a (policy) legacy.4 This works admirably at the country level, which
is the focus of their study on approaches to labour unions. However, the distinction
between mechanisms of production and reproduction are not clear when the focus is on
the decision-making within a political party. Organisational changes, for instance, are
arguably their own mechanisms of reproduction, since changes in formal rules are more
or less permanent.
As argued in chapter two, this study follows the definition given by Capoccia and
Kelemen.5 They define a critical juncture as a relatively short period of time during which
there is a heightened probability of meaningful impact by actors within an institutional
context. The critical juncture framework implies that the critical juncture is brought on
by an important event. In the context of this study, that event is a heavy electoral defeat.
As has been argued quite convincingly, external shocks of this kind are more likely to lead
to change.6 Defining change as the potential outcome of the critical juncture, a heavy
electoral defeat certainly increases its probability. Therefore, a heavy electoral defeat can
be seen as leading to a critical juncture.
However, we still need to specify what constitutes an electoral shock. What differen-
3. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 29.
4. Ibid., 30-31.
5. Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 348.
6. A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, trans. from the Italian by M. Silver
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1982]), 243; R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated
Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 265-266.
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tiates election defeats which qualify as shocks from those that do not? This is strongly
related to the reason these shocks lead to a higher probability of change in the first place.
If a defeat does not make it more likely for a party to change, it is definitely not a shock.
Panebianco and Harmel and Janda agree that a shock is a strong environmental pressure.7
Harmel and Janda additionally propose that this pressure must impact negatively on the
party’s primary goal for it to be considered a shock.8 This primary goal is defined in terms
of policy, office, votes or internal democracy. The problem with this definition is that,
as Strøm and Müller acknowledge, parties have multiple goals.9 Determining a party’s
primary goal is an empirical nightmare. One need only look at Duncan’s puzzlement that
the Dutch CDA did not act as a purely office-seeking party from 1994 to 2002 to realise
that.10
Electoral shocks are special because they alone can be expected to affect any party,
no matter its mix of goals. In a democratic system, the ballot box defines the power
relationships among political parties. In a system where coalitions are required, this
influence might be smaller.11 Generally, however, it is still true that a larger number of
votes increases a party’s influence. The less votes a party gets, therefore, the less resources
it has to secure its goals, even if that goal is policy or office. This is why electoral shocks
can be expected to lead to an increased probability of party change.
Returning to the definition of an electoral shock, it becomes clear that the distinguishing
factor is one of magnitude. Electoral shocks are distinguished from “normal” electoral
defeats because they lose a party more votes or seats. They are electoral defeats that
weaken a party in such a way that a rational party elite would have no other option than
to consider them crises and act on them. The line is drawn at that point where the decline
in a party’s performance is so sharp that business-as-usual no longer cuts it. Therefore,
electoral shocks can be defined as electoral defeats of such a magnitude that they durably
compromise a party’s electoral potential. In other words: an electoral shock is an electoral
defeat in which a party loses so heavily that if it were to carry on within the bounds of
normal competition, it would see its electoral potential permanently diminished. This
is why, although parties often use them to estimate their likely performance, we cannot
factor in opinion polls, since there is always a chance that they could change or even turn
out to be wrong. Even when the defeat could be seen coming in the opinion polls for
a while, therefore, when it materialises in practice it still counts as a shock. Before a
heavy defeat predicted by the polls, a party can still hope that these polls will be proven
7. Panebianco, Political Parties, 243; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and
Party Change,” 267.
8. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 267.
9. K. Strøm and W. C. Müller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” in Policy, Office or Votes: How
Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, ed. K. Strøm and W. C. Müller (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9.
10. F. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’: External Shocks, Party Change and the
Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats During ‘Purple Hague’, 1994-8,” Party Politics 13, no. 1
(2007): 83.
11. See K. Deschouwer, The Survival of the Fittest: Measuring and Explaining Adaptation and Change of
Political Parties, Paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop on ‘Democracies and the Organization
of Political Parties’, European Consortium for Political Research, Limerick, Ireland, 30 March to 4 April.,
1992, 16.
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wrong. In a similar vein, while a heavy defeat being unforeseen by the opinion polls could
certainly strengthen the sense of crisis within a party, there are too many ways of dealing
with the polls to consider them in the definition of shock in their own right.
It is up to party elites where the line between a normal defeat and a shock is drawn
exactly. As argued by Koole and Van Praag, perception is an important part of a party’s
strategy.12 While diminished resources such as party funding may therefore play a role,
what is more important is whether a party sees its electoral potential as having been
durably compromised. This means various factors in individual cases might lower a party’s
“pain threshold”, so to speak. A party which has been in government for all its existence
will likely see a defeat as a shock sooner if it also stands to lose office for the first time. A
party in opposition might experience a shock earlier if it loses significantly once more. As
shocks are operationalised further in chapter 4, the challenge is finding a rule of thumb
that includes most cases that can be considered shock, while also allowing for these special
circumstances to be taken into account.
By seeing electoral shocks as events initiating a critical juncture, we arrive at a definition
with a number of elements. The first is its relatively short span of time. Due to this
criterium, an electoral shock cannot be gradual and must be a single electoral defeat.
The second is the heightened probability of change. This occurs, following Harmel and
Janda, because a party’s capacity to accomplish its goals is diminished.13 For this to be
the case, the defeat must be large enough (or at least perceived to be so) to make it
very unlikely that the party can recover acting as it had before the crisis. These factors
combine to make an electoral shock a likely cause of party change, opening up a window
of opportunity for major changes. It is whether these changes occur and how they occur
that the model focuses on next.
3.3 Constructing the Model
Once faced with an electoral shock, a party faces two choices: whether to change and how
it changes (strategy of change). These two choices structure two subsequent phases of
decision-making within the model. As in every model, there is a degree of simplification:
in practice, the phases might not be very well-delineated. However, to answer the eventual
question of what changes and why, it is necessary to consider each in turn. Explaining a
party’s actions assumes some sort of unifying framework. Therefore, it is vital to go from
establishing the decision that something needs to change, through the general strategy,
to the concrete actions a party takes. This is the way the model is structured, as can be
seen in figure 3.1. In this section, this general statement of the model will be elaborated
before moving on to specifics, conceptualisation and propositions.
As has been argued in section 3.2, the starting point is the electoral shock, i.e. the
low level of electoral performance. This causes the critical juncture because it heightens
12. R. A. Koole and P. van Praag Jr., “Electoral Competition in a Segmented Society: Campaign
Strategies and the Importance of Elite Perceptions,” European Journal of Political Research 18 (1990):
66.
13. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 281.
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the probability of change.14 It makes sense empirically to assume that this takes the form
of forcing a reconsideration of the party’s essentials and its place in the party system.
However, the definition of critical junctures only implies a heightened probability of change,
not its inevitability. Under such electoral strain, doing nothing risks further decline,
possibly leading to party death or elite displacement. Since party elites have at least
some self-interest, this is not an attractive prospect.15 This is why change is the most
likely outcome. The model must, however, also allow for the theoretical possibility of non-
change. This helps avoid one of the common fallacies Capoccia and Kelemen identified
in critical juncture scholarship of defining a critical juncture by the outcome of change.16
This question whether or not to change is the essence of the ‘whether’-stage. Many
parties make a habit of evaluating every election, especially those that went badly for
them. These evaluations form the concrete expression of the ‘whether’-stage. The most
likely result is the conclusion that change is needed for the party to recover. This is
referred to in the model as “diagnosing a crisis”. The opposite is that the crisis does not
appear as such to the party. In this situation, the party concludes its current strategy
and modus operandi will be sufficient for a better performance at the next election, or
at least to meet its goals. In such an event, a party will not diagnose the shock as a
crisis and ignore it. They might make smaller changes, but these can be characterised as
superficial or run-of-the-mill.17 When a crisis is not diagnosed, the model moves straight
back to electoral performance, since the changes made are too small to fall under the next
phases of the model.
The ‘how’-stage follows the diagnosis of a crisis. At this stage, the party evaluates
which strategy to pursue towards electoral recovery. In a sense, this phase contains what
Collier and Collier call the mechanisms of production of the legacy.18 At this point, it
is clear that the party must do something to increase its electoral performance and hold
on to those votes. In essence, the choices made at the ‘how’-stage are the same as those
a party would usually have to make. However, due to the increased contingency of the
situation, the bandwidth within which changes can take place is broader. Since a party
is at a critical juncture, more fundamental changes than the usual array of adjustments
are possible.
This broader array of changes would be impossible to explain individually and without
some sort of unifying framework that serves both as a starting point for theory devel-
opment and as a heuristic device to reduce the complexity entailed by the breadth of
possibilities for change to more manageable proportions. To construct this framework, we
will draw on insights from studies of electoral strategy during election campaigns.
Recently, a number of authors have conducted studies into the electoral strategies of
14. Cf. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical
Junctures,” 348.
15. Strøm and Müller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” 13-14; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated
Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278; A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New
York: Harper & Row, 1957).
16. Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 352.
17. P. Mair, “Adaptation and Control: Towards an Understanding of Party and Party System Change
(1983),” in On Parties, Party Systems and Democracy: Selected Writings of Peter Mair, ed. I. van Biezen
(Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014), 170.
18. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 30.
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parties during election campaigns. Kriesi et al. attribute the relative newness of this field
to the general supposition that election campaigns have a very minimal effect.19 Instead,
a lot of attention in the literature on electoral strategy has been paid to spatial models of
party behaviour.20 In these studies of election campaign strategies, a twofold distinction is
made between a strategy of playing to core voters and one aiming to win the votes of non-
core voters. This is variously called a defensive or offensive strategy21 or the mobilizing
and chasing strategies22. More importantly, there is at least some evidence that parties
actually think in these terms.23 In these studies, different courses of action appeal to core
and non-core voters.24 Parties need to balance between holding on to what they once had
and reaching out to new voters. They can only do both to a limited extent.25
In this study, this dichotomy from the study of electoral strategy is adapted to the
situation of a party in crisis and the increased scope for changes. This form of strategy
will be called a recovery strategy. The model presented here refers to two types of recovery
strategies. The first, the reinforcement strategy, is defensive. It appeals to core voters,
that is, voters who barring unusual circumstances (the election possibly being one) have
always supported the party at previous elections.26 Like its counterpart in Rohrschneider’s
chasing strategy, it is characterised by a traditional approach, introducing changes to move
the party into a more traditional direction.27 The opposite strategy is referred to as the
extension strategy, and is offensive in character. Rather than looking exclusively to core
voters, the extension strategy (also) seeks to win the votes of new groups of voters. These
voters can belong to a category of floating voters or be supporters of other parties who
might be encouraged to switch. In doing so, the strategy makes changes to the party
to de-emphasise its traditional heritage in an attempt to broaden its support. The two
strategies represent change to add depth or breadth of support, respectively.
Where electoral strategy revolves primarily around campaign plans for one election,
a recovery strategy (whether reinforcement or extension) has scope to go further. By
analogy to marketing, while an electoral strategy only adjusts the sales strategy, a recovery
19. H. Kriesi, L. Bernhard, and R. Hänggli, “The Politics of Campaigning – Dimensions of Strategic
Action,” in Politik in der Mediendemokratie, ed. F. Marcinkowski and B. Pfetsch (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag,
2009), 345.
20. E.g. I. Budge and D. Robertson, “Do Parties Differ, and How? Comparative Discriminant and Factor
Analyses,” in Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes
in 19 Democraties, ed. I. Budge, D. Robertson, and D. Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987), 387–416.
21. J. J. M. Van Holsteyn and G. A. Irwin, “CDA, naar voren! Over de veranderende verkiezingsstrategie
van het CDA,” in Jaarboek 1987, ed. R. A. Koole (Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke
Partijen, 1988), 69-70.
22. R. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing: how do parties target voters in election campaigns?,”
Electoral Studies 21, no. 3 (2002): 368.
23. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 374; J.J. Albright, “Partisans or independent? Evidence
for campaign targets from elite interviews in Spain,” Electoral Studies 27, no. 4 (2008): 720.
24. See Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 368; J. Green, “A Test of Core Vote Theories: The
British Conservatives, 1997-2005,” British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 4 (2011): 739.
25. Although a successful strategy employs both, as noted by Van Holsteyn and Irwin, “CDA, naar
voren!”
26. See A. Campbell et al., eds., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley / Sons, 1966),
7.
27. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 368.
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strategy can also adjust the product itself. These changes following on from the strategic
aim are often more than adjustments in manifestoes or campaign plans. They represent
a deeper kind of change to programme or ideology, long-term targeting practices, elite
recruitment, party symbols or organisation. In this study, the assumption is that the
party’s strategy becomes visible in what the party does. Changes will be assigned to
either a reinforcement or extension strategy depending on their inferred aim. In section
3.5.1. of this chapter, a framework shall be developed to classify changes on the tactical,
programmatic and organisational dimensions into the two strategies.
In this way, the extension and reinforcement strategies serve the two purposes intended
for the model. Theoretically, they provide a foundation for developing expectations about
the causal mechanisms at play. As we shall see shortly, the fact that the choice made
in crisis is presented as a choice between core and non-core voters leads naturally to
the assumption that historical loyalties will play a large role in the process. Another
theoretical advantage of linking up the debate on party change following external shocks
with electoral strategy in this way is that it avoids seeing change as unidimensional. The
reinforcement strategy can represent change just as much as the extension strategy. It is
simply of a different character, moving (back) towards a party’s roots rather than away
from them. More pragmatically, the two strategies work as a heuristic device, reducing
the potentially enormous complexity of options available to political parties. By seeing
party change following an electoral shock not as individual instances but as parts of two
broader recovery strategies, we can start to formulate thoughts on causal mechanisms
that might get lost in all that complexity otherwise.
The ‘how’-stage is the heart of the model, since this stage determines the kind of changes
seen. The model seeks to explain the attitude underlying the party’s behaviour. Therefore,
the main explanatory variables also enter into the equation at the ‘how’-stage. Electoral
studies have noted various internal and environmental characteristics that relate to the
strategies parties adopt. The main proposition of the model is that while the range of
options available to parties might be broadened, a party’s choices among these options are
still influenced to a large extent by its previous path-dependent development. Attitudes
towards the party’s core voters and ideology among decision-makers might sway the party
for either strategy. They come into play from the very moment a party starts considering
how to address the defeat because this defeat has opened up more fundamental options for
party change. This seems logical: quite apart from the question of whether the changes
will be efficient, the kind of fundamental and more or less permanent changes that can now
be considered beg the question whether they are desirable. This question of desirability in
light of attitudes prevailing within the party is stronger than external strategic constraints
at the outset.
However, the importance of the environment in which a party operates cannot be ig-
nored. The strategic realities of party competition shape any electoral strategy, and
therefore also a recovery strategy. In particular, the way the electoral system translates
votes into seats and therefore into influence in the legislature can be expected to be a
strong influence. This will be the main focus in terms of external factors. Other factors
of note, such as the structure of the party system,28 are also influenced by the electoral
28. See M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans.
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system. By considering the electoral system, therefore, we have the advantage of study-
ing both one of the most direct influences upon the recovery strategy but also, indirectly,
other factors such as the party system.
Before moving on, it should be emphasised that what happens empirically will be a
trade-off between reinforcement and extension. As noted in the literature on political
parties, parties will always need to strike a balance between their core voters and “new”
voters.29 Though a pure strategy is possible in theory, therefore, empirically most parties
will pursue elements of both. However, this need not be a problem. Parties can still be
expected to lean one way or the other based on their characteristics and the environment
in which they operate. Empirically, the balance of the mix of measures a party takes
probably still adds up to a strategy leaning a certain way.
The model does not assume that parties are unitary actors. However, this plays a
different role at the ‘whether’-stage than at the ‘how’-stage. At the ‘whether’-stage, the
decision that something must change may be the result of a shift in factional balance,
as in Panebianco and Harmel and Janda’s power-oriented change.30 At the ‘how’-stage,
however, priority is given to the shared institutional heritage that a party has developed
over the course of its path-dependent historical development over its factionalism. Still,
while that heritage has a more or less uniform influence, it does not mean we can assume
the party is a unitary actor as a result. In any party, different decision-makers will
make different types of decisions. Checks and balances in the party organisation might
lead decision-makers to abandon an intended course of action. For example, membership
pressure not to stray too far from the party’s roots might sway a national committee to
abandon an intended extension strategy. However, in the framework of the study, such
pressure itself is direct evidence of a loyalty to the party’s ideological roots influencing
the strategy.
3.4 Whether to change?
Let us examine the first stage of the process, which has been labelled the ‘whether’-
stage. Following Capoccia and Kelemen, we have not defined the critical juncture that
is an electoral shock by its outcome of change.31 Because of this, there is theoretically a
possibility, however improbable, that change does not occur. Where this is not the case,
it is most likely because a party does not see the need for a change of strategy. This is
what is called ‘not diagnosing’ the defeat as a crisis. Since parties are attached by their
nature as institutions to the way in which they conduct themselves, there will almost
always exist a tendency within the party to argue that not much is wrong. In this case,
the argument will often be that the party must just “do better” or “explain better” what
it has done all along.32
from the French by B. North and R. North (London: Methuen, 1954 [1951]), 217.
29. Van Holsteyn and Irwin, “CDA, naar voren!,” 69.
30. Panebianco, Political Parties, 244; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and
Party Change,” 278.
31. Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 352.
32. Mair, “Adaptation and Control,” 170.
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Figure 3.2: The ’whether’-stage
Unsurprisingly, the way in which our model treats the ‘whether’-stage builds on the
main workings of the existing literature on external shocks. After all, these models have
done relatively well at explaining the occurrence of change (see chapter two).33 Up to the
point where the concept of change branches out into concrete types of change, there is no
reason not to use them. Party change, whether power-oriented or goal-oriented, is seen
as a matter of overcoming a party’s inherent resistance to change. The probability of
diagnosing a crisis and accepting the need for change, then, varies with the strength of
two tendencies within the party: one is ‘loyalist’ and argues that change is not necessary;
the other arguing that it is and the shock proves it.34 If the tendency towards change is
stronger than the tendency towards stability, the balance will be in favour change, either
because there is a new dominant coalition advocating it35 or because the old dominant
coalition perceives a threat to the party goals36. In this case, the party will accept the
need for change and diagnose the crisis.
The decision on whether or not to diagnose the crisis therefore depends on how much
the shock weakens the case for stability and strengthens the pressure towards change.
It should be noted that it is not necessary for the advocates of change to agree what
must change. This is addressed at the ‘how’-stage. Essentially, causal mechanisms similar
to the ones proposed by Panebianco and Harmel and Janda apply.37 Chiefly, it is the
magnitude of the defeat that makes it a shock and affects a party’s goals adversely. There
is also the possibility of a learning effect. These mechanisms are summarised in figure 3.2
and will be elaborated later.
Harmel and Janda propose that the poorer a party’s performance in achieving its goals,
33. Panebianco, Political Parties; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party
Change.”
34. See Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 279.
35. Panebianco, Political Parties, 244; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and
Party Change,” 280.
36. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278.
37. Panebianco, Political Parties, 244; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and
Party Change,” 278.
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the greater the pressure for change will be.38 As has been argued in section 3.2. above,
an electoral defeat impacts on policy and office goals as well as vote goals. Therefore, the
magnitude of the electoral defeat is inversely related to goal performance. The heavier
the defeat, the worse a party’s goal performance. Because of this, a larger proportion of
votes or seats lost relative to the previous election can be seen as a greater reduction in
performance towards the party’s goals. As a result, we can adapt Harmel and Janda’s
proposition to a framework considering electoral shocks only by proposing that the more
seats or votes have been lost relative to the previous election, the more likely it is that
the party will diagnose the defeat in question as a crisis (proposition 1).39
In addition, we can propose a kind of learning effect. If the party has already experi-
enced an electoral defeat large enough to qualify as a crisis, it will most likely already have
given thought to its structural weaknesses. This approach is based on adaptive-learning
models of behaviour: when parties perform in a satisfactory manner this will increase the
chance that they take a certain approach once more.40 In addition, the aspiration level
which defines what is satisfactory will also vary depending on how difficult it has been
for a party to achieve its aspirations.41 As an example of how this works, consider Schu-
macher et al. on the effect of aspiration levels on risk-taking.42 They argue that parties
with high aspiration levels (and thus high hopes of office) take fewer risks than those with
low aspiration levels (and little hope of office based on past performance). When a party
suffers an electoral shock for the first time, it will likely have a higher aspiration level
which in the course of this crisis will likely be lowered. When a second shock occurs,
then, the party will be more likely to take more drastic measures and diagnose a crisis.
Therefore, we can formulate proposition 2 that if a party has previously experienced a
defeat which qualifies as a crisis, this will increase the probability that the party will
diagnose the present crisis as well.
These two propositions represent, in effect, the way circumstances overcome the natural
resistance of parties to change. From the diagnosis of the crisis onwards, it is decided that
a party has to change. After this, the possibilities start to branch out and the previous
models become less useful. In addition to the way it feeds into the next stage of the model,
the way we have conceptualised the ‘whether’-stage has another function. It allows testing
the conceptual and operational definition of crisis by subjecting it to the empirical test of
whether parties view a shock at a certain level of losses as a crisis or not. In the current
preliminary stage of construction of the model, such information is very useful to reflect
on the validity of the definition of crisis given in section 3.2. and the way it shall be
operationalised in chapter 4.
38. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 280.
39. Ibid.
40. J. Bendor, D. Mookherjee, and D. Ray, “Adaptation-Based Reinforcement Learning in Repeated
Interaction Games: An Overview,” International Game Theory Review 3, nos. 2&3 (2001): 24.
41. H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69,
no. 1 (1955): 111.
42. G. Schumacher et al., “How Aspiration to Office Conditions the Impact of Government Participation
on Party Platform Change,” American Journal of Political Science, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http:
//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12174/abstract.
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3.5 How to change?
The heart of the new model is represented by the ‘how’-stage. At this stage, the party
adopts a strategic attitude in the form of a reinforcement or extension strategy or a mix
of these. This strategic attitude finds expression in the way the party behaves in crisis,
i.e. the kind of changes that it makes. The question of the ‘how’-stage, then, is simply
what a party has to do to get out of a crisis. Once a crisis has been diagnosed and it has
been decided that something has to change, the possibilities branch out. Even if there is
agreement that change is necessary, it is not self-evident what it should look like. Our
model must therefore address which variables play a role in deciding what kind of recovery
strategy to pursue. Again, this exercise is both theoretical and heuristic: it serves the twin
purpose of laying a theoretical foundation and developing the heuristic tools to grapple
with the complexity produced by these branching possibilities.
Although Harmel and Janda offer both a power-oriented and a goal-oriented account
of party change, neither of these are suited to studying the question of how a party
changes after a shock.43 No precise account of how goal-oriented change works is offered,
except by stating that the changes “further the party goals” and that parties which are
not democracy-maximisers are less likely to pursue organisational change. Due to the
earlier development by Panebianco, the power-oriented variety of party change is better-
developed.44 A shock leads to the replacement of an old dominant coalition by a new one.
This new coalition then consolidates its power, leading to changes by what is called the
conformation of the dominant coalition.45 This process is what leads to change in the
power-oriented variant of party change.
However, since the new dominant coalition might not agree on exactly what has to
change, this power-based causal process falls flat when it comes to explaining the occur-
rence of particular changes as well. Empirically, it is very hard to determine exactly who
constitutes the dominant coalition and what the specific beliefs or interests of each faction
are. Even assuming reasonably stable factional dynamics, making such calls a priori is
very hard. In addition, categories such as programmatic change cannot be directly linked
to the consolidation of power by a dominant coalition. For all these reasons, the concept
of conformation of the dominant coalition is of limited use in theorising about particular
changes. This presents a problem, since Harmel and Janda’s goal-oriented framework is
not detailed enough to formulate hypotheses on exactly which changes will ensue.46
This difficulty can be resolved by using the critical juncture framework. This is done
by distinguishing between strategy and change. Party change is not the essence of the
critical juncture, but rather its outcome or legacy.47 The strategic aims formulated at
the ‘how’-stage find their concrete expression in the outcomes observed. The assumption
made is that the changes are strategic. The recovery strategy underlies the changes
43. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278.
44. Panebianco, Political Parties, 278.
45. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 279; Panebianco,
Political Parties, 278.
46. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 279-280.
47. Cf. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 30; Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of
Critical Junctures,” 352.
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parties make, based on the voters the party looks to to recover its lost electoral potential.
By making this assumption, it becomes possible to explain the concrete changes a party
makes through explaining the underlying strategic choice.
As has already been discussed in the general statement of the model in section 3.3.
above, these two strategies are the reinforcement and extension strategies. Conceptually,
these two strategies represent two extremes of a continuum or trade-off. This trade-off, as
has been mentioned, is based on Rohrschneider’s mobilizing-chasing dichotomy.48 It is, in
effect, a version of this offensive/defensive trade-off reflecting the fact that rather than just
the party’s immediate campaign plan, more fundamental things such as party programme
or ideology, organisation or long-term targeting strategies can also be changed. In section
3.5.1 below, these two strategies will be further elaborated.
Figure 3.3 shows the causal process according to our model at the ‘how’-stage. Starting
from where we left off, the diagnosis of crisis, it brings in two explanatory variables that
impact at two different points in the causal mechanism in two different ways. Internal
institutional characteristics of the party, specifically those surrounding loyalty to a defined
base of core voters and to the party’s ideology, can be expected to impact as a result of
path-dependency. They are so fundamental to the party and its conception of itself that
they impact upon the formation of preferences for a certain strategy itself. In general, the
stronger the loyalty to base and/or ideology engendered by a party’s past is, the likelier
a party will be to prefer a reinforcement strategy.
The environment in which a party operates, particularly the electoral system, is mod-
elled at a later stage and impacts in a different way.49 Some circumstances might constrain
a party’s options by making a certain strategy less viable. Because these external fac-
tors act to constrain the preferences formed based on the internal characteristics of the
party, their expected effect is to change the strategy where it runs into these constraints.
Specifically, the FPTP and PR electoral systems each privilege a different strategy, con-
straining the other. In effect, the final strategy arrived at should therefore reflect the
party’s internal characteristics as changed (potentially) by the constraints of the external
environment.
3.5.1 Reinforce or extend? The two strategies elaborated.
The reinforcement and extension strategies represent two conceptual categories through
which the many changes a party can make in a crisis are unified and explained. As already
noted in section 3.3, this serves as both a theoretical foundation and as a heuristic device
designed to tackle the complex and diverse array of possible changes. By unifying all
these changes into two possible recovery strategies, we provide both a theoretical starting
point for the model at this stage and a way to make sense of shock-induced party change
in general. The distinction between the two is drawn upon the basis of a strategic aim.
48. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 376.
49. In empirical reality, things are less black-and-white. Parties might consider both internal and
external circumstances simultaneously. However, since external factors are modelled as a constraint on
the preferences influenced by internal characteristics, they must be modelled as impacting after preferences
have been formed by these internal characteristics.
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This is essentially the same as in studies of electoral strategy: does a party primarily look
towards its core voters or does it seek to broaden its appeal?
Who exactly are these core voters? Core voters shall be understood to be “normal”
voters: voters who regularly give their vote to a particular party.50 The concept of the
“normal vote” represents the general baseline level of support for a political party. While
this concept has been criticised, Anker showed that these critiques mainly targeted the
specific operationalisation chosen in its first elaboration and not necessarily the concept
itself.51 Those belonging to the core vote may occasionally defect in unusual circumstances,
but generally do not permanently switch allegiance. The opposite category of what we
shall call “non-core voters” contains all those who are not core voters, but primarily refers
to unaligned voters or those weakly aligned to another party. It would also involve first-
time voters, but there are problems involved in this one-on-one identification between
the two. After all, first-time voters are not a homogenous group: some or even most
might be predisposed through their environment growing up towards a particular party.
A first-time voter from the working class, for example, would be more disposed towards
a social democratic party, and therefore could also be argued to be a core voter. Political
socialisation is a complex process,52 and that means that first-time voters cannot be
assumed to fall under non-core voters, even if the definition would strictly speaking call
for this.
This, in accordance with the literature on electoral strategy, leads to the assumption
that different measures must be taken to appeal to both groups. Core voters are reached
through methods that could be considered more traditional than those that would appeal
to their non-core counterparts. Rohrschneider suggests that core voters are attracted by
a ‘mobilizing’ strategy consisting of a primary focus on policies, reliance on ideological
heritage, emphasis on core constituencies and an instrumental approach to organisation.53
The opposite ’chasing’ strategy focuses on votes, appeals to unaligned voters, emphasises
modern technology in designing the message, emphasises leaders and considers innovation
part of the message.54
The framework proposed by Rohrschneider cannot be used one-on-one to study parties
in crisis.55 For one, it is concerned far too much with narrow campaign strategy, that is, it
takes place within the space of a single election campaign. In addition, the policy-seeking
versus vote-seeking contrast he makes is odd, since this distinction speaks more to the
party goals than to the content of the strategy itself. This contrast also contradicts our
assumption that votes are important to all parties. Nevertheless, the essence of both
strategies developed by Rohrschneider is useful: one is a defensive one using ideology
and the understanding of core constituencies, the other is an offensive one using modern
50. Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order, 7.
51. H. Anker, Normal Vote Analysis (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1992), 12.
52. See for example M. McDevitt and S. Chaffee, “From Top-Down to Trickle-Up Influence: Revisiting
Assumptions About the Family in Political Socialization,” Political Communication 19, no. 3 (2002):
281–301.
53. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 376.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
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Table 3.1: Changes associated with the extension and reinforcement strategies

















Tactical: Who does a
party target?
Broader constituency Core constituency
technology.56 This logic can be extrapolated to the study of the measures parties take in
crisis. This is how we arrive at the reinforcement-extension dichotomy.
To further structure the analysis and formulation of both strategies, the analysis is
restricted to categories of party change. To Harmel and Janda, party change encompasses
all self-imposed changes in party rules, structures, policies, strategies or tactics.57 Krouwel
makes a similar distinction, distinguishing between the electoral58, programmatic and
organisational elements of party in tracking the evolution of parties over time.59 There
are also similarities to the way the mobilizing-chasing dichotomy is developed.60 These
will be highlighted below where they are relevant. Because the party shocks literature is
sketchy on the details of individual changes, the conceptualisation below shall draw on the
way in which Krouwel conceptualises these dimensions.61 To avoid confusion, Krouwel’s
electoral dimension has been relabelled the tactical dimension. The entire strategy is,
after all, electoral, and this term would better reflect that this particular dimension of
change is concerned with tactical matters such as targeting. The conceptualisation shall
be offered in the form of a series of questions with two possible answers, one for the
extension and one for the reinforcement strategy. An overview of the conceptualization
of both strategies on each dimension is given in table 3.1.
56. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 376.
57. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 277.
58. Krouwel refers to this dimension in this way because his work is concerned with transformation over
time and he looks at the changing constituency of a party. I have opted for the term “tactical” because
we’re arguing from the perspective of the party, and “tactical” seems a better term to denote that this
is just an attempt by the party to change its constituency. Electoral change in Krouwel’s term is the
macro-level result of our “tactical changes” at the party micro-level.
59. A. Krouwel, Party Transformations in European Democracies (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2012), 8-9.
60. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 376.
61. Krouwel, Party Transformations in European Democracies, 30.
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3.5.1.1 The organisational dimension
The party organisation could change in a number of ways impacting or reflecting the
balance of power within the party, but only where actions are taken that can be said to
directly affect the appeal of a party to either its core voters or a broader constituency does
it figure directly in the conceptualisation of strategy. We can make the link by looking
again at research testing May’s law. Norris found that rather than being more radical
than both leaders and voters, party members and officers were actually in between the
two.62 Testing May’s Law in the Netherlands, Van Holsteyn et al. found a mixed picture
which casts doubt on May’s Law and is rather more complicated than the one presented
by Norris.63 They do, however, suggest that if a group deviates from the consensus among
voters, members and MPs, it is the MPs rather than the membership.64 If this is the
case, members link the leadership to its core voter base. As such, any move to increase
the influence of rank-and-file party members can be considered part of the reinforcement
strategy. Conversely, decreasing the influence of rank-and-file party members can be
considered part of the extension strategy.
This has also been argued by Katz and Cross, who observed that one side of intra-party
democracy for parties represented the chance to get more in touch with public opinion and
turn passive supporters into active participants.65 It has also been shown that internal
democratisation, such as giving party members a greater say in candidate selection or
policy formation, is part of this. The opposite, internal de-democratisation which might
be expressed in powers that make the leadership more autonomous from coalitions among
the rank and file, is therefore part of the extension strategy.66
In a similar fashion, we can say that the recent development in which some parties open
up their selection and policy formulation processes to the public at large and sympathisers
who are not members, which can be described as external democratisation of the party,
is part of the extension strategy. Since this opens up influence in the party to those
outside of its membership, it can make the party more appealing to and in touch with
both its core voters (who might become members) and non-core voters, at the cost of the
exclusiveness of membership, thereby reducing the influence of rank-and-file members.
This also matches Rohrschneider’s account of the role of organisation in electoral strategy,
where organisational innovation is a part of the message. Research conducted on this
diversification of options to get involved in party politics has shown that parties do in
fact use these measures to reach out to broader groups.67 After all, it allows those on the
62. P. Norris, “May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited: Leaders, Officers, Members and Voters in
British Political Parties,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 42.
63. J. J. M. Van Holsteyn, J. M. den Ridder, and R. A. Koole, “From May’s Laws to May’s legacy: On
the opinion structure within political parties,” Party Politics 23, no. 5 (2017): 477.
64. Ibid., 479.
65. R. S. Katz and W. P. Cross, “Problematizing Intra-Party Democracy,” in The Challenges of Intra-
Party Democracy, ed. W. P. Cross and R. S. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 171.
66. See Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, “The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies,”
in The Presidentialization of Politics (2005), 9, isbn: 9780199252015, doi:10.1093/0199252017.003.
0001.
67. S. E. Scarrow, Multi-Speed Membership Parties: Evidence and Implications, 2014, Paper prepared
for “Contemporary Meanings of Party Membership”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca,
Spain, April 10-15, 2014., 21.
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verges of the party but quite outside its traditional appeal, a role in the party and might
thus naturally act to extend the party’s appeal.68
3.5.1.2 The programmatic dimension
The programmatic dimension presents a challenge in that there are various ways in which
it can be conceptualised. It is clear that it is concerned with the programme of a political
party, but for the purpose of the analysis, there are various ways in which that programme
can be and has been defined. Chiefly, the distinction here is between a position-based
approach and one based on saliency. In practice, most contributions to the party plat-
form change literature use the quantitative data generated by the Comparative Manifesto
Project, which can be said to measure saliency first and foremost, since it counts the
number of quasi-sentences devoted to certain policies.69
A position-based approach has one major drawback in terms of the conceptual dis-
tinction between an extension and a reinforcement version of programmatic changes. It
would require making an assumption about the preferences of (former) supporters for ei-
ther more radical or more moderate policies. May’s law of curvilinear disparity does argue
that a party’s voters are generally more moderate than both leaders and sub-leaders, a
broad category including all non-leadership members.70 However, it has been questioned
whether this is the case empirically.71 The alternative would require some form of data
on the preferences of party members as well as voters, which would limit the availability
of data and might not offer a similar picture.
This study will therefore take a saliency approach. According to Rohrschneider, the
mobilizing strategy sees its programme structured by ideology, while the chasing strategy
adopts a programmatic message based around modern technology.72 This can be trans-
lated into a salience approach based around the prevalence of traditional party themes
and values in the party’s programme. Are traditional (ideological) values and themes
downplayed or highlighted? What values or themes are traditional can be distilled from
the secondary literature on party history and where available on evidence on elite percep-
tions in primary sources. As a consequence, this also means that issues can be traditional
if a currently influential faction within the party interprets them as being part of the
party’s traditions. A programmatic change that is part of the reinforcement strategy will
highlight the party’s traditional values and themes, while the extension strategy will be
characterised by changes to the programme to downplay these elements.
Most radically, this applies to the party ideology itself. A sufficiently heavy defeat
might lead a party to make efforts to change their ideological foundations to de-emphasise
traditional elements and emphasise new additions which might be more in tune with the
general spirit of the times, or “go back to its roots” and reaffirm certain core commitments.
68. Katz and Cross, “Problematizing Intra-Party Democracy,” 175.
69. Volkens et al., The Manifesto Data Collection: Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR).
70. J. D. May, “Opinion Structure of Political Parties: the Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity,” Political
Studies 21, no. 2 (1973): 139.
71. Norris, “May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited,” 42; Van Holsteyn, Ridder, and Koole, “From
May’s Laws to May’s legacy,” 477.
72. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 376.
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Since ideology refers to the entire belief system of a party (as defined by Mair and Mudde,
see also 3.5.2.2. below), this is a very fundamental change and therefore the furthest extent
of either strategy in terms of programme.73
3.5.1.3 The tactical dimension
The tactical dimension revolves around the electoral tactics of a party, and is therefore
closely related to the overall choice of strategy. The question is, then, whether it is not
a category of a different order than the rest. This is, however, not the case, since the
full extent of each strategy is only reached if a certain direction on the tactical dimen-
sion is accompanied by matching measures in other dimensions. The tactical dimension
describes above all the party’s intended targets as expressed in its campaigning actions
and relationships with society. Without accompanying moves in other dimensions, even
if a party picks a broader focus for its electoral tactics, it is therefore still theoretically
possible for a party to lean more in the direction of a reinforcement strategy.
Krouwel defines what he calls the electoral dimension in terms of the “size, stability
and social structure” of electoral appeal and support.74 Transformed into a form suitable
to define the recovery strategy of a political party in terms of our model, this leads to a
definition of the tactical dimension of the recovery strategy as that part of the strategy
concerned with the decision whether to target a narrower or a broader electoral base. The
former is part of the reinforcement strategy, and conceptually represents a party adopting
a renewed focus on its existing supporters and those matching their profile. The latter
is part of the extension strategy, and represents a party actively undertaking actions to
broaden their constituency. Unlike the two strategies themselves, this definition does
include efforts to win the support of certain groups for a single election.
The heightened contingency of a critical juncture means that measures on the tactical
dimension go beyond electoral strategy. Though campaign plans cannot be ignored as
a part of the tactical dimension, this conceptualisation also looks explicitly for more
long-term measures. For example, a party might create a new organisation to durably
strengthen its appeal to a certain group. The most powerful instances of tactical change
are those where not just the internal targeting strategy is adjusted, but where the party’s
externally visible symbols are changed to create an image that is either more inclusive of
a broader array of groups or more exclusive and reaffirming the traditional image. The
strongest example of this would be a change of the party logo and house style explicitly to
convey such an image. It should be noted, however, that not all changes of logo are part
of any particular strategy: an update to ‘modernise’ the party logo without any intention
of changing the image is not part of either strategy. These varying degrees of changes
to the campaign targeting strategies, long-term targeting initiatives and changes to party
symbols and slates of candidates together form the tactical dimension of the strategy.
73. P. Mair and C. Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study,” Annual Review of Political Science 1
(1998): 220.
74. Krouwel, Party Transformations in European Democracies, 33.
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3.5.2 Internal characteristics: electoral base attachment and
ideological attachment
Let us now turn to the explanatory variables. These enter in two sub-stages: preference
formation and constraints on those preferences. This sub-section takes a closer look at the
way in which various internal institutional characteristics of a party affecting its ties to its
ideology and its core voters impact the formation of a preference for either strategy. The
literature locates the causes of change primarily in threats to the conformation or primary
goal of the dominant coalition.75 However, as has been argued above, these accounts have
proven better at explaining the occurrence of change than explaining exactly what changes
are made. It seems useful to elaborate a new perspective on what the resistance of political
parties to change consists of, and the role that it can play in structuring a goal-oriented
push towards change.
The alternative our model presents is essentially a path-dependency argument. As
institutions, parties develop certain distinct characteristics which are imbued with value
over the course of their history. The resistance of parties to change which forms a core
part of the external shocks literature can be said to consist, at the level of each individual
party, of the value attached to certain characteristics of the party by its members and
elites. Because these characteristics have sustained the party for a long time, it has
become increasingly difficult to steer away from them.76 It is entirely conceivable that even
an electoral shock does not necessarily break the party’s path-dependent development.
Therefore, we assume that a party’s preferences are still at least partly shaped by these
traits in a crisis unless external circumstances compounding the shock (see 3.5.4. below)
overrule it.
This means that the influence of a party’s institutional traits comes in earlier than any
external characteristics. Of course, the two can never really be separated this strictly in
practice. However, it is empirically as well as theoretically plausible that internal factors
predominate at an early stage. After all, parties which experience a crisis often enter a
period of factional conflict about what the party is and who it is for. In this way, these
questions become the more immediate ones as a party evaluates the defeat. This factional
conflict also makes it more dangerous to steer away from the common denominator of
practices which keep the party together. This is another reason why path-dependence
even in a crisis should not be underestimated.77
Since the strategy choice is expressed in terms of appealing to core or non-core voters,
the institutional characteristics that influence preference formation relate primarily to the
attitude a party takes towards these core voters. If a party feels strongly attached to a
normative role as traditional champions of a particular social group, then that would make
them less well-disposed towards directing focus away from such a group. More broadly,
a party’s attachment to its traditions also plays a role, since it is these traditions that
75. Panebianco, Political Parties; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party
Change,” 278.
76. See P. Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” American Political
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 261.
77. See Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics”; Collier and Collier,
Shaping the Political Arena.
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have to be reaffirmed or sacrificed to add breadth of support. This can be expressed
by the strength of a party’s attachment to its ideological heritage alongside its electoral
base attachment. These two variables will be conceptualized in turn below, after which
propositions will be formulated about the effect of each of them on the overall choice of
strategy.
3.5.2.1 Electoral base attachment
Defined in terms of the normal vote, the group of core voters or electoral base of the party
consists of long-term supporters of each party. To the party, then, there is such a thing
as a base: the core group of voters on which the party has relied in the past. Since the
choice of strategy relates to the approach taken to this base, the attitude towards this
group is a key variable. In particular, the preferences formed by each party are bound to
be influenced not just by the electoral importance of the base, but by the institutional
loyalties to these core voters formed over the course of the party’s history. Such influences
of a party’s social origins and the way they developed throughout a party’s history have
been a recurring theme in the party types literature since Duverger.78
The clearest expression of the idea that a party is based on a certain segment of society
is found with Lipset and Rokkan, who introduced the influential idea of parties formed on
the basis of social cleavages.79 In the party change literature, the changing relationship
of a party to its social base is one of the main themes of the party types literature.
The concept of party-voter linkage is also related.80 On the level of the individual voter,
belonging to a party’s electoral base is expressed in the form of party identification, a
form of emotional attachment to the party. This is the form in which the link between a
party and its core voters usually figures in the scholarly literature, because it is usually
discussed in the context of party electoral strategy and why voters support parties.81
It is not necessary for our purposes to define core voters in terms of party identification.
Voters are not the unit of analysis under study, and going into such detail about an attitude
such as party identification adds little to the way a certain loyalty is expressed in voting
behaviour. What does matter is the inverse of this usual form of linkage between party
and core voters. Just like a voter can feel loyal to a party, a party can also feel loyal to its
supporters. Given the nature of parties as institutions, this loyalty is the result of a party’s
history and institutional development. The continued reliance on the support of certain
core voters can be expected, in most parties, to breed a path-dependent attachment to this
electoral base. This attachment is always to a group, since parties cannot possibly appeal
to voters as unique individuals.82 As an institutionalised characteristic, it is expressed
78. Duverger, Political Parties, 63-64; see also O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western Euro-
pean Party Systems,” in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 190; R. S. Katz and P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party
Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995):
5–28.
79. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and voter alignments, 5-6.
80. See R. S. Katz, “Party as linkage: a vestigial function?,” European Journal of Political Research 18,
no. 1 (1990): 143–161.
81. P.E. Converse, “The Concept of a Normal Vote,” in Elections and the Political Order, ed. A. Camp-
bell et al. (New York: John Wiley / Sons, 1966), 21; Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 373-374.
82. See also M. Thau, “How Political Parties Use Group-Based Appeals: Evidence from Britain 1964–
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in formal rules such as party constitutions as well as in more informal ways such as
personal ties, norms and values.83 Electoral base attachment can therefore be defined as
the strength of attachment of a party’s decision-making elite to (parts of) its electoral
base through formal rules as well as informal values and ties.
The relationship between electoral base attachment and the choice of strategy at the
‘how’-stage should be self-evident. Parties are institutions following a path-dependent
pattern of development, and this path-dependence persists even in crisis. Parties with
stronger electoral base attachment should therefore develop a preference to remain loyal
to their electoral base in the form of a reinforcement strategy. Lacking such strong at-
tachment, parties less attached to their core voters have less incentive to do so, and might
find it an easier option to broaden their support through the extension strategy. There-
fore, proposition 3 relating to electoral base attachment is as follows: parties with higher
levels of electoral base attachment will be more inclined towards a reinforcement strat-
egy, whereas parties with lower levels of electoral base attachment will be more inclined
towards an extension strategy.
This basic conceptualisation of electoral base attachment will be extended below by
discussing both the formal and informal expressions of electoral base attachment. While
personal ties to a party’s core electorate are technically not formal in the sense that they
appear as solid rules, they are nevertheless treated together with formal electoral base
attachment. The reason for this is that unlike other informal forms of electoral base
attachment like norms and conventions, personal ties are immediately observable. This
is not the case for norms and conventions, which only become apparent in the expressed
attitudes of party decision-makers.
Electoral base attachment by formal rules is characterized by the existence of formal
ties between a party and an organization representing (parts of) its core electorate. A
classic example is the British Labour Party, which originated as a mass party of the
unionized working-class and is characterized by the enduring formal influence of the unions
in its governance. This is not just the most clear-cut way of recognizing electoral base
attachment, but also potentially its strongest form. In all other ways in which a party
can be attached to its base, the ties to the group in question stop short of formal power.
With formal rules guaranteeing the influence of an organization representing (parts of)
the core electorate, however, such organisations can actually enforce a certain degree of
loyalty to the group they represent on the party. Even when they do not do so, their
presence is probably enough to guarantee continued attention to the needs of the group
of core voters so represented. Therefore, parties featuring such arrangements will most
often have high degrees of electoral base attachment and have a stronger preference for a
reinforcement strategy.
One step below electoral base attachment by formal rules is what one might call electoral
base attachment by personal ties. Here, there are no formal ties with the organizations
representing (parts of) the core electorate, but decision-makers within the party often also
have positions in or (former) ties to these organisations. Lijphart’s concept of interlocking
2015,” Political Studies, December 2017, 003232171774449, doi:10.1177/0032321717744495.
83. W. R. Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (London: SAGE, 2008), 50-51.
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directorates provides a strong example of what this looks like.84 However, even if the
decision-makers are independent from the organisations representing (parts of) the core
electorate, they nevertheless are bound to share some of the norms of the organisations
they have ties with. This leads to closer ties between the party and its core electorate
than where such personal ties do not exist. This, then, heightens the degree of electoral
base attachment and also the likelihood of a preference for a reinforcement strategy.
Electoral base attachment by informal norms and conventions is the most variable
and malleable form. Instead of being expressed in formal rules or personal ties, it is
characterized by the prevalence of informal norms and conventions among party decision-
makers about which groups constitute the core electorate and whether the party should
be loyal to them. This must therefore be inferred from the stated opinions of decision-
makers. Such norms might be a result of the party’s ideology.85 For instance, socialist
parties will often have a normative attachment to working class interests, while Christian
Democratic parties often have links with Christian voters.86
Interestingly, while formal and personal ties can only strengthen electoral base attach-
ment, informal norms can both strengthen and weaken it. Formal ties and personal ties
can only strengthen attachment, since they exert outside influence on the party. Since
the very existence of these ties constitutes a special relationship with such organisations,
they cannot at the same time signify that a party is against such special relationships.
However, this does not go for informal ties, which can go both ways. It is just as easy
to imagine a norm that states a party should serve the interests of a particular group
in society as to imagine the opposite: a norm that states a party should not serve any
particular interest. An example of this is the Dutch D66, which throughout its history
has taken great pains to prevent being seen as an “interest party”. Parties which have
such norms in the absence of any stronger attachment through formal or personal ties
have the weakest possible electoral base attachment.
3.5.2.2 Ideological attachment
Although some theorists prefer not to encumber parties with the concept of ideology and
argue that their positioning is merely strategic in a vote-maximising way,87 most of the
literature from some of the earliest contributions88 on assumes parties have an ideological
belief system. The concept of ideology has been variously defined in political science
literature. Budge and Robertson, for example, present a spatial conception of ideology
looking for the principal dimensions of partisan competition, principally the left-right
distinction.89 This generally leads to the assumption that the more extreme a party is
on such a dimension, the more ideological it is.90 Others see ideology as an institutional
84. A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968), 61.
85. A. Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 22.
86. K. Von Beyme, Politische Parteien in westlichen Demokratien (München: Piper, 1984), 97-98.
87. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 28.
88. E.g. M. Ostrogorski, La Démocratie et les Partis Politiques (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1912).
89. Budge and Robertson, “Do Parties Differ, and How?”
90. See for example J. Rovny, “Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? Party Strategies Under Multidimen-
sional Competition,” European Union Politics 13, no. 2 (2012): 275.
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characteristic of a party that has developed over its history.91
Mair and Mudde extend this further, seeing ideology as part of a party’s identity.92
This latter view is the one most suited to the present inquiry, since the internal factors
in the model represent the impact of the previous institutional development of a party on
its actions in a crisis. In such a path-dependence argument, it is useful to see ideology
as a part of a party’s identity rather than just as a function of its position in a spatial
spectrum. It is not so much what the party’s ideology is substantially that drives changes,
but rather how important it is and has been to the party and its decision-makers. This
is an element that is lacking in definitions which cast ideology in terms of dimensions
underlying the space of party competition93 or as any collectively held vision of an ideal
society.94 We therefore adopt the conceptualisation used by Mair and Mudde of ideology
as “the characterisation of a belief system that goes to the heart of a party’s identity”.95
Ideology defines what parties are rather than what they do.
The conceptualisation given above derives from a party families perspective, which does
not specify the depth of ideological attachment. A separate conceptualisation of ideolog-
ical attachment will be necessary. Some, such as Sartori, have attempted to construct a
scale of the extent of ideological motivation of parties by opposing it to pragmatism.96
However, when acting on the definition of ideology adopted above, we have to carefully dis-
tinguish pragmatism as a belief system (which could very well be ideology in that sense)
from sheer electoral opportunism. Sartori does this, to some extent, by disentangling
spoils motivations from the ideological dimension.97
This means pragmatism or moderatism can be ideologies in their own right under the
chosen definition. As a result, ideological motivation or attachment cannot be concep-
tualised by opposing it to pragmatism or moderatism. While radical ideological stances
seem logically associated with a high degree of ideological attachment, moderatism or
pragmatism is not necessarily associated with the lower end of the scale. The key is
therefore to conceptualise ideological attachment not in terms of the ideological content,
but in terms of its prevalence among the party’s motivations. Therefore, ideological at-
tachment is conceptualised as the degree to which party decision-makers are attached to or
motivated by their party’s structured belief system in deliberation and decision-making.
Much like electoral base attachment expresses the loyalty of a party to its electoral base,
ideological attachment therefore expresses the loyalty of a party and its decision-makers
to their ideological belief system.
The institutional and historical way in which ideology is conceptualised here makes
ideology a conservative force in the process of party recovery, inclining strongly ideological
parties to a reinforcement strategy. Elites which are strongly attached to ideology might
91. Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, 22ff. Von Beyme, Politische Parteien in westlichen
Demokratien, 43-45.
92. Mair and Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study,” 220.
93. For example: Budge and Robertson, “Do Parties Differ, and How?”
94. For example: M.B. Hamilton, “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology,” Political Studies 35, no.
1 (1987): 38.
95. Mair and Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study,” 220.
96. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 78.
97. Ibid., 77-78.
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be less willing to change the party’s ways, as doing so might weaken or contravene the
party’s ideological narrative. This is of course strongest on the programmatic dimension,
where a party’s traditional values are directly at stake. However, we can also plausibly
argue that broadening the base or shifting power within the party away from the members
who have by their membership committed to this ideology might introduce demands and
influences which threaten the party’s ideological heritage as well. For example, a broader
base might require sacrificing ideological purity for electoral reasons. Evidence on party
responsiveness takes a similar reading, finding that niche parties, which are often more
radical, gear their programmatic shifts to shifts in the opinions of their supporters rather
than of the electorate as a whole.98 If part of a party’s institutional makeup, ideology
acts as an inhibitor on the variant of change that swings away from a party’s origins.
Therefore, it is proposed that parties with high degrees of ideological attachment will
be more likely to pursue a reinforcement strategy, whereas parties with lower degrees of
ideological attachment will be more likely to pursue an extension strategy (proposition
4).
3.5.2.3 Relative importance of various internal factors
The propositions on electoral base attachment and ideological attachment formulated
above seem clear enough, but there is still one question remaining: if a party is, for in-
stance, highly ideological but has a weak electoral base attachment, or vice versa, which of
the two influences is the strongest? Though this is an empirical question it is nevertheless
good to look at it from a theoretical angle as well. The question here is when certain
variables will take precedence over others.
To resolve this, the choice has been made to disaggregate the strategies into their com-
ponents, taking advantage of the distinction between them, much like Bale did by seeking
to link changes in the public face of the party, organisational change and policy changes
separately to his three drivers of change (defeat, leadership and dominant faction).99 The
tactical dimension, being concerned with measures to directly broaden or narrow down
a party’s appeal, is obviously more closely related to electoral base attachment than
to ideological attachment. The organisational dimension is also more closely related to
electoral base attachment than to ideological attachment since, as we have recounted in
3.5.1.1. above, the members of a party often form a link to its voters. Likewise, since the
programmatic dimension concerns the programmatic emphasis of a party, it seems likely
that the attachment to the ideology underlying that programme is more influential than
attachment to the electoral base. This leads to proposition 5: electoral base attachment
impacts the organisational and tactical dimensions more than the programmatic dimen-
sion, while ideological attachment impacts the programmatic dimension more than the
organisational and tactical dimensions.
In order to demonstrate this, we can formulate a concrete expectation as to how each
dimension should turn out for this to be the case. If proposition 5 as a whole is correct,
then in each case the organisational and tactical dimensions should line up with the party’s
98. L. Ezrow et al., “Mean voter representation and partisan constituency representation: Do parties
respond to the mean voter position or to their supporters?,” Party Politics 17, no. 3 (2011): 288.
99. Bale, The Conservatives Since 1945, 10; 313ff.
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electoral base attachment, whereas the programmatic dimension should follow the party’s
ideological attachment. This leads to a subdivision of the proposition into three sub-
propositions. Proposition 5a states that stronger electoral base attachment should lead to
organisational reforms shifting power towards the members (reinforcement), while weaker
electoral base attachment should lead to the opposite, parties shifting power away from
the members (extension). The same is stated for the tactical dimension in proposition 5b:
stronger electoral base attachment should lead to a predominantly reinforcing strategy
(focusing on the core constituency) whereas weaker electoral base attachment should lead
to an extending strategy on this dimension (and hence a focus on a broader constituency).
Finally, proposition 5c states the concrete expectation about ideological attachment and
the programmatic dimension: parties that have stronger ideological attachment tend to
highlight their traditional values, whereas parties that have weaker ideological attachment
tend to downplay them.
Although they are a way to resolve the problem of having to distinguish between the
strengths of the various influences, these separate relationships between electoral base
attachment and ideological attachment on the one hand and a specific dimension of the
recovery strategy on the other theoretically would also apply where these two independent
variables point in the same direction. After all, the same logic expressed above also
underlies propositions 3 and 4, which presume a unified effect: if ideological attachment
and electoral base attachment line up, then there should be either a reinforcement or
an extension strategy on all dimensions at the same time. Even where electoral base
attachment and ideological attachment do point in the same direction, there is a practical
advantage to disaggregating as in propositions 5a through 5c: since the reality is bound to
be complex, looking at each dimension separately could also help localise areas in which
the model runs into problems. This is invaluable information for refining what is, after
all, a tentative model. This way of dealing with the potentially contradictory effects of
propositions 3 and 4 also has the key advantage that it requires no further concepts and
variables (such as party goals or factional dynamics) to be added to the model. It also
seems an adequate first step towards one of the aims of the model, which is to explain
the presence or absence of certain types of change in varying contexts.
Finally, let us briefly touch upon the matter of faction dynamics. It is characteristic
of the external shocks literature that external shocks produce factional struggle.100 Why
are the influences of electoral base attachment or ideological attachment uniform, even
amidst a factional power struggle? In part, these influences can be expected to operate
uniformly because they reflect a common denominator the party is looking towards in
order to put the period of internal strife behind it. If these factors are strong enough,
they might facilitate the formation of a dominant coalition behind a unified reinforcement
or extension strategy on all dimensions. Elements of such a strategy are more likely to
remain in place even after external pressure. If not, then the picture emerging from this
first stage will inevitably be a compromise or simply reflect the different perspectives of
those with influence over the various dimensions in a piecemeal manner.
100. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278; Panebianco,
Political Parties, 243-244.
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3.5.3 A functional alternative: the identity of defectors
Before moving on to the external environment, let us highlight once more that the main
thrust of our model is institutionalist. According to our model, it is the institutional
characteristics of a party, developed over its past existence, that determines the mix of
measures pursued. There is, however, a rival explanation, which is a more functional
interpretation of goal-oriented change: the party simply does what is functional to secure
its goals. This is in essence a very strict interpretation of Harmel and Janda’s concept
of goal-oriented change.101 In this interpretation, there is no question what a party’s goal
should be: it should win back the votes it has lost in the shock election. If this is the case,
the identity of defectors should be a better explanation than the internal characteristics
given as independent variables in propositions 3 and 4. If it is not, this would be a good
indication that parties’ actions in crisis are influenced by institutional characteristics as
we have argued.
Therefore, it should make a difference whether the voters lost by the party can be
perceived to be non-core voters withdrawing their support for the party or defecting core
voters. In the latter case, the party is in danger of losing these defectors in a more durable
way. It stands to reason that any party acting deliberately to regain their electoral position
from before the crisis election would pursue a strategy which relates to the voters they
lost. Therefore, where more non-core voters are lost, one can expect that the party will
lean towards an extension strategy, whereas a party which loses more core voters can be
expected to lean towards a reinforcement strategy. This will be treated in each of the
subsequent results chapters as a characteristic of the shock election. It operates via a
slightly different causal mechanism than the electoral system in that it doesn’t so much
impose constraints on preferences but rather sets different goals these preferences must
achieve. The hypothetical impact of this functional consideration therefore operates in
a way similar to the impact of institutional characteristics in the model: the question
is whether a party’s preferences are determined by its institutional characteristics or by
what is necessary to regain the allegiance of voters lost in the shock election.
Let us briefly consider two examples to show the logic of this proposition.102 Party A
has had 35% of the vote at election t-2, and has always been around this level. At election
t-1, let’s say it slightly increased its vote to 37%. Then, at election t which formed the
electoral shock, it fell to 20% of the vote. Most of its vote loss must consist of voters who
have supported the party in both elections t-1 and t-2 but who have now defected. For
this reason, the logical reaction would be for the party to try to reassure its core voters
by opting for a reinforcement strategy.
Compare this with party B. Party B has always been a rather smaller party, and at
t-2 it had 10% of the vote. At t-1, circumstances conspired in favour of the party, and it
increased its share to 15%. Then, at the shock election t, the party fell back to 8%. In
this shock defeat, it seems most likely to assume that the party believes it has lost the
allegiance of all the non-core voters it had gained at election t-1 over the core voters it
had, given the fact that the core voters have shown more loyalty to the party in the past.
101. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278.
102. Both examples assume equal turnout.
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In this case, it is likely that party B, all else being equal, would tend towards an extension
strategy to try to entice these temporary defectors back.
Of course, a party cannot know precisely which voters it has lost in a secret ballot,
although it can make an approximation based on polling. However, it is reasonable to
presume that since core voters are on the whole more loyal to their party than non-core
voters, non-core voters will desert first. By the time core voters defect in large numbers,
the non-core vote will likely be depleted already. Consider these two examples. Party A
might have lost some non-core voters, but its normal performance being way above its
performance at shock election t will strongly suggest that core voters are deserting as well,
since there are not all that many non-core voters to lose. Party B might have lost some of
its core vote. In fact, there is 2% that can only come from the core vote. However, since
its performance at elections before t-1 was only slightly above performance at the shock
election t, it seems logical to assume the larger part of the votes lost were not core voters.
This is the result of the loyalty of the core voters which comprise the normal vote: for a
party elite in a crisis, lacking evidence to the contrary, the loyalty of core voters seems a
more plausible assumption to make than their mass defection, leaving a party with only
non-core voters.
3.5.4 External environment
Where the internal institutional development of a party influences the formulation of
preferences directly, the external environment works as a constraint. Because of the effects
of institutions such as electoral and party systems, certain strategies may be constrained
and parties in pursuit of recovery might be pressured towards other strategies. In other
words: a party might form preferences making it want to do X, but in the end it will do
Y because it is forced in that direction by the environment in which it operates. Seeing
institutions as constraints on behaviour in such a way is a staple of neo-institutionalism.103
Argued from the path-dependency perspective used in the discussion of internal char-
acteristics above, the external environment can compound the shock in such a way that
a party’s preferences might be overruled.104 Essentially, external factors impact the costs
and benefits of a certain strategy. If this impact is large enough, it can potentially increase
the expected benefits of a strategy that would run counter to the party’s institutional in-
clinations. If this is the case, the high costs of changing away that are the hallmark of
path-dependency can be overcome, causing a party to switch trajectories.105
The underlying assumption is that external factors enter into consideration later than
internal factors. This is the result of the usual strength of the path-dependent patterns of
development, that is, of a party’s general resistance to change. It further results from the
tendency parties have to turn inward after losing heavily in an attempt to regroup amidst
factional strife. For all these reasons, the effect of the external environment may not filter
into the strategy until later on in the process. It may even take a new defeat to drive the
103. P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, “Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political
Studies 44 (1996): 943.
104. Cf. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change”; Panebianco,
Political Parties.
105. As argued by Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” 261.
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point home. In any case, since external factors act as constraints on internally-formed
preferences in the account given by our model, this assumption can be justified, even if it
is to some extent an oversimplification.
Since the main goal of a party in crisis is to recover, this also influences how external
factors constrain the strategies. It is proposed that parties operating in an environment
which constrains the capacity to recover through an appeal to their core vote will be
more likely to pursue an extension strategy, whereas an environment that does not do
so makes parties more likely to pursue a reinforcement strategy. It should be clear from
this general proposition that the kind of external factors looked at centre around the
institutional context a party operates in, particularly the electoral system. After all,
it is the electoral system that translates votes into seats, and therefore into power and
influence.
The choice has been made to treat other external factors, such as the party system,
as background variables related to the electoral system. There are multiple theoretical
and practical reasons for this. First of all, other external variables such as the behaviour
of competitors and in particular the party system are often quite strongly related to
the electoral system. According to Duverger’s Law, the number of parties in the party
system is after all caused by the electoral system.106 Seeing factors such as the party
system in light of the electoral system also has the practical benefit that it limits the
complexity of various influences working on parties at the same time, which is crucial
so as not to overcomplicate the model at this stage of theory development. In other
words: the electoral system can be expected to impact strongly on most aspects of the
behaviour of parties, including such patterns of behaviour such as inter-party competition
and the party system, because the electoral system presents a very direct influence upon
party behaviour in a democracy. This means it is, at least for the initial stage of theory
development we are in, the best external factor to use as an independent variable.
3.5.4.1 Electoral system
Many characteristics of the electoral system can impact upon the choices made by a
party in crisis, but the manifold details of each country’s electoral system such as district
magnitude, type of electoral system, openness of party lists, electoral thresholds, etc.,
cannot possibly all be included separately in the model at this stage (and some may
not even be relevant). The most important distinction is undoubtedly the one which
categorises electoral systems by the way in which they translate votes into seats, delivering
a distinction between majoritarian systems and proportional systems.107
The rules by which votes are translated into seats are crucial because they affect a
party’s chances to win office or increase its influence in the legislature. Especially in cer-
tain systems where votes do not transfer proportionally into seats, seats are the dominant
way in which electoral progress is expressed. The psychological effect by which parties
anticipate these mechanical effects of the electoral system is crucial: the more the sys-
tem gives weight to the votes of certain people over others, the more a party will feel
106. Duverger, Political Parties, 217.
107. Ibid., 204-205.
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constrained in who it seeks to appeal to.108
This has led Rohrschneider to link certain institutions to certain electoral strategies.109
In most majoritarian electoral systems, he argues, parties have more incentives to go
after unaligned voters who might decide the election. Core voters, by contrast, may be
restricted in their opportunities to defect, rendering the normal vote more stable. By
contrast, a proportional system, according Rohrschneider, rewards a strategy geared to-
wards core voters, since it is easier for them to defect to ideologically-proximate parties.110
Though the reasoning is slightly overgeneralised and also makes assumptions about the
number of parties, it is nevertheless plausible. For one, it is more often than not the
case that a proportional system coincides with a multi-party system while there are fewer
parties in First Past the Post systems.
Argued in another way, the understanding of the normal vote makes a hypothesis that
majoritarian electoral systems lead to an extension strategy and proportional ones to
a reinforcement strategy plausible. Especially in a majoritarian electoral system with
single-member districts, the geographical distribution of the vote is important. Most core
voters will be concentrated in a number of safe seats, where defection is unlikely to be
successful and rather unattractive. In more competitive seats, which are the ones that
will ultimately allow a party to regain seats, the normal vote of contesting parties is much
smaller, but the long-term loyalty that is expressed in the concept of the normal vote also
makes defection more costly. It therefore becomes more logical to increase attractiveness
to non-core voters, as they can potentially swing these decisive contests, while the core
voter can only prevent losses.
Likewise, in a proportional system, the vote translates into seats in a more proportional
way, such that it matters less who a voter is and where he lives. Since, even with thresholds
in place, a defection by a core voter has a more direct impact on the distribution of seats, it
becomes more important to defend a party’s core vote from potential competitors (which
may or may not be more numerous than in a plurality system), and more hazardous to
risk their defection by diverting attention to non-core voters. This would then increase
the costs of an extension strategy and make a reinforcement strategy more likely.
Therefore, parties operating under a First Past the Post electoral system will tend
towards the extension strategy, whereas parties operating under a Proportional Repre-
sentation electoral system will tend towards the reinforcement strategy (proposition 6).
This resembles arguments offered by Downs that a multi-party system leads to parties
cultivating niches of core voters.111 This was also proposed by Duverger, who proposed
that parties under PR would be more rigid than under a majoritarian system.112
Part of the potential problem with this proposition is that it can be contingent on all
sorts of other variables. Indeed, the distribution of the vote, the number of parties and
the presence of competitors could all conceivably contribute to constrain or enable certain
108. For a discussion of the mechanical effects of electoral systems, see A. Blais et al., “The Mechanical and
Psychological Effects of Electoral Systems: a Quasi-Experimental Study,” Comparative Political Studies
44, no. 12 (2011): 1599–1621; Duverger, Political Parties, 217.
109. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing,” 378.
110. Ibid.
111. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 125-127.
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strategies. However, as already argued above, an argument can be made that the electoral
system is a strong influence on many of these kinds of variables. Their interaction with
the electoral system also strengthens the case for treating them like background variables
without including them in the model with separate propositions. Using the case study
method (see chapter 4), we can examine whether these background variables play a role
alongside or in combination with the electoral system, generating evidence that can be
used to refine proposition 6 if necessary.
3.5.5 The final strategy and recovery
A final theoretical and operational matter to consider is at what point the recovery process
ends. There is one clear end state in which we can truly say the process has concluded:
full recovery, the point at which the party has managed to make up for the losses of the
shock election defeat. We can take some liberties where part of the shock was not strictly
numerical – return to government, in most cases, can be seen as recovery, particularly
when election results rather than coalition politics are a strong influence on it. Yet not
all parties reach even this point, so the question arises: when do we stop looking at a
recovery process?
Technically, the process never ends because if we look at figure 3.1, even when a party
seems satisfied with its way of doing things and does not diagnose a crisis anymore (per-
haps because there is none), there will be a re-evaluation at the next election. There has
to be a point, however, especially for parties which continue in a state of crisis, when the
strategy has achieved some definitive form. Otherwise, we would never be able to conclude
anything about the pressures of internal characteristics and the institutional environment
on parties trying to recover from heavy electoral defeat as we would not be able to assign
any value to the dependent variable in a definite way. Theoretically at least, it is easy to
conceptualise an end point: the recovery process ends from the party’s perspective when
its electoral performance is evaluated in such a way that the case for further reforms to
the party is defeated by ‘loyalists’ to the new situation, and therefore is no longer judged
to be a reason to act.
Theoretically easy though this is, there are practical concerns in operationalising the
end of a recovery process. For one, we cannot assume that recovery strategies are “locked
in” when they lead to gains at the polls. After all, gains may or may not be taken as
sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of its current course depending on the situation the
party is in. In terms of our model, once a new “whether’-stage’ comes along, even small
gains might under some circumstances (such as in the British Labour Party in 1987) be
judged insufficient to resolve that no further action on the crisis is needed. For this reason,
the “final strategy” will be defined pragmatically. In this dissertation, this time period
will be restricted to two electoral cycles after the election. This allows for a new election
in the middle of the period as a sort of evaluation point, which allows gauging whether
the strategy changes as a result, without requiring impracticably large amounts of data.
It will also be used to operationalise the sequence of the model in which institutional
characteristics impact first and the constraints of the electoral system second.
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3.6 Summary and conclusions
In summary: the strategy a party chooses consists of a mix of measures belonging to
the extension and reinforcement strategies in the areas of tactics, programme and organ-
isation. This mix can therefore contain both strategies at the same time, even within
the same dimension. According to the theory outlined here, this mix emerges as part of
a process that is here described as a two-step model. The six propositions formulated
in the course of this chapter are enumerated in table 3.2. Preferences are formed in a
path-dependent way through the inclinations of actors within the party, influenced by
the historical institutional characteristics of the party in question. In particular, these
preferences are influenced by variables which relate to the strength of a party’s ties to its
electoral base and to its ideology. The stronger these affective ties or practical reliance on
the base or on ideology, the stronger the pressure will be towards a reinforcement strategy.
By all accounts, the constraints of the institutional environment in which a party oper-
ates and the dynamics of the party system would appear in our formulation of the theory
to be stronger than internal factors. This is because the main goal of a party in an elec-
toral crisis is to win back votes: the environment logically imposes substantial constraints
on how this can or cannot be done. Although external considerations will probably have
an immediate impact in reality at least for some of the actors in the process, the model
considers this impact to occur after the preferences have been shaped by internal consider-
ations because it seems likely that this impact increases over time. In this way, our model
can be said to consist of multiple phases of recovery strategies in which each successive
strategy would be impacted increasingly by the external environment.
Thinking of the impact of various factors in two steps, the first being internal factors
and the second environmental constraints, helps give analytical clarity to what is more
likely than not going to be a messy continuous progression from one strategy to the
other as certain considerations increase in importance over time. It is, in other words, a
simplification of a complex reality intended to aid theorising. By comparing what a party
initially intends to change about itself to what, by the end, it actually has changed about
itself, we can test whether the impact of certain factors is as hypothesised and, within-
case, whether the size of the impact does indeed vary over time. In the next chapter,
the operationalisation of the model shall be considered in order to allow a test of the six
propositions.
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Table 3.2: Summary of propositions
’Whether’-stage
1. The higher the proportion of votes or seats lost in the shock electoral defeat
relative to the last election, the greater the pressure towards change will be,
and therefore the higher the probabolity that a party will diagnose a crisis.
2. When a party has previously experienced a defeat which meets the threshold
set for a crisis, this will strengthen the case for change and therefore increase
the probability that a party will diagnose a crisis.
Internal factors
3. Parties which have higher levels of electoral base attachment are more likely
to pursue the reinforcement strategy; those with lower levels the extension
strategy.
4. Parties which have higher levels of ideological attachment are more likely to
pursue the reinforcement strategy; those with lower levels the extension strat-
egy.
5. Electoral base attachment impacts the organisational and tactical dimensions
more than the programmatic dimension, while ideological attachment impacts
the programmatic dimension more than the organisational and tactical dimen-
sions, leading to the following concrete expectations:
a) Parties with a higher electoral base attachment tend to favour organisa-
tional reforms shifting power towards the membership, whereas those with
lower electoral base attachment tend to favour organisational reforms shift-
ing power away from the membership.
b) Parties with a higher electoral base attachment tend to favour their core
constituency, whereas those with lower electoral base attachment tend to
favour a broader constituency.
c) Parties with a higher ideological attachment tend to highlight their tradi-
tional values, whereas parties with a lower ideological attachment tend to
downplay their traditional values.
External factors
6. Parties under FPTP are more likely to pursue the extension strategy; parties
under PR are more likely to pursue the reinforcement strategy.
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4 Methodology and Case Selection
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has outlined a heuristic model that can be used to interpret and
explain the choices made by a party in crisis and formulated a number of hypotheses to
help test its validity as well as generate insights that can be used to refine the model and
develop it into a full theoretical model. This chapter will start by justifying the choice of
a research design based on the comparative and case study methods in section 4.2 below.
This is followed in section 4.3 by the specification of this comparative research design,
in particular the case selection. After this, section 4.4 discusses the archival method of
data collection and discusses the sources to be used in each case. Section 4.5 gives an
operationalisation of the various concepts introduced in chapter three as dependent and
independent variables. Finally, section 4.6 brings it all together, outlining the way in
which this method will be used to test the six propositions formulated in chapter three.
4.2 The Comparative and Case Study Methods
A qualitative research design best suits the subject matter of this dissertation. So far,
both quantitative and qualitative designs have been used in studies on shock-induced
party change. The first test of the Harmel and Janda model by Harmel et al. was a
quantitative large-N study.1 However, as Müller observed, it is not really a causal analysis
since alternative expectations cannot be ruled out by the method and it cannot resolve
conflicts between the possible factors empirically – if multiple explanatory factors are
present, what caused the change?2 These are problems that also pop up, as already
observed in chapter three, in the tentative model that is being tested in this dissertation.
Without looking in-depth at cases and taking into account the causal chains linking various
factors to outcomes, there is a ‘black box’ over the case which prevents looking in to isolate
precisely what causes certain categories of party change.
Following Müller’s reasoning, it therefore seems logical to use a case study.3 This method
focuses on the detailed qualitative examination of a single case, seeking to understand the
way in which various factors lead to various outcomes. It is a method often used in
1. R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 8; R. Harmel et al., “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party
Change: An Empirical Analysis,” West European Politics 18, no. 1 (1995): 1–33.
2. W. C. Müller, “Inside the Black Box: A Confrontation of Party Executive Behaviour and Theories
of Party Organizational Change,” Party Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 295.
3. Ibid.
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historical institutionalist research involving path-dependency.4 This is also a matter of
necessity – since the theoretical concept of path-dependency involves the idea that the
sequence of events in each case is of crucial importance, the cases need to be examined at
a level of detail that allows the complex sequences of events leading to different outcomes
in each case to be observed.
However, case studies such as Müller’s also reveal a problem of the method: their
analytical method focuses in part on what is particular about the case.5 By cleverly
selecting the cases such that they are least-likely or most-likely scenarios for the theory
to apply, this can be partly mitigated in the sense that there is less of a problem with
generalisation. However, as observed in chapter two, there is also the problem that the
conception of change varies slightly in each case – what is explained in each study is
different from the next. This is in part also due to the method, which by focusing on
detailed examination of a single case is better equipped to explain the presence of an
outcome than its absence (since for an outcome to be absent somewhere it must be present
elsewhere). This is probably why Duncan could not go further than suggesting certain
explanations for the perceived absence of programmatic change in his case study of the
Dutch CDA.6 Without evidence of what caused programmatic change to be present in
another case, it is harder to explain what the CDA lacked to produce an outcome without
it. More generally speaking, therefore, without evidence from other cases, in the same
terms, it is hard to conclude what determines the presence or absence of certain changes.
Since the propositions formulated in chapter three frequently propose that certain fac-
tors increase the probability of one strategy rather than the other, it is necessary to use
qualitative evidence from multiple cases using the comparative method. Ideally, the cases
should be either as similar or dissimilar as possible in order to demonstrate the presence of
a causal relationship across cases. Even if this is rarely possible in practice, the compara-
tive method can thus do what is more difficult in a single-case study: apply the same logic
across cases and provide evidence why the causal relationships proposed apply in some
cases but not in others. Therefore, this dissertation will have to include a comparative
research design.
The case study method and the comparative method are often considered to be similar
to each other. Together, they constitute the most used qualitative research methods
in political science. Lijphart noted that the two methods were and should be closely
connected, and might even overlap in some applications.7 Indeed, some case studies, even
studying a single case, draw on the logic of comparison in the sense that they belong to
a certain class of cases and the selection of the single case might have consequences for
the class. George and Bennett went a step further, stating that the comparative method,
or structured comparison, was a version of the case study method rather than the other
4. E.g. R. Berins Collier and D. Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor
Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
5. Müller, “Inside the Black Box.”
6. F. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’: External Shocks, Party Change and the
Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats During ‘Purple Hague’, 1994-8,” Party Politics 13, no. 1
(2007): 84.
7. A. Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Re-
view 65, no. 3 (1971): 691.
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way around, and was characterised by mimicking the experimental method.8 Seen in this
way, the two methods operate in a similar way by qualitative description of a case and
drawing inferences from those observations in a structured way. These inferences are, in
both methods, made useful by the design of the study, particularly in the selection of the
cases, which is the most crucial part of the research design.
Both methods are well-suited for the purposes of this dissertation. This study is con-
cerned withtesting a heuristic model in order to build a full theoretical model of shock-
induced party change. Lijphart noted that generating hypotheses where a gap exists in
the literature is one of the most useful aspects of case studies.9 By examining empirical
evidence, a case study can arrive at new or fine-tuned explanations of a previously unad-
dressed problem. Even though this study already has testable propositions, this reasoning
does apply to the broader heuristic function of the model. By studying single cases in
detail employing the conceptual and heuristic toolset provided by the model, we can gen-
erate data that can be used to refine the model and the propositions. Case studies can
also be useful to validate a broad theoretical model such as the one formulated in chapter
three. This is because studying this particular class of cases, involving an element of
chronology and observable reasoning behind decision-making as they do, allow us to test
whether the theoretical direction of the argument is at all plausible.
The comparative and case study methods complement eachother. A weakness of the
single-case study is that unless selected as a deviant or crucial case, there is limited
scope for generalisation. This is a problem combined with the more general propositions
formulated in chapter three. Take for instance the proposition that parties with higher
electoral base attachment are more likely to pursue the reinforcement strategy, while those
with lower electoral base attachment are more likely to pursue the extension strategy. A
single case study might be able to offer support for either of these sides of the proposition,
but only a multiple-case design that shows that the reverse applies as well can fully validate
this proposition. However, the sheer number of propositions means that the problem
of “too few cases, too many variables” applies. The cases vary on multiple independent
variables and might also be subject to many of their own idiosyncrasies. In such a context,
the case study method is helpful: by conducting within-case analysis as well as between-
case analysis, some of these idiosyncrasies of each case might be resolved and evidence
produced prioritising between the various factors proposed to impact the choice of recovery
strategy. The comparative method is indispensable for testing the propositions generated
by the model, while the case study method is most useful in complementing this test with
the data needed to refine the model further.
Thus we arrive at the final form of the research design with both a comparative and
a single-case component. The comparative component of the research design consists of
four cases. These cases should be selected in such a way that they vary on the two major
independent variables of the model – electoral base attachment and electoral system. In
this way, the four cases effectively yield four different comparisons as illustrated in table
4.1 below. These comparisons approximate the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)
8. A. L. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 151.
9. Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” 692.
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by keeping either electoral base attachment or electoral system constant while the other
varies, thus allowing tests of the most important propositions.
Ultimately, the setup of this design meant a choice had to be made between ideological
attachment and electoral base attachment as a selector variable. Taking both into account
in the case selection and research design would double the number of cases needed since
it would then require two out of three independent variables to be held constant for the
method to work optimally. This would also have increased the probability of an open cell
where no case displays a particular configuration of independent variables, especially if it
is taken into account that most FPTP systems have fewer parties and therefore a smaller
population.
Electoral base attachment was preferred because it is closer to the basic logic of the
model. The two strategies are conceptualised largely in terms of the voters they appeal
to, and the causal mechanism is mediated by the way certain internal and external factors
make parties relate to their core electorate in different ways. Since electoral base attach-
ment essentially represents this importance of the core electorate to a party, it is more
central to the model.
While the comparative part of the research design figures mainly as a theory-testing
device for the most important propositions, the case study method will be used to validate
the nuts and bolts of the model. It is better-suited to testing the proposition that various
variables impact different parts of the recovery strategy, which apart from evidence across
cases can be strengthened significantly by specific within-case evidence linking specific
variables to specific parts of the recovery strategy. Such links are easier to discern at the
level of the individual case. They are especially important because at this early stage
of development, the model will likely require some degree of revision as a result of the
comparative test. The insights generated by using the model more loosely as a heuristic
device in the case study chapters will be very useful in the refinement that results. This
is why combining the two methods is crucial at this stage of theory-building.
The single-case studies make use of the process-tracing method, with some qualifica-
tions. This method was designed to study the intervening steps between a known outcome
and a possible cause correlated with it. It can also involve backwards reasoning down a
causal chain to explain an outcome in a similar fashion to studies using the historical
method.10 It can be argued that cause and effect are known in this way: despite the
theoretical possibility that nothing happens, it is fairly well-documented that an external
shock leads to some kind of party change. In a sense, each individual case study represents
tracing the causal chain of events from the cause of change, the shock, to the change itself,
with multiple independent variables intervening to determine the kind of strategy we end
up with.
4.3 Case selection
Table 4.1 displays the way the comparative part of the research design operates as a test
of proposition 3 on electoral base attachment and proposition 6 on electoral systems.
10. D. Beach and R. B. Pedersen, Process-tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (2013), 20.
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As can be seen, each of these two propositions is tested by two Most Similar Systems
Design (MSSD) comparisons. Electoral base attachment is studied by comparing the
parties that differ in electoral base attachment in the same electoral system, and vice
versa the electoral system is studied as an independent variable by comparing parties
with similar electoral base attachment in different electoral systems. This produces the
four-cell research design displayed in table 4.1. This design requires four cases: in two
electoral systems, a low-attachment and a high-attachment party were selected. If the
model is to be validated, then the configuration of the recovery strategy in the four
cases should be as shown below. Because of the different times at which internal and
external factors come into play, there is also an element of sequencing: where internal
factors lead to a preference that is impacted by external constraints in such a way that it
should change, the second electoral cycle should show a different strategy than the first.
The methodological considerations underlying the research design shall be discussed first
before moving on to the justification of the final selection.
Technically, it could be possible to select parties from similar systems in different coun-
tries. However, for the method to closely approximate the ideal MSSD condition of
variance only existing on the variables under study, it is better to select the cases from
one country for each electoral system. This is not just because electoral systems have
subtle differences across countries, even if they are of the same type, but also because
the political conditions differ considerably between countries in other ways. For exam-
ple, while the United Kingdom might technically have the same basic electoral system as
Canada, Canadian politics as a whole can be said to differ considerably from Britain’s
because Canada more often elects a parliament without a majority. The same argument
applies to longitudinal variations in the same country, adding the consideration that the
cases selected in each country should be as close to each other in time as possible. To use
the example of Britain again, British politics was substantially different in the 1950s and
1960s, when both major parties were more moderate, than it would be in the 1970s and
1980s, which saw polarisation in politics.11
After two countries have been selected, two cases should be selected in each, one with
a low electoral base attachment and one with a high electoral base attachment. Here the
case selection runs into an operational question. The population of cases from which the
11. J. Black, A History of the British Isles (2003), 281-282.
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cases are selected must be defined. This population consists of all cases in which a party
has suffered an electoral shock. It follows that a criterion must be established by which
a ‘normal’ electoral defeat can be distinguished from a shock. The most obvious way
in which shocks can be distinguished is their magnitude. Here any limit will always be
arbitrary. Balancing the necessary number of cases to select from in a number of Western
countries with the necessity of having as high a threshold as possible, the rule of thumb
employed in this study is that a shock is any electoral defeat in which a party loses at
least a third of its votes or seats. Even then, there are other cases of electoral defeat which
are generally understood to have been shocks. These shocks were, in some cases, added
to the population for more qualitative reasons, such as that they involved a sizeable loss
while in opposition or loss of government status for the first time.
The requirements placed upon the case selection by the comparative method have a
potential drawback for the case study method. While the comparative method requires
that the cases be as similar to each other as possible for the comparison to be controlled,
the case study method thrives on diversity of the selected cases. After all, if the causal
mechanisms can be shown to be present in a number of very different cases, this provides
stronger evidence that they work in the same way across the entire population of parties
in crisis. The choice was made to prioritise comparison in order to get a better test of
the propositions. This does not mean, however, that the single cases cannot be selected
within the comparative design in such a way that they present, for instance, typical or
deviant cases. Where possible, if such a rationale for the case study method is feasible, it
will be noted in the final case selection below.
4.3.1 Selecting two countries
As described in section 4.2 above, this research project operates through a combination of
case studies and a total of four focused comparisons between parties within and between
two countries. The practical considerations of case selection, then, start with the question
of which countries should be used to select cases from. The countries selected were
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This involved a number of considerations
practically similar to those made when selecting two MSSD cases. The two countries
should be comparable in most respects except where their electoral systems are concerned.
To aid the comparison, furthermore, two countries should be selected that differ as much
as possible on this variable. As the electoral systems were operationalised in terms of a
continuum between the majoritarian FPTP system and an extreme proportional electoral
system, the countries selected should be as close to these two poles as possible. As
shall be considered in more detail discussing the cases below, both countries satisfy these
requirements.
The British “Westminster” system of government can be considered the archetype of
a majoritarian system. From 1945 onwards, there have been only three occasions, in
February 1974, 2010 and 2017, on which the election produced a “hung” Parliament at
Westminster, that is, when no party had an overall majority. The FPTP system in single-
member constituencies where members are elected by a simple plurality of the votes is
seen to advantage the two major parties - the centre-left Labour Party and the centre-
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right Conservative Party - with a chance of a majority.12 Minor parties have, for the most
of British post-war history, only had a handful of seats, but have occasionally become
important. Britain is therefore often called a two-party system. The psychological as
much as the mechanical effects of the British electoral system make for a very majoritarian
playing field, where only the two major parties are serious competitors for office.
Ideally, we should then select a proportional system that is as different as possible
in these respects from the British system. The Netherlands seems to present a clear
candidate. Since 1917, the Dutch electoral system has been one of the most radical Pro-
portional Representation systems. Though there are multiple administrative districts for
the purposes of lists of candidates, there is only a single national district for calculat-
ing the results of elections and allocating seats among parties. In addition, there is no
threshold beyond the natural threshold required for a single seat in Parliament. This
results in a system with a multitude of political parties represented in Parliament, and
continuous coalition government. More importantly, as is the primary requirement for
the case selected, it weighs every vote the same way. In such a context, the effect of
the electoral system can be expected to be rather different from the British case. With
such low barriers to winning seats and entry into the party system for newcomers, the
system is more competitive between the multiple parties. This is particularly the case
after pillarization broke down, as evidenced by a relatively high level of electoral volatility
compared to other Western European countries like it.13 This might result, as proposed
in chapter three, in pressures towards cultivating the loyalty of one’s core voters, and
therefore a reinforcement strategy.
4.3.2 Selecting the parties
In chapter 3, electoral base attachment was conceptualised as the strength of attachment of
a party’s decision-making elite to its electoral base through formal rules as well as informal
values and ties. Because parties do not usually approach voters as unique individuals but
rather as members of groups, this attachment is also to the electoral base seen as a
particular group. Often, this will take the form of a particular social class or religious
group, especially if the party originated from a cleavage. The strongest form of electoral
base attachment was stipulated to be a formal tie with an organisation perceived to be
representing this group, such as a trade union or a church. Absent any formal ties,
electoral base attachment could also be the result of overlapping personal loyalties within
the party elite. Since these two forms of attachment are at once the clearest and often
the strongest forms of electoral base attachment, they will be employed as a logic for case
selection.
The criterion for case selection is therefore that two parties should be selected which
have formal or personal ties to the base, and two which do not. To further strengthen
12. M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. from
the French by B. North and R. North (London: Methuen, 1954 [1951]), 218; G. V. Golosov, “Party
nationalization and the translation of votes into seats under single-member plurality electoral rules,”
Party Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 126.
13. S. Mainwaring, C. Gervasoni, and A. España-Najera., “Extra- and within-system volatility,” Party
Politics 23, no. 6 (2017): 626.
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Table 4.2: Years post-1945 in which British parties lost at least 33% of votes or seats
Parties Votes Seats
Liberal Party 1951 1951, 1970
Labour Party 1983
Liberal Democrats 2015 2015
Democratic Unionist Party 1987, 2010 1997
Plaid Cymru 1964, 1979 1979
Ulster Unionist Party 2005 2001, 2005, 2017
National Liberal Party 1964, 1966
Scottish National Party 1979 1979, 2017
Communist Party of Great Britain 1951 1950
Conservative Party 1997
Nationalist Party (Ireland) 1950
Alliance Party (Northern Ireland) 2015
United Kingdom Independence Party 2017
Green Party of England and Wales 2017
Social Democratic and Labour Party 2017
the case selection, we might select from parties lacking such ties those where informal
norms and conventions inimical to privileging a certain base exist. In this way, we can
counterpose parties which definitely have some form of ties to the base beyond informal
rules with parties that definitely will have lower levels because their informal rules are
inimical to electoral base attachment. This strengthens the comparison by making the
difference between the two cases as large as possible.
In the United Kingdom, from a population consisting of all parties having suffered an
electoral defeat in excess of one-third of the previous vote or seat count or added for
qualitative reasons (see table 4.214) , two parties were therefore selected: the Labour
Party and the Liberal Party. The Labour Party is a typical example of a party with
formal ties to its base. Having grown out of the trade union movement, the party has a
constitution which reserves a certain formal influence or power for the unions.15 It is the
best high-attachment case available, given the unique nature of this arrangement among
British parties. It is also a typical case of party recovery, since the rise of New Labour
is among the most high-profile transformations in social democratic parties in Europe.
When looking for a party which lacks such ties and exhibits low attachment by informal
conventions or norms, there is likewise not as much choice. Since most other small parties
are geographically based, they can be said to have some form of attachment, in this case
to a geographical base. This leaves only the nationwide parties. Looking for a case that
is temporally close to the case of the Labour Party, the Liberal Party was selected. Not
14. Data obtained from H. Döring and P. Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov),”
Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018,
http://www.parlgov.org.
15. A. Clark, Political Parties in the UK (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 178; P. D. Webb,
“The United Kingdom,” in Party Organizations: A Data Handbook, ed. R. S. Katz and P. Mair (London:
SAGE, 1992), 855-857.
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Table 4.3: Years post-1945 in which Dutch parties lost at least 33% of votes or seats
Parties Votes Seats
Boerenpartij 1971, 1977 1971, 1977
Centrumdemocraten 1998 1998
Communistische Partij Nederland 1959, 1977, 1986 1959, 1977, 1986
Democraten 66 1972, 1982, 1998, 2002,
2006
1972, 1982, 1998, 2002,
2006
Democratische Socialisten ’70 1977 1977, 1981
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond 1977 1977
GroenLinks 2012 2012
Lijst Pim Fortuyn 2003 2003
Nieuwe Middenpartij 1972 1972
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij 1971, 1977, 1986 1971, 1977, 1986
Partij van de Arbeid 2002, 2017 2002, 2017
Partij voor de Vrijheid 2012 2012
Politieke Partij Radicalen 1977 1977, 1982
Reformatorische Politieke Federatie 1986 1986
Socialistische Partij 2010 2010
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 1992, 2002
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 2002 2002
only does the Liberal Party lack formal and personal ties to organisations representing
their core voters, they can also be said not to have much in way of a core vote.16
Turning to the Dutch cases, for which the universe is enumerated in table 4.3,17 there
is one obstacle: none of these parties had the same formal arrangement Labour maintains
to the organisations of its trade unionist base at the time of a crisis. It seems prudent
to select a party of a similar size, type and position in the party system to Labour, but
which exhibits electoral base attachment by personal ties rather than through formal rules.
This is how we arrive at the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), our high-attachment
Dutch case. The CDA has many personal ties between its leadership and the leadership of
Christian-inspired organisations in civil society, from which it often recruits its candidates
and leaders.18 It is also, like the Labour Party, a major party. In addition, the CDA is
a case that has defied the expectations of previous studies and could therefore be used
as a deviant case study.19 For a low-attachment case, Democrats ’66 was selected. It is
ideologically similar to the Liberal Party: advocating a centrist Liberalism very similar to
the position the Liberals arrived at.20 To avoid the problems a young party suffers which
16. J. Curtice, “Liberal Voters and the Alliance: Realignment or Protest?,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed.
V. Bogdanor (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 105.
17. Data obtained from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
18. K. Van Kersbergen, “De christendemocratische feniks en de moderne, niet-seculiere politiek,”
chap. 197-216 in De Conjunctuur van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch Appèl 1980-2010, ed. G.
Voerman (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 203.
19. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’.”
20. Even though the party itself refused to adopt any sort of ideological orientation, and multiple
discussions on whether the party was “social liberal” ended without any adoption of such an ideological
label, it did in the end define itself as a liberal party, and many members saw the party as the spiritual
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36,9% 35,3% 8,5% 11%
Pre-crisis seats 269/635 54/150 12/630 17/150
Crisis vote
share
27,6% 22,2% 7,5% 4,3%
Crisis seats 209/650 34/150 6/630 6/150
Electoral base
attachment
Formal ties Personal ties No ties No ties
are peculiar to its newness, which may hamper comparison, the 1982 crisis was preferred
to the earlier one in 1971. Moreover, Democrats ’66 has informal norms and conventions
against prioritising the interests of any sort of core voter, preferring a programmatic
appeal.21
Thus we arrive at the final case selection summarised alongside a number of key variables
in table 4.4. The cases that have been selected form a strong basis for comparison. The
cases are not just as comparable as possible given the total number of cases in each
country, but also in terms of the voteshares polled before the crisis and their position in
the party system.
4.4 Archival research: opportunities and limitations
Like many qualitative studies, this study has to rely on historical data. This is more
restrictive on the cases than it seems. Historical records almost always have restrictions
placed on them for a certain amount of years to protect the persons involved in the
decision-making process, some of whom may be prominent political leaders. Therefore, the
youngest available will have its crisis at most 20 years ago. This has certain implications
that must be kept in mind. For one, the structure of party competition may have been
successor of a pre-war social liberal party, the Vrije Democratische Bond.
21. M. S. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie: de Geschiedenis van D66, 1966-2003 (Den Haag:
SDU, 2003), 380.
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different. Defeats on the scale of what we term a crisis occurred less often. Certain
practices that are now very wide-spread, such as One Member One Vote (OMOV), were
less wide-spread, and external democratisation was almost unheard of. This has to be
kept in mind in judging the cases.
In order to observe the decision-making processes of a historical case of a party in
crisis, using Qualitative Historical Analysis, there are a number of possible sources.22 The
most direct ones are primary sources, in this case the archival records. One could also
find the necessary information in the secondary sources compiled by historians, but it
has been observed by methodologists in the social sciences that it is too often forgotten
that historians have had to select and interpret their data, and that their accounts by
necessity give only a partial picture.23 To make a judgment wholly tailored to the needs
of the research question, therefore, there is a need to consider source material that is as
complete as possible. This can be found in archival sources that are accessible.
Literature on archival research distinguishes between two sources of data: the running
record and the episodic record.24 The episodic record consists of often personal instances
of data that are not compiled continuously, such as correspondence and diaries.25 The
term running record refers to the records made by organisations, often in a continuous
run, of their decisions and meetings. Minutes and papers of official bodies are the part of
the running record that will be most useful to this research project.
There is one significant advantage to the running record over methods like surveys and
interviews: the data was not produced with research in mind. The people who compiled
the running records of a political party did not do so bearing in mind that they were
talking to a researcher who might in some distant future read their files.26 Rather, they
were concerned with preserving certain historical decisions and meetings for the record
of their particular party. This means that researchers do not have to deal with questions
normally raised in obtrusive research, such as whether the observations are biased by the
fact that actors know they are being scrutinised by researchers.27
In this way, the archival records of political parties can provide us with the data needed
to understand the causal mechanisms at work in the model. Archival records preserve not
just the decisions made, but also what decisions were originally proposed but changed or
ultimately decided against. Papers included in runs of files from party institutions often
also include some of the evidence on which decisions were based. The evaluation reports
(also occasionally called "post-mortems") often produced after electoral defeat are a very
important example of this type of source, because they reveal what a party knows as well
as how they propose to deal with it. Most crucially, however, minutes often set out at
22. See C. G. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International
Relations,” International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 4 (2002): 351–372.
23. Ibid., 364.
24. E. J. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1972), 53.
25. Ibid., 88.
26. Ibid., 53.
27. Of course, the running record is preserved so that there is an internal record, and this means there is
some possibility of scrutiny by future decision-makers. The key phrase here, therefore, is "by researchers":
scientific research entails a different mode of perusing the archives that is unlikely to have been on the
mind of decision-makers at the time these records were made. It is, therefore, a different kind of scrutiny.
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least the bare bones of the reasoning leading to a certain decision, and this is primarily
how the model works: via the perceptions of party decision-makers.
This mitigates what is seen as the most important weakness of archival research: the
risk of a selection bias creeping in.28 Of course, selection bias is still a problem. Because
the running record is preserved with an eye to keeping internal records of decision-making,
there is the risk that certain parts which are less comfortable or not deemed as important
are not recorded.29 In addition, the justification of decision-making on the record might
have its own social desirability reflex, that is, it might not tell the full story. However,
the fact that the record is coloured by the perceptions of party decision-makers is exactly
what we are looking for: it does not matter so much whether a party’s base is actually
important if those who make the decisions at least believe it is important, for example.
Similarly, the perceived effects of an electoral system are more important to the way the
choices parties make are modelled than its actual effects. In this way, the justification
given in the running record for certain decisions, especially where the record was intended
to stay private and not released to rank-and-file members, can be counted on to reveal
something close to the reasoning that forms the causal mechanism hypothesised in the
model.
Another way of mitigating the risk of bias creeping into archival observations is trian-
gulation with different data sources.30 Triangulation is undoubtedly strongest when the
archival record is cross-referenced with primary data from non-archival sources. Inter-
views with key figures seem a clear candidate.31 Matters that are not on the record for
any reason, hidden meanings and suchlike can be checked with interview respondents who
were in important positions at the time. There is, however, a drawback: having to find
respondents would put a maximum on the number of years one can go back to find cases,
since any decision-maker in his or her 40s during a crisis would be at a very advanced age
now. For all these reasons, the only case where interviews will be used in this dissertation
shall be the CDA, the most recent case, and only to fill in temporal gaps in the archival
data. These interviews were conducted within the context of a previous study of party
recovery involving this case.
This study shall mostly rely, therefore, on the running records of political parties as
preserved in their party archives. Where a personal archive is used, the focus will still
be on documents that are part of a running record or relate to a running record, such
as memos prepared for meetings. Correspondence from personal archives is occasionally
used where it concerns important actors, but the use made of these sources is limited.
Where diaries and memoirs were available, they were referenced but only used where they
add information to the running record, such as the personal perspective of certain actors.
In the absence of interviews, triangulation can only be between different archival records
and contemporary media accounts, as well as with the secondary source material. This is
28. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Rela-
tions,” 355; Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures, 54.
29. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures, 55.
30. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Rela-
tions,” 357.
31. O. Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: a Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” PS:
Political Science and Politics 40, no. 4 (2007): 765–772.
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not necessarily a problem, since the historical method often relies on triangulation between
multiple primary sources as well.32 Some parties have enjoyed extensive treatment of their
histories by historians or in other case studies by political scientists and these multiple
sources can be used for the purposes of triangulation, taking into account the caveats
above about the fact that each history is in itself an interpretation that makes its own
selection from the sources. If the interpretation of the running record diverges wildly from
the judgment of previous scholars of the party in question, it might reveal a bias in either
source which we were unaware of and which should be approached carefully. In this way,
secondary sources can be used for a limited triangulation. However, the primary focus is
on the archival sources, with the secondary sources being used to fill in historical gaps and
supplement missing facts. The available sources will be discussed for each case selected
in more detail.
As argued in chapter three, the choice has been made to fix the span of the data for each
case so that it starts at the crisis election and ends two elections after that, incorporating
two electoral cycles. In that time, the contours of a more or less final strategy will likely
become clear and there is enough scope to examine the impact of the party’s performance
on its eventual choice of strategy. It also results in time periods of at most ten years,
which is a practicable timespan to do the labour-intensive work that is archival research.
4.4.1 Sources per case
Although the type of sources used for each case is similar and poses broadly similar
challenges, no running record is exactly the same as the next one. This is especially
the case when used in a qualitative manner rather than, as implicitly recommended by
Webb et al., by quantitative measures such as indices constructed from the data.33 The
depth and breadth of the data differs between the cases and sometimes even within the
cases, depending on the way in which it records certain events or decisions, ranging from
a simple list of conclusions reached or decisions made to verbatim reports. The types of
documents included in each archive also vary, as each party has a different structure and
even comparable bodies have different remits, which affects the kind of documents they
produce. Therefore, what follows is a brief overview of the data (see table 4.5) to be used
per case and potential problems or biases.
4.4.1.1 The British Labour Party, 1983-1992
The archives of the British Labour Party are extensive and well-preserved. The full run of
minutes and documents from all the national bodies of the party, particularly the National
Executive Committee (NEC), is deposited at the Labour History Archive and Study
Centre of the People’s History Museum in Manchester and available for the period under
study without restrictions34. This meant the case study was able to draw on papers from
32. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Rela-
tions,” 357.
33. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures, 82-83.
34. People’s History Museum. Labour History Archive and Study Centre, “Collection Catalogues &
Descriptions,” accessed December 12, 2017, http://www.phm.org.uk/archive-study-centre/online-
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all major actors, including the National Executive Committee (NEC), Shadow Cabinet
and the Parliamentary Party, as well as papers produced by various committees instituted
to work on certain aspects of the recovery strategy, chiefly the Policy Review. All in all,
there is possibly too much material for the 1983-1992 period available to consult in the
scope of this study, but the selection includes the party publications, the full runs of NEC
and Parliamentary Party/Shadow Cabinet minutes for the entire period and documents
of the Policy Review Group, Franchise Review Group and Trade Union Links Review
Group, selected to focus in on certain parts of the recovery strategy.
This leaves one important actor in the Labour Party uncovered – the leader, Neil
Kinnock and his team. Luckily, the papers of Neil Kinnock have been preserved and
extensively documented at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge.35 These papers
give an important perspective on the recovery strategy that, when triangulated using the
official party papers, should give useful information. More importantly, it gives an insight
into the motivations driving one of the central figures of the recovery project. There is
the risk of bias, but this has been mitigated by looking mostly at copies of the running
record contained in Kinnock’s papers, which allows an eye on the context.
4.4.1.2 The British Liberal Party, 1970-1974
The Liberal Party archives are a greater challenge. Perhaps unsurprising given the smaller
size of the party organisation, the archives as preserved at the British Library of Political
and Economic Science are at times uneven, with some bodies missing in the run of the
papers.36 The papers of the Standing Committee, which dealt with policy, were missing
for the 1970-1974 period, for example, leaving only a few papers sent to other bodies.
The main bodies, however, all had their minutes and resolutions preserved, including the
NEC, the Party Council and the Liberal Assembly. This should give enough information
for the analysis.
It should be noted, in addition, that the archives of the Liberal Parliamentary Party do
not seem to be available. An extensive overview of sources on party organisations main-
tained by the Political Parties and Parliamentary Archives Group UK at the Bodleian
Library in Oxford37 makes no mention of the location of any such files. Attempts to supple-
ment this gap with personal archives from Liberal MPs at the time were also unsuccessful,
given that they did not have the years in question or only contained correspondence and
constituency papers.
4.4.1.3 The Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal, 1994-2002
The Christian Democratic Appeal is the most recent case. The documents, while archived
at the National Archives in the Hague, are not yet publicly available and have not yet
catalogue/.
35. University of Cambridge, “The papers of Neil Kinnock,” accessed December 12, 2017, https://
janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0014%2FKNNK.
36. LSE Library, Catalogue record for the Liberal Party, accessed December 12, 2017, https://archi
ves.lse.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=LIBERAL+PARTY&pos=1.
37. Political Parties and Parliamentary Archives Group, UK, “Guide to Political Records,” 2010, ac-
cessed December 12, 2017, http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/pppag/pppag-records.htm.
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been fully catalogued.38 The project was therefore dependent on the permission of the
national executive of the CDA to consult the requisite files. Permission was given to
consult the bulk of the material, the national committee and party council files, and to
make use of resources freely available at the party’s central office, which included all the
council and congress files and a number of party publications. Permission to consult the
files of the national executive (see chapter 5) was denied. Even with this restriction, the
data was ample and provided the necessary information, with little clarification needed.
Among the archival sources, a prominent source of information is the 1994 evalua-
tion report of the Gardeniers Commission.39 Chaired by former Minister Til Gardeniers-
Berendsen, this report contains an exceptionally clear picture of the party’s strengths
and weaknesses that resonated within the party and was taken up as the guiding thread
throughout the recovery process. Because of this, the report can and will be used to
measure the independent variables – illustrating how the CDA perceived its own position
and what it knew about external challenges – as well as providing a point of reference for
the analysis of the strategy itself.
There was a major hurdle to be overcome during the archival research: the national
committee data was only available up to 2000 because it had only been catalogued up to
that year. To resolve this issue, requests were sent out to the members of the national
committee during those final two years to make minutes and files they had on the period
available. This resulted in the donation by an unnamed member of the national executive
of national committee files up to 2001 to central office, where they were made available for
consultation. While it concerns a personal archive, the collection only consisted of copies
of the running record. Although the data was not as extensive as the official archival
material, it was enough for the purposes of the analysis.
The data was also supplemented by a number of semi-structured interviews conducted
in the context of a master thesis on a related subject, in which the same CDA crisis figures
as a case. This was mainly done to fill in the gap in the data that exists for the year 2002.
These interviews give insights into the thinking of several high-profile figures from the
crisis years, including both Party Chairmen during that period, Hans Helgers and Marnix
van Rij. All quotes from these sources are used with the permission of the respondents.
Additionally, they are only used where the data was not also in the written sources.
4.4.1.4 The Dutch Democrats ’66, 1982-1989
The archives of D66 are deposited at the Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties
at Groningen University, and are publicly available with prior permission from the party’s
headquarters.40 They contain the full run of all documents related to the party’s national
congress, advisory council, national committee and national executive during the 1982-
38. The archivist provided a provisional catalogue, which is used as the basis for citing from the archives.
39. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie” (1994), in-
ventory nr. 1678, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal
Archief, the Hague.
40. Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, “Democraten 66 (D66) archieven,” accessed De-
cember 12, 2017, http://dnpp.nl/dnpp/node/834.
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1989 period.41 These files were used, in addition to the party magazine Democraat, which,
because of the party’s unusually democratic internal structure, contains most of the papers
for the national congress and also reports on the decisions made by party bodies, although
this is becoming progressively less the case as the crisis continued. Van der Land’s party
history Tussen Ideaal en Illusie is also used extensively as a secondary source to establish
the historical background of the party.42
4.4.2 Comparability of the data
A key question to be answered in regard to the sources outlined above is whether the
data are comparable. That is, whether sources which are as similar as possible are used.
Insofar as data can really be comparable where the record is produced with bodies with
different competences, the main bulk of the data is indeed comparable since it consists of
sources from similar bodies in the party organisation. Each contains the full run (or close
to it) of at least the minutes of those bodies. These bodies are the national committee,
the party council (where applicable) and the national congress of each party. They can be
regarded as central to the party organisation, receiving reports from most other bodies.
To get a picture of what a party has done, and the most rudimentary reasons why, the
research project can rely on these comparable records.
Does the addition of certain sources, such as those of the Parliamentary Labour Party,
Policy Review and Leader’s Office and the CDA interviews, hamper the comparability
of the data? In essence, this is only an issue where there is a comparable body that is
known to have been active during the crisis, but to which for whatever reason we have no
access. Most of the problem can be mitigated by using references to these bodies in other
parts of the party organisation’s records. For example, the leadership of a parliamentary
party is represented in most executives and usually makes a statement from which the
positions of the parliamentary party can be inferred. Likewise, most committees set up
during a crisis report to the national committee of these parties, and will update them on
their progress and the decisions they propose.
While the absence of, say, Policy Review records for the CDA or Parliamentary Party
records for the Liberal Party prevent the analysis from going into the maximum possible
amount of detail examining key actors in the recovery process, and may lead to their
interests being underrepresented in any candidate explanation, they do not necessarily
compromise the comparability of the data as such. Care should be taken, however, when
using additional sources, to remain aware of any potential bias introduced by the presence
or absence of such material.
41. An inventory is not yet available online. The catalogue used was a provisional one in which the
boxes were ordered chronologically.
42. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie.
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4.5 Operationalisation of key variables
4.5.1 The reinforcement and extension strategies
The choice between the reinforcement and extension strategies, on the whole and (in
the case of propositions 5a through 5c) on each of the separate tactical, organisational
and programmatic dimensions, acts as the dependent variable. In chapter three, these two
strategies were conceptualised in terms of the strategic question where the votes to replace
the voters who deserted the party should come from: from core voters (the reinforcement
strategy) or by extending the base of the party durably with the votes of non-core voters
(the extension strategy).
The greatest challenge in operationalising the reinforcement and extension strategies
and their component dimensions is the relative paucity of qualitative operationalisation of
the various dimensions of party change. Previous case studies of party change are rarely
explicit about their operationalisation, often because they seek to explain a particular
instance of change rather than map out the broader picture.43 Even where this is not the
case, a full operationalisation is rarely offered.44
Like most of these studies, this study uses the actions taken by parties in the process
of recovery as evidence of their approach. In general, these actions will be measured with
reference to the minutes of the national committee, party council and/or national congress
of parties. These bodies, even if they do not take the decisions themselves, often receive
reports from the actors that do. Their proceedings therefore should provide a reasonably
accurate total picture of what a party did. We can then proceed to look at the specific
dimensions and classifying specific actions into the reinforcement or extension strategies.
The general logic by which this is done is as follows: since the recovery strategy differs
from an electoral strategy by occurring at a moment of heightened contingency, we are
looking first towards more long-term and radical measures. Where these are lacking, the
constantly changing elements of normal electoral strategy like manifestos and campaign
plans can also be used. In any case, we should cross-reference between the former and
the latter to see if the changes made are also reflected in the usual documents.
Before jumping into the specific dimensions, a few general issues should be considered.
The first is that the choice between the two strategies is conceptualised as a continuum:
parties can and often will pursue elements of both. This introduces the question of
weighting the various measures on each dimension and each dimension as part of the
overall strategy. Determining a precise rank-ordering of dimensions and of individual
measures will always be hard. After all, even if the amount of possibilities is constrained
by the conceptualisation into a number of dimensions, there is still an almost boundless
43. J. Burchell, “Evolving or conforming? Assessing organisational reform within European green par-
ties,” West European Politics 24, no. 3 (2001): 113–134; W. C. Müller, “Inside the Black Box: A Confronta-
tion of Party Executive Behaviour and Theories of Party Organizational Change,” Party Politics 3, no. 3
(1997): 293–313; L. Bille, “Leadership Change and Party Change: The Case of the Danish Social Demo-
cratic Party, 1960-95,” Party Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 379–390; F. Løvlie, “Explaining Hamas’s Changing
Electoral Strategy, 1996-2006,” Government and Opposition 48, no. 4 (2013): 570–593; E. Bélanger and
J.-F. Godbout, “Why Do Parties Merge? The Case of the Conservative Party of Canada,” Parliamentary
Affairs 63, no. 1 (2010): 41–65.
44. Such as in Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’.”
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set of possible actions under each of them.
To make sense of that complexity, this study first imposes a number of criteria by which
some actions can be judged to be more far-reaching than others. These are the direct
result of the conception of the two strategies as superlatives of “normal” electoral strategy
where fundamental changes to the party are possible as a part of it. These changes can be
deeper and more long-term than adaptations to “normal” strategy, changing things that
in normal circumstances would be more or less immutable. For example, where “normal”
electoral strategy often involves a change of a single policy in an election manifesto, a party
in crisis might also change its underlying ideological documents or review its entire raft
of policies. This would be a further-reaching change, since such documents are normally
off-limits, and should therefore be assigned a heavier weight when determining the party’s
strategy on the programmatic dimension. Long-term projects that make use of the fact
that a recovery strategy, in contrast to "normal" electoral strategy, does not just take
place during one election campaign but over the course of an entire electoral should also
be assigned a heavier weight. For example, while a “normal” electoral strategy might
adapt the target groups in the campaign plan, a recovery strategy could also contain
long-term measures such as setting up a new body to appeal to a certain group.
Having determined the strategy on each dimension, we can then proceed to determine
the overall strategy. In general, the choice has been made to accord equal weight to each
dimension. This is, of course, a significantly simplified view of the recovery strategy,
but nevertheless a necessary one. Most importantly, the complexity of the concept of a
recovery strategy makes it hard to establish which dimensions should be weighted more
strongly than others. Various parties might, from the viewpoint of their histories and
characteristics or from circumstances, consider different parts of the strategy to be more
important. Since the rationale of weighting the strategies should be uniform for the sake
of rigour, this is hard to model at this point in time. The choice made to use equal weights
therefore also serves the express function of being a starting point for inquiry - like many
aspects of the model, it is an admittedly simple version that can and probably will be
refined and made more complex as the model is being refined.
4.5.1.1 Measuring organisational change
The operationalisation of the organisational dimension of the strategy is summarised in
table 4.6. Organisational change will usually be reflected in some way in (amendments
to) the party’s constitution or statutes. However, the minutes and papers of party bodies
also offer a deeper perspective. They include not just the changes that did happen,
but also those that were attempted or tested. Large reports on the party organisation, in
particular, are useful in this regard, insofar as they touch upon the issue of democratisation
or the power of the membership. With Cross and Katz, we take a broader understanding
of democratisation, asking a number of questions including who is to be empowered in
democratic decision-making and in what fields.45 This can be in the field of policy-making,
candidate selection or leadership elections.
45. W. P. Cross and R. S. Katz, “The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy,” in The Challenges of
Intra-Party Democracy, ed. W. P. Cross and R. S. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6-10.
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Table 4.6: Organisational components of the reinforcement and extension strategies









































The distinction between the reinforcement and extension variants of organisational
change is that the former is about empowering those ‘inside’ the party: the members.
This is usually done through a process of internal democratisation. Democratisation can
touch a number of fields of party activity, including leadership and candidate selection
and policy formulation.46 Studies of selection have measured the breadth of the group
involved in selecting party leaders (the selectorate), running from the whole electorate
(inclusive) to a single individual (exclusive).47 Extrapolated to other fields of intra-party
decision-making, this inclusiveness measure can be used to operationalise organisational
change: if the selectorate is broadened to include more members or to include members
more directly, it is evidence of internal democratisation and therefore of a shift in power
towards the membership. If the opposite is true, and powers are being concentrated in
the hands of the party leadership, power is instead shifting away from the membership.
If the selectorate is broadened beyond members, this is evidence of a shift in power away
from the membership as well: after all, such reforms detract from the exclusiveness of
membership by vesting powers previously vested in members or leaders of the party in a
wider population.
4.5.1.2 Measuring programmatic change
The first documents to look at in measuring programmatic change will be those which
represent big efforts to reshape a party’s programme. These efforts range in extent from
46. Cross and Katz, “The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy,” 9.
47. G. Rahat and R. Y. Hazan, “Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework,” Party Pol-
itics 7, no. 3 (2001): 301; Ofer Kenig, “Classifying Party Leaders’ Selection Methods in Parliamentary
Democracies,” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 19, no. 4 (2009): 243, doi:10.1080/
17457280903275261.
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Table 4.7: Programmatic components of the reinforcement and extension strategies

































more fundamental to less fundamental. An overview of this range of measures can be found
in table 4.7. At the furthest extent, a party might revise its ideological underpinnings
and publish new descriptions of its ideological foundations. Going a bit less far, it might
change the way in which it translates these foundations into concrete policy with either
a comprehensive or a piecemeal overhaul of policies. We are therefore looking for reports
on the party’s ideological and policy programme, particularly those of such ideological
and policy reviews. To judge whether such changes are highlighting or downplaying a
party’s values, terms of reference and reports of the bodies appointed to conduct the
review should be considered.
A first operational issue associated with this, then, is how to determine what these
values are. The secondary literature often already offers an interpretation. Combined
with information on topics the party has generally considered of symbolic importance and
any available ideological documents of the party, the values of a party can be established.
In addition, what a party elite thinks its traditional values are, as evidenced by the way
programmatic decisions are argued in the minutes of its decision-making bodies, is also
of key importance.
Suppose, for example, that a party’s traditional values were against nuclear weaponry.
We could know this because there is a general scholarly consensus on it, because a declara-
tion of founding principles asserted it, or simply because the documents show a generally
expressed consensus that it is fundamental to the party. Any programmatic change quali-
fying the policy could then be considered to play down this element of the party’s values,
and a major policy document boldly reasserting it to highlight it. Depending on how
deeply the conviction were held, this would be at least a medium-extent programmatic
change.
As a final check, it is also important to consult the traditional measure of programmatic
change and look at manifestoes. Manifestos change every election and therefore we cannot
be sure whether a change in the manifesto would not also have been made outside a crisis
situation. However, it could be relevant to see whether the priorities of reviews also occur
in the manifesto a party presents at an election, and whether the drafters of the manifesto
took the work of such reviews as major input.
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As regards the use of manifesto data, a qualitative approach to each manifesto informed
by available secondary sources has been preferred over the use of datasets such as the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey48 or the Comparative Manifesto Project49. The former is only
available since 1984, which excludes some of our cases. More importantly, however, the
operationalisation of the programmatic dimension requires a certain level of detail. Shifts
in a party’s traditional values can be evidenced by very specific issue areas such as nuclear
disarmament in the case of the Labour Party or direct democratisation in the case of D66.
While the Comparative Manifesto Project has recently added sub-categories which
could do this, these are as of yet unavailable in the dataset for the required period of
time.50 Without such sub-categories, the data is not fine-grained enough to use it as a
reliable indicator in very specific issue areas. In addition, the data is measured relative
to the entirety of the source document. While this remedies effects the length of the
document would have on absolute score, it introduces noise in the measurements. In
particular, a decline in the score for a certain issue might mean one of two things: the
issue is less important or others have, potentially independently, increased in importance.
Under such circumstances, qualitative study of the text of documents themselves seems
the preferable option.
4.5.1.3 Measuring tactical change
Within the archival records described above, we are looking for more fundamental or long-
term initiatives for tactical change. These include two general categories of measures:
targeting measures, i.e. long-term measures to reach out to a particular group of voters;
and image measures, that is changes to party symbols and changes to parliamentary and
governmental tactics to influence how voters perceive the party in general.51 These tactical
measures are outlined in table 4.8. In addition, the party’s campaign plan for any new
election will be examined if available, cross-referencing to see if the long-term plans of
the party also find expression in its concrete campaign plan. Where specific measures of
this type are absent, we can go on the campaign alone,52 but since campaign plans always
change according to circumstances even in normal electoral strategy, we can assume that
these measures are always of a lesser extent.
Targeting measures are the most obviously recognisable in the papers of party decision-
making bodies. They include every measure consciously designed to increase the party’s
attractiveness to a particular group. Depending on whether the party perceives these
groups to be part of its electoral base already or not, the measure can be classified as a
reinforcement or extension strategy. Evidence for this decision can be found in campaign
evaluations and in the discourse used to justify the measures. In addition, since electoral
48. M. Steenbergen and G. Marks, “Evaluating Expert Judgments,” European Journal of Political Re-
search 46, no. 3 (2007): 347–366; L. Ray, “Measuring party orientations toward European integration:
Results from an expert survey,” European Journal of Political Research 36, no. 2 (1999): 283–306.
49. A. Volkens et al., The Manifesto Data Collection: Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)
(Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2018).
50. Ibid.
51. As in Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 77-78.
52. As in R. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing: how do parties target voters in election cam-
paigns?,” Electoral Studies 21, no. 3 (2002): 367–382.
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Table 4.8: Tactical components of the reinforcement and extension strategies











































base attachment also requires some idea of who the party perceives to be its electoral base,
this information can also be involved in judging whether a targeting measure represents
an attempt to broaden or narrow the base.
Image measures are more tricky since they do not always directly appeal to specific
groups. It includes changes to symbols such as the party logo, attempts to affect the
image projected by its candidates and changes in the way a party conducts itself in office.
Such an image can be more inclusive, geared towards making a party more attractive to the
public in general, or exclusive, in which case the aim is to emphasise its symbolic ties to its
electoral base. To get at attempts to shift the party image, this study examines logos and
house styles, changes to affect the personal composition of candidate lists and documents
and reports on the party’s strategy in parliament. Not every change is necessarily linked
to one of the strategies: a logo that has simply been updated to look more relevant and
modern need not fall under either of them, for example. As with targeting measures,
strategic intent and reasoning is key. The intent to change a party’s image to be more
broadly appealing or conversely more narrowly appealing determines which strategy it
falls in.
4.5.2 Electoral base attachment
The main mediating variable in the model constructed in the previous chapter is electoral
base attachment: the strength of attachment of a party’s decision-making elite to (parts
of) its electoral base through formal rules as well as informal values and ties. Detailing
this conceptualisation further, a roughly ordinal scale was constructed employing the
distinction used in institutionalist literature between formal rules and informal norms
and conventions.53 Formal rules giving influence to organised representatives of (parts
53. E.g. W. R. Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (London: SAGE, 2008), 51.
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of) a party’s electoral base constitute the strongest form of electoral base attachment.
Overlapping personal loyalties among the party elites and informal norms and conventions
are ranked below this. The weakest electoral base attachment is evidenced where formal
rules or informal norms and conventions stipulate that a party should not privilege its
core supporters.
The operationalization of electoral base attachment as shown in table 4.9 thus hinges on
measurement of both formal rules and informal ties, norms and conventions. Institutional
analysis usually identifies certain carriers containing these institutionalised attitudes.54 By
identifying these carriers or concluding that they are at work, we can infer the presence
of a certain institutionalised attitude to the base. Measuring electoral base attachment,
therefore, should start by examining the evidence for the presence of these carriers.
Although the logic is the same (look for the carriers), this works out different for formal
and informal types of electoral base attachment. According to Scott, the carriers of formal,
regulative institutions are rules, laws, governance systems and power systems. Their chief
characteristic is their codification.55 It is easy to identify these carriers in a political
party: they consist in their written rules and in the power relationships among actors
54. Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 79.
55. Ibid.
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within the party that they constitute. Identifying formal electoral base attachment, then,
is a matter of consulting the party’s written rules. If these rules give power or influence
to representatives of an organised base group, then that is evidence of strong electoral
base attachment. Where they are absent, a party’s constitution, statutes or ideological
documents might also contain references to the group a party wishes to represent. These
are more symbolic, since they do not imply power relationships, but they still constitute
electoral base attachment.
Within more informal types of institutions, we can distinguish between normative and
cultural-cognitive types.56 The carriers of these are more intangible, such as values, ex-
pectations, informal regimes, systems of authority, roles and identities. They are more
difficult to recognise given that they cannot be directly observed. Instead, they must
be inferred from evidence on the loyalties, behaviour and beliefs of party elites. Where
loyalties are concerned, an important indicator is the occurrence of interlocking direc-
torates: double roles played by members of the party’s decision-making bodies.57 We
make one modification to the way Lijphart operationalised interlocking directorates.58
In the Dutch context he describes, counting only simultaneous memberships of various
elites in the same pillar made sense. They are still the strongest instances. However,
non-simultaneous memberships can be equally telling, even if they represent a weaker
form. An elite member who is socialised in an environment embodying a particular social
interest will likely carry something of that affiliation over to the allied party.59 Parties
like the Dutch CDA have been noted to have a high degree of overlap in their leadership
with (former) leadership of civil society organisations connected to their Christian base.60
Such members will undoubtedly have some loyalty to these organisations and the groups
they represent, and therefore increase electoral base attachment.
Even less tangible are the roles played by values and expectations, and informal norms
and conventions in general. The presence of such institutionalised norms can therefore
only be established by inferring it from rhetoric or argumentation in internal documents.
Statements that express belief in the party’s links to society or a certain subset of society,
insist that the interests of a certain group are crucial or fundamental or that connect the
identity of the party to a certain group all provide evidence of the presence of informal
electoral base attachment. Of course, the more generally these opinions seem to be held
and the more they are seen to sway opinion in the party, and the more often they recur,
the more certain we can be that electoral base attachment by informal ties is at play.
Especially where informal norms are concerned, it can be hard to know where to start.
To remedy this, two additional sources can be employed. First of all, electoral base
attachment was conceptualised as having formed over the course of a party’s history,
the historical development of the party can serve as evidence. The roots of a party,
56. Ibid.
57. A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968), 59.
58. Ibid., 61.
59. See also R. A. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party,”
Party Politics 2, no. 4 (1996): 266.
60. Van Kersbergen, “De christendemocratische feniks en de moderne, niet-seculiere politiek,” 203.
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in particular, have been held quite widely to relate to its character.61 If a party was
founded as a mass party of the working class, it makes sense to look particularly for
signs of this heritage. Conversely, a party built upon the idea of some general interest
might be expected to display norms against privileging sectional interests. Similarly, the
secondary literature can be used to provide information on the general level of electoral
base attachment to be expected.
4.5.3 Ideological attachment
In chapter three, ideology has been conceptualised as “the characterisation of a belief
system that goes to the heart of a party’s identity”.62 Attachment to an ideology, therefore,
is characterised by the loyalty of a party and its elites to this characterised belief system
and by the degree to which their actions and decisions are guided by the party’s ideology.
It has further been conceptualised as a developed institutional characteristic of a party.
Operationalisation of ideological attachment, therefore, could follow the same general
schema as the one used for electoral base attachment. However, since most parties have
statements of their core beliefs in some sort of formal codified document, the mere presence
of formal rules and statements become less useful to distinguish between parties. Since all
parties have them, we must distinguish in some other way to what extent the parties are
attached to the ideologies expressed in them. As such, the operationalisation of ideological
attachment must lean far more on informal norms. In other words, we must determine to
what extent a party lets itself be guided by its ideology.
In particular, this concerns the attitudes of decision-makers. The concrete evidence for
this is found in expressions of the strength of the party’s ideology and refusal to change
positions regarded as ideologically significant for the sake of electoral expediency, as well
as in the use of ideological concepts and vocabulary to frame decisions. Such expressions
might be found in the minutes, consultation documents or in party newspapers. In addi-
tion, the judgments of other scholars in secondary literature will also be used to judge the
ideological attachment of the parties under study. In this way, parties can be classified as
more or less attached to their ideology.
In primary sources, ideological attachment can be recognised in much the same way as
we recognised electoral base attachment through informal norms (see 4.5.2 above). As
an additional challenge, however, we are looking for the use of ideological language and
argumentation. It is unlikely that we can ascribe the same meaning to a member of a
party arguing that “ideology X is important” as to a member arguing that “base group Y
is important”, since the ideology of a party is quite multi-interpretable. Rather, we should
look for certain “signal words” in the documents which signify ideological commitments.
The more frequently these occur and the more they seem to sway opinion, the more
ideologically attached a party is. These words differ from party to party. They can be
more generic, such as the name describing the ideology (e.g. “democratic socialism” for a
61. S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives
(New York: Free Press, 1967), 5-6; Duverger, Political Parties, xvii.
62. P. Mair and C. Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study,” Annual Review of Political Science 1
(1998): 220.
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socialist party), or concepts and agendas more specific to a certain party (e.g. “community
politics” for the British Liberal Party and “democratic renewal” for the Dutch D66).
Much like we can look towards history and secondary sources to identify what to look
for to indicate electoral base attachment, these “signal words” can also be derived from
other sources. With constitutional party documents such as party constitutions and
programmes of principles, the question is not so much whether they are present (since
most parties have them at least in the countries under study) but how much value is put
on what is expressed in them. They contain the “official ideological language” of the party,
however, and this makes them very useful. Signal words derived from these documents
can therefore be seen as strong indications of ideological attachment. Similarly, secondary
sources might point us towards certain traditions prevalent in a certain party, especially
in comparison with parties in the same party family.
4.5.4 Identity of defectors
The next variable to be operationalised is the control variable of the identity of the
defectors during the crisis election: which votes were lost? The conceptualisation of this
particular variable is based on the concept of the normal vote: were the votes lost those
of loyal voters who almost always supported the party, or were they floating voters won
in the last election? The key operational concern here is what baseline to compare it to:
how do we determine what a party’s normal vote is? In his original formulation of the
concept, Converse makes a complicated calculation taking advantage of the American two-
party system. In multi-party contexts, such an operationalisation based on “equal rates
of defection between the parties” is not possible.63 The concept has been adapted to a
multi-party concept but the complexity of such models of the normal vote in a multi-party
system are beyond the scope of this study.64
However, since the normal vote is a baseline constructed on the basis of variations in
the election results of a party between elections, it can be approximated by taking an
average of past electoral performances. This should suffice for our purposes, since all
we need to know is whether the election result before the shock occurred was higher or
lower than usual. If it is above average, then it is at least likely that a larger part of
the voters that deserted the party in the shock defeat will have been floating voters. If
it is below average, then it seems likely that the proportion of core voters will in general
be higher. Following Converse, five elections before but not including the shock election
will be used to calculate this.65 Many parties will have their own electoral research done
after an election. This means that, of course, the evidence obtained by comparing the
election preceding the shock to the average calculated in this way can and should be
cross-referenced with the evidence arising from this to see if the party comes to a similar
conclusion.
Another operational question on this control variable is where it comes in. Since the
variable is intended to control for the possibility that functional considerations (winning
63. P.E. Converse, “The Concept of a Normal Vote,” in Elections and the Political Order, ed. A. Camp-
bell et al. (New York: John Wiley / Sons, 1966), 27.
64. For example: Anker, Normal Vote Analysis.
65. Converse, “The Concept of a Normal Vote,” 21.
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back the lost votes in the most direct way) rather than institutional ones determine the
party’s strategy. This means that it is specifically a rival to the effects of electoral base
attachment and ideological attachment. It is also constrained in the same way by the
electoral system: a plan designed to win back those voters lost in the shock election
can be more or less viable based on the effects of the electoral system. Therefore, like
electoral base attachment and ideological attachment, it will be seen as impacting via the
formation of a preference for a strategy, which means it has the most influence during the
first electoral cycle.
4.5.5 External factors
The model formulated in chapter three makes a distinction between the way internal
and external factors can be expected to impact upon the recovery process. While the
internal factors impact upon the response in a more direct way, through the formation
of preferences at the start of the process, external factors are conceived as impacting as
constraints on the party acting on those formed preferences. This creates a temporal
difference between the two: while the internal factors are present from the start, external
factors only enter into the model later on, and their effects should therefore only become
visible later on.
To operationalise this in a simple way, this study proposes to take advantage of the
two-cycle time period under study. To measure the potential constraining effect of the
external environment, we make the assumption that the external environment only enters
into consideration after a new evaluation point in the form of an election. As an election
provides evidence of the success or failure of the chosen course of action, it is likely to give
grounds to reconsider some elements of it in light of the prevailing external environment.
Even if external factors did impact during the first electoral cycle, it is entirely plausible
that if the strategy adopted during this cycle does not work, the party might pay more
attention to its environment and be willing to compromise on its initial preferences. This
is a somewhat strong assumption, but the alternative would be to argue a separate point
in each case when external influences started to act to constrain a party’s actions, which
could introduce all sorts of idiosyncrasies. By contrast, using this admittedly strong
assumption we could compare the strategies during the first and second electoral cycle to
see whether it has changed in response to potential external factors.
4.5.5.1 Electoral system
The proposition on the impact of electoral systems developed in the previous chapter
only refers to one characteristic of the electoral system that is most important to electoral
recovery – the way in which votes are translated to seats, the so-called mechanical effects
of the electoral system.66 The previous chapter’s proposition makes a distinction in this
regard between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.
Admittedly, there are many mixed forms in between these two extremes. However,
as the comparative research design only involves two countries which were deliberately
66. Duverger, Political Parties, 266; A. Blais et al., “The Mechanical and Psychological Effects of
Electoral Systems: a Quasi-Experimental Study,” Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 12 (2011): 1600.
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selected at the extremes, it is best to keep the operationalisation of the electoral system
simple. After all, the comparative design already accounts for two very different envi-
ronments. In the chapters on the separate parties, therefore, the electoral system will be
represented simply by the mechanism by which it returns members of the lower house of
Parliament – either a majoritarian First Past the Post system or a Proportional Repre-
sentation system. This should be enough for now to make inferences on the basic effect of
the most important characteristic of electoral systems to this study on the choice of the
recovery strategy.
4.6 Conclusion: testing the propositions and the
importance of sequence
Using the methodology and operationalisation presented above, we can proceed to test
the six propositions formulated in chapter three. In doing so, it is vitally important to pay
attention to the temporal dimension of the argument, operationalised by using the two
electoral cycles following the electoral defeat. This is particularly important for testing
propositions 3 through 6, which concern the ’how’-stage. After all, propositions 1 and 2,
which test the model at the ’whether’-stage do not depend on the possibility of changes to
the strategy: a party either diagnoses the crisis and formulates a strategy or does neither
of these things. In addition, since all cases were selected from a population of parties
which had suffered a crisis, the probability of one of our four cases not diagnosing a crisis
is very low. In the likely event that no party fails to diagnose a crisis, the test of the
proposition will therefore rely solely on within-case evidence. Here, temporal sequencing
is important, as the speed with which the party acts after a crisis can be an indication of
reluctance to diagnose the crisis.
Since all the independent variables involved in propositions 3 through 5 were conceptu-
alised as impacting on the preference formation of political parties, the first-cycle strategy
is key to testing these propositions. Regardless of what changes later, for the effects to
be as proposed in our model, what is important is that the strategy the party settles
on before the next election (our first point of measurement) takes the form that is to be
expected based on the proposition. Likewise, for proposition 6 on electoral systems to be
confirmed, we need to observe a change of strategy between the two cycles where the con-
straints of the electoral system would run counter to the first-cycle strategy. Concretely,
any British (FPTP) cases which show a reinforcement strategy in the first cycle should
switch to an extension strategy, while Dutch (PR) cases showing a first-cycle extension
strategy should switch to a reinforcement strategy.
The case studies presented in chapter 5 through 8 each form a building block of the
comparative analysis to be presented in chapter 9, as well as an analysis of the recovery
strategies and the variables involved in each case. The comparative analysis in chapter
9 will likely lead to the conclusion that a number of the propositions and indeed the
model needs to be further refined. To this end, chapter 9 can also build on the case
studies in a different way, bringing in the detailed evidence of the causal mechanism
observed in the case studies to suggest the possible direction of this refinement. In this
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way, the methodology outlined here will fulfill the dual purpose of this study: to test
the propositions derived from the model we have constructed, and at the same time to
generate data which can be used to suggest where this model can be further refined
afterwards.
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5 The Christian Democratic Appeal,
1994-2002
5.1 Introduction
In 1994, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) suffered an unprecedented defeat for a
major party in the Netherlands. Amidst an election in which more seats changed hands
than at any previous post-war Dutch election, the party lost 20 of its 54 seats. Having
led the government without interruption since its foundation in 1980 as a merger of three
Christian parties, one of which was perpetually in government since World War II, the
party now faced a “trek through the desert” of opposition. The use of this Biblical image
is no overstatement of the difficulties faced: for a party which had a strong tradition
of government going back to its predecessors, opposition was a particularly challenging
prospect. In addition, speculation about the demise of Christian politics in the Nether-
lands resurfaced. The party was driven to reconsider its essentials and its place in the
party system.
Considering the CDA’s office-seeking character, Duncan has hypothesised using the
Harmel and Janda model that the party would follow what we call an extension strategy.1
He was, however, surprised that the CDA did not conform to this expectation. In fact,
the CDA’s desert years bring to mind other characteristics of the party. The party is
relatively more ideological compared to others in its international party family.2 The
Dutch literature also finds this.3 It also boasted the largest membership of all parties
by far and had strong roots in the pillarized Christian mass parties that merged into it.
Based on this picture of ideological and membership strength, one would expect the party’s
traditions to push it towards a reinforcement strategy. However, the party also faced the
realities of partisan dealignment and the accompanying decline of its core support base,
which should increase pressure towards the extension strategy. Overall, however, since
the Proportional Representation system does not share the strong effect of a majoritarian
electoral system towards the extension strategy and makes defection by core voters easier,
1. R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 74; F. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’: External
Shocks, Party Change and the Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats During ‘Purple Hague’,
1994-8,” Party Politics 13, no. 1 (2007): 69–87.
2. J.-E. Lane and S. O. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1994), 149;
D. Hanley, “Introduction: Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon,” in Christian Democracy in
Europe: A Comparative Perspective, ed. D. Hanley (London and New York: Pinter, 1994), 5.
3. M. Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen: Een geschiedenis van het CDA, 1980-2010,” in De
Conjunctuur van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch Appèl 1980-2010, ed. G. Voerman (Amsterdam:
Boom, 2011), 170; G. Voerman, “Inleiding,” in De Conjunctuur van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch
Appèl 1980-2010, ed. G. Voerman (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 9-11.
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one would expect a reinforcement strategy rather than an extension strategy.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 sets the stage before outlining how the
CDA scores on our independent variables: electoral base attachment, ideological attach-
ment and the external environment, particularly the electoral system. The aim of this
section is to translate the propositions generated in chapter three into specific testable
expectations for this case. In section 5.3, a brief discussion of the defeat of 1994 follows.
The bulk of the analysis in section 5.4 discusses how the variables measured up in section
5.2. led to the recovery strategy as it materialised, tracing it from its causes in the internal
and external factors through the recommendations of the Gardeniers report towards the
actions taken by the party. Finally, the conclusion brings it all together and highlights
the most remarkable aspects of this individual case.
5.2 The CDA in 1994: setting the stage
In the model outlined in chapter 3, electoral base attachment and ideological attachment
constitute major internal characteristics influencing the choice of recovery strategy. These
characteristics, founded in the party’s history, will recur prominently in this case. As
Duncan argued after reviewing the varying scope of change in various areas of the CDA’s
recovery project, understanding its history is vital to understanding the route taken to
recovery after the 1994 defeat.4 Before moving on to the specific values of variables, some
general points about the party’s history have to be considered.
To understand the roots of the CDA, it is important first and foremost to understand
what is known as the ‘pillarization’ of Dutch society. From the beginning of the 20th
century through to the 1960s, Dutch society was split up between four distinct subcultures:
Protestants, Catholics, socialists and liberals. Each of these four ‘pillars’ had their own
associated political party, schools, trade unions, choirs, sports clubs, et cetera. Although
it has to be noted that on the basis of criteria formulated by Lijphart not every pillar
was as pillarised, he nevertheless saw it as an essential characteristic of Dutch democracy
and postulated that Dutch democracy could be stable despite pillarisation because of
the behaviour of the elites of each pillar.5 The concept of pillarisation has been much-
debated, with some scholars doubting whether it has not been overestimated.6 Politically
speaking, the pillars were so stable that one could at one point predict with a high degree
of certainty the vote of a citizen based solely on his class and religious affiliation.7
It is outside the scope of this chapter to consider all the different theories proposed
to explain the existence of these pillars. However, it is a highly important fact that the
CDA’s predecessors – the Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP) and the
Protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, ARP) and Christian
Historial Union (Christelijk-Historische Unie, CHU) – were the political arms of the most
4. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 84.
5. A. Lijphart, Verzuiling, Pacificatie en Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek (1971; Haarlem: Becht,
1990 [1971]), 204.
6. For a discussion, see P. De Rooy, “Farewell to pillarization,” Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences
33, no. 1 (1997): 27–41.
7. A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968), 25.
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highly organised of the pillars. It perhaps explains the distance at which the CDA has
remained the largest political party in the country based on membership numbers, as it
inherited the membership of multiple highly organised mass parties like the KVP and
ARP.8
Another salient point to make is that the disappearance of the pillars was particularly
disruptive to the fortunes of the party’s predecessors (despite small gains for the ARP),
which between them had held at least half of the seats in Parliament at every election up
until 1967. The formation of the CDA itself can therefore be seen as a process of dealing
with several electoral shocks which represent the process of depillarisation and seculariza-
tion of Dutch society that started in the 1960s. Ten Napel highlights the importance of
several electoral shocks, starting in 1967, in bringing the three parties together.9 At the
1967 parliamentary elections the three parties had no majority between them for the first
time ever, leading to the first official discussions about cooperation between the parties a
month later in March.10 Further defeats in 1971 and 1972 provided impulses leading up to
the formation of a federation in 1973, a joint list of candidates for the 1977 parliamentary
elections and the formal merger in 1980.
By electoral performance and office-seeking standards, the merger was a success. Al-
though beaten to plurality by the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) in
its first election as a united force in 1977, the CDA leader Dries van Agt managed to
secure the premiership, renewing it with a plurality of votes in 1981. The central posi-
tion of the CDA in the Dutch political spectrum and the mutual exclusion of the PvdA
and its centre-right VVD opponents gave the party an advantage that led to continuous
dominance of the premiership by Christian Democrats, first by Van Agt and from 1982
by the longest-serving Dutch PM to date, Ruud Lubbers. This success can be seen as
a contributing factor to the fact that the CDA has a strong orientation towards office,
though this can also be seen to be due to its ideological focus on responsibility.11 This
dominance left an important governmental imprint on the CDA that, as we shall see,
resurfaced in crisis.
Finally, let us consider the way the party organisation functioned and who the key
actors were. In many ways, the CDA party organisation was typical for a Dutch party.
Like most Dutch parties, its structure largely follows the electoral makeup of the Nether-
lands, with branches at each corresponding sub-national level. At each level, organs are
constituted to take care of candidate selection and programme formation for elections. Un-
usually, its highest sub-national level of organisation was the influential regional branch
(Kamerkring) based on the administrative electoral districts for national elections; it did
not have provincial branches. At the national level, these powers were split between a
8. According to statistics gathered by the Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties at Gronin-
gen University, the CDA had approximately 30,000 more members than its closest competitor, the PvdA,
in 1994. Even in the middle of the electoral crisis, 1998, the party still had 20,000 members more than
the PvdA. Even if this is far less than its predecessors (and parties in general) in the 1950s and 1960s,
the party seems to have taken pride in this despite the general decline in party membership across the
board. Statistics found at http://dnpp.nl/dnpp/node/352 (Visited on 25th October 2017)
9. H.-M. Th. D. Ten Napel, “Een Eigen Weg: De Totstandkoming van het CDA (1952-1980)” (PhD
diss., Leiden University, 1992), 334.
10. Ibid., 94-99.
11. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 72.
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national congress and a party council.12 Typically for Dutch political parties at that time,
each level sent delegates to several higher-level bodies.
Given what we know about the office-oriented imprint of the party, it would stand to
reason that its parliamentary party, the much-diminished party in office, would play an
important role. Indeed, Dutch constitutional provisions on the free mandate of parliamen-
tarians gave parliamentary parties in general a great deal of autonomy that allowed them
to play a dominant role in their parties.13 Since the party’s supreme bodies, the national
congress and party council, could only pass non-binding resolutions, the CDA parliamen-
tary party would probably able, at least on the programmatic or tactical dimension, to
impose a certain direction.14 However, several factors weakened the parliamentary party
as an actor in 1994. As a result of a lack of formal term limits15 and the poor electoral
performance of 1994, the parliamentary party was relatively old and socialised into a gov-
ernmental context which hampered their effectiveness in opposition.16 The departure of
the top candidate on the list, who is normally considered the party’s political leader by
virtue of his selection to lead the list, also deprived his successors in the leadership of the
authority inherent in this direct mandate from the national congress until 1998.17
Instead, the central role was assumed by the organs of the party organisation, partic-
ularly its executive, consisting of the 7-member national executive (Dagelijks Bestuur,
DB) and the larger national committee (Partijbestuur, PB).18 The national committee,
charged with directing the administrative and political work of the party, consisted of the
chairmen of the regional branches and a number of freely elected members elected by the
party council, including the national executive.19 It thus figures as a central meeting point
between the central leadership and the interests of the branches. In the deliberations of
the national committee, a strong weight is accorded to balance both among regions and
12. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1985, art. 67 and 69, accessed
August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9483, Documentation Centre on Dutch
Political Parties, Groningen University.
13. Constitution of the Netherlands, Official translation, art. 57.3.
14. R. A. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij: Veranderende Partijorganisatie in Nederland
1960-1990 (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1992), 251.
15. “Reglement voor de voorbereiding van kandidaatstelling voor de verkiezingen der leden van de
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal”, art. 2g. Found in Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Kan-
didaatstellingen,” 1980, accessed August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9482, Doc-
umentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Gar-
deniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie” (1994), inventory nr. 1678, Christen-Democratisch
Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, p. 31.
16. The CDA parliamentary party elected in 1994 had served an average 8.1 years in Cabinet or Parlia-
ment before and was therefore old compared to the PvdA (6.5) and the VVD (7.4). Calculation by the
author based on biographical data obtained from Parlement.com.
17. This assumption that the top candidate is also the leader is also evident in the report of the
Gardeniers Commission (CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 30), when it
notes that the early designation by Lubbers of Brinkman as top candidate and his successor is described
as having been intended to avert a succession crisis (kroonprinsenstrijd).
18. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1985, accessed August 22, 2017,
http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9483, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties,
Groningen University; R. S. Katz and P. Mair, eds., How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in
Party Organizations in Western Democracies (London: SAGE, 1994).
19. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1985, art. 73, accessed August 22,
2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9483, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political
Parties, Groningen University.
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among the “blood groups” of the party, the former members of the three predecessors and
direct members of the CDA.20 Although the formal fusion protocol21 which governed this
balance after the merger was terminated prematurely, there is still a strong imprint of
accommodation. This is especially true when it comes to the candidate lists and the party
officers such as the chairmanship.22
Notably, the unifying role of the national committee is exemplified by its chairman.
It should be kept in mind that in contrast to parties in other countries, the chairmen
of Dutch political parties do not lead the party politically but act as head of its extra-
parliamentary organisation. As a young organisation, the CDA chose to appoint relatively
heavy-weight party chairmen like former minister Piet Bukman, who were able to keep
the party’s house in order.23 This leading role of the party chairman, as we shall see, was
carried through during the crisis. Especially as regards the executive, it is worthwhile to
note that it was also a forum for regional and “blood group” interests.
The two highest representative bodies in the party organisation were the national
congress (Partijcongres), composed of municipal delegates, and party council (Partijraad),
composed largely of district delegates.24 While the national congress figures mostly as a
toogdag, a membership outing mostly intended to reinforce party cohesion, the party coun-
cil was regarded as an influential body whose most important powers were to give political
directions and adopt candidate lists and manifestoes.25 However, there were serious con-
cerns about the functioning of not only the congress but also the council by 1994, levelling
the charge of being an “applause machine”26.27
Perhaps because of the need for unity in the young merged party, there was a large
degree of concentration of powers in the party organisation. One body prepared the
meetings of another. The national executive, by preparing the decision-making of the
larger national committee, acted as a crucial influence on its decisions.28 Likewise, the
national committee’s membership of both the committee and the council, resulted in a
20. See R. A. Koole and J. J. M. van Holsteyn, “Religie of regio? Over de bloedgroepen van het CDA,”
in De Conjunctuur van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch Appèl 1980-2010, ed. G. Voerman (Amster-
dam: Boom, 2011), 131–154; Also noted in CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie.”
21. CDA, “Statuten en Kandidaatstellingen,” 3-13.
22. Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen,” 68
The Catholic inaugural leader, Van Agt, was balanced by an ARP party chairman, Bukman. When
Bukman left, the impulse was to appoint a former CHU member, but none could be found, leading to
the election of direct member Van Velzen. Similarly, 1994 saw the election of the Catholic Hans Helgers
to work opposite Protestant parliamentary leaders Brinkman and Heerma.
23. Ibid.
24. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1985, art. 67 and 69, accessed
August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9483, Documentation Centre on Dutch
Political Parties, Groningen University.
25. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Boll Commission, Appèl en Weerklank (The Hague: CDA, 1983),
115-116; Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 9.
26. In the Dutch jargon, the qualification “applause machine” describes a body which, while formally
empowered to make decisions, is mostly concerned with projecting unity and following the directions of
the leadership.
27. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie” (1994), in-
ventory nr. 1678, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal
Archief, the Hague, 37.
28. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 114.
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large degree of control over the party council.29 This was a source of discontent in the
party, which struggled with the lack of effectiveness arising from these problems and a
lack of preparation on behalf of the delegates. In the opinion of the Gardeniers evaluation
commission, this impaired the direction-setting abilities of the council.30 In a similar way,
which also provoked much discussion, nominations were usually prepared well in advance,
with the national committee often proposing a single name which was elected without a
formal counter-candidate.31 Hillebrand remarks in the context of a study of selection for
the 1986 elections that the national committee and in particular the chairman, secretary
and parliamentary leader dominated the procedure.32 The central decision-makers in all
these fields, in this way, can be easily located in the form of the national committee and
executive. Having considered all this, let us now turn to how the CDA’s character as a
party and the environment in which it operated translate into the independent variables
used in our model.
5.2.1 Electoral base attachment
The CDA was selected as a party with high electoral base attachment. Though the merged
party committed from the start to “appealing to the whole of the Dutch population” in
its statutes33, signifying its catch-all nature, it maintained many of the historical and
institutional links showing the mass party roots of its predecessors. The CDA has always
prided itself on its strong presence in civil society, with the overwhelming percentage of
the membership being a member of a church and a majority actively volunteering in that
context, though it maintained no formal links to any group.34 The party thus inherited
strong ties to its base constituency, whose loyalty was also expressed in a membership
total that was even by 1994 by far the largest of all Dutch parties (see section 5.2).
This was complemented by strong informal and personal ties with organisations in civil
society which shared the party’s ideological orientation, who often also supplied it with
candidates for public office.35 Koole notes that even after the foundation of the CDA,
29. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Beknopt memo discussie in Partijbestuur over
rapport Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig, 23 september 1994,” Memo on the debate in the National Committee
on the Klaassen report (1994), SC/9403089/cb.lvb, inventory nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl
(CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague.
30. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 37.
31. This singular nomination practice continued for the Party Chairmanship until 2002, when Marja
van Bijsterveldt was elected by the members in a direct election between two candidates. For the top
candidate, it continued with only a single exception in the form of the 2012 leadership election, although
the intention to hold such an election was also expressed in 2017. In all these cases, there was the formal
opportunity to nominate a counter-candidate, which was, however, seldom used.
32. R. Hillebrand, De Antichambre van het Parlement: Kandidaatstelling in Nederlandse Politieke Par-
tijen (Leiden: DSWO, 1992), 54.
33. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1985, art. 3, accessed August 22,
2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9483, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political
Parties, Groningen University
34. J. J. M. Van Holsteyn, R. A. Koole, and J. Elkink, “Marginaal of midden in de maatschappij? Leden
van CDA, D66, PvdA en VVD en hun activiteiten in de samenleving,” Beleid en Maatschappij 29, no. 2
(2002): 72.
35. K. Van Kersbergen, “De christendemocratische feniks en de moderne, niet-seculiere politiek,”
chap. 197-216 in De Conjunctuur van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch Appèl 1980-2010, ed. G.
Voerman (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 203.
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the organisations of the KVP in particular maintained a considerable amount of influence
within the parliamentary party.36 The main expression of electoral base attachment in the
case of the CDA is through these personal ties.
These personal ties are complemented by informal norms and conventions underscoring
the importance of its loyal supporters to the party. This is in part expressed by pride and
confidence in the strength of its large membership organisation in official documents.37
More specifically concerning the Christian character of the base, the informal conventions
surrounding the party’s electoral base attachment also found expression in a touchiness
in parts of the party which surfaced whenever somebody proposed concrete measures to
involve those of non-Christian faiths to a greater extent. This is in part ideological, as
revealed by the fact that it usually included a suspicion that the ‘C’ in the party’s name,
a symbol for its Christian inspiration, would be terminally downplayed.38
On balance, therefore, the CDA of 1994 can be considered to be strongly attached to
its base. This is further reinforced by the confidence in the base of the Gardeniers report,
which appears to have resonated strongly within the party. This belief in the base of
the party is referred to as the “people’s party character” (volkspartijkarakter) in the CDA
lingo and recurs often in archival documents discussing base and membership.39 Electoral
studies showed that the CDA’s base vote had not stopped declining, a fact also echoed in
the party’s own evaluations of the 1994 elections.40 The party, for this reason, was very
much dependent on the floating vote to maintain its high level of electoral performance
throughout its merged existence. Nevertheless, on balance the CDA shows itself rooted
in and attached to its inherited base in the remnants of the three confessional pillars to a
large extent.
It is important to consider what this means in terms of our model. In the model
described in chapter three, a higher degree of electoral base attachment entails a stronger
resistance to broadening the base beyond the original base the party is attached to.
Therefore, despite the demographic decline of its base, the high degree of electoral base
attachment leads to the expectation of a reinforcement strategy. If the effect is not uniform
as in the simplest form of proposition 3, then at least there should be an impact leading
to the party narrowing its appeal on the tactical dimension and introducing measures to
empower the membership.
36. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 266.
37. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 11-12.
38. For example: Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst van het Partijbe-
stuur van het CDA d.d. 17 november 2000”, Conclusions of the National Committee Meeting, 17th of
November 2000 (2000), Anonymous Personal Archive consisting of National Committee Minutes, CDA
Central Office, the Hague, p. 4.
39. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Klaassen Commission, “Beknopte versie,” Condensed version of the
Klaassen report Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig. (1994), inventory nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl
(CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 1; Christen-Democratisch
Appèl, Klaassen Commission, “Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig: Voorstellen ter Versterking van de Organisatie
van het CDA,” Final report of the Klaassen Commission (1994), WPEA/9491721.04/MG, inventory nr.
1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the
Hague, 8-9; 29.
40. Van Kersbergen, “De christendemocratische feniks en de moderne, niet-seculiere politiek,” 201-202;
CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16.
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5.2.2 Ideological Attachment
Although its office-seeking bend is undeniable and well-founded in its history, theorists
such as Lane and Errson and Hanley have registered that compared to its sister parties in
other nations, the CDA is more principled and scores highest on a programmatic focus.41
This is a theme also found in the Dutch literature, where the strong programmatic and
ideological basis was identified as particularly important when the party went through a
crisis.42
Throughout the process leading up to the merger, we find what can be argued to be
one of the most important antecedents of its principled nature: the heated discussions
on the Biblical foundations of the new party. The question here was whether the Bible
should be an inspiration for a party with an open basis (as some in the KVP advocated)
or the actual cornerstone of the new party (as the ARP wanted).43 The party’s founding
father, Steenkamp, resolved this by formulating the “response philosophy” in his influential
paper Towards a Responsible Society (Op weg naar een verantwoordelijke maatschappij ).
This concept that not the gospel itself but a political response to it should bind the
party together, proved to be “the formula that superseded all three party cultures”.44 It
still forms article 2 of the CDA’s programme of principles: “The political convictions of
the CDA are shaped in response to the appeal of the Bible. (. . . ) This Programme of
Principles gives expression to those convictions”.45 The response philosophy and its four
accompanying principles of differentiated responsibility, stewardship, solidarity and public
justice form a strong foundation for the party, and have proven to be enduringly strong,
although as Duncan suggests that this may also be due to the fractious discussions this
compromise resolved.46
The importance attributed to the ‘C’, to the concept of a ‘responsible society’ and
to the programme of principles in general is, therefore, a surprising qualifier on what is
otherwise an office-seeking party. This surprise must be qualified, however: in such a
young party as the merged CDA, a unifying factor such as the response philosophy, must
be jealously guarded, even becoming to some extent a founding myth of some sort. In the
discussion on the party’s informal electoral base attachment above, this was already briefly
touched upon with reference to the defensiveness that surfaced whenever accommodating
those of non-Christian faiths was proposed. This demonstrates that across the party,
active members were very keen to preserve their party’s Christian heritage. Moreover,
the evaluation report authored in 1994 by the Gardeniers Commission casts the party’s
ideology as a strength rather than a weakness, with reference to the “responsible society”.47
41. Lane and Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, 149; Hanley, “Introduction,” 5.
42. Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen,” 70.
43. Ten Napel, “Een Eigen Weg,” 177.
44. Hoogendijk in ibid., 177, translation by the author of this dissertation.
45. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Program van Uitgangspunten CDA,” 1993, italics added. Original
text: "In antwoord op de oproep van de Bijbel krijgt de politieke overtuiging van het CDA gestalte. (...)
Dit Program van Uitgangspunten geeft uitdrukking aan deze politieke overtuiging.", accessed August 22,
2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9872, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political
Parties, Groningen University.
46. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 73; see also Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij
met idealen,” 106.
47. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 11-12.
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This Christian Democratic basic principle complements the “people’s party character”
which expresses the party’s informal electoral base attachment and expresses a strong
symbolism for the party that cannot be disregarded.
As a part of this symbolism, the ideological attachment of the CDA complements and
reinforces the expected effect of electoral base attachment towards the reinforcement strat-
egy. After all, the model stipulates that ideological attachment leads to a reinforcement
strategy because it presents a strong part of the party’s institutional identity that preju-
dices against the extension strategy, which usually changes away from the party’s roots.
Combined with the expectation based on electoral base attachment, therefore, this leads
to the expectation that the CDA would pursue a reinforcement strategy out of the gate.
5.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system
As discussed in chapter 4, the Dutch electoral system can be said to be one of the most
radically proportional in the world. This was also the case in 1994, as demonstrated by
the high Rose index of proportionality of 97.6548 at this election.49 During and even after
the pillarization period, the political landscape was dominated by three major ideological
subcurrents – the Christian Democratic tradition of the CDA and its predecessors; its
main competitor to the left, the social democratic Labour Party (PvdA); and the growing
conservative-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) to the right from
1960. These parties usually controlled well over a 100 seats in the 150-seat lower house,
even in 1994.50
However, the low threshold in this extremely proportional electoral system indisputably
leads to great potential for new parties, which started entering the party system again
from the 1960s onwards.51 As Mair observes, this use of the relatively open party system
coincides with the loosening of the pillarized cleavage structure.52 A few of these par-
ties became (at least for the moment) permanent fixtures, such as Democrats 66 (D66),
Democratic Socialists ’70 (DS’70) and the Radical Political Party (PPR). This contrasts
with the earlier stability of the party system after the second World War, where rarely
more than 20 out of 150 seats changed parties at any election. With 34 seats (over a fifth)
changing hands, 1994 represented a new record. According to figures presented by Mair,
the 1994 election was only surpassed by the system-shaking elections of 1994 in Italy and
1958 in France in terms of level of volatility.53 Over the entire 1990s, Mair finds that
48. Calculated by the author based on data from H. Döring and P. Manow, “Parliaments and govern-
ments database (ParlGov),” Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, 2018,
accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.parlgov.org.
49. The Rose index is calculated by subtracting the sum of the differences between each party’s voteshare
and seatshare at a given election, divided by two, from 100. See R. Rose, ed., International Encyclopedia
of Elections (Washington: CQ Press, 2000)
50. Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
51. Although the effect of PR was also visible in the pre-war years, see also K. Vossen, Vrij vissen in
het Vondelpark: Kleine politieke partijen in Nederland 1918-1940 (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2003),
37.
52. P. Mair, “Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: a Comparative Perspective,” Acta Politica
43 (2008): 241-242.
53. Ibid., 239.
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the Netherlands was the second-most volatile electorate in Western Europe.54 The 1994
election saw the creation of two senior citizens’ parties (the General Pensioners Union
(AOV) and Union 55+), which were in direct electoral competition with the CDA and
entered into Parliament with a combined 7 seats.55
The low electoral threshold also has consequences for the number of minor parties.
Though the number of parties with seats in Parliament increased from 7 in the first post-
war election to 11 in 1994, there was already a great diversity of parties, in particular
within Dutch Christian politics. These smaller religious parties were exclusively of an
orthodox Protestant persuasion. Two of them originated in church splits, but the third,
the Reformatory Political Federation (RPF), split from the ARP in the 70s as a response
to the cooperation with the Catholics. Most were rather more conservative than the CDA,
evidenced in their usually being bundled under the term of the “small Christian right”.
There was therefore competition for parts of the CDA’s core vote.56 According to the
model presented of chapter three, the presence of other parties in the same party family
should lead to a pressure towards the reinforcement strategy.
The low barriers to enter into the party system mean that as dealignment continued,
competition to established parties like the CDA was always an option. The rise of the
AOV and Union 55+ in 1994 no doubt has something to do with the fact that the CDA
was seen as wanting to cut pensions (and the party itself agreed with this assessment). In
the Gardeniers report, the party would signal that the senior citizens constituency had to
some extent returned to the party between the municipal and national elections of 1994.57
Nevertheless, the threat posed by these newcomers to part of the CDA’s core electorate
acts as part of the overall effect of the electoral system to reinforce pressures towards a
reinforcement strategy if the model is born out.
5.2.4 Overview and expectations
The configuration of the independent variables in the CDA case is simple, as can be
seen in table 5.1. It is not difficult, therefore, to generate expectations on the course of
events that is likely to unfold in this case. The party scores high on both electoral base
attachment and ideological attachment. This means that proposition 3 and 4 (and by
extension propositions 5a through 5c) point in the same direction. For these propositions
to be supported by the data in this case, the party should display a preference towards
the reinforcement strategy and therefore pursue a reinforcement strategy in the first cycle
following the electoral defeat. As for proposition 6 on the effect of electoral systems,
the PR system the party operates in favours the reinforcement strategy. Therefore, we
should not see the CDA change course after the 1998 election, and it should remain on
the reinforcement trajectory at the end of the second electoral cycle.
54. Mair, “Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System,” 238.
55. Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
56. Although in 2002, the party’s campaign handbook noted that the main competitors were the VVD
and the PvdA and that there was less overlap with the smaller parties, including the Christian right:
Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Campagnewijzer Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2002” (2002), Collection of
Party Documents, CDA Central Office, the Hague.
57. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16.
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Table 5.1: Overview of the Independent Variables: the CDA in 1994
Internal factors Measurement Expected Strategy
Electoral base attachment Strong (personal ties) Reinforcement
Ideological attachment Strong Reinforcement
External environment
Electoral system Proportional Representation Reinforcement
Previous election Above average (+2,9%) Extension
5.3 The 1994 General Election defeat
The leadup to the 1994 General Election had already spelled trouble for the CDA. The
12-year premiership and party leadership of Ruud Lubbers was coming to an end and by
established party tradition, he was succeeded by the parliamentary party chairman, Elco
Brinkman. The two, however, had clashed in the run-up to the election over various issues,
primarily in the field of the welfare state, with Brinkman being regarded as more right-
wing than the Prime Minister, and during the campaign, their relationship remained
fractious.58 The matter came to a head publicly when the Prime Minister announced
he would be casting his preference vote for a candidate lower on the list rather than
his successor, which was widely portrayed as backstabbing Brinkman.59 Lubbers himself
recorded in his memoirs that this had not been his intention, and that with hindsight he
should not have done it, but he did acknowledge that the differences between him and
Brinkman caused friction.60
In addition, the municipal elections held earlier that year went particularly badly for
the party. A statement by an economist on the manifesto committee that the CDA “would
not exempt pension law” from the proposed reforms of the welfare state went down badly
with the party’s many older voters.61 In the municipal elections, they turned away from
the party towards newly organised senior citizens’ parties AOV and Unie 55+.
In the 1994 general election, the party lost 20 of its 54 seats in Parliament, reaching its
lowest level of electoral performance so far. This is well above the rule of thumb of a third
of the seats defined in chapter three. The crisis was further aggravated by the looming loss
of government office.62 It reopened the debate around the party’s foundation about the
future of Christian democracy in an increasingly secular society, thereby causing exactly
the kind of re-evaluation that our theory, following the literature, assumes happens in the
event of a crisis.
With regard to the way the 1994 election defeat related to the previous performance
58. See M. Metze, De Stranding: het CDA van Hoogtepunt naar Catastrofe (Nijmegen: SUN, 1995), 236;
R. F. M. Lubbers, Persoonlijke Herinneringen (Amsterdam: Balans, 2018), 196.
59. Metze, De Stranding, 237-238.
60. Lubbers, Persoonlijke Herinneringen, 196.
61. Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen,” 84.
62. There was still a chance of retaining government office and joining the new PvdA-led coalition was
not ruled out. However, D66 was pushing for a cabinet without the CDA, and when PvdA and VVD
overcame their differences to join the “Purple” cabinet, the CDA was left with no choice but opposition.
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Figure 5.1: Electoral performance of the CDA, 1977-1994
of the party and the identity of those who deserted the party, the picture is mixed, as
can be seen in figure 5.1.63 Over the five elections between 1977 and 1989, the party had
polled an average of 32,4% of the vote. At 35,3%, the 1989 election was, with 2,9%,
slightly above this average. By contrast, the 1994 election, at which the party polled only
22,2% of the vote, is 10,2% below the average. Employing the rough operationalisation of
the identity of the defectors given in chapter 4, this would mean that the party had lost
core voters as well as non-core voters. Some of the evidence the party itself had, which
describes the largest losses as having taken place among young (below age 24), urban
and irreligious voters, which are all more likely to be non-core voters, although big losses
were also recorded in the Province of North Brabant and among voters between 35 and
49, where the party had historically been stronger.64 Combining this with the fact that
the final election before the shock was above-average, there must have been a significant
amount of non-core voters that deserted the party, as well as core voters.
Indeed, this fits what we know about the vulnerability of the CDA as a result of partisan
dealignment and rising levels of volatility.65 This decline of the party’s Christian base was
already reason for pessimism around the time of its formation. As a consequence, the CDA
was more dependent on the floating vote, and would become increasingly dependentin the
future. The Gardeniers Commission showed itself aware of this.66 Combined with the
election result, this would mean that if the party wanted to return to its previous level
of performance, it would have to win non-core voters as well as core voters back. A
purely functional strategy would therefore lean towardsthe extension strategy so as to
63. Based on data from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
64. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16.
65. Van Kersbergen, “De christendemocratische feniks en de moderne, niet-seculiere politiek,” 201-202.
66. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16.
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win back the required non-core voters.This runs counter to the expectations derived from
the institutional variables in our model, and should thus provide an interesting test of the
model’s central idea that party change after an external shock is driven by institutional
rather than by purely functional factors.
5.4 The recovery strategy
As we have argued earlier in chapters three and four, the evaluations carried out by
political parties are a prime source on the background of the recovery process. The CDA
case is notable for the influence of its 1994 evaluation report, which resonated strongly
with the embattled party. This resonance is evidenced from the very start by the many
positive reactions to the report summarised in the national committee papers.67 This,
in turn, suggests that its fundamental analysis was recognised and shared by many in
the CDA. Therefore, we can conclude that this positive, ideological appraisal of what
the CDA was and what it was for seems to have been shared at least by those in the
party that were important to the recovery, and probably more broadly as well. This
makes the Gardeniers report a valuable piece of evidence in linking the picture of the
CDA’s strengths and weaknesses in the literature via its recommendations to the actions,
thereby allowing a clear evaluation of the propositions.68
Before diving into a detailed discussion of the recovery strategy, discussion of this
influential report is therefore in order. The committee was set up shortly after the 1994
defeat by the national committee. Its chair was to be Councillor of State and former
minister Til Gardeniers-Berendsen. The terms of reference were to look at the structural
causes of the defeat.69 Central question, according to then-acting party chair, Tineke
Lodders, was whether the result reflected dissatisfaction with the way the party had
approached the 1990s or whether there were more structural causes.70 The commission
itself emphasised repeatedly that it was not in the business of passing judgment on persons
or apportioning blame, also at the urging of the national committee.71
67. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Beknopte samenvatting ontvangen reacties op
rapport evaluatiecommissie,” Summary of the reactions to the Gardeniers Report (1994), inventory nr.
1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the
Hague; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur d.d. 2 juni 1994, gehouden in het SBI-congrescentrum te Doorn,” Minutes of the National
Committee, 2nd of July 1994 (1994), PB/9453766V/ps, inventory nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl
(CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 5.
68. Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen,” 108; Lane and Ersson, Politics and Society in Western
Europe, 149.
69. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 3; 45; Christen-Democratisch Appèl,
National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 6 mei 1994, gehouden
in vergadercentrum ’Hoog Brabant’ te Utrecht,” Minutes of the National Committee, 6th of May 1994
(1994), PB/9453193V/ps, inventory nr. 1678, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000,
voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 4.
70. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 6 mei
1994, gehouden in vergadercentrum ’Hoog Brabant’ te Utrecht,” 2.
71. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 8; CDA, National Committee, “Re-
sumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 6 mei 1994, gehouden in vergadercentrum
’Hoog Brabant’ te Utrecht,” 4.
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Reference has already been made above to what the Gardeniers report signifies for the
evaluation of electoral base attachment, ideological attachment and external challenges it
presents. We also know that the report resonated strongly within the party and got many
positive reactions.72 This is important because it signifies that the report’s core analysis of
the party as strong ideologically and in terms of membership but facing the challenge of a
declining core vote was taken to heart. Decision-makers, therefore, can be assumed to take
mostly the same line in assessing the parties strengths and vulnerabilities as the Gardeniers
report did. This assessment also, significantly, matches up with the measurements of the
independent variables in section 5.2. This is important to keep in mind as the recovery
strategy is discussed, since connecting these attitudes to the measures allows a judgment
of the internal versus the external pressures. In general, the former should push the party
in the direction of the reinforcement strategy, while the latter should push the party in
the direction of the extension strategy.
The Gardeniers report appears in the recovery process as a central thread running
through the recovery process. Therefore, the analysis below of the 1994-1998 period
starts with describing the relevant parts of the Gardeniers analysis and recommendations
in each area. Special attention should be paid as to whether the strong conviction that
the party’s ideology and membership were strong and the threat of demographic decline
led to the expected recommendations, and to what extent these were implemented. As
we shall see, this offers strong evidence about the strength of internal factors in the case
of the CDA, even after a further demoralising defeat in 1998.
5.4.1 Strong foundations? 1994-1998
There was a leadership change immediately following the election, with the Party Chair-
man, Van Velzen, taking responsibility for the electoral defeat and resigning. He was
succeeded by former prison director Hans Helgers after a brief interim period under the
chairmanship of the Deputy Chairman, Tineke Lodders. The party leader, Brinkman,
would resign in Augst 1994, pressured by the national executive into resignation because
they were unsure he could lead the party to recovery in opposition (much to the conster-
nation of some on the national committee).73 A shift of power within the party ensued,
for various reasons. One was the struggle of the new parliamentary party with its new
role in opposition. Brinkman’s successor as party leader and parliamentary party chair-
man, Enneüs Heerma, was a safe pair of hands who struggled to project the party line in
Parliament, and was replaced in 1997 by the younger Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.74 The high
average incumbency of the parliamentary party that has already been noted meant that
almost all of its members were socialised in the role of supporting the government. It
72. CDA, National Committee, “Beknopte samenvatting ontvangen reacties op rapport evaluatiecom-
missie”; CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 2 juni
1994, gehouden in het SBI-congrescentrum te Doorn,” 5.
73. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het Partijbe-
stuur d.d. 5 september 1994”, Minutes of the National Committee, 5th of September 1994 (1994), inventory
nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief,
the Hague.
74. Ten Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen,” 91.
Chapter 5. The Christian Democratic Appeal, 1994-2002 105
was therefore ill-equipped for opposition, and the parliamentary party seemed an unlikely
candidate at best to lead the way for change.
This, in turn, perhaps in response to the criticism of the Gardeniers report, led to a
new assertiveness of the national committee and particularly of the Party Chairmanship.
The incoming party chairman would play a highly visible role in the recovery process
as the extra-parliamentary party reasserted its influence. Important pressures towards
renewal did not come from the struggling parliamentary group or indeed from the national
committee, but from actors at a further distance such as the Research Institute.
5.4.1.1 Organisational changes, 1994-1998
The Gardeniers analysis strongly projects the image of a party which was proud of its large
membership and convinced that it was part of its core strength, reflecting an informal norm
reinforcing the party’s electoral base attachment. In the very introduction of the report,
the committee notes how inspiring the involvement of the membership in the process was.75
This perhaps served to convince the committee that the CDA remained a ‘bottom-up’
organization, full of involved members who were its strength. In contrast, the committee
was less kind to the party elite, whom it accused of technocratic smugness.76 The national
committee, in particular, had failed to balance the concerns of the membership with
political pressures on the political leadership, leading to disgruntlement over the 1994
selection and manifesto processes.77 In general, the erosion of checks and balances was
observed to have allowed the technocratic and political concerns of leadership to prevail
over the need for a clear Christian Democratic course.78
Relating all this to our model, the high degree of electoral base attachment (both per-
sonal and informal) should produce an organisational strategy shifting power towards
the membership. The reasoning for this is that the membership provides the party with
a valuable link to its core supporters in society and that strengthening the membership
therefore could serve to make the party more attractive to them. This is only strengthened
by the described disconnect between supporters and elites of the party, since it increases
the need for such a strategy. The importance of the membership is also underlined by the
prominence of the ‘people’s party character’ (volkspartijkarakter) as a frame for discussion
about the party organisation.79 This term often recurs in the minutes of discussions on
organizational reforms in the national committee80 and in documents surrounding organi-
zation.81 It bears remembering, in addition, that the party was the largest party in terms
of membership numbers at some distance. All this leads to strengthen even further the
expectation of a reinforcement strategy.





80. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur van 13 mei 1996, gehouden in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” Minutes of the Na-
tional Committee, 13th of May 1996 (1996), PB/9652215V/ps, inventory nr. 2805, Christen-Democratisch
Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 2.
81. CDA, Klaassen Commission, “Beknopte versie,” 1; CDA, Klaassen Commission, “Herkenbaar en
Slagvaardig,” 8-9; 29.
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This expectation is borne out by the recommendations of the report and the way they
were justified. The party had become too administrative in its orientation, and the
closer involvement of members and sympathisers was seen as a solution, particularly in
policy-making.82 While going little into specifics, the Commission did specifically call for
extended consultation of the membership, and therefore increased internal democracy.83
This general thrust was taken up by the Klaassen Commission (also known as the Appèl
& Weerklank II committee), a commission set up before 1994 under the chairmanship of
regional branch chairman and executive member Leendert Klaassen to review the party
organisation. Reconsidering its prepared recommendations in light of the evaluation of
1994, the commission recommended the introduction of membership elections on the
election of “high-profile persons” such as the party chairman, the top candidate on the list
(who is the party leader) and the top 50 candidates on the list.84
The national committee seems to have been ambivalent to this. First of all, two regional
branch chairmen openly questioned the wisdom of an overhaul of the party structure while
the party was in dire straits.85 Secondly, and more specifically, the national committee
indicated that it was broadly supportive of the principle, but proposed a number of
practical variants which included more limited and consultative versions.86 Earlier, voices
on the national committee had opposed the value of membership consultation on selection
altogether.87
The party council, however, proved more unambiguously sympathetic. This is not sur-
prising. Often when the national committee offered an election by acclamation in the
absence of a countercandidate rather than nominating multiple candidates, currents of
opposition to this practice surfaced.88 At the committee session that discussed the pro-
posals a majority supported membership elections, although not for the list.89 In the 1997
revision of the statutes, a membership referendum initiated by the council on a specific
issue90and the direct election of the party chairman (though not the top candidate), made
82. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 40-42.
83. Ibid., 41.
84. Ibid., 29-30.
85. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Concept-Partijbestuursstandpunt Herkenbaar
en Slagvaardig,” Draft National Committee response to Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig (1995), inventory nr.
1680, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the
Hague, 4.
86. Ibid., 15-16.
87. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur d.d. 14 oktober 1994,” Minutes of the National Committee, 14th of October 1994 (1994),
PB/9453766V/ps, inventory nr. 1680, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige
toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague.
88. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 10 juni 1995,” Papers of
the Party Council, 10th of June 1995 (1995), Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central Office, the
Hague; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 23 november 1996,”
Papers of the Party Council, 23rd of November 1996 (1996), Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central
Office, the Hague.
89. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Verslag Parallelsessie II Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig
op 10 juni in de Reehorst in Ede,” Report on the parallel session on the Klaassen report at the Party
Council on the 10th of June 1995 (1995), inventory nr. 1681, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij,
1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, p. 3.
90. Though this is left implicit, it can safely be presumed that this option was meant to cover matters
of policy, because elections of party officeholders and candidates were covered elsewhere.
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it to practice.91 It should be noted, however, that there would not be a contested election
for the chairmanship for the duration of the crisis.92
Further steps were planned in the area of membership involvement. The working group
‘Political Party New Style’ (PPNS) was instituted by the national executive in 1996 to
make the party more attractive to “socially-active people” (“maatschappelijk betrokken
mensen”) as a result of an action plan formulated by Helgers.93 Although some regional
branches immediately offered themselves as pilot locations, the enthusiasm seems to have
waned quickly and attendance at grassroots meetings to implement the PPNS proposals
was noted to be disappointing.94 After the report of PPNS, which recommended various
smaller initiatives, the only one that seems to have led to structural change was the
creation of differentiated types of membership, introduced only in 2003.95
It seems hard to get at the reason why PPNS failed where Klaassen succeeded. Likely,
issues of power were involved, as evidenced by the ambivalence of the national committee
to membership consultation which also resulted in the more limited scope of One Member,
One Vote (OMOV) involvement of the membership in selection (through direct elections)
and policy-making (through referenda) than Klaassen recommended.96 Important though
the chairman was, the proposals to elect the top candidate and the list via OMOV would
have constituted far more extensive reforms. It is likely that though the national com-
mittee was convinced by the arguments that the membership was a vital resource to be
tapped, issues of power and influence may have limited the scope of the reforms.
The same seems to have been the case in another major area of organisational reforms
proposed by the Gardeniers Committee: the unsatisfactory performance of the party
91. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1997, art. 58g and 59a1, accessed
August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9485, Documentation Centre on Dutch
Political Parties, Groningen University.
92. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 5 juni 1999,” Papers of
the Party Council, 5th of June 1999 (1999), Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central Office, the
Hague, 10.
93. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur, gehouden op vrijdag 16 februari 1996, in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” Minutes
of the National Committee, 16th of February 1996 (1996), PB/9652101V/ps, inventory nr. 2805, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 5.
94. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur d.d. 21 oktober 1996, gehouden in vergadercentrum Pax Christi te Utrecht,” Minutes of
the National Committee, 21st of October 1996 (1996), PB/9652385V/ps, inventory nr. 2806, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 5;
Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé vergadering CDA Partijbestuur d.d. 12
mei 1997 gehouden in vergadercentrum Pax Christi te Utrecht,” Minutes of the National Committee
Meeting, 12th of May 1997 (1997), PB/9752321V/ps, inventory nr. 2984, Christen-Democratisch Appèl
(CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 3-4, p. 3-4.
95. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Politieke Partij Nieuwe Stijl Working Group, “Concrete Acties naar
Partijvernieuwing,” Draft of the Report (1996), report nr. 9600810 version 4, inventory nr. 2806, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 7-
9; Implementation found in the 2003 statutes revision: Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en
Huishoudelijk Reglement,” 2003, art. 5.2 statutes and art. 2 HR, accessed August 22, 2017, http :
//dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9486, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen
University.
96. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 14 oktober
1994.”
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council.97 Here, the findings seemed to have been shared in a fashion similar to the area
of membership involvement. After all, the ineffectiveness of the party council was and
remained a complaint in discussions on organisation. Discussing the issue, the national
committee pointed out that a lack of preparation time and pressure put on the regional
chairmen by their membership of the national committee, seems to have been unhelpful.98
The size of the party council was also seen as part of the problem by the Klaassen
Commission. The recommendations of the Klaassen report about the party council were
mostly concerned with the numbers. The committee proposed that after the move from
regional to provincial branches which it proposed, the number of party council delegates
allotted to each association relative to their membership would be decreased.99 Like mem-
bership consultation, this seems to have run into concerns of power and influence within
the party, because these proposals failed to make it to the 1997 revision of the statutes.100
A reform to the national congress limiting its membership to municipal delegates, in-
tended to make it more democratic, did pass.101 However, since the national congress
had rather limited powers (as noted in section 5.2 above, it was the party council which
considered manifestoes and candidate lists), this change can be regarded as a minor one.
Ironically, the party’s organisational culture which Gardeniers saw as part of the prob-
lem seems to have limited the scope of the structural reforms proposed by the Klaassen
commission. However, it cannot be denied that significant steps towards democratisation
were made which followed the spirit of the evaluation report: the Klaassen commission
revised its recommendations based on Gardeniers, and the national committee and party
council followed by introducing OMOV elections for the party chairmanship and member-
ship referenda on specific issues. In this way, the power of the membership was enhanced.
It is also quite clear that these were made by the same logic as our propositions presup-
pose: that a strong membership, being rooted in society, helps to gain electoral support if
it is given a greater degree of power in the party organisation. In this way, the ‘people’s
party character’ of the CDA presents solid evidence in favour of a connection between a
strong attachment to a particular base and the reinforcement strategy.
97. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 32; 42.
98. CDA, National Committee, “Beknopt memo discussie in Partijbestuur over rapport Herkenbaar en
Slagvaardig, 23 september 1994.”
99. CDA, Klaassen Commission, “Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig,” 26; CDA, National Committee, “Concept-
Partijbestuursstandpunt Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig,” 9-11.
100. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1997, art. 55a, accessed August 22,
2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9485, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties,
Groningen University; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten, Huishoudelijk Reglement en Standaard
Reglementen CDA,” 1994, art. 66a, accessed August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/
eprint/9484, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
101. Proposal made in CDA, Klaassen Commission, “Herkenbaar en Slagvaardig,” 25-26; Christen-
Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1997, art. 55a, accessed August 22, 2017, http:
//dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9485, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Gronin-
gen University; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten, Huishoudelijk Reglement en Standaard Regle-
menten CDA,” 1994, art. 66a, accessed August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9484,
Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University
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5.4.1.2 Programmatic changes 1994-1998: the strength of ideology
The key variable in the model on programmatic changes is ideological attachment. As
has been argued above, the CDA, even as an office-seeking party, maintained a strong
ideological orientation. The Gardeniers report shows that this appraisal in the literature
also prevailed within the party. By casting the “responsible society” as an ideological
advantage enabling a middle way on the reform of the welfare state, the Commission
shows how confident the party was of its ideological relevance.102 The unifying importance
of the ideology in the relatively young party should also not be underestimated. All this
shows that the party had a high degree of ideological attachment that should lead to
a focus on traditional issues and ideology rather than a broader profile in which these
traditional values are downplayed.
Again, the recommendations of the Gardeniers report offer the first signs that the
party did in fact reason in this way. This is a first sign that the party did approach the
crisis from an institutional rather than a functional perspective as we have predicted, and
provides evidence in favour of proposition 5c that strong ideological attachment inclines
a party towards the reinforcement strategy. After all, as has been argued in 4.3. above,
the decline of the party’s traditional base, which it was also aware of, might have enticed
the party to play down its traditional values. The diagnosis of the report was that the
party’s external image had “flattened out” due to the technocratic demands of office.103
To remedy this, a renewed focus on the core tenets of the party ideology, united under the
concept of “the responsible society”, was prescribed, with a special focus on immaterial
issues.104
The party acted on this recommendation by setting up a Policy Review (Strategisch
Beraad, roughly translating as Strategic Council105) under the chairmanship of party
grandee and former Minister of Finance Frans Andriessen. It was prompted by a resolution
of the party council of November 1994, instructing the national committee to initiate such
discussions “in short order” and offer proposals for decision-making at the 1995 Spring
party council.106 This resolution also called for analysis of the recent social developments
to be guided by the Christian democratic ideology and the programme of principles and
named a few issues it felt should feature.107
The Policy Review was set up and carried out under the auspices of the party’s Research
Institute. Although the minutes note that formally, the institute was charged with the
102. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 11-12.
103. Ibid., 39. Original text uses the term \{}textit{"vervlakking"}.
104. Ibid., 37.
105. The translation “Policy Review” has been preferred over a more literal translation to draw attention
to the comparison with the Labour case (ch. 6).
106. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Resolutie m.b.t. plaatsbepaling” (1994), inventory
nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief,
the Hague.
107. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Resolutie m.b.t. plaatsbepaling” (1994), inventory
nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief,
the Hague.
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review by the national committee108, other documents109 noted that the initiative itself
came from the institute and its director, Jos van Gennip. This sheds an interesting light
on the agency of this actor. Much respected for their medium-term policy studies, the
Research Institute does seem to have had an authority that might have added to the
Review’s influence.
The Review was seen as, essentially, a renewed application of the Programme of Prin-
ciples, which would form its point of departure, to contemporary politics and society.110
Furthermore, the Policy Review Group, consisting of people “with some distance to the
daily policy formulation process”111, was given a threefold task: to advise with regards
to a repositioning of the party on “major social challenges” in the coming decades, to
promote dialogue and discussion and to recruit new capacity and expertise for Christian
democracy.112 The Policy Review Group included many exponents of a younger generation
of party thinkers, most prominently its influential secretary, Christian-social philosopher
and future Prime Minister, Jan-Peter Balkenende.113
The title of the report provides an apt summary of its contents: “New Ways, Firm
Values”.114 The “Strategic Choices” it made rarely shift the party’s ideological foundations,
but in fact return to the roots of the party’s ideology as expressed in its Programme of
Principles.115 In terms of issues, themes of security and values prevail – it gives priority
to immaterial issues as Gardeniers seems to have recommended.116
One might expect the party’s ideological tradition to have led to a more Christian-social
positioning. Indeed, the issues the party council asked for in the positioning resolution of
108. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
partijbestuur gehouden 20 januari 1995,” Minutes of the National Committee, 21st of January 1995
(1995), inventory nr. 1680, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang,
Nationaal Archief, the Hague, p. 6-7.
109. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
partijbestuur gehouden op 12 december 1994 in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” Minutes
(Resumé) of the National Committee, 12th of December 1994 (1994), inventory nr. 1680, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 2;
Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Het Strategisch Beraad,” Memo on the Policy
Review dated 19th January 1995 distributed at National Committee Meeting (1995), inventory nr.
1680, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief,
the Hague, p. 2.
110. F.H.J.J. Andriessen, “Aan het bestuur van de gemeentelijke afdelingen van het CDA,” Letter to
the Boards of the Municipal Associations, dated 5th of April 1995. (1995), WI/SBG/22.95/JPB/MJ,
inventory nr. 1680, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal
Archief, the Hague; CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-partijbestuur
gehouden op 12 december 1994 in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” 2.
111. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-partijbestuur gehouden op
12 december 1994 in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” 2, translation by the author of this
dissertation.
112. CDA, National Committee, “Het Strategisch Beraad,” 1.
113. Ibid., 2.
114. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Policy Review, Nieuwe Wegen, Vaste Waarden, Report of the Pol-
icy Review (The Hague: CDA, 1995), translation is the official party translation of the title. Ac-
cessed August 22, 2017, https://d2vry01uvf8h31.cloudfront.net/Organisaties/Visiegroepen/
Publicaties/Nieuwe_wegen_vaste_waarden_1995.pdf.
115. CDA, National Committee, “Het Strategisch Beraad,” 2.
116. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 37.
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November 1994 seemed to call for this.117 However, the Policy Review turned up some-
thing else. Voerman casts New Ways, Firm Values as a socially conservative document,
introducing a strong focus on values and standards that was not there before.118 Indeed,
while the document seems strongly grounded in Christian democratic ideology, it does
focus on issues that had not been part of the party’s core appeal earlier or focuses on old
issues in a new way.119 These choices would later prove very important, a crucial part of
the party’s return to power.120
Although the minutes of the national committee also give fear that the discussion would
be mired in procedures as a reason for ruling out amendments to the document itself,121
the party decided upon a new and less conventional method for discussion of its contents
in order to get a wide-ranging dicussion of the report beforehand in a ’bottom-up’ manner,
encouraging the district branches to take the lead in bundling reactions that would be
used to formulate the resolutions that would be presented to the party council.122 The
report was well-received in the branches, judging by a summary of the responses to this
consultation.123 One would expect that the 1998 manifesto would therefore have made
heavy reference to a report so well-received. The 1998 manifesto, however, follows very
Christian-social “centre-left” lines, as Lodders, chairwoman of the manifesto committee,
named community, family, healthcare and education as main priorities to the national
committee, with values and security missing.124 This might be due to the fact that it was
agreed that the committee should have some room to deviate from the Review.125 Later,
the 2002 manifesto would be based heavily on the work of the Review.
117. CDA, Party Council, “Resolutie m.b.t. plaatsbepaling.”
118. Voerman, “Inleiding,” 18.
119. For example, security, in the Dutch context, has mostly been associated with the VVD rather than
the CDA, and it figures as one of the main strategic choices of the Policy Review.
Reference is made to these 5 themes in Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé
van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur, gehouden op vrijdag 3 november 1995 bij het SBI te
Doorn,” Minutes of the National Committee 3rd of November 1995 (1995), PB/9552753V/ps, inventory
nr. 1681, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief,
the Hague, 2
120. As also argued by Voerman, “Inleiding,” 19.
121. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur d.d. 19 januari 1996 gehouden bij het SBI te Doorn,” Minutes of the National Committee,
19th of January 1996 (1996), PB/9652032V/ps, inventory nr. 2805, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA):
Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 2.
122. J.J.M. Helgers, “Aan de Kamerkringvoorzitters, c.c. de secretarissen,” Letter to the chairmen
of the District Branches, dated 25th of October 1995 (1995), VZ/9500179/SvE, inventory nr. 1861,
Christen-Democratisch AppÃšl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the
Hague; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Besluitvormingsprocedure Strategisch Be-
raad” (1996), inventory nr. 2805, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige
toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague.
123. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Samenvattende Inventarisatie Notitie Strate-
gisch Beraad: op basis van samenvattende reacties kamerkringen en reacties gelieerde organisaties,” Sum-
mary of responses to the Policy Review (1996), inventory nr. 2805, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA):
Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 4.
124. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het versterkt
CDA-Partijbestuur gehouden op maandag 13 oktober in "De Poort van Cleef" te Utrecht,” Minutes of
the expanded National Committee Meeting, 13th of October 1997 (1997), inventory nr. 2816, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, p. 3-4.
125. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur, gehouden op
vrijdag 16 februari 1996, in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” 4.
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The programmatic changes follow quite directly from the analysis and the recommen-
dations of the Gardeniers Commission. The high amount of confidence in the party’s
ideology and in particular in its focus on the ’responsible society’, as well as the pre-
scription to give more attention to immaterial issues, were taken to heart by the Policy
Review. The report of the Policy Review does exactly this: it sheds light on the issues
of the day, including rediscovered issues of security and values, while starting from an
extensive reflection on the Christian democratic ideology and maintaining the typically
Christian democratic focus on responsibility and society. In so doing, the Policy Review
became the cornerstone of a programmatic reinforcement strategy: it highlighted the
party’s traditional values, rather than downplay them. In this way, the programmatic
dimension of the CDA’s recovery strategy shows a clear connection between ideological
attachment and the reinforcement strategy: from the confidence in the party’s ideology
shown by Gardeniers, to a Policy Review which took this ideological heritage as a point
of departure.
5.4.1.3 Tactical Changes, 1994-1998: the advent of marketing
With high electoral base attachment through both informal norms and personal ties as well
as ideological attachment in evidence, one would expect that the tactical choices made by
the CDA would be guided towards a reinforcement strategy as well and lead to a tactical
focus on a narrower constituency. Indeed, this seemed to have been the early preference
of the parliamentary party.126 However, the evaluation commission’s recommendations
and, as we shall see, the party’s actions, did not conform to expectations. Instead, the
recommendations stressed a broader appeal by bringing in new organisations in civil
society and strengthening the position of those of non-Christian faiths.127
In looking for an explanation for this surprising deviation from the overall pattern, two
pieces of evidence suggesting lower electoral base attachment and a challenging external
environment should be kept in mind. First, the party was avowedly catch-all, since its
statutes committed it to appealing to the whole of Dutch society, and this could qualify
the generally strong electoral base attachment. Related to this, the evidence of partisan
dealignment contained in the Gardeniers Report suggest that the numerical importance of
the base in the future would decline. Based on a functional strategy, this would mean some
pressure towards an extension strategy to remedy the decline of the base. This interaction
of external factors with internal factors could lead to elements of a broader-based strategy
being introduced in the tactical dimension in particular.
A large role in these matters must be attributed to a number of bodies set up by
the national committee with the intention, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, to
help the party reach certain groups. The Intercultural Group (Intercultureel Beraad,
ICB) was reformed from a committee into a special organisation to help integrate ethnic
minorities into the CDA. The extension background of this initiative was not just clear,
it was actually explicit: the memo of the National Executive proposing this ICB-new
style explicitly referred to the clause of the programme of principles that states the CDA
126. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-partijbestuur gehouden op
12 december 1994 in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” 8.
127. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 29 & 39.
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directs itself to the entire Dutch population and it referred to a 1991 resolution which sets
the body a two-fold goal of promoting minority participation in the party and in politics
in general.128 A later memo on the body, however, made note of the tension between the
party’s Christian orientation and the position of minorities, a matter, as we shall see,
which would be a recurring theme and which would mean a natural constraint on efforts
to implement this particular Gardeniers recommendation.129
There were, however, also reinforcement elements. These largely concerned specific
groups that had deserted the party in 1994 and contributed to a combination of measures
appealing to core and non-core voters that is part of the extension strategy. The way the
pension system had figured negatively in the party’s image over the course of the 1994
campaign gave rise to a clearly tactical initiative: the wish, first expressed in 1994, for the
formation of an old-age group or association.130 The initiator of the eventual proposal,
Van Egmond, explicitly mentioned the relation to electoral targetting131, which is not
surprising as the elderly were one of the major base groups deserting the party in 1994.132
This Seniorenberaad was instituted by resolution of the party council in June 1996.133
Measures were also undertaken to strengthen the party where it was structurally weak, in
the cities, particularly the larger ones in the Randstad134 conurbation.135 To improve the
position of the party in the big cities, a working group was created devoting its attention
entirely to this topic.136
Under Helgers’s chairmanship, the CDA moved to using marketing techniques based
on lifestyle instead of demographics. In an analysis of (among others) the strategy of
the CDA in 1998, Van Praag and Penseel make note of the use of lifestyle segments
from the model of Amsterdam marketing firm Trendbox by the party.137 They note that
religious altruists (older religious voters) belong to the CDA’s core electorate, and the
profile given for “reserved social activity” (religious but less so than the altruists) also
128. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Executive, “Betreft: opzet ICB nieuwe stijl,” Memo to the
National Committee on the ICB-New Style (1994), PB/9453578/N/ps, inventory nr. 1679, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 9-11.
129. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, ICB Steering Group, “Betreft: Startnotitie / Plan van Aan-
pak,” Memo to the National Committee (1995), PL06/9454071c/N/ps, inventory nr. 1680, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 1.
130. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 14 oktober
1994,” 5.
131. CDA, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-Partijbestuur van 13 mei
1996, gehouden in het Jaarbeurscongrescentrum te Utrecht,” 5.
132. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16.
133. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 30 mei en 1 juni 1996,”
Papers of the Party Council, 30th May and 1st June 1996 (1996), Collection of Party Documents, CDA
Central Office, the Hague, 14.
134. The Randstad is the Dutch term for the country’s major conurbation, formed by the urbanized
area between the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. It contains the four largest Dutch cities:
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and the Hague.
135. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16 & 53.
136. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Betreft: Werkgroep Grote Steden,” Memo on
the Big Cities Working Group (1994), JK/05/12/1994, inventory nr. 1679, Christen-Democratisch Appèl
(CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague.
137. P. Van Praag Jr. and S. Penseel, “WatWil de Kiezer? Politieke Marketing en de Verkiezingscampagne
van 1998,” in Jaarboek 1998, ed. G. Voerman (Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke
Partijen, 1999), 107.
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implies that many of them were CDA core voters.138 The other two categories - labelled
"dependent security" and "civilized hedonism" and corresponding roughly speaking to
the "average Dutchman" who watched RTL4 and more individualist voters - are mostly
floating voters for whose vote the primary competitor is the VVD.139 The analysis also
makes note of a category of “more progressive young voters” (“caring postmaterialists”, in
the Trendbox terminology), who would have been attracted to the party on the basis of
the manifesto but were not chosen as a target constituency. Crucially, they note that the
“dependent security” segment of voters supported the CDA in large numbers during the
Lubbers years.140 Therefore, insofar as the short-term campaign plan is concerned, the
CDA’s strategy is accurately characterised as tending towards the reinforcement strategy.
However, with more long-term projects in the cities and among minorities, there are
significant elements of an extension strategy as well.
In response to the inability of the Parliamentary Party (which was not much rejuvenated
in the 1994 election, as stated before) to achieve breakthroughs in opposition, Helgers
and the executive came up with a very different candidate list for 1998: of the top 15
candidates, only the top candidate, new party leader Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, was an
incumbent MP. This intention to bring in a new generation was an explicit part of the
profile established for the new parliamentary party.141 Although none of these candidates
(save perhaps for Doctors Without Borders co-founder Jacques de Milliano) were new to
the party, the sheer scope of the overhaul and its intent of bringing in a new generation
are enough to qualify it as an increase in the number of “outsider candidates” and part
of the extension strategy. It has to be noted, however, that many of the candidates were
connected and identified with the new course set out in the Policy Review which, as
already noted, did not move away overly much from the party line.
In an interesting way, the actions of the CDA on the tactical dimension between 1994
and 1998 show how these strategies are often trade-offs. Nevertheless, this particular
combination of core and non-core voters leans on balance towards the extension strategy
rather than the reinforcement strategy. It seems that where short-term campaign strategy
was characterised as tending more towards reinforcing the base, several long-term projects
such as the ICB and the big-cities group were justified with reference to the demographic
decline of the base. These measures generally fall within the bounds of the extension
strategy. However, it is interesting to note that there is an element in the process which
does reflect some of the influence of high electoral base attachment towards a reinforcement
strategy in the form of the resistance to broadening the base to non-Christian faiths with
explicit reference to the ’C’ of the CDA.
138. Van Praag Jr. and Penseel, “Wat Wil de Kiezer?,” 107.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Candidate Selection Committee (Vertrouwenscommissie), “Rapport
van de CDA Vertrouwenscommissie Kandidaatstelling Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 1998,” Report dated
15th of September 1997 (1997), inventory nr. 2984, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-
2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 6-8.
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5.4.2 Sticking to the plan: 1998-2002
The 1998 election was without a doubt another crisis for the party. Despite its best efforts
in opposition, the party not only failed to gain any seat in Parliament but actually lost
a further five, bringing it to another record low of 29 seats. The party fell from second
place and was displaced by the VVD. The polls, however, had the CDA more or less
constantly around 30 seats up until the last campaign week.142 The loss was therefore
more or less anticipated. A report found that the party’s loyal electoral base (good for
around 23 seats) had held, and ascribed the loss of CDA-leaning voters to a premiership
battle between the PvdA and the VVD.
Despite the devastating effect on morale, an evaluation working group chaired by former
Central Office director Gert Groenendijk reported optimistically. The base had held,
despite its long-term decline.143 The party’s profile was strengthened on important issues
such as security. Despite an image problem, there was, according to the committee, an
opportunity to compensate by gaining the allegiance of newer voters.144 This must in part
have been due to the good position among the youngest cohort of voters.145
Given the shock of losing seats while in opposition, one could have reasonable argued
that the CDA might reverse course after 1998, adopting a clearer extension strategy
after the previous reinforcement strategy had failed to work out. As we shall see, this
is not in fact what happened. It bears keeping in mind that seat loss could have been
more or less expected looking at the polls.146 More importantly, the Groenendijk report
states that certain recommendations of the Gardeniers report hadn’t been completely
implemented yet.147 On that basis, it is less surprising that the party, rather than pivot
towards extension, went even further on the path it had set out on in 1994.
5.4.2.1 Towards OMOV: Organisational changes, 1998-2002
In 1997, the CDA revised its statutes, incorporating some of the Klaassen recommenda-
tions (see 5.4.1.1.). Combined with the lacklustre results of the PPNS pilots, one might
surmise that this was about as far as the CDA would go in terms of organisational reforms.
However, six years later in 2003, the party revised its statutes yet another time, this time
abolishing party council and national congress in favour of a single congress operating by
OMOV.148 Though the amendment is outside of our period of inquiry, its preparation is
not.
As we have seen between 1994 and 1998, while the principle of internal democratisation
was universally held on the national committee, the practice of full OMOV ran into
political constraints. Attachment of actors, especially the regional branches, to the current
142. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Groenendijk Working Group, “Nieuwe Wegen in Aanleg” (1998),






148. The result of this revision can be found in Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk
Reglement,” 2003, accessed August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9486, Docu-
mentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
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setup of party organs and the accompanying power structures, seems to have played a key
role here. The party council and national congress and their respective powers gave to
each lower level its own way to get influence. This much was evidenced by the reluctance
even to accept a change to the basis on which membership numbers transferred into
delegate numbers.149 On that basis, one would expect that the status quo after the 1999
revision would be held.
What caused the CDA to change its mind about OMOV? It could have been the
disappointing results of the 1998 elections, but if that were the case Nieuwe Wegen in
Aanleg would have recommended this course of action.150 Another possible reason is
external to the party, and should be mentioned because it presents the possibility that
the party’s hand was forced. In 1998, a lawsuit calling for the dissolution of the party was
filed by a private citizen because the party allegedly violated association law provisions
stating that the general assembly should be a single body.151 In the case of the CDA, it
was unclear whether the national congress or party council was this supreme body.152 The
response of the party reveals that there is no direct link with OMOV, however, since the
same letter by the party’s lawyer notes that the national executive then decided that this
role should be played by the national congress, while the party council should become
a ’political forum’. Merging the two, as in the later OMOV scenario, was not on the
table.153
The debate on OMOV was reopened when the youth wing CDJA submitted a resolu-
tion on party structure to the November 1999 party council.154 This resolution explicitly
called for the consideration of a full OMOV system, strict separation between council and
congress, multiple nominations as the rule and a new division of responsibilities between
sub-national branches and national organs.155 The text of the resolution, which was sup-
ported by the national executive at the party council, mentions the desirability of more
influence for members.
In response to this adopted call for proposals to be presented at the 2000 spring party
council, the national executive instituted a committee led by executive member Koos
Janssen to report on these issues.156 At the next party council and each subsequent meet-
ing, the committee reported in a way that much resembled the intent of the original CDJA
resolution.157 The OMOV system was to be extended to the entire party, including council
149. As described in 4.1.2., this recommendation of the Klaassen Commission was not implemented.
150. In fact, Nieuwe Wegen in Aanleg did not make any recommendations as regards the structure of
the party. Such was not even part of its rather technical terms of reference as reported on page 7 of the
report.
151. R. Steenvoorde, “Betreft: Aanpassing statuten,” Letter to the members of the Statutes Commission
dated 8th of December 1998 (1998), inventory nr. 3084, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij,
1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 1.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Resolutie Partijstructuur ingediend door het CDJA”
(1999), Digital Archives, CDA Central Office, the Hague.
155. Ibid.
156. M. Stolk, “Partij in Beweging; Partij in Ontwikkeling,” Draft Discussion Paper on Party Devel-
opment, dated 6th of December 1999 (1999), inventory nr. 2987, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA):
Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 6.
157. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken,” Papers of the Party Council, 13th
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and congress.158 In addition, multiple nominations would be made compulsory at least
for the party chairmanship.159 It seems likely that this radical course of action was made
possible because of the support of the national executive; not least because running up
to 2001, there were still notes of disquiet on the national committee about the extent of
OMOV.160 In other words: the same constraints we observed in 1994-1998 with OMOV
were still present, but seem to have been circumvented by an alliance between the national
executive and interested parties like the CDJA. In addition, Janssen defended his pro-
posals to the national committee by pointing out that newer and younger members were
overwhelmingly in favour of OMOV.161 This justification by appealing to the preferences
of new members implies that OMOV was considered important to stopping the decline of
the membership.
The Janssen Committee’s recommendations, in line with the CDJA resolution, appear
in the 2003 Statutes revision.162 OMOV was introduced in the new national congress
of the party that replaced congress and council, although each provincial branch could
send a number of delegates who would get an additional vote in addition to their vote
as a member.163 It is hard to infer causality here, but both the court case and the new
OMOV system seems to have played a role in merging the two organs. In the internal
regulations of the party (Huishoudelijk Reglement), there is an explicit requirement for
multiple nominations for the party chairman and his deputies.164 In this way, a discussion
that had been ongoing for a long time was brought to a conclusion.
Interestingly, the CDA also experimented with a very limited form of external democrati-
sation, which is conceptually part of the extension strategy. The national executive chose
a new way of compiling a manifesto. Rather than the usual internal committee which
would come up with a proposal to be amended and confirmed by the party council, there
of May 2000 (2000), Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central Office, the Hague, 89-92; Christen-
Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Spelregels Partijraad 4 november 2000” (2000), Collection of Party
Documents, CDA Central Office, the Hague, 16-19; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Ver-
gaderstukken CDA-Partijraad en Congres 3 november,” Papers of the Party Council and National
Congress, 3rd of November 2001 (Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central Office, the Hague, 2001),
17-26, The run of national committee minutes available at CDA Central Office reveals that Party Devel-
opment was a monthly recurring item on the agenda.
158. CDA, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken CDA-Partijraad en Congres 3 november,” 17-26.
159. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 17 februari 2001,” Papers
of the Party Council, 17th of February 2001 (Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central Office, the
Hague, 2001), 84-87.
160. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Verslag vergadering van het Partijbestuur van
het CDA d.d. 31 augustus 2001 in Utrecht,” Minutes of the National Committee Meeting, 31st of August
2001 (2001), Anonymous Personal Archive consisting of National Committee Minutes, CDA Central
Office, the Hague, 1.
161. Ibid., 2.
162. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement,” 2003, art. 27 and 30. Ac-
cessed August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9486, Documentation Centre on
Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
163. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement,” 2003, art. 30. Accessed Au-
gust 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9486, Documentation Centre on Dutch
Political Parties, Groningen University.
164. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement,” 2003, art. 24 and 25 HR,
accessed August 22, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9486, Documentation Centre on
Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
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would be a “Competition of Ideas”.165 In this competition, members and non-members
could submit ideas on ten major themes. The best ten of each issue area, as determined
by groups of experts reporting to the program team, would then be put into the mani-
festo.166 The 2002 manifesto marks each pledge inspired by such an idea with an asterisk,
giving us insight in the extent to which the ideas influenced party policy: about 75% of
the pledges, a substantial part, was influenced by the competition.167
It should be noted that there was no question of the Competition ever being enshrined
in any rules. It was deliberately presented as an experiment with an innovative way of
coming up with a new manifesto. The keyword here was “bottom-up”. The involvement
of non-members in this crucial policy formulation process was defended by stating that
ideas from outsiders were considered worthwhile even if the sources of those ideas could
or would not commit to membership.168 It serves the logic of an extension strategy as
we outlined it: the more people that are involved through external democratisation, the
more people are potentially bound to the party.
Because the Competition was an experiment with empowering non-members, it also
does not weigh up against the OMOV reforms which empowered the membership. This
means that power, on balance, shifted towards the membership, resulting in a reinforce-
ment strategy. This reinforcement strategy admittedly might not have taken the exact
same form without the court case brought against the party. However, the fact that the
party also entertained the possibility of a more limited change retaining the delegate-based
system, but in the end chose to go with the OMOV-based new national congress in a sim-
ilar vein as the first-cycle attempts at empowering the membership shows a continuing
thread between the Gardeniers report and its analysis and the recovery strategy.
5.4.2.2 Programmatic changes, 1998-2002
In programmatic terms, the reinforcement strategy continued. Despite the 1998 defeat,
there seems to have been a general consensus that the manifesto from that year was a solid
Christian Democratic document. This was, among others, expressed in references to the
manifesto alongside the Policy Review as a primary source of direction for the future.169
The only problem the Groenendijk working group found was a mismatch between various
165. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst CDA-Partijbestuur van 22
september 2000,” Conclusions of the National Committee Meeting, 22nd of September 2000 (2000),
Anonymous Personal Archive consisting of National Committee Minutes, CDA Central Office, the Hague,
1-2.
166. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Betrokken Samenleving, Betrouwbare Overheid,” 2002, 4, accessed
November 3, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/424; It should be noted that the original
way the Competition was presented would have only six winners, independent of focus group. This is
stated in CDA, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 17 februari 2001,” 77.
167. CDA, “Betrokken Samenleving, Betrouwbare Overheid,” 76 out of a total of 100 chapters marked
with an asterisk.
168. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Party Council, “Vergaderstukken Partijraad 4 november 2000,” Pa-
pers of the Party Council, 4th of November 2000 (2000), Collection of Party Documents, CDA Central
Office, the Hague, 43.
169. Resolution submitted by the CDJA, found in CDA, Party Council, “Spelregels Partijraad 4 november
2000,” 24; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst Partijbestuur van 2 juni
2000,” Conclusions of the National Committee Meeting, 5th of June 2000 (2000), Anonymous Personal
Archive consisting of National Committee Minutes, CDA Central Office, the Hague, 2.
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documents on issues like security released in addition to the manifesto, which were seen as
being external to it.170 A major conclusion of the committee based on electoral research
after the election was that the approach of 1994 through 1998 seemed to be working: in
addition to being the owner of issues like family, agriculture and values, the party was
fully in contention for healthcare and education and had made solid progress towards
ownership of the VVD-held security issue.171
The consensus therefore seems to have been that the party was on the right track
programmatically. Both in minutes of the national committee and in resolutions of the
party council, the drafters of the party’s newest manifesto were explicitly given both the
Policy Review and the 1998 manifesto as their frame of reference.172 Perhaps due to the
Competition of Ideas and a deliberate choice on chairman Van Rij’s part to push for
businessman Hessels, a relative outsider, to head the process, however, the final product
of the committee looked very different from its predecessor.173 The 1998 manifesto had
been regarded as a more social-Christian document – the 2002 manifesto’s top 10 priorities
include more conservative policies on law and order and immigration which were hitherto
regarded as the territory of the VVD.174 It is also telling that the issue areas named by
the Groenendijk report as areas with potential for issue ownership – healthcare, education
and security – contain prominent new initiatives.
A similar focus can be seen in various “themed years” geared towards claiming ownership
of various issues during the 1998-2002 parliamentary session. 1999 was declared the Year
of Security, with various programmatic efforts focusing on this topic.175 2000 became the
Year of Generations, focusing on both the elderly and families, two core CDA segments.176
Nevertheless, especially the Year of Security was not typical CDA programmatic territory
(as has been noted above, law and order issues are largely regarded as VVD territory)
and it can thus be regarded as a shift towards a broader political programme, part of the
extension strategy.
In conclusion, the party remained on the reinforcement track. This is largely due to the
continued optimism in CDA ranks about the strength of the party ideology. Combined
with perhaps slightly more realism arrived at through electoral research, this makes for
a strategy which hangs towards a focused programme playing on the party’s electoral
strengths – values and families – while attempting to gain ownership of a few highly
topical issues such as security using the conclusions of the Policy Review.
170. CDA, Groenendijk Working Group, “Nieuwe Wegen in Aanleg,” 21-22.
171. Ibid., 16-17.
172. Resolution submitted by the CDJA, found in CDA, Party Council, “Spelregels Partijraad 4 november
2000,” 24; CDA, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst Partijbestuur van 2 juni 2000,” 2.
173. M. L. J. Van Rij, Duizend Dagen in de Landspolitiek: Leiderschapscrises in het CDA (Amsterdam:
Meulenhoff, 2002), 105.
174. CDA, “Betrokken Samenleving, Betrouwbare Overheid.”
175. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Jaarverslag CDA 1999,” Annual report of the CDA, 2000, 22-23,
accessed November 3, 2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/822.
176. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Jaarverslag CDA 2000,” Annual Report of the CDA, 2001, 28-29,
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5.4.2.3 Tactical changes, 1998-2002
In the tactical area of the recovery process, there also seems to have been a continuation
along the lines inspired by the Gardeniers report earlier. The Groenendijk report found
that the 1998 general election had consolidated the party’s core electorate, although that
group was still declining.177 This observation is significant in two ways. First of all, it
notes the success of the defensive narrow-base reinforcement measures of 1994-1998, such
as those among senior citizens. Secondly, it once again draws attention to the realities
of partisan dealignment. Because the base had been more or less successfully defended,
this leads to the expectation that dealignment will become a bigger factor and lead to a
broader focus in tactics. This view was indeed taken as the basis for a presentation of
campaign strategy by Communications Director Joep Mourits, which advocated focus on
new groups of voters, especially younger CDA-leaning voters (oproepbaren).178 This strat-
egy was endorsed by the national committee.179 A pocket campaign handbook for 2002
also notes that especially among non-religious voters and Roman Catholics, improvement
of the party’s fortunes was essential for a good result.180 In addition, the CDA campaign
focused more on the PvdA and the VVD than on smaller competitors, surmising that the
main competition was with those parties.181 It can be said, therefore, that the CDA was
looking to recapture the support of non-core voters it had enjoyed under Lubbers.
A major initiative in terms of forming durable links with new segments of voters was a
renewed pursuit of the Gardeniers report’s recommendation to give a stronger position to
those of non-Christian faiths. Acting on this idea, Van Rij initiated the formation of an
arms-length Centre for Politics, Religion and Spirituality (Centrum voor Politiek, Religie
en Zingeving, CPRZ). This provoked criticism, both in the broader party and on the
national committee, that he wanted to do away with the party’s Christian inspiration.182
Saliently, though, the party chairman wrote in the party magazine that the CPRZ was
“intended to form new coalitions in society”.183 The centre functioned for the entire period
of Van Rij’s chairmanship, and was successful in drawing in minority figures such as the
Dutch-Surinamese Kathleen Ferrier, who would become the ‘outsider’ Deputy Chairperson
of the manifesto drafting team.184 It did not, however, durably lead to a visible shift in
focus of the party’s main tactical strategy towards minorities.
Meanwhile, Van Rij, himself a relative outsider (he had not been a member of the
national committee before ascending to the chairmanship) came to office with a spirit of
177. CDA, Groenendijk Working Group, “Nieuwe Wegen in Aanleg,” 18.
178. J. Mourits, “Waar liggen de groeikansen van het CDA,” Sheets for a Powerpoint Presentation dated
7th of April 2000 (2000), inventory nr. 3001, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000,
voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague.
179. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst Partijbestuur 7 april 2000,” Con-
clusions of the National Committee Meeting, 7th of April 2000 (2000), Anonymous Personal Archive
consisting of National Committee Minutes, CDA Central Office, the Hague.
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181. Ibid., 5.
182. CDA, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst van het Partijbestuur van het CDA d.d. 17 november
2000,” 4.
183. M. L. J. Van Rij, “CDA in het politieke landschap: CDA moet zich ontwikkelen tot pluriforme,
multiculturele partij,” CD/Actueel, August 14, 1999, 4–5.
184. Van Rij, Duizend Dagen in de Landspolitiek, 105.
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renewal in mind. Fraanje and de Vries and Van Rij himself note the range of appoint-
ments of outsiders in the party bureaucracy and key functions in the organisation.185
This continued in the traditionally ‘in-house’ appointment of the chairman of the mani-
festo committee: rather than appoint a party grandee as usual, the national committee
appointed two outsiders to the chairmanship and deputy chairmanship of the commit-
tee, businessman Hessels and the aforementioned Kathleen Ferrier.186 The wish for the
chairman to have a business background was even in the profile drafted for the vacancy.187
There are various versions of the precise agendas involved, but the fact of the matter
remains that De Hoop Scheffer grew to distrust party chairman Van Rij, leading to the
two being increasingly at odds towards the end of the second electoral cycle. Various
memos on the leadership and the course of the party from the chairman and his allies
were interpreted by the party leader as an assault on his position.188 The exact personal
interests involved need not be treated extensively in this chapter.189 The fact remains,
however, that by the end of the clash over the leadership this distrust escalated into, both
Van Rij and De Hoop Scheffer resigned from their functions, leaving a sort of vacuum
that was filled as by “Planned Coincidence”190 by the young Finance spokesman, the later
Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende. Balkenende had been deeply involved with the
programmatic renewal efforts as secretary of the Policy Review and was named by the
campaign plan as “the personification of the (. . . ) rich ideas and certain values”.191 As
such, this particular personal change can be seen mostly as a final choice of leader who
had been deeply involved with the strategy in programme, and more generally with the
new course of the party. So argued, it complements the reinforcement components of the
strategy apparent in the Policy Review.
On balance, the decisions taken on targeting and the diversity of the party elite seem to
continue the trend of the 1994-1998 period in containing both reinforcement and exten-
sion elements. The targeting focus on both Catholics (reinforcement) and non-religious
voters (extension) in the short term had shifted slightly to extension, perhaps because of
the success in reinforcing ties with the base earlier. The more important long-term mea-
sures enabled by long-term contingency, particularly the CPRZ were all geared towards
extension. It has to be noted, however, that the same resistance to extending the base to
non-Christian religious voters that was apparent in the response to the Gardeniers report
also surfaced here and to some extent hampered the execution of the plan. However,
on balance the strategy still focused in its long-run intent on broadening the base and
185. R. Fraanje and J. de Vries, Gepland Toeval: hoe Balkenende in het CDA aan de macht kwam
(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), 26; Van Rij, Duizend Dagen in de Landspolitiek, 105.
186. CDA, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst CDA-Partijbestuur van 22 september 2000,” 2.
187. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Profielschets voor de voorzitter van het Pro-
gramTeam” (2000), MS/20/09/00, inventory nr. 3001, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-
2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague.
188. Van Rij, Duizend Dagen in de Landspolitiek, 99-100; Fraanje and Vries, Gepland Toeval, 40.
189. For example, it was rumoured that Van Rij had ambitions to become party leader himself. Van
Rij has always denied this, and in an interview with the author paints the picture that by the end, he
had created a power vacuum from which a new leader simply had to (and did) emerge. M.L.J. Van
Rij, Interview with the author, The Hague, 12th of June, 2014; see also Van Rij, Duizend Dagen in de
Landspolitiek
190. Fraanje and Vries, Gepland Toeval.
191. CDA, “Campagnewijzer Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2002,” 5.
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projecting a more inclusive image, continuing the tactical extension strategy.
5.5 Conclusion: True colours
Although the party pursued a reinforcement strategy on balance during both cycles as
expected, table 5.2 paints a puzzlingly mixed picture of the CDA’s recovery strategy
nevertheless. Although the organisational and programmatic dimensions show clear rein-
forcement strategies, with at most minor extending measures being taken on the organ-
isational dimension, the tactical dimension turns up a strategy that leans more towards
broadening the party’s base than focusing on its core voters. Interestingly, this means
that while the party reaffirmed its traditional values and empowered its large member-
ship, where its targeting was concerned it focused more on those outside of its base of
core voters. How come? A clue might be found in the information available to the party
at the time. After all, the well-received and influential Gardeniers report made note both
of the party’s confidence in its membership and its ideology and of its vulnerability in the
face of partisan dealignment.
This works in two ways. On the one hand, the reinforcing elements of the party’s strat-
egy seem clearly related to this high degree of electoral base attachment and ideological
attachment, and this impression is further strengthened precisely because the party was
also aware of its vulnerability. In the face of that particular piece of information, one might
expect that the party would also downplay its traditional values and move power away
from the membership to allow more leeway to appeal to a broader constituency. The fact
that this did not happen is clearly related to the party’s high ideological attachment and
electoral base attachment. In the discussion of the Policy Review and the organisational
reforms considered above, the confidence in the strength of Christian Democracy and in
the membership from the Gardeniers report onwards clearly figure into the narrative for
these changes and show a party confidently putting its faith in the strengths it believed
it had.192
In particular, the resonance of the Gardeniers self-analysis throughout the process lends
credence to these findings. There were two components to this analysis: the strength and
relevance, according to members, of the ideology itself (the Christian Democratic vision on
man and society) and the vitality of the membership organisation (related to the people’s
party character). Both lead, with a single exception, to a uniform pressure towards the
reinforcement strategy on the organisational and tactical dimension: if one believes in the
continuing strength of its core ideological tenets, strong social roots and vital membership,
then of course one will tend towards going back to those strong foundations. This seems
to be what happened in both the Policy Review and the major moves towards OMOV,
although the latter naturally runs into institutional interests resulting in a reluctance
to embrace it. This reluctance was only overcome when the CDJA resolution on party
structure forced a breakthrough.
On the other hand, the party’s existing membership did not help it much in the face
of its own decline and particularly against the decline of its core vote that Gardeniers
192. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 11-12.
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observed.193 This might explain the apparent paradox that a party so attached to its
electoral base and its ideology would still pursue a strategy on the tactical dimension that
mostly seeks to broaden its appeal. This has been visible since the Gardeniers report,
which also recommended measures to extend the appeal of the party to non-Christian
groups. This could, on the one hand, be argued to emerge from the people’s party
character of the party – “the party, without distinction, appeals to the whole of Dutch
society”.194 On the other, however, there seems to have been more than a little resistance
towards broadening the party to non-Christian faith groups for fear of the Christian
inspiration of the party being lost. This attachment to the party’s Christian ideological
roots apparently prevailed over this commitment in the party statutes, as most of the
measures to extend to non-Christians fell flat in the face of it. However, this does not
explain why the party also took measures to broaden its core vote based on other factors
than religion, such as the Big Cities Group.
What tipped the scales in favour of broadening the electoral base and kept the party
leadership invested in their attempts to broaden their appeal was probably the reality of
partisan dealignment itself. This occurred especially towards the end of the 1994-2002
period and is most visible in campaign strategy documents between 1998 and 2002. Al-
though the documents do not directly link the two, the known decline of the party’s core
vote as recounted in the Gardeniers report and the renewed appeal to groups outside this
core vote do coincide, suggesting a possible link between the two. Among the different
facets of the recovery strategy, electoral tactics proved to be most susceptible to external
pressures. We also see this same pattern emerging in a more limited way on the or-
ganisational dimension with the experiments with forms of external democratisation and
membership diversification such as the PPNS pilots and the Competition of Ideas, intro-
ducing an extending element into an organisational strategy mostly based on empowering
the membership.
When we compare both electoral cycles studied in this chapter and look at the impact
of the second defeat, what stands out is that even if the party seemed deeply demoralised,
there was a large amount of continuity. The election defeat did not lead the CDA to
conclude that its current course must be wrong. In fact, the 1998 evaluation report
explicitly sees the new defeat in the light of the as-of-yet incomplete implementation of
the Gardeniers report.195 Although the strength of the Gardeniers Report as a kick-off
for the renewal agenda and the low expectations within the party for 1998 must be seen
as a factor, we should also entertain the influence of the electoral system here. Further
down the line, the argument of the lost election does not explicitly figure as a motivation
to redouble the efforts towards implementing Gardeniers. This suggests that these were
being pursued on their own merits and would have been increased even in the event of a
moderate gain. This suggests, in turn, that at least in the CDA case, the question of the
influence of PR can be settled by concluding that PR, at least in this case, has no effect
193. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16.
194. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, “Statuten en Reglementen CDA,” 1985, art. 3. Accessed August 22,
2017, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9483, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political
Parties, Groningen University.
195. CDA, Groenendijk Working Group, “Nieuwe Wegen in Aanleg.”
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on the choice of recovery strategy.
When its goals come under pressure, the first question the party has to deal with is
what the party actually is. In the case of the CDA, the broad but principled Christian
democratic people’s party led to a reinforcement strategy. This image goes back to the
time of its formation, and was undoubtedly reinforced in the pressure cooker of the party’s
early years. This is not surprising, given the prevalent idea in the literature on party
change that parties are inherently conservative and resistant to change.
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6 The Labour Party, 1983-1992
6.1 Introduction
If there exists a paradigmatic case of electoral crisis leading to dramatic changes in a
party’s outlook, it is almost certainly the British Labour Party’s reinvention as New
Labour. After going through a period of great internal strife in the 70s and a major split
leading to the creation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981, Labour suffered
one of the most humiliating defeats for an official opposition party in Britain: in the 1983
election, they lost a quarter of their votes, almost a fifth of their seats and barely scraped
for second place in the popular vote.1 The form Labour took after going through this
difficult period was perhaps the first iteration of the Third Way on the European left.
One might almost forget that it was not as easy as that. Before 1983, Labour was a
party with a deep socialist and trade unionist identity, under the increasing programmatic
control of those favouring its ideological purity. The transition into New Labour was
tumultuous and incremental, and not, as it turns out, all due to the internal motivations
of the party itself. In fact, the internal institutional characteristics of the Labour Party
would be a sure recipe for a reinforcement strategy, in which the party would go back to
its roots and its traditional values to rediscover its strength. This is exactly the opposite
of the ultimate outcome of the process.
The analysis of Labour in this chapter shows the clearest of all evidence to be found
for the proposition concerning the effects of the electoral system, particularly First Past
the Post (FPTP), on the recovery strategy. In concrete terms: the structure of the FPTP
system can be expected to constrain Labour to a more extending trajectory than one
would expect based on its internal characteristics. Taken together, the full thrust of the
expectations generated by the model in this case would be for initial preferences to show a
marked reinforcement strategy, before the effects of the electoral system give more rational
and functional reasons to pursue a reinforcement strategy.
This chapter analyses the process of transformation the Labour Party underwent be-
tween 1983 through 1992 based on minutes from the party archives and the personal
archives of Neil Kinnock, along the lines of our model, identifying two different phases:
an initial phase from 1983 until the 1987 general election and from the 1987 general elec-
tion onwards. Before doing so, section 6.2 will present a general overview of the Labour
Party and its organisation, and measure up the party according to the independent vari-
ables of the model. After a short introduction on the 1983 General Election which gave
the electoral shock in section 6.3, section 6.4 will then present a dimension-by-dimension
1. H. Döring and P. Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov),” Information on
parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.
parlgov.org.
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descriptive analysis of the recovery strategy as it developed. Finally, section 6.5 presents
the conclusion of the analysis.
6.2 The Labour Party in 1983: setting the stage
In the course of the 20th century, the Labour Party has emerged as the major centre-
left force in British politics. Founded in 1900 as the Labour Representation Committee,
the Party originated as a conglomerate of organisations (mostly trade unions) pooling
together into a single organisation to sponsor left-wing Parliamentary candidates. The
party introduced individual membership in 1918. It entered government for the first time
in 1924 under Ramsay MacDonald with a very small minority of the seats in Parliament;
over the course of the interbellum, Labour would rise to supplant the Liberals as the major
opposition to the right-wing Conservative Party. It won its first majority government in
the landslide of 1945 under Clement Attlee, forming a government that would among
others be responsible for the foundation of the National Health Service (NHS).
Over the course of its history, the bond with the trade unions remained a strong part
of the party’s identity. It was characterised during the period between 1945 and the
1970s as a rather moderate party upholding the “post-war consensus”, a somewhat cor-
poratist position shared by both the Labour and Conservative Parties. In his influential
Parliamentary Socialism, left-wing thinker Ralph Miliband argued that Labour’s history
was ‘dogmatic’, but about parliamentarism rather than socialism.2 They were strongly
committed to the parliamentary system and ‘flexible about all else’. Indeed, Labour’s
political leaders were more moderate. The rise of the left in the party in the 1970s led to
ever stronger factional conflict.
The link with the wider Labour movement (as the trade union movement is usually
referred to within party circles) has left a strong imprint on the party organisation. Webb
notes that British parties largely concentrate power at the centre, particularly around
their parliamentary parties, and place little in the way of demands on their members.3 The
Labour Party was no different in this regard. Where it was different from the Conservative,
Liberal and Social Democratic Parties, this was largely the result of its historic role
as political wing of the trade union movement. Organisationally, the party had three
wings: in addition to the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the extra-parliamentary
organisation represented nationally by the National Executive Committee (NEC) and
locally by the Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), the party’s affiliates, dominated by
the trade unions, comprised the party. To understand the Labour Party and the events
of 1983-1992, it is crucial to have an understanding of the dynamics between the three.
Like in all British parties, the parliamentary party was a dominant force and had wide-
ranging autonomy.4 Its leadership was also the leadership of the party-at-large and of the
2. R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1972 [1961]), 13.
3. P. D. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain: the Iron Law of Centralization?,” in How
Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, ed. R. S. Katz
and P. Mair (London: SAGE, 1994), 109.
4. Ibid.
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Labour movement as a whole. The PLP had dominated both leadership selection and
the process of policy-making, especially surrounding the authoring of manifestos. Unlike
their Conservative counterparts, however, the PLP’s authority was not unrivalled. This
was because of Labour’s setup as a mass organisation. The Labour Party Constitution
governed the way in which the entire party conducted its work, and was under the author-
ity of the Annual Party Conference, thus limiting the autonomy of the PLP compared to
the Tories and Liberals.5
This is particularly relevant when considered in light of the way the balance of power had
shifted by 1983. By that time, the PLP’s influence had become the victim of factional strife
between the left and right of the party. Historically regarded as a bastion of the pragmatic
right of the party, the PLP and its leadership were accused by left-wing activists of
repeatedly betraying the policies passed by conference and included in the party’s general
election manifestoes. This eventually grew into what could be called the “betrayal theory”,
which equated leadership with betrayal.6 Over the course of the 70s, the Campaign for
Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was set up by the left, and successfully pushed to
curtail the autonomy of the PLP. Two reforms in particular were important. First of all,
while the PLP had at first elected its own leader, in 1981 this was placed in the hands
of an electoral college representing CLPs and affiliates as well as the members of the
PLP.7 Secondly, the left had successfully pushed for mandatory reselection as candidates
of incumbent MPs, which meant local activists could more easily replace MPs whom they
thought had “betrayed” the manifesto.8 Regardless of these reforms, however, the leader
of the party remained a central figure to its organisation, and his elected frontbench team
of spokespersons known in opposition as the Parliamentary Committee or the Shadow
Cabinet9 was a driving force for policy still.
The other major actor in the party was the 29-member NEC. The unions were rep-
resented on this body by a twelve-man strong contingent, much smaller than the seven
allotted to the CLPs, five specifically to women and two (leader and deputy leader) to the
PLP (although some MPs served as representatives of other sections).10 These members
were elected by the relevant sections of party conference. The official role of the NEC was
to develop policy between conferences and direct the work of national headquarters.11 The
chairman of the NEC was traditionally chosen based on seniority, and did not have a large
role in the party organisation’s day-to-day direction. That role was played by the general
5. The Liberals had a Constitution, of course, but the Liberal Parliamentary Party was only named as
supplying members for certain bodies, and the appointment of its officers left autonomous. In the Labour
Party, this was different.
6. E. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 1994), 165; see also the quote by Mitchell on page 20.
7. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain,” 119; D. Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional
Right in the Labour Party 1979-1987” (PhD diss., Queen Mary College, University of London, 2004),
21-22.
8. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 16-17; Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional Right in the
Labour Party 1979-1987,” 19.
9. In the text, preference shall be given to the colloquial term “Shadow Cabinet” rather than the official
term “Parliamentary Committee”, in the interests of clarity.
10. P. D. Webb, “The United Kingdom,” in Party Organizations: A Data Handbook, ed. R. S. Katz and
P. Mair (London: SAGE, 1992), 855.
11. Ibid.
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secretary of the party, the head of Labour Party Headquarters, an important figure that
attended the NEC without a vote. The NEC conducted its work largely through a number
of committees, including the influential Home Policy Committee and the Organisational
Committee.
This leaves the role of the unions. In practice, the unions used their dominant position
in the party with a considerable degree of self-restraint.12 Unions were regarded as being on
the “traditional right” of the party.13 According to Minkin, trade union leaders recognised
that asserting too much influence would be damaging to the party, and therefore exercised
restraint, leaving leadership in political affairs to the PLP.14 Successive bodies were formed
to give union support to Labour election campaigns.
As can be inferred from the way certain bodies were perceived as on the left or right,
the factional balance plays a particularly important role. Each faction generally had its
own group of MPs and extra-parliamentary groups. The right of the party had historically
been dominant, with the support of the trade unions. Its ideology was “labourism” more
than socialism, being concerned more with furthering the labour movement’s interests
than with ideological concerns of socialism. They also dominated the PLP before 1981
organised in the Manifesto Group, but their power was diminished when defectors from
the right left the party and established the SDP. Their organisations were the St. Ermins
Group of trade union leaders, the Labour Solidarity Campaign and Forward Labour.15
By 1983, an important development was taking place in this factional balance as the
left was splitting. The leadership challenge of the left’s standard-bearer, Tony Benn, to
the sitting Deputy Leader, right-winger Denis Healey, is often seen as a pivotal moment.
Several left-wingers, including the party’s 1983-1992 leader, Neil Kinnock, abstained from
the ballot in protest, leading Benn and his allies to leave the left-wing Tribune Group of
MPs and form the ’hard-left’ Socialist Campaign Group.16 The remaining members of the
Tribune Group are usually seen as the ’soft left’. This soft left is very important to our
narrative, not just because Kinnock was a member of this faction, but also because this
split in the left opened up opportunities to ally with the old right and trade unions to
restore electoral viability.
The Labour Party is a large party, both in terms of votes, seats and members. Especially
in the latter regard, if the affiliated members through the trade unions are taken into
account, it dwarfed all other British parties with a total of just over 6,5 million in 1982.17
However, Webb also notes that these trade union members were largely passive.18 The
individual members were considerably fewer in number at 273,803, and much smaller as
a body than the reported 1,2-million membership of the rival Conservative Party in 1982,
but still way larger than the minor Liberal Party with its 100,000 members in 1985, the
12. See L. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 1991).
13. Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional Right in the Labour Party 1979-1987,” 10.
14. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance, 28; 30.
15. Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional Right in the Labour Party 1979-1987,” 8.
16. Ibid., 25-26.
17. Webb, “The United Kingdom,” 847.
18. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain,” 110.
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closest year these statistics are available for.19 As a result, Labour has a significant amount
of resources.20
It should be kept in mind that the factional conflict within the Labour Party strongly
colours the discussions on electoral base attachment and ideological attachment. Labour’s
tradition was, for most of the 20th century, defined by the dominant position of the
right, which was less ideological and more socialised in the parliamentary and trade union
environment. Essentially, the right adhered to a revisionist social democracy.21 However,
the rise of the left, which was more committed to socialism as an ideology and differed in
its ideas about the working class, changed all this in the rather short timeframe between
the foundation of CLPD in 1973 and the implementation of the electoral college in 1981.22
This will be expanded upon further in the analysis below, which serves to measure up the
party according to the independent variables of the model.
6.2.1 Electoral base attachment
The party’s strong links to the trade union movement and its wide array of affiliate organ-
isations make the party a strong example of a party with high electoral base attachment
through formal ties. In the common discourse, Labour has essentially been seen as the
party of the unionised working class and the political arm of the trade union movement in
particular. Webb notes that the trade unions affiliated to the party effectively “became”
its organisation.23 Within the party, this trade union connection is usually regarded as
a valuable part of the Labour identity; to the outside world, especially during the 80s,
experience with general strikes in the preceding decade had occasionally seen this bond
portrayed as pernicious or damaging to society-at-large.24 Nevertheless, the formal links
to the trade unions and the informal norms that put value on these links combine to make
the party strongly attached to its base through these formal and informal links.
This is in part due to the party’s origins as the Labour Representation Committee
through which the unions sought political representation, and in part due to the class-
based nature of British politics. Although Webb describes Labour as a mass-integration
party, he also distinguishes this from a mass-membership party and notes that essentially
“coalitions of parliamentary and union elites” dominated it.25 It was also grounded in
working-class culture.26 The working-class self-image of the Labour Party, in terms of our
model is informal electoral base attachment: the working class, perhaps more even than
socialism itself (hence the term Labourism), was the core identity of the party and its
raison d’être.
More importantly, however, the identity of the party as the political arm of the broader
Labour movement found expression in its institutions and therefore in the broader dy-
19. Webb, “The United Kingdom,” 847.
20. Although Webb remarks that most British parties do not place a lot of demands on their members.
21. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 2.
22. Ibid., 8.
23. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain,” 110.
24. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 46.
25. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain,” 110, italics added.
26. L. Black, “‘What kind of people are you?’ Labour, the people and the ‘new political history’,” in
Interpreting the Labour Party: Approaches to Labour Politics and History (2003), 31.
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namics of power within the party. The party did not just have individual members, but
also a huge block of affiliates who were members through their trade unions. These affil-
iates were largely passive payers of an automatic ‘political levy’ through which the trade
unions supported the party.27 The number of individual members, who joined through
their local Constituency Labour Party (CLP), was considerably smaller. This meant the
levy dwarfed Labour’s income from membership fees, giving the unions a strong position.
This strong position was also expressed in the party’s governing bodies. The party’s
Annual Conference or national congress consisted of one delegate per 5000 members, be
they affiliated through their union or CLP, which gave the unions a huge ‘block vote’ to
cast on behalf of their largely passive membership.28 Likewise, the unions were guaranteed
12 seats on the 28-man National Executive Committee (NEC) for their representatives.29
This tied the party strongly to its trade union roots both through the purse strings and
through power relationships. It should be noted that the unions were reticent when it
came to exercising this power, as has already been noted above.
Even if the Labour Party was strongly attached to its working-class and trade union
base through its formal organisation, it should be noted that like all major parties, it was
confronted with the effects of partisan dealignment. Webb notes that both its individual
and affiliate membership were declining, and that there was also a decline in the patterns
of class voting.30 Documents in the personal archives of Neil Kinnock show that the
party was aware of this.31 However, the party remained formally attached to the trade
unions, and this influence required them to at least take the views of their unionised
base into account. This attachment to the electoral base of the party should engender a
reinforcement strategy, particularly in the field of electoral tactics and organisation: the
party’s history as a working-class movement should make it more difficult to veer away
from this particular path.
6.2.2 Ideological Attachment
As noted above, Labour’s identity was defined more by its working-class base than its
ideology, which was commonly described within the party as “democratic socialism”.32
The word “commonly” should be emphasised here, for the party had no declaration of
its founding principles which contained the official version of this ideology. What official
references there were to ideology were contained within the party constitution, specifically
in the infamous Clause IV which described its aims. The original version of this clause
contains a commitment to eventual full-scale nationalisation of the means of production.33
27. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain,” 114.
28. Webb, “The United Kingdom,” 857.
29. Ibid., 855.
30. Webb, “Party Organizational Change in Britain,” 114-115.
31. G. Marshall et al., “The Decline of Class Politics?” (1985), KNNK 2/1/67, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 2-3.
32. For instance in the title of N. Kinnock and R. Hattersley, “Democratic Socialist Aims and Values”
(1988), Papers on the Policy Review, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
33. D. Wring, “The media and intra-party democracy: ‘New’ Labour and the clause four debate in
Britain,” British Elections & Parties Review 7, no. 1 (1997): 50.
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The words were considered symbolic and appeared on the party’s membership cards.34
Nevertheless, Clause IV has been divisive throughout the party’s history, showing much
of Labour’s conflictedness when it came to its ideology. This was a factional conflict.
The right of the party had a more practical bend, while the left was more ideologically
motivated.35 This came to the fore in various battles between left and right, such as
the 1960s attempt by rightist leader Hugh Gaitskell to abolish Clause IV because of its
electoral drawbacks. Davis notes that the party’s socialist ideals such as Clause IV had
at most been paid lip service, and subordinated to the need to achieve the emancipation
of the working class through Parliament.36
It was the right wing, with its “Labourism”, rather than socialism, driving the party for
most of its existence.37 According to Cronin, Labourism rested on cooperation between
trade unions and government to keep wages low, coupled with Keynesian economic strate-
gies to spur growth.38 For much of its existence, therefore, the party was very pragmatic,
willing to sacrifice its expressed socialist principles to secure government and the ability
to make parliamentary progress. This was made possible by the passive position adopted
by the trade unions and the membership. Its history is not one of strong ideological
attachment.
Nevertheless, by 1983, this had changed. The movement known as the “New Left”
within the Labour Party had changed the dynamics within the party. More activist party
members felt betrayed by the parliamentary leadership and openly denounced the prag-
matism with which the party conducted itself in government as a casual disregard for the
party’s electoral manifestoes. The strength of the left was already evident as early as
the 1960 party conference, when the party briefly embraced unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment until party leader Hugh Gaitskell’s Campaign for Democratic Socialism succeeded in
overturning it, and in the successful resistance to Gaitskell’s attempt to scrap Clause IV
at the same conference.39 Unilateral nuclear disarmament and Euroscepticism would be
major bones of contention between the factions.40 These charges of betrayal against the
elected leadership of the party led to the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD)
in 1973: unless the MPs were brought to heel by mandatory reselection as a candidate,
an electoral college for the leadership and NEC control over the manifesto, they would
keep betraying the leadership, according to the left.41
Due to a loss of control of the union leaders over their members, the activists were
able to mobilise successfully. Between 1979 and 1981, both mandatory reselection and
34. Ibid.
35. M. Davis, “’Labourism’ and the New Left,” in Interpreting the Labour Party: Approaches to Labour
Politics and History, ed. J. Callaghan, S. Fielding, and S. Ludlam (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2003), 45.
36. Ibid.
37. see Davis, “’Labourism’ and the New Left”; J.E. Cronin, New Labour’s Pasts: the Labour Party and
its Discontents (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004), 7-8.
38. Cronin, New Labour’s Pasts, 7-8.
39. Davis, “’Labourism’ and the New Left,” 41 & 45; Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional Right
in the Labour Party 1979-1987,” 6.
40. Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional Right in the Labour Party 1979-1987,” 6.
41. Ibid., 15.
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the Electoral College were achieved.42 This put pressure on MPs to tread more carefully
around their CLPs. The left also managed to secure crucial seats on the NEC from
year to year, and left-winger Michael Foot was elected by a PLP under pressure from
their constituency parties to lead the party in 1979.43 This flexing of muscles by the
left, combined with the exodus of major right-wingers who defected to form the Social
Democratic Party in 1981, turned Labour’s ideological character around. Since the left,
which was far more ideologically attached than the right, occupied such a position of
power, Labour has to be regarded as strongly ideologically attached, even if less so than a
party in which ideological attachment had a longer history of ideology. This should make
it costlier to pursue an extension strategy, particularly in the field of programme, since
the dynamics of influence in the party would resist such changes. Altogether, Labour
should therefore be expected to pursue a reinforcement strategy.
6.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system
The British political system is notoriously majoritarian – in fact, the Westminster system
is seen as the archetype of the majoritarian system. British elections to Parliament are
effectively elections for a governing party, since a single party typically controls a majority
of the seats in the House of Commons. Between 1945 and 1983, there has been only a
single election that returned a so-called “hung parliament” in which no single party had
an overall majority, in February 1974.
This is because the elections are conducted using a First Past the Post (FPTP) system
with single-member electoral districts. In chapter three, we have already argued, following
Rohrschneider, that a majoritarian electoral system like FPTP will make it harder for
core voters to defect, as well as giving parties incentives to chase after unaligned voters.44
In practice, the electoral system results in a large number of safe seats for both major
parties – as Golosov has noted, very large parties are generally advantaged by the system,
and the system also benefits those with territorially concentrated support.45 Safe Labour
seats are historically concentrated in urban areas, mostly in the industrial heartlands of
the North of England, whereas Conservative safe seats are more rural, located largely
in the Home Counties in the South. The election is effectively decided in a number of
marginal constituencies where the two parties are closely matched, given that these seats
determine the majority in Parliament. As a result, the British electoral system is quite
disproportional, with a Rose index of proportionality of just 76.3546 for the 1983 General
Election.47
42. Hayter, “The Fightback of the Traditional Right in the Labour Party 1979-1987,” 21-22.
43. Ibid., 21.
44. R. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing: how do parties target voters in election campaigns?,”
Electoral Studies 21, no. 3 (2002): 378.
45. G. V. Golosov, “Party nationalization and the translation of votes into seats under single-member
plurality electoral rules,” Party Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 126.
46. Calculated by the author based on data from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments
database (ParlGov).”
47. The Rose index is calculated by subtracting the sum of the differences between each party’s voteshare
and seatshare at a given election, divided by two, from 100. See R. Rose, ed., International Encyclopedia
of Elections (Washington: CQ Press, 2000)
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Table 6.1: Overview of the Independent Variables: the Labour Party in 1983
Internal factors Measurement Expected Strategy
Electoral base attachment Strong Reinforcement
Ideological attachment Strong49 Reinforcement
External environment
Electoral system First Past the Post Extension
Previous election Below average (-4%) Reinforcement
This has resulted in a party system that is effectively a two-party system, where only
two parties stand any chance of entering into government: the Conservative Party and the
Labour Party. However, by 1983, a serious challenge had developed to this mode of com-
petition in the form of the Alliance between the centrist Liberal Party and the breakaway
Social Democratic Party formed by four rebel Labour MPs, which polled unprecedentedly
high numbers in the popular vote for a third party in British history at 25.4% in the 1983
general election compared to Labour’s 27.6%.48
The characteristics of the British electoral system are such that if the goal is to win
more seats (and through them, a majority government), appealing to those that have
voted for the party in the past is less useful. After all, these supporters largely live in safe
seats that Labour already holds, and increasing the majority of the votes there therefore
has no effect towards securing a majority. Therefore, there should be increasing pressure
towards an extension strategy as the crisis continues, since this the electoral logic should
push the party in this direction. In addition, the evidence already noted above of the
decline of the party’s working-class base should also lead Labour towards an extension
strategy to compensate for this decline. According to the operationalisation of the impact
of external factors developed in chapter four, this should primarily be in evidence in the
second electoral cycle between 1987 and 1992, especially since the 1987 general election
ended in another defeat for the party.
6.2.4 Overview and expectations
As shown in table 6.1, Labour’s internal characteristics at the time of the 1983 general
election point into a single direction. Through its history and its formal links to the
trade union movement, Labour remained strongly attached to its working-class base. In
addition, however, the dominance of the left and the concern for socialist ideological
purity which it had managed to push to the forefront through the CLPD, strengthened
the attachment of key actors in the party to socialist ideology. Because of this, we can
expect a uniform influence towards a reinforcement strategy during the first electoral
cycle. However, the dynamics of the FPTP electoral system constrain this option: an
48. See I. Crewe and A. King, SDP: the Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic Party (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995).
49. Albeit with less of a tradition and more due to the increased influence of the left in the party, who
can definitely be said to have such an attachment more than the party’s traditional rightist leaders.
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appeal to Labour’s core voters, concentrated as they are in safe seats, will only have
a limited effect if the party is to win back power. Therefore, a second cycle can be
expected to show a change of strategy from the reinforcement to the extension strategy.
For propositions 3 through 6 to find support in the data, therefore, the party should start
off with a reinforcement strategy and then change to an extension strategy in the second
cycle.
6.3 The 1983 General Election defeat
The 1983 General Election defeat saw Labour suffer the worst defeat in its history. Despite
being in opposition against a generally unpopular government, the party managed to lose
52 of its 261 seats, about one-fifth, and after losing almost 10% of its share of the popular
vote (a quarter of what it had polled in 1979) was uncomfortably close to the Alliance
in the battle for second place.50 This is below the 33% of votes or seats lost which we
have set as a rule of thumb to recognise a crisis in a quantitative way. However, there
are solid qualitative reasons to consider the case despite this. The official opposition can
usually expect to gain seats at a general election. However, in 1983, this expectation of
at least gaining on the Conservative government was not met in the slightest, leading
to a feeling of crisis on all sides of the party, expressed differently: the hard left loudly
complained that the Alliance and the press had stolen the election from them, whereas
the right blamed the defeat on the left.
The fact that the previous election had already been a defeat for Labour also plays a
role when we consider the identity of the defectors. In 1979, Labour was already below
its average performance over the last five elections by 4%, as can be seen in the chart in
figure 6.1.51 The shock of 1983 brought it down to 13,3% below this average. This means
that most of the defectors would have been core voters judging by our operationalisation.
Though there might be some non-core voters involved, the threat to the core vote was
significant. This would mean that the functional strategy for Labour to pursue would be
a reinforcement strategy. As we shall see later in the discussion of tactical change, there is
evidence supporting the picture that the Thatcherite Conservative Party was presenting
a challenge to groups which traditionally voted Labour.
Perhaps thanks to the most graphical description of it by right-wing Labour MP Gerald
Kaufman as “the longest suicide note in history”52, the 1983 election defeat is associated in
the popular mind with the Labour Party manifesto.53 The manifesto was pushed through
based on all the resolutions of a party conference dominated by the left of the party.54
This led to a manifesto seen by many on the right of the party as unwieldy, contradictory
and out-of-touch with the concerns of ordinary voters, without emphasis. It is generally
also presumed that the manifesto’s inclusion of many unpopular policies contributed to
50. Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
51. Based on data from ibid.
52. “Editorial comment: a loser’s manifesto,” Financial Times, May 17, 1983,
53. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 41.
54. Ibid., 24.
Chapter 6. The Labour Party, 1983-1992 137
Figure 6.1: Electoral performance of the Labour Party, 1966-1983
the defeat.55
In addition, secondary literature implies that the party’s attitude to communication
was outmoded. While the Conservatives conducted a slick, professionalised campaign
using the services of PR agency Saatchi and Saatchi, which had also seen them to victory
in 1979, the Labour left had a deep mistrust of using the techniques of modern marketing
in political campaigns, considering them too corporate and capitalist.56 This might also
have contributed to the defeat.
6.4 The recovery strategy
The 1983 landslide defeat threw the Labour Party into disarray. However, it seems that
the dominant interpretation of the defeat, expressed by many on the left, was that its
political direction and policies were not to blame. Outgoing party leader, Michael Foot,
emphasised that he thought the manifesto was not the problem and that he was convinced
the party’s stances would be vindicated.57 The general attitude on the left seems to have
been that the voters might not perhaps have appreciated Labour’s principled positions
during the general election but that they would in time be able to be educated to come
round to the party’s point of view. This was underscored by statements like “nuclear
disarmament policy should not be decided by a public opinion poll” (attributed to the
55. Ibid., 27.
56. Ibid., 53.
57. M. Foot, “Manifesto Will Prove Right,” Labour Weekly, July 17, 1983, Accessed at the Labour
History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
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General Secretary, Jim Mortimer, in Labour Weekly)58 in defence of the policy on uni-
lateral nuclear disarmament, which indicated that although the party’s leadership on the
left was aware that its policy was out-of-sync with ordinary voters, it did not believe that
this should result in changing it.
By contrast, critics of the leadership, mostly on the right of the party, were very quick
to point out the flaws in the party’s policies and presentation. Gwyneth Dunwoody MP,
who would later become a prominent leader on the right, wrote to the General Secretary
that “. . . the entire presentational attitude to these policies could not have been better
designed to alienate the very people whose votes we needed”59 and the General Secretary
wrote in Labour Weekly shortly after the election that the defeat was political rather than
organisational, and owed to a number of “own goals”.60 It appears that this assessment was
also shared to some extent at Labour Party Headquarters, because Policy Director Geoff
Bish wrote of the failure to prepare a manifesto that “accurately reflected the concerns
and needs of ordinary voters” as one of the failings, also mentioning presentational and
organisational feelings.61
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the mood on the left of the party, the National Execu-
tive Committee’s evaluation of the 1983 general election, which was put before the 1983
Party Conference as the statement Campaigning for a Fairer Britain, reveals that it was
unwilling to lay the blame squarely at the feet of the party’s policies.62 The tone of the
NEC statement as regards policy seemed to be that a majority agreed with the party,
but that the SDP split had alienated them from the party.63 The campaigning priorities
outline fairly traditional areas of party policy as the focus of party efforts, and most of
the changes announced dealt with organisation and party unity.64 It seems therefore that
even the magnitude of the defeat was almost unable to convince part of the party elite
(though not its new parliamentary leadership) that the crisis could not be ignored.
However hesitantly, the party had resolved to act on the crisis and perhaps moreso than
the NEC, the incoming party leadership under Kinnock and Hattersley had resolved to
tackle the party’s problems in a decisive manner. Between 1983 and 1992, when Kinnock
left office, and even moreso between 1983 and 1997, when Blair won a majority, Labour
would be transformed into an altogether more centrist governing alternative, adopting
some of the characteristics of its Conservative rival. In terms of the dominant power
coalition, this has gone hand-in-hand with the reassertion of power by the parliamentary
leadership of the party through the sidelining of the Party Conference in policy-making
58. H. Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim,” Labour Weekly, July 17, 1983, Accessed at the Labour
History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
59. G. Dunwoody, “Letter to James Mortimer, General Secretary, the Labour Party” (1983), page
stamped 000702, National Executive Committee Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre,
Manchester.
60. Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim.”
61. G. Bish, “The 1983 Election Campaign: the Failures: and Some Lessons” (1983), KNNK 2/1/20, the
Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 1.
62. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, “Campaigning for a Fairer Britain” (1983), KNNK
2/4/3, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; J. Mortimer, “Gen-
eral Secretary’s Interim Report” (1983), KNNK 2/1/20, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill
Archives Centre, Cambridge.
63. Labour, NEC, “Campaigning for a Fairer Britain,” 6.
64. Ibid., 7-14.
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and the employment of a more professional organisation in the Leader’s Office.
There is a very clear dividing line to be drawn between the first electoral cycle of
Kinnock’s leadership from 1983 to 1987, in which the outlook was more traditional, and
the later period from 1987 to 1992, in which some of the contours of what would later
become New Labour were becoming visible. Due to the decision to restrict analysis to two
electoral cycles following the shock, this chapter does not go beyond 1992 in the analysis.
This is not as problematic as it might seem - after a fashion, Blair’s New Labour emerged
as a consequence of the foundations laid under Kinnock’s leadership.65 We shall return to
this argument in the conclusion. In the sections that follow, we shall occasionally discuss
New Labour – but always from the perspective of how Kinnock’s actions presaged and
enabled the later formation of New Labour and its essential characteristics.
6.4.1 First hesitant steps: 1983-1987
The 1983-1987 period of Labour’s recovery process is characterised by a rather traditional
reinforcement strategy. Internally, the period seems to have marked a shift in the balance
of power within the party from the hard left of the party to a coalition of the soft left
and the trade unions, led by the party leader, Neil Kinnock. This was marked by the
development of a more compliant attitude by the NEC towards the 1987 general election as
elections to the NEC saw members more sympathetic to the party leadership returned.66
It was also evidenced by the party leader’s struggle with the Militant Tendency. This
Trotskyist faction, often accused of entryism, had built several power bases inside the
party and the country. The group clashed with the party leader’s new mission to make the
party electable, offering a radical left-wing alternative and promoting civil disobedience.
The group had been proscribed in 1982 but still retained sympathy in significant parts
of the party. A turning point in the battle against Militant for Kinnock was marked by
a widely-acclaimed speech to the 1985 Party Conference in which he turned on the “far-
fetched resolutions” of the Labour left, referring to Militant-influenced Liverpool Council’s
disobedience to new local government budget restriction, which saw the council infamously
hire taxis to “. . . scuttle round the city, handing out redundancy notices to its own
workers”, in Kinnock’s words.67 Following the speech, sympathy for Militant took a heavy
hit, and in 1986, the Liverpool Council’s deputy leader was expelled from the party.
Nevertheless, as we shall see, the NEC and the leadership did hold considerably dif-
ferent outlooks (and the hard left, still influential, held yet another). The NEC can be
characterised as cautious. With a significant left-wing contingent and wary of the CLPs
which would react against too radical changes, the NEC primarily focused on organisa-
tional reform at the Walworth Road Party Headquarters. Even there, it was noted by
65. Although this could be seen to be by no means both a necessary and sufficient condition. After all,
John Smith’s leadership between 1992 and 1994 was a more traditional continuation of Kinnock’s course
(for example, Smith’s leadership saw the implementation of OMOV). Smith died in office, but his more
limited reforms might very well have won the 1997 general election Blair’s reforms went much further
than Smith or Kinnock would ever have considered, but in a way they continue the more individualist
cast which Neil Kinnock’s programmatic reforms had given to Labour politics.
66. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 37; 159.
67. Quoted in ibid., 36.
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his team member Patricia Hewitt that Kinnock had to take the lead to avoid different
vested interests on the NEC bogging down the reforms.68 It outlined a fairly traditional
campaigning agenda, stemming from its evaluation of the defeat in Campaigning for a
Fairer Britain as a function of presentation and party unity.
It should be noted that Kinnock’s origins in the soft left probably did not put him
that far from the old party line on many issues. His leadership campaign recommended
that “unilateralism [in nuclear disarmament] must be held to unequivocally”69. However,
he seemed aware of the fact that the party needed to appeal to a broader constituency,
especially “those of the working class who have made at least some progress” and that
“Thatcherism co-opts themes like liberty or patriotism that should be ours”.70 The docu-
ments in his personal papers show the agenda of the Leader’s Office to be one more radical
than the course that emerged, especially in organisational matters. Therefore, while it
remains unlikely for Kinnock to have held the kind of programmatic views he would later
push as party policy, we can at least say that he was of a mind to tackle further-going
organisational and tactical changes.
6.4.1.1 Organisational changes, 1983-1987
According to the terms of the model, its strong attachment to its working-class base
should lead to Labour adopting internal democratisation measures to empower the mem-
bers, who are largely in tune with this core constituency’s values. However, the con-
crete circumstances in the Labour case pose a challenge to this understanding of internal
democratisation that needs to be cleared up first, since the largest part of the working-
class base was passively affiliated rather than an active individual member of the party.
The active members of the Labour Party in the 1980s, who held much of their power
through the CLPs, are portrayed by Shaw as more radical and not afraid to pick fights
with the leadership, causing a "crisis of legitimacy".71
Internal democratisation has an interesting effect in that it distributes power more
widely, offering the possibility of a voice to the passive member. Since the affiliate mem-
bers trump the voting power of the CLPs, the effect of introducing One Member, One
Vote (OMOV) reforms in selections and the way in which the unions were treated was
crucial in changing the balance of power in the party. Even if it only empowered in-
dividual members of the party and not affiliates, this can still be argued to be part of
the reinforcement strategy. Bearing in mind the domination of left-wing CLPs because
of their active and involved membership, empowering the more passive members of the
party by means of OMOV shifts power away from these activists to members who are
potentially more in touch with the concerns of Labour’s core electorate.
This logic is evidenced by the attitude of the prime proponents of this reform. The
68. P. Hewitt, “Some Thoughts on Party Reorganization” (1984), KNNK 2/1/25, the Papers of Neil
Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
69. Labour Party, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes” (1983),
KNNK 2/1/20, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 3.
70. Labour, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes,” 2; P. Hain,
“Memo on leadership strategy” (1983), KNNK 2/1/20, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill
Archives Centre, Cambridge, 11.
71. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 19-20.
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leadership was favourable to OMOV because they believed it would stimulate membership
involvement and further democratisation. This is exactly the logic of the model: through
membership involvement, the party gets closer to its core supporters.72 They pointed
towards favourable experience with CLPs balloting their members in the 1983 leadership
election.73
Of course, there is also something to be said for a power-based explanation of the push
for OMOV. Since the parliamentary leadership now had the sword of Damocles of being
refused reselection by left-wing CLPs hanging over its head, it was undoubtedly in their
interest to circumvent radical activists within the party by broadening the franchise for
these votes to less activist members. This was the motivation ascribed to the reforms by
the CLPD and similar opponents on the left.74 They claimed the move was caused by re-
sentment over the introduction of mandatory reselection and that the primary motivation
was to protect disloyal MPs from the scrutiny of their CLP, something Kinnock always
vehemently denied.75
The battle for OMOV that started in the 1983-1987 electoral cycle was, therefore, a
complicated affair. Kinnock’s senior advisors, his chief of staff Charles Clarke and press
secretary Patricia Hewitt cautioned against the resistance any move towards a mandatory
OMOV arrangement for all CLPs would face, which made it a battle Kinnock was sure
to lose.76 While the leadership would have preferred a mandatory system, therefore, a
voluntary system empowering CLPs to choose whether or not to use OMOV was devised.77
When Conference rejected this compromise solution, it started a rather confusing back-
and-forth between the NEC and Conference in which Conference defeats the proposal one
year and then asks for new proposals to the same effect the next from the NEC, which
failed to introduce them by 1986 (ahead of the 1987 general election) as planned.
The issue of trade union involvement played an important role in the discussions over
OMOV. One of the principal criticisms of OMOV was that in the pure form in which
only individual members would be entitled to vote, it would shut out the trade union
movement of which Labour considered itself the political arm.78 A group set up in response
72. C. Clarke, “Reselection - Issues and Possibilities” (n.d.), KNNK 2/1/55, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; N. Kinnock, “Letter from Neil Kinnock to MPs opposed
to Franchise Extension” (1984), KNNK 2/1/56, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives
Centre, Cambridge, 2-3.
73. Labour Party, Leader’s Office, “A Note on Re-Selection” (1984), KNNK 2/1/55, the Papers of Neil
Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 1; Kinnock, “Letter from Neil Kinnock to MPs
opposed to Franchise Extension,” 2-3.
74. Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, “One Member, One Vote: Realities behind the slogan”
(1984), KNNK 2/1/55, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
75. Kinnock, “Letter from Neil Kinnock to MPs opposed to Franchise Extension,” 3.
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by a transcript of a speech Kinnock gave to the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR). Found in National
Union of Railwaymen, “Extract from the speech of the Rt. Hon. Neil Kinnock MP on Tuesday, 30th June,
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to the 1985 resolution asking the NEC for proposals recommended a decision for either
of two mandatory systems for parliamentary selection: pure OMOV and a compromise
Local Electoral College (LEC) in which votes were split between individual members and
the block votes of affiliated trade union branches.79 This latter system was adopted by
conference in 1988.
The factional impact of the possible OMOV reforms was undeniable, and quite probably
formed part of the leadership’s motivation for the reforms. However, as expected from
the theoretical framework of this study, it should be noted that there are strong themes
of the party’s working-class identity at play here. Looking forward to the reforms of
the second electoral cycle, where this comes even more clearly to the fore, the question of
what effect this would have on the party-union relationship looms large and lends support
to the idea that while OMOV might have had a factional element, the eventual form of
the system that was adopted, the Local Electoral College, also shows the hallmarks of
Labour’s attachment to the trade union base. In this way, Labour’s high electoral base
attachment can be said to have contributed to an outcome in which the membership of
the party was empowered by organisational reforms.
6.4.1.2 Programmatic changes 1983-1987
The historical influence of socialist ideology in the Labour Party might be in dispute
in the literature, but with the socialist left firmly in control of the party in 1983, their
influence generated what one might call ideological attachment. Important veto-players
in the party, such as the NEC and Conference, held strongly to traditional values in
areas of policy such as nuclear disarmament80 and employment, regardless of electoral
consequences. The General Secretary of the Party, among others, insisted that changing
policy for electoral reasons was not a discussion.81 Even the incoming leadership insisted
that the policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament must be held “unequivocally”.82 In such
an atmosphere, a continued and even renewed focus on these traditional issues is to be
expected.
In the NEC statement Campaigning for a Fairer Britain, the NEC did indeed focus
the party’s programmatic efforts on a number of traditional issues.83 The statement to
conference named a number of issues that undoubtedly can be seen as part of Labour’s
core programmatic efforts: the National Health Service, the welfare state and industrial
relations.84 There appears to have been the possibility of some influence of opinion re-
search on the programmatic focus of the party: a Campaign Strategy Committee (CSC)
79. Labour Party, Franchise Review Group (Working Party on the Franchise), “Party Franchise for the
Selection and Reselection of Parliamentary Candidates” (1987), Franchise Review Group Papers, Personal
Papers of Dianne Hayter, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
80. Although unilateral nuclear disarmament was a policy that was only introduced to the party in
1960, the fanaticism with which the left pursued it and the influence of that particular wing within the
party ensure that it was regarded at that time as one of the party’s core issues. Much like the power
of the left made the party more attached to ideology than it was at its foundation, unilateral nuclear
disarmament can therefore be seen as having become a traditional issue by 1983.
81. Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim.”
82. Labour, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes,” 3.
83. Labour, NEC, “Campaigning for a Fairer Britain.”
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document notes the issues as those on which the party was most trusted.85 However,
such electoral concerns apparently did not trump ideological influence. When the Shadow
Communications Agency (SCA, see 6.4.1.3.) found that the issue of unemployment was
not likely to sway any votes except those of voters who were unemployed themselves, this
changed nothing about the general focus the party placed on the issue of jobs.86
Despite the realisation of the Leader’s Office that “Thatcherism co-opts themes (. . . )
that should be ours”87, therefore, the party clearly elected to pursue an appeal highlighting
their traditional values, contributing to a reinforcement strategy. This seems related to
the party’s ideological attachment in multiple ways. First of all, the prevailing opinion as
evidenced in Labour Weekly seemed to favour holding fast to traditional stances on issues
like unilateral nuclear disarmament.88 Secondly, it should be noted that in the wake of
the crisis, there was a need for party unity which might have forced the party to focus
on policies that it generally was not divided upon. Finally, there is the perspective that
Kinnock did not choose his battles.89 Being engaged in a fight with the hard left and the
entryist Militant Tendency, even if he had wished to he could not have afforded to move
away from the party’s traditional platform for the time being. In this way, the influence
of the left, which is the principal reason for Labour’s high ideological attachment in 1983,
seems to be an important reason for Labour’s programmatic reinforcement strategy.
6.4.1.3 Tactical Changes, 1983-1987: from red flag to red rose
Theoretically, the tactical dimension is of great interest to the model in the Labour case.
Its strong attachment to its electoral base should incline it to playing to its traditional
working-class constituency as predicted by the model. On the other hand, this base was
evidently in demographic decline, and the party’s leadership was aware of this. This latter
circumstance would naturally require broadening the party’s constituency, a pressure
strengthened by the FPTP system. These contradictory expectations are important,
since in contrast to the avowedly reinforcement-oriented other parts of the strategy in the
1983-1987 period, movement on the tactical dimension seems to decidedly favour a more
inclusive image and therefore a broader constituency.
In explaining this deviation from the overall pattern, it is important to understand
that the leader and his team carried greater influence in tactical decision-making. Shaw
chronicles how prior to 1983, the Labour Party, particularly the left, had been distrustful
of commercial campaigning and neglected public relations and campaigning.90 Indeed, a
note found in the archives sees a pollster explain to his colleague that Labour “does not
understand what research can do for them until they’ve seen it in action”.91 The election
85. Labour Party, Campaign Strategy Committee, “Campaigning Strategy” (1983), CSC 4/14/11/83,
KNNK 2/1/29, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 5.
86. Labour Party, Shadow Communications Agency, “Report on a Communications Strategy” (KNNK
2/1/72, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge).
87. Labour, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes.”
88. Foot, “Manifesto Will Prove Right”; Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim.”
89. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 30.
90. Ibid., 52.
91. C. Fisher, “Letter to Alistair Buchan” (1983), KNNK 2/1/20, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK),
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
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post-mortem produced by policy director Geoff Bish corroborated this by making note of
a failure by the party to use its advertising agency appropriately.92
This changed in 1983. As a result of the evaluation, the NEC proclaimed communica-
tions a new priority, and a number of measures were taken that greatly empowered the
leader and his confidants.93 First of all, a Campaign Strategy Committee (CSC) was set up
under the chairmanship of the leader with a wide-ranging coordinating role, strengthening
his authority in the area.94 In conjunction, a Campaigns and Communications directorate
was created at Labour HQ, which came under the directorship of Kinnock’s appointee
Peter Mandelson and worked closely with the Leader’s Office.95 Finally, 1986 saw the
creation of the SCA, a network of volunteer professionals to help the party prepare itself
for the general election, which would prove very influential.96
All three innovations in campaigning structure served to empower Kinnock and his
office, and this explains the deviation from the overall pattern that is the extension strat-
egy on the tactical dimension. Internal documents from the Leader’s Office are crystal
clear about what voters Labour should be aiming for. In 1983, before being elected to
the leadership, memos received by Kinnock make mention of an extension of Labour’s
alliance with the traditional working class and industrial trade unions to those sections
of the working class “who have achieved material, educational or social progress”.97 In-
terestingly, the same paper decries the idea of a “conglomerate of minority groups”, often
described as a rainbow coalition, including for example the gay rights movement, such as
had been employed in Greater London, as a “dangerous and diversionary strategy”.98 Re-
search conducted by the party on attitudes on young voters and women additionally gave
alarming intelligence regarding the ideological influence of Thatcherism on both groups
and the extensive image problems Labour suffered from.99
The most visible aspect of the change in communications outlook was the new “red rose”
logo adopted by the party which was worked out through the SCA. Corporate designs
need not be significantly related to an attempt to change the party’s appeal and image –
they may just have been attempts to look fresh and modern. However, the red rose logo
which replaced the red flag in the 1983-1987 period appears to be a deliberate attempt to
evoke more moderate continental social democracy rather than the previous democratic
socialism. Primary sources confirm this: a summary of findings for research on the logo
convey very clearly that the designers and communications experts behind this were acting
on instructions to go out of their way to avoid extremist and Militant connotations,
92. Bish, “The 1983 Election Campaign,” 10.
93. Labour, NEC, “Campaigning for a Fairer Britain,” 7.
94. Labour Party, Campaign Strategy Committee, “Terms of Reference” (1983), KNNK 2/1/29, the
Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 2.
95. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 56.
96. Labour Party, Shadow Communications Agency, “Terms of Reference” (1984), KNNK 2/1/72, the
Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
97. Hain, “Memo on leadership strategy,” 11.
98. Ibid., 12.
99. Labour Party, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Female Voters” (1985), KNNK 2/1/71,
the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Labour Party, “Report on
a Communications Strategy for Young Voters” (‘, 1985), KNNK 2/1/71, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
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suggesting that a more moderate and inclusive image evoking “caring, compassion and
nationality” was the goal.100
By the 1987 general election, Labour had become much more publicity-conscious and
more consciously appealed to the floating vote. In fact, this letter from polling firm MORI
to Chris Powell, who headed the advertising agency for the campaign, note that this 20%
of voters who are floating should be the “primary target voters”.101 Earlier, in 1985, this
focus on the floating vote was already in evidence as social scientist Roger Jowell, in a
presentation, noted that Labour had moved from a sectional to a broader-based appeal
and that this was “absolutely correct”.102
Despite the overall attention devoted to the extension of the franchise in candidate
selection, less attention appears to have been afforded to attempts to change the overall
composition of Labour’s contingent of MPs and project a more inclusive image in this
way. While the Franchise Review Report includes the mandatory shortlisting of a woman
candidate in all its versions of the selection procedure, this appears to have come at the
last moment.103 Most likely, the efforts to reform candidate selection were focused on the
franchise at the expense of looking for ways to increase Labour’s number of women MPs.
This would be in accordance with the reading of the period in the literature,104 which
recounts how efforts to increase the participation of women only picked up in earnest
after 1987.
The leadership, empowered by the organisational reforms and in the knowledge that
the base was declining, therefore, consciously pursued a broader-based constituency. All
this should, however, be taken with a significant caveat: although Labour clearly sought
to win over these floating voters, and did specific research into the attitudes of women
and young voters, it was not yet ready to act on warnings coming out of this research
that Thatcherism and its main theme of aspiration and ambition had a more intuitive
appeal to these groups than the party had assumed.105 One of the significant findings of
this research was that the issue of unemployment had very little appeal to the individual
voter unless he himself was unemployed; nevertheless, Labour continued to campaign on
the issue.106
It seems to be the case, therefore, that style was ahead of substance in the Labour Party.
The revision of the party logo was explicitly intended to soften and broaden its image.
Though this shows that the party was reshaping its electoral strategy towards a broader
constituency, this was not mirrored in substantial changes to the party programme yet.
100. Labour Party, Shadow Communications Agency, “Corporate Design/Slogan Research: Summary of
Findings” (), KNNK 2/1/72, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
101. R.M. Worcester, “Letter to Chris Powell” (1986), KNNK 2/1/72, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
102. R. Jowell, “Summary of Roger Jowell Presentation January 16th 1986” (1986), KNNK 2/1/72, the
Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
103. Labour, Franchise Review Group, “Party Franchise for the Selection and Reselection of Parliamen-
tary Candidates.”
104. E.g. S. Perrigo, “Women and Change in the Labour Party, 1979-1995,” Parliamentary Affairs 49,
no. 1 (1996): 116–129.
105. Labour, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Female Voters”; Labour, “Report on a Commu-
nications Strategy for Young Voters.”
106. Labour, SCA, “Report on a Communications Strategy.”
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Nevertheless, as a category, the 1983-1987 tactical strategy prefigured the much more
sweeping changes the party would pursue from 1987 onwards, which would tackle these
problems head-on. A possible explanation would be that the tactical dimension might be
influenced by external demands earlier than the other dimensions.
6.4.2 Blatant Electoralism, 1987-1992
After Labour failed to win much ground in the 1987 election, its strategy shifted. This
was most apparent in the area of programmatic change, which was previously confined
to renewing the party’s appeal on its traditional issues. In a 1987 PLP meeting, Kinnock
pleaded guilty to “electoralism”, and indeed, this seems an apt description of the general
thrust of Labour’s recovery strategy between 1987 and 1992.107 Kinnock himself seems to
have shifted in his attitudes towards the party’s policy programme. For example, he now
regarded unilateral nuclear disarmament as having been a liability in the 1987 election
campaign rather than a policy that should be held to unequivocally.108
The balance of power within the party now seems definitely to have shifted in the
direction of more radical changes, most likely because the 1987 result proved the party
could not win without them. The Shadow Cabinet, though divided on the scope of the
changes, was swinging in favour of changing Labour’s programme.109 The NEC seems
to have come onside, as well. In fact, the NEC played a great role, as we shall see, in
allowing the leadership to bypass conference in its efforts to overhaul the party’s policy
programme based on the conclusions of working groups of the PLP and NEC.
In an internal preliminary report, the weak position in London and the South was also
underscored.110 In addition, Labour was preferred on most issues but lost on its defence
policy.111 The NEC publicly responded to the “bitter disappointment” of the defeat in its
statement to conference, Moving Ahead.112 The tone was very different from Campaigning
for a Fairer Britain four years back. Where the 1983 document had blamed the defeat
on presentation and party unity, Moving Ahead contained an extensive analysis of social
107. N. Kinnock, “Neil Kinnock Address to PLP” (1987), KNNK 2/2/1, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 7; Labour Party, Parliamentary Labour Party, “Minutes
of the Party Meeting Held on Wednesday 4th November 1987 at 11.30 AM in Committee Room 14” (1987),
Parliamentary Labour Party Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester, 1.
108. Labour Party, Parliamentary Committee, “Minutes of a Parliamentary Committee Meeting Held
on 1 July 1987 at 6.00 pm in the Parliamentary Committee Room” (1987), Parliamentary Committee
Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester, 2; Labour Party, Parliamentary Com-
mittee, “Minutes of a Parliamentary Committee Meeting Held on 15 June 1988 in the Parliamentary
Committee Room” (1988), Parliamentary Committee Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Cen-
tre, Manchester, 2; Labour Party, Parliamentary Committee, “Minutes of a Parliamentary Committee
Meeting Held On 17 May 1989 in the Parliamentary Committee Room” (1989), Parliamentary Committee
Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester, 2.
109. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 92.
110. Labour Party, General Secretary’s Office, “General Election 1987: Preliminary Report by the General
Secretary” (1987), GS 56/6/87, NEC 34/6/87, National Executive Committee Archives, Labour History
Archive and Study Centre, Manchester, 4.
111. Ibid., 5.
112. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, “Moving Ahead: Statement to Conference 1987”
(1987), KNNK 2/2/1, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 2.
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changes that Labour acknowledged they had to confront.113 Not only did it observe these
social changes: it recognised the stark reality that without winning the South, “[Labour]
cannot win the next election.”114 It set the tone for the next five years of work: widening
the appeal of the party to new white-collar occupational groups and to women, confronting
the divide in the working class between deprived and affluent members.115 It announced a
large-scale policy review and proclaimed “extending the freedom of the individual - every
individual” the aim of democratic socialism.116 This, then, was a radically different point
of departure, and it would prefigure a radically different project of recovery, which is
further detailed below.
6.4.2.1 Organisational changes, 1987-1992: the continued battle for OMOV
The general thrust of the reforms to increase autonomy for the leadership seems to have
continued following the 1987 election defeat. The success of the Policy Review (see
6.4.2.2.) led to the establishment of a permanent National Policy Forum (NPF) to lead
the process of policy formulation in a similar manner, thereby bypassing Conference’s
policy formulation functions. This was important, since conference was one of the tradi-
tional strongholds of the party’s socialist left. The NPF would establish and maintain a
standing programme.117
Meanwhile, the battle for OMOV may have seemed over with the adoption of the
voluntary Local Electoral College in 1988, but in fact it was far from it. Conference
abolished the LEC again in 1990 to be replaced with OMOV with an unspecified trade
union involvement.118 According to the report of the Trade Unions Links Review Group,
this left the party without a new selection procedure for the 1992 election.119 The version
proposed by the report was effectively a reintroduction of the LEC but with the union vote
cast by affiliated “registered supporters” among trade union branches affiliated with the
local constituency party.120 A similar change was also proposed to the Electoral College
for leadership elections.121 These changes would ultimately be implemented under the
leadership of Kinnock’s successor, John Smith.
The interesting thing about the final result of the battle for OMOV is that it clearly
shows the effect of the strong formal and informal attachment of the Labour Party to its
traditional supporters in the unionised working class. While initially, Kinnock and his
team had intended to extend the franchise in the party to members only, a form of internal
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of external democratisation alongside the proposed internal democratisation. Though
limited to a very specific social group, many of the arguments offered for the system
correspond to arguments later used for more general external democratisation schemes,
regarding the “registered supporters” as a solid base in society and possible bridgehead to
greater popular appeal.122
6.4.2.2 Programmatic changes, 1987-1992: the Policy Review
The most radical turnover in strategy between the 1983-1987 and 1987-1992 periods oc-
curred in the field of programme. Before 1987, the party’s attachment to its democratic
socialist ideas seems to have prevailed and little attempts to broaden its profile were made.
After 1987, it appears that the party was confronted with an electoral reality that made
this untenable. As shall be argued in more detail below, the Policy Review process that
dominated the programmatic efforts from 1987 onwards appears to have been particularly
motivated by electoral expediency. In addressing its electoral liabilities, the party adopted
not merely a broader profile, but was brought to shift various ideological boundaries as
well, particularly on the acceptance of the free market.
The Policy Review was launched in 1987, soon after the general election. Having noted
the tenacity with which the party stuck to its principles in the previous electoral cycle, it
was rather surprising to find a large number of papers relating the work of the Review to
the need for broadly appealing policies. Moving Ahead, with its reference to winning over
those who had never voted for the party and the need to win in the South, was described as
one of the review’s points of reference by the General Secretary, Larry Whitty.123 Similar
statements are found in a statement by Kinnock to the PLP on the subject,124 while
the need to win in the South and/or "more prosperous areas" is referenced in the PLP
records a number of times in the context of PLP discussions on the Policy Review.125 The
listening exercise with which the Review was to kick off also focused especially on areas
where the party was weak, again mentioning the South as well as the Midlands.126
All this suggests an electoral motivation to the Policy Review. The essentially pragmatic
backcloth of this wholesale policy overhaul becomes evident even further when studying
its practice. The Policy Review Groups (PRGs) of the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet
charged with the Review were presented with a polling report entitled Labour and Britain
in the 1990s at the start in 1987.127 The Britain in the World group also received a
122. Labour, TULRG, “Trade Unions and the Labour Party,” 5-7.
123. L. Whitty, “Policy Review and ’Labour Listens’: Note by the General Secretary” (1987), KNNK
2/2/1, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 2.
124. Kinnock, “Neil Kinnock Address to PLP,” 2; 4; Labour, PLP, “Minutes of the Party Meeting Held
on Wednesday 4th November 1987 at 11.30 AM in Committee Room 14,” 1.
125. For instance: Labour Party, Parliamentary Labour Party, “Proceedings of the Party Meeting Held
on Wednesday 6 July 1988 at 11.30 AM in Committee Room 14” (1988), Parliamentary Labour Party
Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester; Labour Party, Parliamentary Labour
Party, “Minutes of the Party Meeting Held on Wednesday 17 June 1987 at 12.00 Noon in Committee
Room 14” (1987), Parliamentary Labour Party Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre,
Manchester.
126. Labour Party, “An approach to policy-making” (1987), KNNK 2/2/1, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 5.
127. Labour Party, “Labour & Britain in the 1990’s.” (1987), Multiple copies found among others in
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report on specific attitudes to international issues which singled out defence policy as a
“significant” factor for desertion of voters.128 The terms of reference for this particular
PRG also strikingly pose the electoral impact of the choices made as to Britain’s role in
the world as the first question to discuss during a preliminary discussion on values.129
This PRG would later, after much discussion, rid the party of its unilateralist policy.130
Before any policy reports were authored, the boundaries of the party’s ideological dis-
course were already being shifted. Kinnock and his deputy, Roy Hattersley, produced
the first-ever formulation of the Labour Party’s principles outside of the Constitution,
Democratic Socialist Aims and Values, to serve as a foundation for the Policy Review.131
The document notably contends that “. . . the true purpose of socialism is (. . . ) a gen-
uinely free society, in which the fundamental objective of government is the protection
and extension of individual liberty.”132 Moving Ahead already took an advance on this
earlier, and in a July note on policy development the Policy Director had also made a
similar statement, but it does remain a remarkable departure from the usual collectivist
understanding of the ideology.133 This is especially notable when seen in conjunction to
the youth and women communications reports of 1985, which had argued that this indi-
vidualism was an area in which Thatcherism usually beat Labour.134
Comparison with alternative versions proposed to the NEC by left-wingers such as
Tony Benn and David Blunkett and Bernard Crick is informative here. In the former,
individualism is absent in favour of anti-capitalism and solidarity.135 In the latter, it is
enshrined in the French Revolutionary tripartite “liberty, equality, fraternity” as a framing
device.136 Aims and Values stands out by making enhancing individual liberty the sole aim
of democratic socialism, showing the influence of the spirit of the times on the thinking
of the soft left-right leadership tandem.137
This has been some time coming – in fact, the theme of a more individualist presen-
tation of socialist values already occurs in a 1983 memo outlining Kinnock’s strategy for
Britain in the World and Economic Efficiency PRG papers, Papers on the Policy Review, Labour History
Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
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the leadership election that year.138 This memo also contains some of the lines of thought
that would later be prominent in the policy review, among others its change in attitude to
large-scale nationalisation, a shift in attitudes to statism away from top-heavy state con-
trol and its attention to ecological concerns.139 The line of thinking was further confirmed
by the above-mentioned 1985 round of communications research with an eye to develop-
ing a strategy for young and female voters, which found that Thatcherism had changed
voter’s attitudes to be more individualistic, entrepreneurial and more hostile to left-wing
extremism in particular.140 The report on women, an important target constituency to
Labour also mentioned in Moving Ahead, recommended a communications strategy to
“play down ideological heritage”.141
Building on Aims and Values, the Policy Review’s reports endorsed the market principle
for the allocations of “most goods and services”, rejected old-style nationalisation as the
only form of public ownership and put special focus on the Environment with an entire
section on quality-of-life issues, among others.142 This rapid change in policy direction was
aided by the total sidelining of the Conference by a NEC-Shadow Cabinet tandem (the
Policy Review Groups were officially working groups of the two bodies and their reports
were made non-amendable).
The change is especially notable in the most controversial policy area of the decade,
being nuclear disarmament. As already mentioned above, evidence to the PRGs as well
as opinion in the PLP seems to be that it was a potential liability, far from the dogged
adherence to it in the 1983-1987 electoral cycle. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Policy
Review abandoned it in favour of a multilateral nuclear disarmament policy, helped along
by international developments, although the issue was still left open in the first report.143
And while employment and public services still figure in Meet the Challenge, Make the
Change, the final report of the Policy Review, the report chooses to focus on education
and training in employment more than on job creation, and takes a consumer perspective
to public services.144
In effect, it seems that the reports constitute an attempt by the Labour Party to regain
its economic credibility by redirecting and broadening its policies. The acceptance of the
market mechanism and the concept of the state as a means instead of an end, referred to
as the enabling state by Shaw,145 was central to this extension strategy. In addition, the
efforts to extend into new politics issues, which were also present in memos from before
Kinnock’s leadership, were seen as being of particular importance to winning in the South,
138. Labour, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes,” 2.
139. Ibid., 2-3.
140. Labour, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Female Voters”; Labour, “Report on a Commu-
nications Strategy for Young Voters.”
141. Labour, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Female Voters.”
142. Kinnock and Hattersley, “Democratic Socialist Aims and Values,” 10; Labour, “Meet the Challenge,
Make the Change,” 5; Labour Party, “Social Justice and Economic Efficiency: First Report of Labour’s
Policy Review for the 1990’s” (1988), Papers on the Policy Review, Labour History Archive and Study
Centre, Manchester, 5.
143. Labour, “Meet the Challenge, Make the Change,” 86-87; Labour, “Social Justice and Economic
Efficiency,” 48.
144. Labour, “Meet the Challenge, Make the Change,” 6-7.
145. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, 92.
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as evidenced by a memo from the Environment spokesman to the Shadow Cabinet which
also seems to have been inspired by good electoral performance by the minor Green
party.146 The clear electoralist backcloth of the overhaul seems to further underscore the
general extension strategy, swinging Labour back well beyond the traditional pragmatism
of the old right. The evidence linking the Policy Review to the 1987 defeat, but also
to documents in the previous cycle, further strengthens the evidence that the electoral
system and the constraints it imposed upon Labour played a large role in the radical
change of direction the Policy Review represented.
6.4.2.3 Tactical changes, 1987-1992: continued broadening
Moving Ahead showed very clearly that the party leadership had now accepted the elec-
toral realities, with a stark message to the conference: if the party did not win in the south
and broaden its appeal, it would never again win a general election.147 This matches the
expected impact of the British electoral system in that it was a constraint upon Labour’s
actions. It is significant that Moving Ahead ’s aims of working to broaden the party’s
appeal, and particularly its stated objectives of winning in the South, appear to have
been strongly linked to many of the measures taken on other dimensions. The electoral
motivation of the project, in this way, becomes very clear: Labour had every intention of
broadening its appeal.
The most far-reaching changes in campaign strategy had already been seen through.
Moving Ahead praised the party’s new professionalism in the organisation and imple-
mentation of its campaigns.148 The party can still be said to have intensified its already
extension-focused tactical strategy of broadening its core electorate. However, now it was
imbued with a new sense of purpose, as the other dimensions were also put in the light
of this commitment. This provides support for the idea that while internal factors might
have a differential impact on the strategy, the impact of the electoral system can be felt
across the board. The fact that the geographical and demographic elements of party
competition remained at the forefront of the leadership’s mind is evidenced by a number
of explicit references to them underlying other measures.149
While between 1987 and 1992 not much had been done to project a more inclusive
image through candidate selection, the second electoral cycle saw an attempt to diversify
the party’s slate of candidates. A consultation report on the representation of women in
Labour from 1990 assigned Labour a “male” image, despite its relatively high quantity of
women MPs.150 In conjunction with the fact that Moving Ahead consciously proclaimed
women voters a target group, this produced a need to increase the number of women
146. J. Cunningham and J. Newbigin, “Quality of Life: Proposals” (1988), Parliamentary Committee
Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester; J. Cunningham, “Developing Our
Political Momentum on Environmental Policy Issues” (1989), Parliamentary Committee Archives, Labour
History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
147. Labour, NEC, “Moving Ahead,” 3.
148. Ibid., 2.
149. See the discussion on programmatic changes in section 6.4.2.2. above.
150. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, “Consultative Document: Representation of Women
in the Labour Party” (1990), National Executive Committee Archives, Labour History Archive and Study
Centre, Manchester, 3.
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in the PLP in particular.151 The 1987 Conference had already made a start, adopting
a rule that required CLPs to put at least one woman on the shortlist during selection
procedures where one had been nominated.152 In 1990, the Party Conference went even
further, supporting a NEC statement calling for a 50/50 representation of women in ten
years or three electoral cycles time.153 Consultation for this statement also included other
quota proposals, including for the NEC itself and CLP executives.154 The PLP had already
adopted a quota for the Shadow Cabinet.155 This commitment put a strong compulsion
to act upon the NEC, which was already conducting its review of parliamentary selection.
The NEC realized that positive discrimination measures would need to be implemented
to achieve the quota set by Conference, leading to proposals for all-women shortlists
being considered. Here, the executive committee seemed willing to consider it, spurred
on by the Women’s Committee and the Women’s Conference, who published a number of
reports and papers advocating this far-going measure to increase the number of women
Labour MPs.156 However, they ran into the influence of the CLPs, who jealously guarded
their influence on shortlisting and selection in general from national interference. After
a consultation paper showed the reticence of the CLPs towards new rules on selections
and to increase women’s representation in particular, the matter appears to have been
dropped until after the 1992 election.157 Though this is never explicitly stated, it might be
that the party’s leadership had to pick its battles carefully once again, and prioritized the
implementation of OMOV in selections over the implementation of all-women shortlists.
Still, the concrete initiatives taken by the leadership to increase women representation fit
into the picture of a tactical extension strategy.
With the parallel changes going on in policy, Labour became much better equipped to
build on the work it had done in the previous Parliamentary term. In fact, despite the
professionalism of the campaign in general, there might even have been a tendency to
overdo it, as witnessed by the final rally of the 1992 general election campaign at which
Labour, confident that it would beat the Conservatives, presented itself as the government-
in-waiting, a type of arrogance that was lampooned by the press.158 Nevertheless, even
this rally shows how conscious Labour had become of publicity and how consciously it
courted a broader appeal. Alongside the 1987-1992 changes on the tactical dimension,
therefore, Labour’s campaign saw it continue and strengthen the extension-based strategy
of the previous electoral cycle.
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6.5 Conclusion: The inexorable march of New
Labour?
Labour’s recovery strategy unfolded in two phases corresponding to the two electoral cy-
cles, as can be seen in table 6.2. In the first electoral cycle, the party appears to have been
beholden to the ideological attachment of the Labour left and the strong electoral base at-
tachment resulting from the link with the unions. The strategy on the organisational and
programmatic dimensions during the first cycle is unabashedly reinforcing, highlighting
socialist values and traditional Labour issues as well as strengthening the power of party
members. The resolve with which the leadership clung to positions such as unilateral nu-
clear disarmament as policies that were not to be changed merely for the sake of electoral
expediency, in spite of their popularity, shows how ideological attachment contributed to
the programmatic reinforcement strategy. Meanwhile, the link with the unions played a
strong role in determining the form of OMOV as a Local Electoral College in candidate
selections. This shows, at least on these specific dimensions, that factors such as ideolog-
ical attachment and electoral base attachment do play a role in determining the preferred
recovery strategy in the first cycle. Admittedly, the reinforcement strategy could also be
the result of the functional need to win back core voters lost in 1983, but this seems less
likely, especially when considering the tactical dimension.
The first-cycle strategy on the tactical dimension presents an outlier, because it sought
to broaden the party’s appeal and is therefore an extension-based strategy. It poses a
problem for both the purely functional explanation noted above and the general influ-
ences of electoral base attachment and ideological attachment expressed in propositions
3 and 4. The tactical dimension is the first place where on would expect a party with
strong electoral base attachment to show its commitment to its core voters. It is puzzling
that this does not appear to be the case and that, in fact, Labour was both playing the
floating vote and consciously trying to dismantle its previous radical and arguably male-
dominated image. A logical explanation for this seems to be that the leadership could
operate with a reasonable degree of autonomy here after the NEC, determined to improve
the communications of the party, established the CSC and the Communications Direc-
torate headed by Kinnock’s appointee, Peter Mandelson. From the archival documents, it
appears that Kinnock was reminded at multiple times of the decline of the working-class
base and the threat posed by Thatcher to elements of Labour’s core vote.159 This might
explain why on the tactical dimension, the party pursued an extension strategy rather
than a reinforcement strategy.
Before moving onto the second cycle, it is good to raise and discuss another possible
alternative explanation: that a party like Labour, upon being defeated quite badly, would
always retreat into the familiar issues they were “most trusted on”.160 While this is, in
most regards, a question only comparative research can answer, it has to be addressed.
Perhaps the best way to do so is to recall that the leftward turn had already been explored
under Michael Foot’s leadership and that 1983 had clearly shown that this had been out
159. The earliest examples of this are found in Labour, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on
Leadership Campaign Themes,” 2; Hain, “Memo on leadership strategy,” 11.
160. Labour, CSC, “Campaigning Strategy.”
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of tune with public opinion. Furthermore, the presence of the very strong centrist Alliance
vote could have suggested to Labour leaders that they needed to move to the centre. It
would have been perfectly reasonable for figures in the party to suggest that policy as
well as presentation needed to change, but the party was clearly not ready for it. It seems
likely that the combination of the trade union connection and entrenchment of left-wing
ideology within the party combined to inspire a more traditional strategy in the first
Parliament following the shock. This fits well with the idea that initial preferences are
shaped by attitudes to the electoral base and the party’s ideology.
If the first-cycle strategy provides considerable evidence towards an effect for ideologi-
cal attachment and electoral base attachment, the second-cycle strategy seems to strongly
confirm proposition 6 on the effect of the electoral system. Where the first-cycle strategy
contained clear reinforcement elements, the second-cycle strategy is uniformly extending
in orientation. The 1987 election, which was lost again while the Conservatives retained
their landslide majority, seems to have driven home to the leadership and the NEC that
the electoral system would not allow Labour to win another election (as noted in Moving
Ahead) if changes were not made.161 The biggest contrast is no doubt on the programmatic
dimension: from a purely reinforcing strategy adamantly against downplaying any policy
liabilities for electoral expediency to the Policy Review, which downplayed and reinter-
preted Labour values by introducing a more individualist and market-based version of
socialism. Given the strength of the left only a decade ago, this is remarkable. What
is also remarkable is that the NEC and leadership made no attempts to obscure what
they were doing: starting from Moving Ahead, the electoral background of the Review
is made quite clear, and indeed many references in the minutes of various bodies to the
need to win in the South and among non-Labour voters in general seem to provide strong
evidence that the change of strategy was indeed related to the constraints of the FPTP
system. The party seems to have paid a lot of attention to other parties and their success
stories. Obviously, this is the case with Thatcherism, which was successful (as the 1984
communications studies showed) in part because of its individualist and market-based
focus.162 However, it also monitored some of its smallest competitors: when the Greens
did well in local elections in the South where Labour needed to win, the Shadow Cabinet
took it as a sign that the efforts on quality-of-life and environmental policies needed to
be stepped up.163
Looking at the battle for OMOV, it becomes clear that the unions remained an impor-
tant factor even when Labour adopted its extension strategy. We have seen that Kinnock
and his team wanted a mandatory system for selection and reselection that would shut
the union vote out entirely in favour of a vote by individual members.164 They never put
this proposal to Conference or even the NEC because, as they themselves well understood,
the unions and the left would not suffer such a diminishment of their influence lightly.165
161. Labour, NEC, “Moving Ahead,” 3.
162. Labour, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Female Voters”; Labour, “Report on a Commu-
nications Strategy for Young Voters.”
163. Cunningham and Newbigin, “Quality of Life”; Cunningham, “Developing Our Political Momentum
on Environmental Policy Issues.”
164. Hewitt, “Reselection: One Member One Vote”; Clarke, “Reselection - Issues and Possibilities.”
165. Hewitt, “Reselection: One Member One Vote”; Clarke, “Reselection - Issues and Possibilities.”
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Eventually, the second-cycle proposals that included individual registered supporters from
the trade unions in the party’s OMOV elections and selection procedures were developed
as the solution. These proposals may have shifted power away from Labour’s members
and they may have been justified by the reasoning that it might bring the party more in
touch with a broader group of voters, but their scope was limited to the unions. This
shows that, in the final version of OMOV adopted under Kinnock’s successor John Smith
(still against significant union resistance), the value placed on the link with the trade
union movement was still a major factor.
The final, more radical recovery strategy pursued under Tony Blair’s leadership from
1994 onwards is directly connected to the outcome of the 1983-1992 recovery process.
The agency of Blair and his allies Mandelson and Brown is key to the way the strategy
was taken even further into the extension direction, most prominently through re-writing
Clause IV to omit the commitment to nationalisation of the means of production from
the Party Constitution. However, this would not have been possible or indeed conceivable
had the Policy Review not reinterpreted the programmatic and to some extent the ideo-
logical foundations of the party to become more individualist and less statist. Although
strengthened by the takeover of a new generation after the sudden death of Kinnock’s di-
rect successor John Smith in 1994, the same dynamic we have described above is at play.
Forced by the constraints of the electoral system, Labour pursued an extension strategy
in which it reinterpreted key parts of its heritage such as its ties to the unions and its
democratic socialist ideology, ending up in the end as the aptly-named New Labour.
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7 Democrats 66, 1982-1989
7.1 Introduction
“Regeren is halveren”: “to govern is to halve”1 – an apt if slightly brutal description of
the perennial problems faced by Democrats 66 (D66).2 From its foundation in 1966 as
a movement for democratic reform, D66 has gone from (potential) coalition partner to
demoralised remnant a number of times, starting with the first crisis in 1972, with the
most recent one occurring in 2006. Support for the Democrats is highly volatile. One only
needs to look at table 4.3 to notice that this party is particularly unlucky and vulnerable
to crisis. Save the first crisis in 1972, all of these crises occurred during or after D66
participated in government. The sense of deep crisis occurring in the party after defeat
is very visible: in 1974, after the 1972 crisis was compounded by disastrous provincial
election results, the only thing that prevented the party’s dissolution was the lack of a
qualified majority at the congress convened to debate the decision.3 Since the 1972 crisis
occurred only six years after the party was founded and may have involved all sorts of
concerns peculiar to the party’s newness (see chapter 4), this chapter discusses the second
instance of crisis in D66’s history, which started in 1982.
The 1982 crisis is captured in the title of the memoirs of outgoing party leader Jan
Terlouw: “to seventeen seats and back” (“Naar zeventien zetels en terug”).4 Just a year
before, in 1981, D66 had won a great victory and taken seventeen seats. After participating
in the ill-fated Van Agt-Den Uyl Cabinet with CDA and the social-democratic Partij van
de Arbeid (PvdA) from 1981 to 1982, new elections a year later returned D66 to only
six seats. During the crisis that followed, D66 showed itself a party with a very strong
self-conception as a movement of political renewal. The party was struggling with the lack
of a well-defined social base and other problems deriving from its newness and its wish
not to be like the other parties. Rather than confront these problems directly, however,
the party sought to work around them, showing how attached they were to their idea that
they were different from the major parties. It is this crisis that forms the focus of this
chapter.
1. Title of the following documentary on the 1982 crisis: R. Bruins Slot, “D66: Regeren is halveren,”
Episode of the Dutch documentary TV series Andere Tijden, accessed January 15, 2018, https://
anderetijden.nl/aflevering/396/D66-regeren-is-halveren.
2. In the middle of the time period under discussion, the party changed its name slightly from
“Democrats 1966”, abbreviated D’66, to Democrats 66, abbreviated D66. The latter form is preferred in
this chapter for the sake of uniformity.
3. M. S. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie: de Geschiedenis van D66, 1966-2003 (Den Haag:
SDU, 2003), 123.
4. J. Terlouw, Naar Zeventien Zetels en Terug: Politiek Dagboek 9 maart 1981-5 november 1982
(Utrecht: Veen, 1983).
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Within the framework of the case selection, D66 was selected as a party in a system
of Proportional Representation with weak electoral base attachment. One important
feature of the party is its lack of and even antipathy towards the old pillarized mode
of politics in which parties defended the interests of particular social groups. Not only
does D66 lack strong electoral base attachment through formal ties, there also appears
to be an informal convention against such strong attachment. This should lead to an
initial preference for the extension strategy, followed by a reinforcement strategy as the
constraints of the electoral context kick in. This will be the subject of section 7.2, which
presents an introduction to the party and measures up the party on the independent
variables electoral base attachment, ideological attachment and its relationship to its
environment and formulating clear operational expectations based on the propositions
presented in chapter three. Section 7.3 will briefly discuss the 1982 general election and
its circumstances. The results of the analysis will be presented in section 7.4, testing the
more detailed expectations generated in section 7.2. The conclusions drawn based on this
analysis will be discussed in section 7.5.
7.2 D66 in 1982: setting the stage
In 1982, Democrats 66 was a relatively recent formation. Its origins lie in the democrati-
sation movement of the 1960s in the Netherlands, mobilised by the idea of breaking open
the old ‘pillarized’ society.5 Some have therefore argued that it is a catch-all party, reject-
ing the old cleavage-based mode of politics and arguing instead for a programmatic basis
to politics.6 Although some founders of the party took their inspiration from the pre-war
social-liberal Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond (Liberal-Democratic Federation), the party
rejected any sort of ideological identification.7 A major aim was to realign the party sys-
tem into a progressive and a conservative camp. When asked what should happen to the
current parties, Van Mierlo famously expressed that “they should explode then”, leading
to the phrase “explosion theory” for the idea.8
D66 had a flying start at its first election in 1967, winning an impressive seven seats out
of 150 in the Dutch lower house. In the first period of its existence, it pursued its goals of
realignment by trying to found a new Progressive People’s Party together with the PvdA
and the smaller Radicals (PPR).9 The 1972 election saw the formation of a pre-election
coalition between these parties, even including a “Shadow Cabinet” that would take office
if they got a majority between them. However, this coalition failed to win a majority,
in part because of D66’s losses. A devastating provincial election defeat in 1974 saw a
serious debate about dissolving the party. Though a majority of the congress favoured
this decision, it fell short of the two-thirds majority required to take it.10
This underscores an essential part of D66’s DNA: its democratic party organisation.
5. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 15.
6. Ibid., 408.
7. Ibid., 19.
8. Ibid., 36, original text: "die moeten dan maar ontploffen".
9. Ibid., 414.
10. Ibid., 123.
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Determined to avoid concentration and cumulation of power, the founders made these an
essential concern in designing the new party’s organisation.11 This led to what was without
a doubt the most democratically organised of the Dutch parties at the time, as the party
operated on the principle of One Member One Vote (OMOV) while other parties still used
delegate models. At every level, individual members debated and made the decisions. This
included the national level, which had two notably innovative features. First of all, the
candidate selection process operated via an OMOV postal ballot where members could
rank all the candidates.12 Secondly, it had an OMOV-based national congress, which
uniquely went by the formal Dutch term for such meetings in associations: algemene
ledenvergadering (ALV; general members’ assembly) rather than the usual partijcongres.13
This body, then, was not like its counterparts which bore that latter name. It was
chaired by chairpersons appointed by the national committee, but who were not members
of that committee.14 Since 1981, general meetings of the branches were empowered to
select amendments and motions for the national congress, although 25 members could
still bypass this requirement.15 What coordinating role there was at the congress was
played by the programme and reporting committees, elected by the congress itself, which
had the task of structuring the agenda.16 The programme committee and national com-
mittee could, as in other parties, advise on whether motions or amendments should be
adopted or rejected.17 Because of all this, the documents of the highly democratic na-
tional congress contain important information, since many of the decisions on the recovery
would eventually be taken or at least discussed there.
However, the unwieldiness of a national congress consisting of hundreds or even thou-
sands of individual members means strategic direction would still need to be provided
by another body. According to the statutes, the main focus of the national committee
(Hoofdbestuur) and its subsidiary national executive (Dagelijks Bestuur) was solely orga-
11. R. A. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij: Veranderende Partijorganisatie in Nederland
1960-1990 (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1992), 107.
12. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 105.3 HR, accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512,
Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
13. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, Ch. 2. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512, Documentation
Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
14. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 15.1 HR. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512,
Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
15. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 13.2 HR. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512,
Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
16. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 14 HR, 37-38 HR and 130.5 HR. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/
id/eprint/9512, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
17. This was not provided in the party rulebooks, but it happened in practice. Any set of papers sent
to members for the national congress contains the advice of HB pertaining to each motion or amendment
on the agenda.
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nizational.18 According to Van der Land, this was regarded as its proper role.19 However,
the political role of the body, even if it can only exercise it through non-binding opinions,
must not be underestimated. As a coordinating body, the national committee specifically
expressed its wish to play a political role during the 1982-1989 crisis.20 Its responsibility
for the preparation of the national congress and the formulation of proposals flowing from
policy documents presented to the ALV make it an influential body in this regard, and
its archives therefore play a key role in mapping out the changes made.
It should be noted that there were harsh anti-cumulation measures involved in the
national committee’s work as well: its members, either elected to the national executive
by the congress or elected as regional representatives, could not hold any other party
function save for membership of the programme committee, and could not be an elected
representative.21 In addition, they were limited to two terms.22 This means the rate of
turnover in the executive was relatively high.23 The same goes for executives at sub-
national levels of government, where the term limits occasionally led to the situation that
not enough volunteers could be found and made the party organisationally weak.
The final national organ that should be discussed plays a less prominent role. D66’s
party council or Adviesraad was a purely advisory body, set up to provide some oppor-
tunity to influence policy for members between congresses.24 The original statutes do
not include the party council, since it was feared that it would only complicate commu-
nications between members and executive.25 However, after the failure of an experiment
in 1967 with "sample meetings" (steekproefvergaderingen) of members selected by lot to
provide this advisory function, the party council was established.26 Its position was rather
ambiguous. For example, the council was allowed to advise the national committee, but
not the national congress.27
This leaves the parliamentary parties in both houses of Parliament. Koole notes that
D66 MPs regarded their duty to render account to the membership as part of their man-
18. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 26. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512, Documenta-
tion Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
19. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 363.
20. An example of this can be found in O. Scheltema, “Beleidsvoornemens Hoofdbestuur; onderdeel
politiek,” Paper on the priorities of the national committee in the political field (1987), HB.DB-87/090, in-
ventory nr. 105, Archives of Democrats 66, Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation
Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
21. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 12.1 HR. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512,
Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
22. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 25.2 HR. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512,
Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
23. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 363.
24. To keep a uniform set of terms throughout, the term “party council” will be used to refer to the
advisory council, since it is functionally equivalent, albeit much weaker than other party councils of Dutch
parties.
25. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 109.
26. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 109; Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 42.
27. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 21. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512, Documenta-
tion Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
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date.28 Still, since the parliamentary party was accountable to the semi-annual national
congress and not necessarily to the national committee, this accountability did not detract
much from the autonomy of the party’s elected representatives. There seems to have been
a division of labour between the parliamentary party in the lower house, which pushed
day-to-day policies, and the extra-parliamentary organization, which undertook mid-term
and long-term policy development and ultimately was able to set the priorities of each
election manifesto. It should be noted, however, that this depended on the stature of the
leader of the party, who headed the list: party founder Hans van Mierlo and his successor
Jan Terlouw could permit themselves more strategic control due to their popularity than
Terlouw’s successor Maarten Engwirda.29
D66 is a small party. Its record at the time of the 1982 crisis, achieved in 1981, was
17 seats, just over 10 per cent of the 150-seat Dutch lower house.30 Nevertheless, it has
been regarded as remarkably successful during its early existence, for such a young party.
D66 never scored below six seats in the lower house even in 1982. This is a significant
criterium for the party, as the party’s founders considered this the threshold below which
one was an ineffectual “splinter party”.31 In addition, unlike many smaller parties in the
Dutch party system at the time, D66 was successful in attaining a seat at the cabinet
table for itself on two occasions, in 1972 and in 1981. The only other small party in the
system to succeed at this prior to 1982 was Democratic Socialists ’70. Therefore, and
given the occasional spikes in the polls, D66 can be regarded as perhaps “the largest of
the small parties” or even as “the smallest of the large parties”.32
Nevertheless, it remained characteristically small. In a time when the major parties
retained upwards of 100,000 members, D66 had around 15,000.33 Just a decade earlier,
in the depths of the 1974 crisis, the Democrats had only a few hundreds of members left,
showing that its membership fluctuated in tandem with the party’s electoral fortunes.
Van der Land also makes this observation that membership involvement plummets in an
electoral downturn.34 This also goes to show that attachment to the party itself waxes
and wanes with the ability to implement its aims. The membership is also unevenly
spread: some local branches were unsustainably small, with executives serving for long
consecutive periods because there is nobody else to do the job.35
In the years leading up to the 1982 crisis, D66 found its feet again under the leadership
of Jan Terlouw. Terlouw brought in a new focus on the environment and technology and
a more liberal profile.36 Under his leadership, the party began to grow again, profiling
28. Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 245.
29. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 366-367.
30. H. Döring and P. Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov),” Information on
parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.
parlgov.org.
31. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 73.
32. M. S. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie: de Geschiedenis van D66, 1966-2003 (Den Haag:
SDU, 2003), 374.
33. R. A. Koole and H. van de Velde, “The Netherlands,” in Party Organizations. A Data Handbook,
ed. R. S. Katz and P. Mair (London: SAGE, 1992), 636-642.
34. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 358.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 414.
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itself with the slogan “the reasonable alternative” and considering itself a “fourth current”
alongside the Christian Democratic, Social Democratic and Liberal currents in Dutch pol-
itics. The focus shifted away from “exploding” the party system. An important tradition
of D66 since its foundation was to express preference for a coalition before the elections,
rather than afterwards, in the so-called “strategy resolutions”. By adopting such a reso-
lution at each pre-election national congress, D66 endeavoured to give clarity to voters
about which coalitions they preferred. 1981 saw the party get its preferred coalition, with
the party joining the PvdA and the CDA, traditional rivals, in Cabinet. Unfortunately,
the rivalry between these two proved unsurmountable and the Cabinet collapsed.37 The
history of D66 paints a clear picture of its base attachment, ideological attachment and
the external challenges it faced, as shall be further explored below.
7.2.1 Electoral base attachment
D66 has had a catch-all mentality from its foundation.38 Its founding membership con-
sisted of a group of members who no longer felt at home in the traditional parties.39 The
chief reason D66 can be seen as having low electoral base attachment is its own definition
of its raison d’être: to “ensure political relations based on concrete party programmes”
and to “ensure maximum possible extension of the circle of those involved in political and
social decision-making”.40 The party, according to its own ideas, was a temporary affair
intended to make itself obsolete – in fact, it was not clear from the beginning that it would
be a party at all.41 The first aim described above can be supplemented easily by adding
“rather than on social cleavages”, offering the reason for D66’s catch-all orientation. D66
had no wish to become a party based on a sectional interest or religious group. Instead,
the party wanted to appeal to the entire populace based on its programme.42
The party seemed to have been aware that not having a well-defined social base was
an electoral disadvantage, but changing it does not appear to have been a discussion. An
evaluation report produced by Political Deputy Chairman Bob van den Bos after the 1982
general election analysed extensively why the party’s electoral support fluctuated so much
over its existence, naming the lack of a concrete voter base as one of the major factors.43
Nevertheless, he also speaks about it in positive terms, and does not seem to advocate
changing it.
D66, then, scores low on our operationalisation of electoral base attachment. As a
result of its historical heritage opposing the remnants of pillarization, it lacked the ties
most of its contemporaries had to groups representing its electoral base. In fact, it was
37. See Terlouw, Naar Zeventien Zetels en Terug.
38. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 407-408.
39. J. J. Godschalk, “Enige Politieke en Sociale Kenmerken van de Oprichters van D’66,” Acta Politica
5, no. 1 (1969): 65-67.
40. Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Politieke Partij Democraten ’66,”
1981, art. 3. Accessed January 14, 2018, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9512, Documentation
Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
41. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 25.
42. This understanding of not wishing to be an interest-based party occurs frequently in the primary
sources as well. See for example B. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid,” Democraat
15, no. 7 (1982): 17; See also Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 380.
43. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid,” 17-18.
Chapter 7. Democrats 66, 1982-1989 163
quite aware that its normal vote was relatively small and that it had to appeal to most
of its voters anew at every election. D66’s relationship to its electoral base is coloured by
the way the party registered this but did not seem to want to change it combined with its
goal to promote programmatic politics and the insistence found in the primary sources
on not becoming an interest party. This makes D66 not just a party without formal ties
to its electoral base, but also one that has informal conventions to the effect that such
attachment is not really desirable.
All this should lead to an extension strategy according to the propositions formulated
in chapter three. Since it has a weak electoral base attachment, the opportunity costs of
pursuing an extension strategy should be lower. In addition, the history and traditions
of D66 should increase the costs of appealing to any sort of social base, since this is
exactly what the party had always criticised in the rest of the Dutch party system. In
all these ways, the party’s exceptionally low degree of base attachment leads to a strong
expectation of an extend strategy.
7.2.2 Ideological Attachment
It is uncomfortable to speak about D66 in terms of ideology, a lack of comfort that extends
to the party itself. As has been noted earlier, some of its founders placed it in the tradition
of the pre-war VDB, a social-liberal party. The discussion resurfaced quite a few times
whenever the party was accused by the media and its political opponents of not having
a clear position: should the party more clearly identify as social-liberal? However, the
use of the ideological label “liberal” encountered serious reservations every time it was
proposed, revealing the complicated relationship of the party with ideological politics.44
Rather than as an ideological party, D66 viewed itself as an essentially pragmatic party,
based solely on its programme rather than a set of principles.45
Still, as we have noted in chapter three, pragmatism itself can be an ideology under the
definition of ideology as a “characterisation of a belief system that goes to the heart of
a party’s identity”.46 In this sense, D66 is highly attached to its ideology because it was
so fanatically committed to its programmatic and pragmatic basis. Even if it strenuously
denied having an ideology, and its members might have strongly believed this to be true,
the party still objectively did have a set of ideas forming the party’s basis to which it was
strongly attached. This is expressed by its own set of signal words (see chapter 4), such
as the “duality” of the party among and opposed to the existing parties, the “explosion
theory”, the “reasonable alternative”, “fourth current”, and so forth.47 The party was also
set in its ways when it came to things like the strategy resolutions detailing coalition
preferences before each election, even when it disadvantaged the party, and the set of
ideas about broad participation also extended to its own organisation.48
44. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 115;395.
45. Ibid., 32.
46. P. Mair and C. Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study,” Annual Review of Political Science 1
(1998): 220.
47. Note that these terms are somewhat more fluid and represent various views of D66’s role. The
“Fourth Current” is a more social-liberal understanding of the party. Nevertheless, it can be argued that
the set of ideas that D66 is attached to is rather social-liberal in nature.
48. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 351; Koole, De Opkomst van de Moderne Kaderpartij, 106.
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Ironically, it was precisely D66’s contention of not having an ideology, of not really
wanting to belong to the party system it wanted to “blow up” that made it highly ideo-
logical by chapter four’s definition. By the very act of refusing an ideological label with
reference to its self-assumed role opposing the current (ideological) political system, the
party casts itself as highly attached to this particular set of ideas. The core of D66’s
ideology is therefore formed by its democratisation ideas: opposition to the old pillarised
system, commitment to programmatic politics, belief in the necessity of presenting a clear
choice to electors and belief in progressive politics.49 These constitute a radical democratic
element in the party’s set of ideas that complements an emerging social-liberal identity.50
It should be noted that Van der Land, in his history of D66, casts the period between
1972 and 1982 as a time in which the radical democratic identity of the party had been
downplayed in favour of its social-liberal tradition.51 After the failure of the attempts at
realignment on the progressive side of politics, D66 seems to have let go of the idea that
it could explode the party system in that way and began profiling itself more as a normal
party among those already active in the party system. The term “fourth current” used
in those years indicates this, since it explicitly acknowledges the existence of the party
alongside the prevailing three currents represented by PvdA, CDA and VVD.52
In the light of the theory, D66 can be seen as highly attached to its ideology. Al-
though the party had extended its programmatic scope beyond democratisation under
Terlouw, this did not change the core of the party’s belief system. This is evidenced by
several practices symbolic to the party’s identity as a party of democratic renewal, which
continued despite imposing electoral disadvantage. This most prominently included the
strategy resolutions and the high level of direct democracy within the party. In addition,
the party’s programme was central to its identity. This illustrates how attached D66 was
to the core of its belief system (democratisation and political renewal) and should produce
pressures towards a reinforcement strategy by making it more costly to change away from
this path.
7.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system
The Dutch system of Proportional Representation (PR) without an electoral threshold
beyond its natural one-seat level is a highly proportional system, as shown by the high
Rose index of proportionality of 97.6553 at the 1982 general election.54 The lack of an
electoral threshold makes the system relatively mild on a young minor party like D66.55 It
enabled the party to win seven seats at its debut in 1967 and has theoretically made the
49. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 397.
50. As shall be touched upon below, D66 became increasingly comfortable referring to itself as a liberal
party during the 1980s.
51. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 414.
52. Ibid., 180.
53. Calculated by the author based on data from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments
database (ParlGov).”
54. The Rose index is calculated by subtracting the sum of the differences between each party’s voteshare
and seatshare at a given election, divided by two, from 100. See R. Rose, ed., International Encyclopedia
of Elections (Washington: CQ Press, 2000)
55. See also K. Vossen, Vrij vissen in het Vondelpark: Kleine politieke partijen in Nederland 1918-1940
(Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2003), 37.
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party a viable option for every voter willing to consider the party.56 It is mechanically as
easy to win seats as it is to lose them. This was part of the reason for D66’s fluctuating
support levels. Combined with the fact that it had a relatively small core vote, the
fact that it had to compete for every floating vote with all other parties made it very
susceptible to fluctuations in its and other parties’ popularity. Since the other parties
generally had larger core votes to fall back on despite the incipient partisan dealignment,
D66 was more heavily hit by these than most.
The system is not entirely devoid of stumbling blocks brought on by psychological
effects, however. Since the largest party is almost always part of the Cabinet coalition, it
matters very much whether a left-wing or a right-wing party has the plurality position. In
addition, whether or not a party can get large enough to negotiate for government office is
a consideration in voting behaviour which ensures minor parties can only enter into play
when the larger parties are too small to govern without a minor partner. This means that
for D66, the feasibility of the traditional CDA-VVD or CDA-PvdA combinations might
make it harder for the party to enter government.
More than in most other cases, D66’s own conception of its place in the system is
important. The party had a complicated concept of its own role, placing it both alongside
and opposed to the existing political parties.57 In the former instance, it operated as
a part of the political system, roughly corresponding to a social-liberal sub-current in
Dutch politics. In the latter interpretation, the party was fundamentally opposed to
the old parties, on the grounds that they obscured a fundamentally simple progressive-
conservative dynamic that would make politics much clearer and more democratic.58 For
this reason, it could not entirely operate as a “normal” party, by its own standards,
a position it has often struggled with. After all, on the left-right scale it usually fell
somewhere in the middle between the PvdA and the VVD, but by its own conception of
its role it still opposed all major parties.
The interpretation of the party system as consisting of progressive and conservative
parties led to shifting coalition preferences. The VVD, the other liberal player in the
Dutch party system, was considered a conservative force; the PvdA a progressive one. The
role of the CDA and its predecessors was more ambiguous, containing both progressive and
conservative elements. Originally, the party hoped to entice progressive CDA supporters
to support progressive realignment. However, the unity of the CDA after its merger in
1980 prevented this from happening.
The central negotiating position of the CDA was also becoming an increasingly impor-
tant problem in the eyes of prominent Democrats.59 The CDA and one of its predecessors,
the Catholic People’s Party (KVP), had never been excluded from any governing coalition
since 1918 and D66 felt it was undesirable that the same minority would always be able
56. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 36.
57. Ibid., 387.
58. This was formulated by Van Mierlo himself quite clearly in his speech to the 1970 national congress
in Breda: “As long as the electorate was being divided by dated ideological divisions by means of the
threefold pattern of socialist, liberal and confessional somewhere in between, those voters who essentially
agree on a number of solutions could not find eachother.” Quoted in ibid., 67, translation by the author
of this dissertation.
59. Ibid., 146.
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to decide who to govern with. This was a problem in the field of democratisation and
political reform but even more so in the field of medical ethics. In both fields, the party
found the CDA blocking all proposals. The fact that this dominant position was brought
on by the mutual exclusion of the PvdA and the VVD led D66 to the conclusion that it
had to make a coalition without the CDA feasible (later termed the “Purple Coalition”).
By 1981, D66 was participating in the Des Indes Conference, initiated by the youth wing
of the VVD in the 70s, to see if a coalition without the CDA could be achieved.60 This
year also marked the first time the Purple Coalition of PvdA, VVD and D66 was named
as a preferred option for D66 in a resolution of the national congress (if at this point
second to CDA-PvdA-D66).
Finally, it should be noted that the other parties did not always take note of D66.
The party’s strategy resolutions briefly touched on above were originally intended to
force other parties to clarify their coalition preferences prior to an election in a similar
manner.61 They did not, however, have the intended effect.62 Rather, because they made
the party’s preferences public before the election, one could say the strategy resolutions
disadvantaged D66, leading to the pyrrhic victory in which the party got its preferred
coalition but was squeezed between the rival CDA and PvdA delegations in the short-
lived second Van Agt Cabinet.
In conclusion, let us briefly discuss some expectations based on the proposition formu-
lated in chapter three. According to proposition 6 on the effect of the electoral system,
D66 should be pushed by the circumstances to take a reinforcement strategy. By the logic
of this proposition, the Proportional Representation system promotes appealing to one’s
core vote, since the proportional system makes defections by core voters more effective.
For this reason, mobilizing and reinforcing one’s own core vote is expected to be the first
priority for D66. However, due to the small size of D66’s core vote, we should keep an
eye out for signs that the proposition is too simple, since it might very well be the case
that D66’s atypically small core vote complicates the matter. We shall return to this in
the conclusion of this chapter.
7.2.4 Overview and expectations
D66 presents a case where the party’s internal characteristics contradict eachother, as can
be seen in table 7.1. Since the party is slanted against any sort of privileged relationship
with any group of voters, it has a weak electoral base attachment that, according to
proposition 3, should lead to an extension strategy. At the same time, it is precisely
this opposition to the existing mode of politics and the ideological basis of the main
parties, as well as its fervent support for democratic reform, that gives the party a strong
ideological attachment. This ideological attachment, according to proposition 4, should
lead to a reinforcement strategy. Like as not, this will be a case where propositions
60. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 274.
61. M. Ten Brink, “betreft: Politieke Plaatsbepaling,” Note to the national committee on political posi-
tioning dated 28th of November 1985 (1985), HB.DB-85/222A, inventory nr. 93, Archives of Democrats 66,
Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Gronin-
gen University.
62. Ibid.
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Table 7.1: Overview of the Independent Variables: D66 in 1982
Internal factors Measurement Expected Strategy
Electoral base attachment Weak Extension
Ideological attachment Strong Reinforcement
External environment
Electoral system Proportional Representation Reinforcement
Previous election Above average (+4,7%) Extension
5a through 5c will come into play: during the first cycle, we can therefore expect that
the tactical and organisational dimensions will show extension-based measures, whereas
the programmatic dimension will see a reinforcement strategy highlighting the party’s
traditional values. If proposition 6 is correct, the second electoral cycle should see a
more uniformly reinforcement strategy, owing to the dynamics of the PR system which
encourages the cultivation of a party’s core vote.
7.3 The 1982 General Election defeat
1981 had been a year of great triumph for D66. Under the leadership of Jan Terlouw,
the party stormed ahead to a record seventeen seats in the lower house, over ten percent
of the vote. This performance was 4,7% above average, as can be seen in the chart of
electoral performance in figure 7.1, and the first performance in double figures at 11,1%.63
Although some in the party had the sense that the party had overperformed and that part
of this support was very soft, D66 was the great winner of the elections.64 Perhaps as a
result, the party got its then-preferred coalition of CDA, PvdA and D66. From the start,
it was clear that this combination faced serious problems, not in the least because of the
personal rivalry between former Prime Minister and PvdA leader Joop den Uyl and the
sitting PM, CDA leader Dries van Agt.65 Terlouw himself joined the Cabinet as second
Deputy Prime Minister.
As one might expect, the Cabinet’s term was fraught with problems, documented ex-
tensively in Terlouw’s diaries among other sources.66 The personal rivalry between Den
Uyl and Van Agt never subsided, and to make things worse for Terlouw and D66, conflicts
between Terlouw at Economic Affairs and Den Uyl at Social Affairs and Employment over
financing a job creation package forced D66 to side against its former left-wing partner.67
This conflict about the finances would ultimately bring down the Cabinet in the spring
63. Data obtained from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
64. J. Glastra van Loon, “Toespraak Jan Glastra van Loon, voorzitter Eerste Kamerfractie D’66 op
de ALV van D’66 op zaterdag, 30 oktober 1982 in "De Flint" te Amersfoort,” Speech to the national
congress of 29th and 30th October 1982 (1982), Congresstukken 82.10.30 JGl, inventory nr. 45, Archives
of Democrats 66, Algemene Ledenvergadering (ALV), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties,
Groningen University, 3.
65. See Terlouw, Naar Zeventien Zetels en Terug.
66. Terlouw, Naar Zeventien Zetels en Terug ; Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 192.
67. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 194-195.
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Figure 7.1: Electoral performance of D66, 1967-1982
of 1982.68 In addition, relations between D66 Ministers and the Parliamentary Party
soured because the former, according to the latter, neglected their ties to the party.69
To compound the unrest, PvdA and D66 also suffered losses at the provincial elections.
This particularly affected Terlouw, whose decision to remain in the rump cabinet of CDA
and D66 formed following the resignation of the PvdA ministers from the Cabinet was
criticised within the party. Four members of the Parliamentary Party voted against his
decision.70
The downward spiral evident in the provincial election defeats continued in dramatic
fashion for D66 at the early elections caused by the fall of its preferred cabinet in Septem-
ber 1982. Trouble surrounding Terlouw’s leadership as a result of his decision to join the
rump cabinet contributed to this defeat.71 In the space of just a single year, the party
had lost eleven of its seventeen seats in 1981, completely evaporating the gains made that
year.72 This is important, combined with the above-average performance of 1981, since
the 1982 election only puts D66 at 2,1% below its average performance in the 5 elections
up to and including 1982. This would mean that the party had lost primarily non-core
voters. This squares with the party’s knowledge that its loyal core vote was rather small.73
In consequence, therefore, if the party were pursuing a functional strategy based on who
defected in the shock election, it would pursue an extension strategy.
68. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 199.
69. Ibid., 195.
70. Ibid., 202.
71. R. A. Koole, “Het D’66-congres en de besluitvorming: Beschouwing bij en letterlijke teksten van
de 33ste Algemene Ledenvergadering van D’66, 16 en 17 juli 1982 te Amersfoort,” in Jaarboek 1982, ed.
R. A. Koole and A. P. M. Lucardi (Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Politieke Partijen, 1983), 48.
72. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 213.
73. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid,” 17.
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The defeat was not only well over our 33% threshold, but also appears to have been
traumatic for D66, as evidenced by the publication of a bundle of essays by party grandees
edited by the parliamentary party leader’s former aide Joris Backer and the speedy way
in which the national committee took up the task of evaluating what had gone wrong.74
The fact that the score of 1981 was most likely a temporary spike in performance did
not detract from this sense of crisis. Nevertheless, unlike the 1974 crisis, there was no
discussion of dissolving the party.75 Terlouw announced that he would not be returning
to Parliament and resigned his party leadership.76
7.4 The recovery strategy
Looking at D66’s reaction to the 1982 defeat, what stands out is how quick the party was
on the uptake. Soon after the defeat, an advisory group was convened by the national
committee. This gathering, consisting of prominent party members, would help the ex-
ecutive prepare proposals for the October meeting of the national congress, just under
two months away.77 The draft resolutions produced by this brainstorming group contain
the earliest forms of some parts of the recovery strategy, and will be brought up where
necessary when discussing the various dimensions of the strategy below.78 The fact that
it was the congress for which the first actions were prepared shows the pre-eminence of
the congress in the structure of the party.
The party was also surprisingly aware of its somewhat precarious position. The eval-
uation of the election result, authored by Acting Party Chairman and Political Deputy
Chairman Bob van den Bos, shows a deep insight into the challenges facing the party.
It presented the sobering conclusion that some of the party’s most cherished traditions
made it vulnerable. As noted above, D66’s core electorate was small and the party did not
want to endeavour for the automatic support of certain groups in society. As a corollary,
it had little support in civil society. It had an aversion of party-political pointscoring
and its open and participatory culture of decision-making often led to the appearance of
indecision and lack of direction. These characteristics, Van den Bos concluded “are so
deeply rooted in their essence in the party culture, that D66 (therefore) always runs the
74. J. Backer, Tussen droom en daad: D’66 en de politieke crisis: meningen (1983); Van den Bos, “Onze
mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid,” See section 7.4 for a more detailed discussion of the speed of the
reaction.
75. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 228.
76. Terlouw, Naar Zeventien Zetels en Terug, 245.
77. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Notulen van verg. 82.09.24/25 H 26 te Soesterberg,”
Minutes of the Weekend Meeting of the National Committee, 24th and 25th of September 1982
at Soesterberg (1982), Bijlage B bij verg. 82.10.28 H 30, inventory nr. 54, Archives of Democrats
66, Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties,
Groningen University, 5; Democraten 66, National Committee, “Verslag Bijeenkomst Adviesgroep Con-
gres op maandag 18 oktober 1982 om 19.30 uur,” Minutes of the Advisory Group on the upcom-
ing National Congress, 28th of October 1982 (1982), inventory nr. 54, Archives of Democrats 66,
Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Gronin-
gen University.
78. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Congresboek B,” Papers for the 34th National Congress
(1982), inventory nr. 45, Archives of Democrats 66, Algemene Ledenvergadering (ALV), Documentation
Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
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risk of destroying itself”.79
Van den Bos’s further analysis showed many similarities with the picture painted in
section 7.2. D66, he argued, was more susceptible to the effects of the political business
cycle, popularity of party leaders, party image, media climate and independent positioning
than other parties at the time.80 Concluding his analysis, Van den Bos recommended a
mix of accepting the party’s vulnerabilities and reinterpreting them to make them less
so.81 He argued that a balance must be struck between the harsh political realities and
profiling the party as a modern progressive party.82
The Van den Bos evaluation and the brainstorming group proposals form the embryonic
state of a strategy. It shows how deeply aware D66 was of the circumstances that brought
it into crisis. Essentially, the choice Van den Bos paints mirrors the central thrust of the
model: go down the familiar path advocating democratisation with new vigour or extend
your appeal further, even at the cost of some of your party’s essentials?
For D66, its ideological baggage would lead to a reinforcement strategy, since its ideas
about democratisation were more or less its raison d’être. However, going on Van den
Bos’s analysis of the external realities, an extension strategy would be the logical choice,
since the party remained vulnerable due to the lack of a large base of electoral support.
Low base attachment should also contribute to this, since it caused the problems Van
den Bos described. Here we have, once again, a test of various factors against eachother.
In the section that follows, the recovery strategy shall be traced from the Van den Bos
evaluation and the brainstorming group to 1986 and from that electoral recovery to 1989.
7.4.1 Towards different politics, 1982-1986
One thing should be noted before discussing the first electoral cycle following the 1982
electoral defeat. The response of the party shifts within this time period, perhaps more
than it shifts between the first and second electoral cycles. Two stages can be distin-
guished within the first electoral cycle: a preliminary one under the leadership of Maarten
Engwirda and a final one after the return of founding leader Hans van Mierlo to the lead-
ership.83 Interestingly, the former period contains more elements of the extension strategy
than the latter. Van der Land uses exactly this point to mark a sharp transition: the end
of the “Fourth Current” and the beginning of the return of the original democratisation
agenda.84
The transition between Engwirda and Van Mierlo was tumultuous. With D66 at its
nadir in the opinion polls at two seats in 1984, a year before the local elections of 1985,
members and activists were getting disquieted over the parliamentary leadership of Eng-
wirda, ultimately saying he lacked charisma.85 Parliamentary party and national commit-




83. In a previous presentation of the preliminary results from this electoral cycle, these two phases were
called the “initial” and “final” reactions.
84. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 239.
85. Ibid., 230.
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tee had also been at odds.86 Ultimately, the difficulties in the party led to speculation of
Van Mierlo’s return which became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Engwirda came to believe
only the former leader had what it took to revitalise the party and would only stand aside
for him.87 In the discussion that follows, the two periods will be identified as such where
necessary to show the development of the recovery strategy within the first electoral cycle.
7.4.1.1 Organisational changes, 1982-1986
As noted above, D66 cherished its highly democratic party structure. From the docu-
ments of the brainstorming group and national committee, it appears there was no wish
to change this. In fact, the brainstorming group proposed a resolution which would even
further decentralise the party organisation.88 This resolution was presented to the national
congress by the national committee with a few changes.89 Opposed to the national com-
mittee’s drive to preserve the party’s organisational basis, a group known as (R)appèl90
which succeeded to capture the attention of the national committee and the party council,
argued that a radical overhaul of the party organisation was necessary.91 Despite the pro-
posals to abolish the party council, the party council supported the manifesto presented
by (R)appèl.92 The national committee showed itself an essentially conservative force in
debates on the party organisation, not just in responding to (R)appèl but also when the
party council requested an extension of its advisory and controlling role.93
In a discussion note published in the party magazine Democraat by Deputy Chair for
Organisation Mieke van Wagenberg, the national committee proposed measures mostly
intended to streamline the party organisation. This was a followup of the resolution passed
at the national congress in October 1982.94 Among others, the role of the local branches
in preparing and streamlining national congress discussions was further strengthened by
delegating the power to bundle motions and amendments to the provincial branches.95
The role of the Programme and Reporting Committees was also strengthened through
proposals to change the Huishoudelijk Reglement.96 All this would serve, according to Van
86. Ibid., 229-230.
87. Ibid., 240.
88. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Resolutie Organisatie,” Draft resolution on the organization
as proposed by the brainstorming group (1982), inventory nr. 45, Archives of Democrats 66, Algemene
Ledenvergadering (ALV), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
89. D66, National Committee, “Congresboek B,” 6.
90. The name is hard to translate - it is essentially a play on the "appeal", the manifesto published by
the founders through which they tried to gauge support for their idea of a new party. The addition of
"(R)" to the name signifies a renewal of this appeal.
91. (R)Appèl Group, “Over fundament en partijcentrum,” Democraat 17, no. 6 (1982): 204-205; Van
der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie.
92. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 205.
93. O. Scheltema, “betreft: Motie AR d.d. 31/5/86 over taakuitbreiding,” Note to the national committee
on the party council motion of 31/5/86 for extension of their tasks (1986), HB.DB-86/082, inventory nr.
96, Archives of Democrats 66, Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on
Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
94. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Voorstellen ter verbetering van de organisatie van de partij,”
Democraat 16, no. 1 (1983): 17.
95. Ibid.
96. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Voorstellen tot wijziging van enige artikelen van het
Huishoudelijk Reglement,” Democraat 16, no. 1 (1983): 8, 17.
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Wagenberg’s note, to reduce the number of motions and amendments to be debated at
the national congress and increase the quality of decision-making.97 In light of reflections
by Koole on the ways the national committee and party leadership could mould the
deliberations of the national congress, one has to conclude that this would add another
tool to their arsenal.98 In relation to the organisational dimension of the recovery strategy,
therefore, these relatively minor changes still provide evidence of mild concentration of
power in the hands of the executive, or internal de-democratisation.
Another change to the democratic procedures of the party concerned a major function of
parties: nominating candidates. Prior to 1982 the party simply conducted a postal ranked
ballot without any sort of structured process to ensure balance of the list. There was no
draft list on which the members would pronounce their verdict; rather they got a list
of all candidates introducing themselves and would then vote. According to Hillebrand,
this gave the members a large amount of control, at the cost of introducing a large
risk of unbalanced results due to lack of coordination.99 Starting in 1982, the national
committee seems to have seen this as a problem, and instituted a committee (Commissie
Kandidaatstelling, candidate selection committee) to review the procedures.
This committee came up with far-reaching proposals to enable the national commit-
tee to give advice to the membership in selection procedures. The national committee
appeared rather conflicted about these proposed new powers.100 After delaying the pro-
posals to study them further, the national committee proposed enabling it to give a
recommendation.101 A special national congress in Biddinghuizen agreed but made the
recommendation optional, at the discretion of the national committee or the national
congress.102 Under the system as it first operated before the 1986 elections, the national
committee appointed a committee, which based on a profile would single out fifteen candi-
dates, without any further order among them, for recommendation.103 Like the changes to
procedures for the national congress, this change is relevant because it eases coordination
by the party’s central decision-makers, at the cost of direct membership influence.
Despite not changing the fundamental OMOV premise of the selection procedures, it
remained contentious. When the national congress first debated a request for advice, the
national committee advised against it.104 According to campaign coordinator Michiel ten
97. D66, National Committee, “Voorstellen ter verbetering van de organisatie van de partij,” 17.
98. Koole, “Het D’66-congres en de besluitvorming,” 53-54.
99. Hillebrand, De Antichambre van het Parlement, 123.
100. M. Van Wagenberg, “Stand van zaken met betrekking tot onderzoek naar de kandidaatstellingspro-
cedure,” Democraat 16, no. 1 (1983): 17.
101. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Beleidsvoorstellen Organisatie,” Democraat 16, no. 6 (1983):
19.
102. D66, National Committee, “Congresboek B,” amendment 5010, p.5; Democraten 66, National Com-
mittee, “Besluitvorming rond beleidsvoorstellen organisatie,” Democraat 17, no. 3 (1984): 6; implemented
in Democraten 66, “Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement,” 1986, accessed January 14, 2018, http :
//dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/9514, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen
University.
103. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Stemadvies Tweede Kamer,” Democraat 18, no. 8 (1985): 8.
104. Democraten 66, “Congres vraagt HB om stemadvies,” Democraat 18, no. 7 (1985): 21; Democraten
66, National Congress, “Congresboek,” Papers of the National Congress held 15th and 16th June 1985
(1985), inventory nr. 63, Archives of Democrats 66, Algemene Ledenvergadering (ALV), Documentation
Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University, motion APM 1050, p. 38.
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Brink, the voting advice was designed more for local elections in which media information
on the candidates was less readily available. On the national level, he argued, the benefits
failed to outweigh the concerns about what this might mean for the party’s internally
democratic structure.105 The first use of the innovation was therefore against the wishes
of the national committee, showing again the hesitation with which changes to the party
structure were treated.
D66 can be said to have pursued an extension strategy in its organisation due to the
way the measures ease coordination and concentrate power ever so slightly more into the
hands of the national committee and other national organs. Even if the democratic rules of
the game were not changed, the increased opportunities to influence the OMOV decision-
making procedures qualified the power of ordinary members. This, in turn, enabled the
leadership to act more independently of the membership. Regardless, the hesitation with
which it approached this and the lack of the proposals in the early documents reveal that
this might have been more a matter of necessity for the national committee, shaped by the
interventions of members and the national congress, rather than an agenda intended from
the start. The harsh external realities were in direct contest with the internal democratic
preferences of the party and its members. This led to a compromise in which minor
concessions were made to the demands of the external environment.
7.4.1.2 Programmatic changes, 1983-1987: Different politics
According to the Van den Bos evaluation, the major imperative for D66 in 1982 in the
field of programme was the clarity of the programme and its independence from the
major parties.106 It remained to be seen, however, whether this clarity would be found in
the party’s traditional radical democratic agenda or in an increasing focus on the social
liberalism of the Terlouw years. Associated as Van Mierlo was with the party’s founding
themes, it should come as no surprise that his return to the stage clearly separates the
programmatic response into two sub-periods. Before Van Mierlo returned, there were
considerable indications that the party intended to search for clarity in broadening and
redefining its programmatic basis,107 whereas the return of the founding leader heralded
a return to a strong democratisation theme.
Van den Bos clearly expressed that on balance, the party was “left-liberal” in his eyes.108
In doing so, he arguably reopened a perennial discussion in the party’s history. On the
one hand, the party put itself in the tradition of the pre-war VDB.109 On the other, it
had a distaste of rigid ‘ideological’ party systems. This split the party into two camps.
105. M. Ten Brink, “betreft: stemadvies HB m.b.t. kandidatenlijst Tweede Kamer Verkiezingen,” Memo
to the National Executive regarding the voting advice of the national committee for the list of lower house
candidates, dated 3th of October 1984 (1984), HB.DB-84/209, inventory nr. 82, Archives of Democrats 66,
Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Gronin-
gen University.
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109. For example referenced in J. Kohnstamm, “Rede Jacob Kohnstamm, partijvoorzitter, op het 35ste
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Interestingly, we can follow their discourse in a series of Democraat articles. One camp, led
by 1982 campaign manager Jan Veldhuizen, got the national congress to call for reopening
the debate and argued that the party had to add a descriptive subtitle to its name declaring
it a “social-liberal” or “left-liberal” party for the sake of clarity.110 The other opposed the
change, mostly on the grounds that “social-liberal” did not fully describe D66 and that it
ran contrary to the non-ideological tradition of the party.111 In the end, a resolution tabled
by Veldhuizen et al. to label the party “left-liberal” failed in the national congress after
the national committee opposed it on the grounds that it would leave the party less able
to accommodate people of diverse views.112 This defeat can be seen as a first indication of
the strength of the opposition to playing up a specific ideological label, which many felt
would be too rigid, and in this regard presages the return to a more radical democratic
course under Van Mierlo.
More importantly, the party started a plan to thoroughly revise its programme. This
was originally a two-part plan.113 The first part was the so-called Democratic Manifesto
(DM) by Aad Nuis, which was based among others on a paper produced earlier by senator
Jan Vis for the brainstorming group.114 The Democratic Manifesto would analyse social
trends and offer a general D66 take on them, to act as the introduction to the next man-
ifesto and offer direction to the revised political programme.115 It seemed to reinterpret
and broaden the party’s idea of democratisation in many respects, focusing on democrati-
sation in all aspects of society while reducing the founding concern with political reform to
a single paragraph.116 A similar emphasis appears in Engwirda’s address to the national
110. Democraten 66, National Congress, “Verslag van de 35e Algemene Ledenvergadering, gehouden op 6
en 7 mei 1983 in de Hanzehof te Zutphen,” Minutes (Verslag) of the 35th National Congress of D66 (1983),
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Partij,” Democraat 16, no. 4 (1983): 11–13; J. Jorritsma, J. Boogerd, and P. Scheele, “Links Liberaal,
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congress discussing the document.117 The congress adopted the document as requested,
with amendments to the text itself having been ruled out.118 In addition, the national
committee presented policy proposals on newer issues like informatics and topical areas
like labour policy to the national congress in what appears to have been an attempt to
broaden the programme.119
The second phase would be a total revision of the party’s programme based on the
DM, although in the end it became more of a collection of already passed policies than
a fundamentally new document.120 Meanwhile, Engwirda, whose leadership was coming
under fire, tried to formulate his own priorities. He declared democratisation the party’s
top priority, in a broader interpretation similar to the DM’s, but the final version of his
strategy paper focuses on the economy before discussing this priority.121 In this way, the
early period of programmatic reform seemed to favour an extension strategy as the party
sought primarily to capitalise on new and topical issues while at the same time trying to
redefine its traditional values to broaden the concept of democratisation.
This changed with the return of Van Mierlo. The early elections planned for 1986 and
the return of the old party leader interrupted the revision of the new policy programme,
which could not be completed and discussion of which was in part delegated to the new
manifesto.122 The DM, in fact, never became the intended prologue to the manifesto of
1986. Instead, the manifesto was based heavily on Een Reden van Bestaan (a reason
to exist), a “political message” prepared by the Senate parliamentary party under Van
Mierlo’s chairmanship.123 In fact, some passages of the manifesto cite the message verba-
tim.124 In contrast to the DM, Een Reden van Bestaan very much put political reform
front and centre once more. The party then shifted rapidly to accommodate the more
traditional concerns of its former leader. Party Secretary Maarten ten Brink urged public
speakers on behalf of the party to keep emphasising “labour and informatics, environment
and individualisation”, adding two issues that the party had come to view as characteristic
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of D66 (environment and individualisation) associated with respectively Terlouw and Van
Mierlo to the list of policy priorities.125
The programmatic developments between 1982 and 1986 combine elements of the rein-
forcement and extension strategies by seeking to reinterpret its democratisation agenda in
a broader way, but with Van Mierlo’s return, emphasis shifted to the party’s traditional
values, as evidenced by the main slogan “Different Politics” (Andere Politiek).126 The
information and labour policies certainly remained important parts of the party’s mes-
saging. However, a renewed focus on political democratisation is clear from the manifesto
and the qualitative archival evidence. In 1986, the party moved to support the institu-
tion of an advisory referendum for the first time in its existence, not only reaffirming but
deepening its founding commitments.127 In this way, the reinforcement strategy came to
predominate as the character of the party reasserted itself, with a focus now on highlight-
ing political reform as D66’s "reason to exist". In the words of the 1986 campaign plan,
the party was now confident that “[its] line is old and good”.128
7.4.1.3 Tactical Changes, 1982-1986: same votes as before
Prior to 1982, D66 had seemed on the way to becoming a social-liberal “fourth ideological
current”, complementing the social democratic, Christian democratic and liberal currents.
It actively sought and claimed this position under Terlouw. However, as the Van den Bos
evaluation reveals, it did not succeed. One of the problems for the party, the Deputy
Chairman signaled, was that the PvdA and the VVD had moved to the centre, squeezing
D66 in between them.129 According to Van den Bos, the party should focus on younger
VVD voters and disaffected Labour voters, as well as younger CDA supporters.130
The general thrust of the party’s targeting strategy seems to have been slanted against
opportunistically angling for as many votes as possible. This was aptly summarized by
a member of the brainstorming group: “we shouldn’t be looking ‘which constituencies
are still left over for us?’ ”131 Van den Bos, in his analysis, concurred that the targeting
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strategy should “derive from our proposed direction”.132 Discussing the priorities of the na-
tional committee, chairman Jacob Kohnstamm also argued: “we should not be conducting
interest group-ish politics.”133
The impression that this puts the party in the reinforcement column is further strength-
ened by a note on the 1986 campaign plan prepared by publicity coordinator Gauke Tanja:
“our voters will have to come from the same corner as before.”134 The party, he argued,
should not focus on having a finger in all pies, but rather focus on well-defined tar-
get groups and areas. Various documents before this already gave a definition of this
target group as being predominantly young (up to 30 or 35 years) and/or of a slightly
above-average education and income level.135 Significantly, the reinforcing intent was made
explicit by Kohnstamm in response to a complaint by Van den Bos during a national
committee meeting that this targeting would be “elitist”. The party chairman reasoned
in response that D66 had to build an electoral base first, and that making it less elitist
would only be possible after this had been accomplished.136
To do so, the party had to position itself in opposition to the other parties. Clear points
of policy should be given preference. This seemed to play right into the programmatic
part of the reinforcement strategy with the return of Van Mierlo, marking a shift from
the fourth current strategy to a new form of the explosion theory, in his words: “Everyone
may run in currents to their heart’s content, so long as they acknowledge the dual role
[of D66 opposed to and among the other parties].”137
Significantly, the national committee discontinued the use of the strategy resolution,
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possibly because of the negative experience of the 1981-1982 coalition, another idea origi-
nating in Van den Bos’s evaluation.138 Instead, they offered a “strategic positioning” which
more or less stated that D66 would only participate in government if they were able to
realise enough of their programme.139 This move away from strategy to results can also be
seen in the attitude to the Des Indes talks with Labour and the VVD, when Van den Bos
wondered whether it would not be better to abandon them.140 In the end, the national
committee decided to continue D66’s participation on the condition that there be concrete
results.141
The party also made significant effort to capture the youth vote. The campaign plan
also mentions the elderly and migrant votes as candidates for “special attention”, but
the youth vote was very clearly targeted.142 This is not so strange in light of the fact,
noted above, that the existing core electorate of D66 was perceived as under 35 years
old. Van den Bos continued his advocacy for targeting young people, and proved a major
force in this area. Among others, he forcefully argued the transformation of the party’s
internal Young People Activation Centre (Jongeren Activeringscentrum, JOAC) into a
full-fledged independent youth wing.143 Early calls by members of JOAC and the party
to do something about the position of young people in the party explicitly mentioned
the need to win the youth vote back.144 The national committee and parliamentary party
embraced this reasoning.145 Despite serious discussion revealing the resistance of D66 to
such a sub-group in the party, the national congress expressed its support for the plan
and as a consequence, the Young Democrats (Jonge Democraten, JD) were founded as an
“independent” youth organization, organizationally separate from the party but aligned
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with it.146 During the campaign, this targeting of the youth vote continued with a well-
received speech campaign by Van Mierlo in the university towns.147
A final change that should be mentioned is the party’s new logo and a slight change
of its name. In the new logo, the apostrophe that hitherto indicated the reference to
the name 1966 (rendering the party acronym as D’66) disappeared. The announcement
in Democraat confirms that the party saw the reference as dated: “in the new logo, 66
no longer refers to 1966”.148 Apart from this new outlook, however, there did not appear
to be much political targeting content to the minor logo change, and it can therefore be
regarded as neutral to the direction of the tactical changes.
The party also did not attempt to attract a different kind of candidate. As a rela-
tively successful new party, D66 was naturally very concerned with the loyalty of their
candidates to the party.149 In the 1985 version of the statutes, the minimum required
length of a candidate’s membership prior to an election was lengthened from six months
to a year, further tilting the balance towards insider candidates.150 Additionally, of the
15 candidates recommended by the voting advice committee, a majority had prior ex-
perience in parliament or on the national executive.151 This was the case most of all for
Van Mierlo himself, of course, who had a prominent history in the party and transferred
from the Senate to the lower house with the 1986 elections. Hillebrand also noted the
influence of the first Voting Advice, this tilted the balance slightly towards insiders.152
Therefore, on balance, the personal part of the recovery strategy, can be seen as leaning
in the reinforcement direction.
All this adds up to a clear strategy reinforcing the party’s traditional targeting strategy,
and therefore belonging to the reinforcement strategy, which seems clearly related to the
traditional antipathy of the party against appealing to sectional interests and against the
existing party system. The party wanted to build on those it already appealed to through
its programme, and go from there. With the exception of the foundation of the JD and the
intention to target migrant and elderly voters, D66 seemed to plan to adopt its traditional
positioning between PvdA and VVD, attracting disaffected voters from both parties as it
used to. The subtle disavowal of the concept of a strategy resolution aided the party in
profiling itself without any reference to the other parties, further reinforcing the distinct
positioning strategy.
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7.4.2 Consolidation, 1986-1989
The 1986 general election proved a success for D66. Under the renewed leadership of
the charismatic Van Mierlo, the party increased its number of seats from six to nine.
Although the pollsters predicted a larger victory for the party, the official evaluation report
authored by campaign manager Michiel ten Brink noted that under the circumstances of
the previous electoral cycle, the gains were more than satisfactory.153 This thread of
thought was visible earlier than the release of the report, almost a year after the elections
– from the first evaluation in a meeting of parliamentary party and national committee,
decision-makers in the party appear to have been proud of the progress made first and
foremost.154
That is not to say there were no concerns. Apparently, the national committee still
entertained a slumbering discontent about the state of the party organisation. A major
concern aired in evaluations was the existence of blind spots where there was no local
branch and what to do with these areas.155
More generally, the party’s strategic thinking remained very much in line with what Van
den Bos had written in 1982, and the party seemed deeply aware that its vulnerabilities
had not entirely been dealt with. Van Mierlo had proved an indisputably popular choice
for the leadership, but there seems to have been some concern about what came after.156
Similarly, the concern with keeping the growth of D66 steady and the related discussions
on targeting also resurfaced. Finally, there was a considerable amount of concern that
the PvdA and the CDA had conspired to shut out D66 from important campaign events
and that they were forming a Cabinet without D66 participation, even though the party’s
own voters were assumed on the basis of polls to favour such participation.157
Nevertheless, all these concerns generally colour within the lines which were broadly
drawn in the preceding electoral cycle. Regardless of all the insecurities, the party seemed
keen to stick to what had worked. Interestingly, the roles in this period became reversed
between the party in and out of office. Where in the previous period, Van Mierlo had
insisted on a sharper and more traditional profile, now we find references in the archives
where Van Mierlo indicated the parliamentary group did not want an even clearer party
identity, even though members of the national committee kept pushing it, instead prefer-
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ring a clearer prioritisation between issues.158
7.4.2.1 Organisational changes, 1986-1989
Interestingly, the experience with the ad hoc organisation of the party during the election
campaigns seems to have resulted in a shift of opinion on the national committee. There
was still a conservative bend to many of the discussions, but in the second electoral
cycle the general membership played this role. As a result of the election evaluation,
the national committee appointed a committee led by former Nijmegen alderman Wim
Vrijhoef to advise on a re-structuring of the party.159 Among others, a central concern
was the dissatisfaction with the way in which the national congress functioned, which was
still deemed unsatisfactory by the national committee.160
The central proposal of the Vrijhoef committee would be to delegate some tasks from
the national congress to other organs. The national committee and executive would
get some of the organisational tasks, while a new party council based on membership
representation would take charge of the political preparation of congress decisions.161
This arrangement mirrors that of other political parties. This is particularly significant
since it would significantly reduce levels of direct democracy within the party. This would
give the cadre of the party more leeway and thus form part of an extension strategy.
The national committee, which had previously rebuffed attempts by the existing advisory
council to become such a party council, appeared broadly supportive of the idea at first.
However, after the report was circulated the regional members of the national committee
in particular proved very critical. This was largely due to discontent about not being
consulted about proposals that included the abolition of their positions on the national
committee. The rest of the national committee appeared to have been slightly taken
aback by this.162 The party’s standing political programme would also be abolished and
replaced by the manifesto plus policy documents determined during the cycle, as had
practically been done in 1986.163
The Vrijhoef proposals never made it to practice. When they were released in the party
magazine in September 1987, they encountered heavy resistance among the membership.
The party council, in a heated meeting, seemed concerned (among others) that it did
not get the expansion of advisory competences it had asked for – ironically, since this
158. Democraten 66, National Executive, “Notulen DB van 7-4-1987,” Minutes of the meeting of the Na-
tional Executive held 7th of April 1987 (1987), HB.DB-87/084, inventory nr. 105, Archives of Democrats
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Groningen University, 1.
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was what Vrijhoef intended.164 In addition, it successfully called for decision-making to
be deferred to the autumn national congress.165 In January, the national committee gave
the national congress two clear options – either implement changes or change nothing.166
Although an internal document noted the diversity and quality of the reactions as the
reason,167 the memo by the national committee published in Democraat implied heavily
that the reactions were generally opposed to the proposals, distinguishing a group inim-
itably opposed to the whole idea of an overhaul and a group that objected to part of
the Vrijhoef proposals.168 The party council advised not to change the structure.169 In
the end, the national committee concluded that a change to the party structure was not
the preferred option of the national congress and prepared minor changes to procedures
instead.170
The national committee appears, in addition, to have entertained the thought of polling
the members on political issues. In a proposal by Scheltema, these polls could be focused
at prioritising issues and evaluating the manifesto policy-wise.171 It was also raised at
the national congress where the Vrijhoef proposals were discussed.172 It is significant that
discussions like this one were held in the context of a membership drive.173 In addition, this
mobilising role of intra-party democracy was clearly linked to the reasoning, as evidenced
by the fact that members of the executive were wary to be seen to use such polls as a lure
on new members, that giving more power to members encourages more people to become
members.174 The proposals did not, in the end, make it into practice.
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What can be seen from the above discussion is that as a result of the continuing dis-
satisfaction with the current functioning of party organs, D66 felt the need to pursue
internal de-democratisation in the form of a move away from OMOV and therefore away
from the membership, showing an extending tendency. However, the resistance encoun-
tered by the Vrijhoef proposals meant that not much changed and organisational efforts
remained largely confined to tweaking the changes introduced previously. The character
of the party and its conception as a unique experiment in direct democracy will no doubt
have contributed to this outcome.
7.4.2.2 Programmatic changes, 1986-1989
By 1986, D66 had reclaimed its old role of challenger to the existing party system under
the leadership of Van Mierlo. The party itself remained identified to the electorate with a
left-liberal positioning, according to a report by executive member Kees van den Brink.175
In large part, from a party with D66’s characteristics and the relative success of the 1986
campaign, one would not expect very large changes to the party’s course.
Indeed, most of what D66 did programmatically between 1986 and 1989 seemed to
lean that way. In a broad treatment of the party’s course at a national committee-
parliamentary party weekend in 1986, the consensus appeared above all to continue on
the current path.176 The slogan “different politics” had struck a chord not just with the
electorate, but even moreso with the party faithful, although some, including Van Mierlo,
doubted whether the theme would carry the party much further.177 The watchwords would
be employed multiple times in the years that followed. The slogan was even employed
in the provincial campaign of 1987, during which it was given strong decentralisation
themes in a national prologue by Van Mierlo inserted into each provincial manifesto.178
In 1986, D66 deepened its commitment to constitutional reform and direct democracy
by adopting a resolution in favour of a consultative referendum.179 D66 appeared to have
fully embraced its old agenda again.
Nevertheless, the positioning of D66 among the other parties as a social-liberal force
made a remarkable comeback after the 1986 elections. This was mostly due to the losses
sustained by the VVD and can therefore also be seen as an electoral maneouver. In
the same weekend discussion as referred to above, shepherding the liberal tradition was
mentioned as a theme, while the VVD’s weakness was also noted, a link explicitly made
175. K. Van den Brink, “betr.: politieke plaatsbepaling,” Memo to the National Executive on Political
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in the plans for the provincial election campaign later that year.180
Towards the end of the decade, D66 became aware that it had not taken a clear position
on social and economic issues. To this end, a large-scale policy review operation was
launched in 1988 consisting of two committees, the committee 2000 and the committee
2001. Both seem to have had roughly the same terms of reference: to sketch the expected
social developments towards the 21st century and formulate proposals on which D66
should focus.181 The two committees differed in age and expertise and this probably
contributed to the fact that their conclusions differed.182 The committee 2000 started its
analysis from economic trends, whereas its younger counterpart committee 2001 started
by signalling problems with the welfare state and the political system.183 This seemed
to be the interpretation at the time as well, as Olga Scheltema, the National Committee
member overseeing the process, remarked the committee 2000 emphasised social-economic
challenges and the environment, the committee 2001, going on remarks by one of its
members, Thom de Graaff, emphasised individualisation.184
Overall, however, the reports of both the committees only contributed to the thrust of
the strategy already established, advocating as they did some of the main themes of the
party. At the core of the agenda, the democratisation, individualism and environmental
concerns that had accumulated over the years towards some sort of identity remained.
Therefore, D66 in the 1986-1989 period, while seeking to broaden the picture, remained
on the old tack of the reinforcement strategy of the previous electoral cycle.
7.4.2.3 Tactical changes, 1986-1989
With regards to which constituencies to target, D66 also did not change course between
1986 and 1989. In the aftermath of the election results, discussion mostly focused on the
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blind spots where the party was popular but had few members.185 A renewed interest in
who voted for the party and why certainly seemed to have occurred within the ranks of
the national committee.186 Proposals to target specific constituencies, posed in a paper
on communication strategy, were still greeted with some scepticism as to whether this did
not offend against the programmatic basis of the party.187
Chiefly, the attitude that voters should not be targeted opportunistically simply because
they were available still prevailed. Rather, the party still expressed a preference to target
those who logically could be supposed to be attracted to its programme – in this regard,
a member even made the observation that this was the natural party base, albeit not an
automatic one.188 Major target groups for the 1987 provincial elections were largely the
same: 1986 voters had to be retained and disaffected voters from the major parties, chiefly
the VVD, had to be won over.189 Even this, however, could be seen as deriving from the
programme, which the party now acknowledged had a liberal bend (see the discussion
on the party label). Since the programme precedes the tactical considerations in every
respect, it has to be concluded that the main thrust of D66’s targeting remained narrowly
focused on those already attracted to its policies. However, the focus on competing
with the VVD adds a slight extending element to the pure reinforcement strategy of the
previous electoral cycle.
Efforts among the youth proved highly successful and were continued with renewed
vigour after 1986. In a few years’ time, the Young Democrats had grown from a fledgling
youth wing into the third largest political youth organisation in the country with 1850
members.190 It should be noted that these members were not equally well-received every-
where in the mother party – many D66 members appear to have seen the Young Democrats
as rather upper-class and careerist.191 Still, this proved enough for D66 to continue its
push to increase its prominence among young voters in the coming period, among others
with the 2001 Committee, which was solely composed of younger party members.
Now let us turn to the personal component of electoral tactics. Perhaps because of
the realisation that Van Mierlo’s popularity had saved the party, the national committee
seems to have become acutely aware of the need to improve access to talent scouting.
This was one of the main parts of the agenda of the new party chairman, Saskia van der
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Loo, who took over in 1986.192 Scouting and coaching new talent appeared as part of the
arguments for decentralising the organisation in the organisational discussions, arguing
that talent inside the party could only move to the next level with more responsibilities
of its own.193 The party was not so much concerned that it did not have all the requisite
expertise within its ranks, but rather that that expertise did not make it to the right
place to be able to capitalise on it, and the whole process was found “based too much
on coincidence”.194 Efforts were therefore mostly concentrated, once more, on finding the
necessary expertise inside the party.
A large part of this was the evaluation of the voting advice for the candidate list
which had first been used in the run-up to the 1986 election. On the advice of the
voting advice committee for 1989, it was made possible for the voting advice to be split
up into separate tranches in order to gain a better professional and regional balance.195
The national committee remained divided on the issue, however.196 With the planned
elections of 1990 approaching, the national committee decided that it would not give
advice to the members, stating that it doubted the added value of the advice in light of
its conflicting position with the OMOV principle.197 Nevertheless, it was overruled by the
national congress, and a voting advice committee operated the revised system for 1989,
preserving again much of the incumbent parliamentary party in the first tranche.198 Thus,
despite attempts to better use the available resources, the party still largely looked inside
its own ranks, part of the reinforcement strategy.
As regards the positioning in the party system, however much the party approved of the
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dual positioning strategy opposed to and among the other parties, it remained a struggle.
Evaluations of the 1986 campaign sharply observed that the positioning opposed to all
major parties was mostly considered detrimental to the clarity of the party’s position.199
In the discussions on the national committee, a clear analysis of the party’s position in the
system can be seen to emerge, as well as a clear coalition preference. Social-economically,
the party aligned more with CDA and VVD.200 In terms of the “liberal heritage”, more with
PvdA and VVD.201 It was this latter combination, in the form of a renewed commitment
to the Des Indes talks, that was preferred. In addition, D66 made the choice to compete
more with the VVD than with the PvdA, citing the new “reasonable” course of the PvdA’s
new leader Wim Kok as one close to D66, whereas differences with the VVD were both
clearer and more likely to win over its voters.202
Here as in other fields, we see slight adjustments rather than major changes in the
existing strategy during the second electoral cycle. D66 remained true to itself as a
slightly rebellious party that did not quite want to conform to the expectations of the
party system it was founded to explode. Nevertheless, it appears that within this broad
reinforcement strategy, the party was coming to the conclusion that it needed to confront
the lack of clarity surrounding its political positioning, and appeared more ready to exploit
its liberal identification to compete with the VVD. With the reinforcement strategy largely
successful, the party started to look outward again, trying to poach away voters from other
parties, which is part of an extend strategy. This mix can largely be seen to be a result of
the large degree of membership participation – sympathies within the membership were
clearly with the more traditional option, while the party organs appear to have thought
more opportunistically.
7.5 Conclusion
The D66 response to the 1982 crisis is very complicated, since a wide range of actors
and pressures are involved due to the highly democratic party organisation. Multiple
times, the members wanted to go further than the party officials, and vice versa, such
as in the matters of the voting advices for the candidate selection procedures of 1986
and 1989 and the reform of the party organisation, respectively. Quite tellingly, in many
of those instances, the underlying sentiment conforms to a similar pattern: concern with
preserving the radical democratic character of the party. This ties in to the most important
conclusion that can be taken away from the experience of D66 in crisis: the importance
of the party’s roots in a radical democratisation movement stand out strongly in the
generally reinforcement-oriented recovery strategy which is summarised in table 7.2 .
In the first period following the 1982 election defeat, we see D66 struggling with its
place in the party system following the evaporation of Terlouw’s 1981 victory. Its intent
on the tactical dimension always remained not to go out of its way to broaden its small
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base, coloured by its antipathy towards politics based on sectional interests. This imme-
diately presents a problem for a purely functional explanation of the changes, since the
votes to be reclaimed belonged largely to non-core voters and this should have impelled
the party towards an extension strategy. However, the party did initially seek its recovery
in a broader programme, de-emphasising its political reform agenda and giving execu-
tive organs within the party a more coordinating role that qualified the radical OMOV
principle of its organisation.
All this changed with the return of Van Mierlo and his intervention which seems to have
totally overridden the earlier programmatic efforts. In part, of course, the decision to bring
back the old leader can be attributed to disappointing polling.203 On the other hand,
however, the ensuing reinforcement strategy did not appear entirely without warning.
The rejection of the social-liberal label in favour of the old non-ideological identification
reveals that here, too, the party seems to have been guided by its founding role as a party
fundamentally opposed to the current political and party system. On hindsight, this may
also be related to the party’s young age, which could conceivably have strengthened the
focus on its founding identity. After all, that is what brought the party together. It
appears D66 did not have a large electoral base; but neither did it particularly want one,
or at least not in the sense that a base is normally understood. In organisation, reference
has already been made to the high emphasis placed on internal democracy and avoiding
concentrations of power. In programme, the focus on democratisation was put front and
centre again and also deepened with the commitment to a referendum.
Given that the organising principle of D66 is exactly its set of ideas, it is not so strange
that its attachment to these ideas had such a strong influence.204 In this sense, it makes
sense that the weak attachment to a base demographic did not lead to an extension
strategy. D66’s base is not demographic but programmatic – therefore, its programme
trumped all concerns and led to an unwillingness to broaden the party’s understanding
of itself in favour of an extension strategy.
At first sight, we cannot truly judge what the impact of the electoral system was. The
party did not change strategy overall between the two cycles, and the changes that do
appear in particular areas between the two electoral cycles go both ways. The party also
was simply already on the ’right’ overall strategy for the 1986 election. However, it bears
remembering that before the return of Van Mierlo, the party was leaning more towards
an extension strategy, especially in the programmatic area. The fact that Van Mierlo
returned because of anticipated electoral problems gives some evidence that electoral
pressures might have played a role in the decision to switch to a more reinforcement-
oriented strategy. This is also a salient observation because it shows that despite the
small size of D66’s core vote, the way in which a Proportional Representation system
rewards the cultivation of a loyal group of supporters and a distinctive message arguably
still played a role, although in the second cycle the party did take some extension-based
measures.
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Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University.
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The strong attachment to the radical democratic and non-dogmatic ideology of the
party also seems a better explanation than a more functional one based on the identity of
the defectors, which would have resulted in a more extension-oriented strategy. Arising
from the Van den Bos evaluation of 1982, it appears D66 was very keenly aware of the
limitations its self-assumed identity placed on it.205 Despite the very realistic observation
that this placed the party at the mercy of the electoral business cycle,206 which in a
less principled party might very well have led to an attempt at an extension strategy, the
party instead chose to simply accept these vulnerabilities. D66 provides a clear example of
preferences being formed by internal institutional characteristics. That the environmental
factors entered into the equation later on can be seen clearly in the second electoral
cycle’s tactical part of the strategy, when D66, probably having exhausted the effects of
its narrower targeting, turned to poaching away the voters of other parties. It appears
that in this case, the proposition that PR leads to a reinforcement strategy is born out.
D66 seems to have been rewarded for its clear independent positioning, and to have acted
accordingly.
Despite imposing a sense of realism that led to a new appreciation of the virtue of clarity
in relation to other parties among the ranks of the national committee, the recovery
of 1986 largely appears to have locked in the strategy. “Different politics” became the
guiding theme for the next electoral cycle.207 Near the end, however, we see the party
try to come to terms with the limitations of the chosen strategy by focusing more on
social-economic themes in 1989, on the advice of the Committee 2000,208 and becoming
more and more convinced of the need for a so-called Purple Coalition without the CDA.
These developments seem to prefigure the later history of D66, in which the party would
finally declare itself to be in the social-liberal tradition, codify its founding principles in
a statement of principles and become the most enthusiastic advocate of Purple.
In summary, the case of D66’s 1982 electoral crisis appears to be dominated largely by
the party’s strong attachment to its original set of ideas. 16 years after its foundation,
the party was still very attached to their non-dogmatic, radical democratic and pragmatic
roots, showing in almost every aspect of the strategy. It presents an alternative for refining
the model, since not every party puts equal weight on every internal factor. In D66’s case,
the absence of a strong identification with a well-delineated social base was trumped as
an explanatory factor by its own programmatic (“ideological”) basis.
205. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid.”
206. Ibid., 18.
207. D66, National Committee, “Verslag van het HB/Fractie-weekend, gehouden op 13 en 14 juni te
Leusden,” 4-5.
208. D66, Commissie 2000, “Rapportage commissie 2000.”
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8 The Liberal Party, 1970-1974
8.1 Introduction
Such have been the difficulties for the British Liberal Party that in most descriptions of
the British party system, it only counts as half a party. Disadvantaged by the electoral
system and irrelevant to the formation of government in a Parliament usually dominated
by a single-party majority, the implicit description as “half a party” in a two-and-a-half
party system is not so far off the mark.1 The Liberal Party had not always been in this
marginal position: when it first arose from the Whig faction in Parliament in the 19th
century, the Liberal Party was one of Britain’s two major parties. However, history
had seen it not merely displaced by the Labour Party in the centre-left role, but nearly
wiped out. Throughout the post-World War II era in British politics, the Liberal Party’s
activists worked with surprising optimism first for their very survival as an independent
party, then for a return to power which they believed was just around the corner.2
This process naturally ebbed and flowed. The electoral defeat of 1970, which is the focus
of this chapter, represents one of those ebbs, with a loss of half the party’s seats (from 12
to 6) on a single per cent of the vote lost. The leadership of Jo Grimond between 1955
and 1967 had seen the Liberals develop the beginnings of a distinct identity and brought
them a much-needed uptick in their electoral fortunes at by-elections and local elections.
This success slowed down in the late 60s, until the 1970 election set the Liberals back to
single-figure seat numbers. This traumatic election set the party thinking anew about its
role in British politics, leading to a slow but sure change that can be traced forward all
the way to the formation of the SDP-Liberal Alliance in the 1980s.
Within the framework of this study, the Liberal Party can be said to have been dealt
the worst hand. As a party with low electoral base attachment in the First Past the Post
System, it is expected that the Liberal Party will have both their own characteristics and
the electoral system going in the direction of extension. The question, however, is whether
it is that simple. A closer look at further factors such as ideological attachment reveals
that the party can be argued to be more attached to this ideology, introducing a pressure
towards reinforcement.
In section 8.2, after the background of the party has been sketched, the party will
be measured up according to these variables, deriving specific expectations. To test
these expectations, this chapter will then look at the 1970 election defeat and the two
electoral cycles following that using archival sources from the time period. The second
1. A. Siaroff, “Two-and-a-half Party Systems and the Comparative Role of the ’Half’,” Party Politics
9, no. 3 (2003): 268.
2. See W. Wallace, “Survival and Revival,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1983), 43–72.
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electoral cycle is a mere eight months long as a result of the failure of the February 1974
election to deliver a Parliament with an overall single-party majority. The dissolution
for new elections in October of the same year made the second electoral cycle unusually
short. For this reason, unlike in the other chapters, the two electoral cycles will not
be considered separately. The results of this analysis will be presented in section 8.4,
following a brief description of the 1970 election in section 8.3. The concluding section
8.5 will summarise the argument and point out various interesting details to be taken
away for the comparative analysis in chapter 9 of this dissertation.
8.2 The Liberal Party in 1970: setting the stage
The Liberal Party is by origin a cadre party, finding its origin in a loose parliamentary
alliance.3 It arose from the 19th century Whig faction in the British Parliament, allying
with Radical MPs to form the Liberal Parliamentary Party in the decade following 1859.
The philosophical and ideological tradition they represented has been identified by Brock
with applying reason in politics. Liberal Prime Ministers like Gladstone and Lloyd George
have earned their place in the history books.4 However, deep divisions in the party between
the followers and opponents of Lloyd George caused its fall from power in 1922, presaging
its ultimate displacement by the Labour Party as Britain’s major left-of-centre party.
Until after the Second World War, the Liberals maintained a double-figures presence in
Parliament. This changed in 1950, when divide-and-conquer strategies from Tory Leader
Winston Churchill, himself a former Liberal, saw the Liberal vote collapse entirely with
only nine seats being retained.5 The nadir of Liberal fortunes came a year later in 1951,
when only six seats were held onto. From that election onwards, the party’s support
was concentrated in the ‘Celtic Fringe’ of the United Kingdom, a region consisting of
Scotland, Wales and areas of South West England.6 This defeat combined with the party’s
glorious past colours the unique character of the British Liberal Party, and is crucial to
understanding the complicated events of the 70s.
It is important to emphasise the small size left over after the party’s fall from power.
Though data for the time period before the 1970 election is unavailable (or at least never
for all three parties at the same time), the Liberals up until 1974 seem locked into a roughly
one-to-ten margin with the Conservatives with 190,000 members to the Conservatives’ 1.5
million in 1974.7 The Labour Party, due to affiliation by unions, is vastly larger than the
Tories at 6.5 million in 1974.8 In terms of paid staff, the margin is smaller but still the
major parties have at least double the resources the Liberals had at their disposal.9 These
3. C. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 1900-1984, Macmillan (London, 1984), 2; P. Norton,
“The Liberal Party in Parliament,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983),
149.
4. M. Brock, “The Liberal Tradition,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor (Oxford: Clarendon,
1983), 23.
5. D. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 139.
6. Although the Liberals always held representation outside the Celtic fringe until the 1970 election,
see ibid., 196.
7. Webb, “The United Kingdom,” 847.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 849-850.
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numbers dwarf the Liberal Party in all respects. In addition to its lower number of votes
and seats, this poses significant challenges to the party. Especially in the British electoral
system (see 2.4), which severely disadvantages minor parties like the Liberal Party, this
small size imposes heavy constraints. The lack of party finance laws means that the
Liberals have less funds at their disposal.10 This in turn leads to a reliance on volunteer
activists or big donors. Finding candidates is also made more difficult and was in fact
largely driven by local factors.11 This difficulty with relying so much on volunteers is
also reflected in the fact that most NEC members were volunteers, local councillors or
candidates for Parliament at most. The minutes made mention of the difficulties of the
officers of the party to fit meetings in London on weekdays into their schedule12, as well
as in the difficulties of getting reliable parliamentary party attendance at the NEC.13
Another general factor of the party’s background that should be taken into account is
the party’s complex organisation. The party prided itself on its highly democratic, federal
structure with a decentralised power structure. Though the constituency associations
were "organs of the party" and were mandated to exist in every constituency by the
constitution, it was these associations which admitted members to the party and who kept
membership records: there was no national membership.14 In addition, the constituent
parties in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were fiercely independent. The Liberal
Party Constitution only applies to them "insofar as its provisions are accepted by those
parties"15, and therefore functions fully only for the English part of the party, the Liberal
Party Organisation (LPO).16 Scotland, in particular, appeared allergic to any sign of being
subordinated to the ’English’ LPO.17
This combined into a party organization where many key actors were potentially in-
volved in the recovery process. Given the reliance on volunteers of the extra-parliamentary
organisation, it should come as no surprise that the highly autonomous Liberal Parliamen-
tary Party (LPP) had an important role. Members of the LPP attended various party
bodies.18 In particular, a Liberal MP always chaired the extra-parliamentary Standing
10. Ibid., 867. The funding for opposition parliamentary parties was only introduced in 1975.
11. M. Steed, “The Electoral Strategy of the Liberal Party,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 79.
12. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the NEC and Par-
liamentary Party held on Tuesday 24th September at the Cavendish Hotel, Eastbourne” (1970), p. 112,
LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 112.
13. Ibid.
14. Liberal Party, “Constitution of the Liberal Party as adopted at Brighton 1969” (1969), LIBERAL
PARTY/ADDENDA/1, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, Lon-
don, sections A.2, B.2 and C.
15. Ibid., Section A.1.
16. D. Kavanagh, “Organization and Power in the Liberal Party,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V.
Bogdanor (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 124.
17. For example Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on
11th of December 1970 at the Albany Hotel, Nottingham” (1970), p. 128-132, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal
Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London; See also Kavanagh, “Organi-
zation and Power in the Liberal Party,” 125.
18. Liberal Party, “Constitution of the Liberal Party as adopted at Brighton 1969,” section A.4.(a).
Thorpe noted in the minutes from September 1970 cited above that the reverse was also true: members
of affiliated organisations could also send a delegation to the parliamentary party meeting.
194 Martijn van Nijnanten - Parties under Pressure
Committee which ruled on policy.19 The leader, who was elected by his fellow MPs, also
drafted the manifesto, albeit in consultation with the Standing Committee.20 Though the
extra-parliamentary party voiced its opinions through the Liberal Assembly, the party’s
national congress, and the Party Council, extra-parliamentary decisions were never bind-
ing on the party’s MPs. Although the there was also a link between these bodies and the
Standing Committee21, in effect the LPP had a large degree of control over the policy and
the political tactics of the party.
The extra-parliamentary party was governed by the National Executive Committee
(NEC). Its job was simply to "direct the work of the party"22, which combined with the
decentralised structure of the party to produce a largely coordinating body. The NEC had
no responsibility for policy.23 Another major power, that of candidate selection, rested
with the local associations, overseen nationally not by the NEC but by the Candidates
Committee, which had heavy representation from the LPP and the candidates them-
selves.24 Relationships with the LPP were not always good. Whenever such a conflict
arose, the NEC could only bank on the moral authority of being the representative of
the membership. It is unsurprising, therefore, that it played this role in these cases.25
Expressing the views of the extra-parliamentary organisation, however, was not primarily
the role of the NEC. That fell to the Liberal Assembly, the annual national congress of
the party, and the more frequent Party Council. Though the resolutions were not binding
on MPs and were communicated directly to (non-Liberal) government ministers rather
than through the party’s own MPs, they had a certain authority within the party it-
self. Kavanagh notes that Liberal Party Assemblies made key strategic decisions.26 They
regularly passed resolutions on the party strategy. The Party Council did much of the
preparatory work.
The upshot of this decentralised organisation, which the Liberals themselves considered
to be eminently democratic, was that a coalition for a certain strategy could be expected to
be difficult to find. At the very least, it needed the support of both the extra-parliamentary
and the parliamentary wing of the party to implement, as various parts of the party had
varying degrees of influence on the various dimensions of the strategy. The leadership of
the Liberal Parliamentary Party was absolutely crucial because of its influence over policy
and strategy – but it was fed by the extra-parliamentary organisation, as we shall see, at
certain crucial moments.
This section serves to set the stage for the analysis. In doing so, it links the various
independent variables of the model formulated in chapter three to their respective values
and the expectations they produce. On the basis of these measurements, which will be
discussed further in sections 8.2.1 through 8.2.4 below, concrete operational expectations
19. Norton, “The Liberal Party in Parliament,” 150.
20. Liberal Party, “Constitution of the Liberal Party as adopted at Brighton 1969,” sections A.4.(a) and
F.4.
21. Ibid., section F.
22. Ibid., section I.4.
23. Kavanagh, “Organization and Power in the Liberal Party,” 137.
24. Liberal Party, “Constitution of the Liberal Party as adopted at Brighton 1969,” section H.
25. Such as when Thorpe unilaterally declared the Liberal Party willing to enter a national coalition in
a party-political broadcast, as described in more detail below.
26. Kavanagh, “Organization and Power in the Liberal Party,” 137.
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will be formulated regarding the strategy chosen by the Liberal Party after 1970. Following
this setup of the key variables, the key actors in the Liberal organisation shall also be
discussed in order to set the stage for the discussion of the party’s shock defeat in 1970
and the following crisis.
8.2.1 Electoral base attachment
The Liberal Party scores low on electoral base attachment. Having originated as a cadre
party, the Liberal Party does not have a very clearly delineated electoral base. Curtice
notes that survey research showed some tendency towards middle class support, but that
any relationships that were found were weak. In Britain’s class-dominated party sys-
tem, this meant the Liberal Party had relatively weak demographic roots.27 Next to the
working-class Labour Party and the upper-class Conservatives, the Liberal Party’s lack of
a clear base in a class stands out even more. In fact, where the Liberal Party is strongest,
in South West England, surveys showed that working-class support was stronger than
middle-class support.28
Indeed, party identification with the Liberals was rather weak.29 As a result, voters
were not particularly loyal to the party either: often, their vote for the Liberals served
as a temporary retreat from either of the two main parties. In Curtice’s words: “[the
Liberal voter] is, above all, a temporary defector from one of the major parties”.30 Liberal
policies were not widely known and instead the party was judged on its style and centrist
credentials.31 The timing of a by-election or solid work on a local level could do more for
the Liberal vote than its national image.
In addition, support was geographically dispersed, putting the party at a disadvantage
in Britain’s First Past the Post electoral system. Apart from its heartlands in the so-called
‘Celtic fringe’ of Southwest England, Scotland and Wales, the Liberal Party support was
spread thinly across the country.32 That having been said, the Liberals did tend to win
most of their seats in rural areas – which is remarkable given the fact that the membership
of the party and areas where it succeeded in council elections to provide it with a sizeable
number of councillors were largely urban in nature.33 All these factors result in a lack of
formal links to any particular base group.
In addition, the party’s Liberal ideology and its focus on the application of reason
led to a strong individualism that was to some extent antithetical to targeting a specific
base. This means, in terms of our operationalisation, that the party did not just lack any
formal or personal links to strengthen its attachment to its electoral base, but that that
attachment was actually weakened by informal norms to the contrary. This leads to the
lowest possible level of electoral base attachment. To the Liberals, their attachment to
27. J. Curtice, “Liberal Voters and the Alliance: Realignment or Protest?,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed.






33. Kavanagh, “Organization and Power in the Liberal Party,” 128.
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Liberalism as an ideology was what made them willing to work for the party and they
were absolutely convinced that in time voters would see it was best for them too.34 This
contrasts with the class basis of the Labour and Conservative Parties.
Stated in terms of our model, this should contribute to an extension strategy. Since the
Liberal Party has no loyalty to any particular group of voters, it becomes easier for the
party to extend its vote than to focus exclusively on reinforcing the vote that it already
has. In fact, the degree of ideological resistance to advocating the interests and views of
one group above the others should lead to a preference for this particular sort of strategy.
After all, reinforcing the base requires paying special attention to voters like one’s current
voters, and that would go contrary to the ideological idea that Liberalism should solely
be concerned with voters as individuals and with pursuing the public interest.
8.2.2 Ideological Attachment
There is not much in the way of a single, organised Liberal ideology to be attached to.
At its genesis, the Liberal Parliamentary Party from which the Liberal Party originated
consisted of Whigs, Radicals and a vast mass of moderates.35 They are still visible in
the post-war party, despite the defection of some of the Radicals to the Labour Party
and some more centre-right members joining the Conservatives as Liberal Unionists. The
youth wing in particular had a rather radical bend, even to the point of advocating direct
action, that brought them at loggerheads with the rest of the party.36 Overall, the Liberal
Party was repositioned in the post-war era as a non-socialist centrist alternative to both
major parties. Nevertheless, as a party president put it, Liberals “do not take directions
from [their] leaders”.37
However, for the purpose of this study the Liberal Party can be seen as a party strongly
attached to ideology. In chapter four, ideological attachment was operationalised in terms
of the degree to which a party, and in particular its elites, lets itself be guided by its
ideology.38 This is definitely the case for the Liberals. A large factor towards this is the
lack of career prospects for many Liberals. Lacking hope of advancement, Liberal activists
are altogether more inclined to put in their effort for the cause they believe in rather than
their own benefit, often having stuck with the party through thick and thin.39 Indeed,
Dutton notes the existence of a surprising optimism in many Liberal activists as a way of
sustaining the motivations of many party members.40 Significantly, the party refused to
entertain even the hypothetical idea of a compromise for government office, continuing to
work for a purely liberal government. This emphasis on opposing both Labour and Tories
is a clear indicator of high ideological attachment.
This Liberal belief system was strengthened by the efforts of Jo Grimond, party leader
between 1955 and 1967. A prolific writer, Grimond set out to clarify the party’s muddled
34. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 171.
35. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 1900-1984, 3.
36. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 198-199.
37. Quoted in ibid., 176.
38. Following the definition of ideology in P. Mair and C. Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study,”
Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 220.
39. Wallace, “Survival and Revival,” 48.
40. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 171.
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image. He sought to cast the party as unashamedly progressive, seeking realignment
in the party system.41 A very influential idea that developed during the Grimond years
would be the idea of community politics, a vague local brand of liberalism which involved
activism on very local issues and empowerment of communities. This was an outgrowth of
a focus on local elections adopted by Grimond: in his own words “every time a local Liberal
councillor gets a bus-stop moved to a better place he strikes a blow for the Liberal Party.”42
However, Grimond was not the main architect of the concept, which was championed in
particular by the increasingly radical young liberals.43 Though Cook notes that the model
was “not particularly Liberal, nor indeed British”,44 various local successes secured the
idea’s influence and it can be regarded as part of an ideological tradition in the party of
some standing by 1970, even though the idea was appropriated by the more radical Young
Liberals.45
The Liberal Party does not have a very clear ideological programme in the sense that it
has a codified ideology. However, despite all this, there are various reasons the party can be
qualified as strongly attached to its ideology. First of all, there is the zeal of party activists.
Secondly, the idea of community politics, having recently been taken into the party’s
ideological discourse, was being increasingly deployed to structure the party’s actions.
Finally, and most importantly, the party appears strongly attached to the differentness of
Liberalism, even if only cast as being very much “not socialism” and “not Conservatism”,
as evidenced by the resistance elicited by even the slightest idea of compromising to
work with either party. Making this distinction too sharp is clearly disadvantageous
for a party which, like the Liberals, is unlikely ever to win a majority under FPTP.
Nevertheless, this is what the Liberal Party stuck to, revealing a considerable degree of
ideological attachment. In the terms of the model, this would lead to a reinforcement
strategy, particularly in the field of the party programme, given how strongly the party’s
ideological discourse seems to frame its actions and narrative.
8.2.3 External environment: electoral and party system
The external challenges to the Liberals are important to understanding this particular
case. The Westminster system with its First Past the Post constituencies imposes severe
constraints on smaller parties by underrepresenting them and disadvantages them by
tactical voting, especially if, like the Liberal Party, its support is evenly spread across the
country.46 Although the Rose index of proportionality for the 1970 election is atypically
high at 91.547, the system still disadvantaged the Liberals even at this election, with only
41. Ibid., 181.
42. Quote from 1960 cited in A. Watkins, The Liberal Dilemma (London: MacGibbon / Kee, 1966),
108.
43. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 1900-1984, 149.
44. Ibid.
45. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 198.
46. G. V. Golosov, “Party nationalization and the translation of votes into seats under single-member
plurality electoral rules,” Party Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 123.
47. Calculated by the author based on data from H. Döring and P. Manow, “Parliaments and govern-
ments database (ParlGov),” Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, 2018,
accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.parlgov.org.
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1% of the seats on the strenght of 7.5% of the vote.48 With only a handful of MPs elected
in this way, it is hard for any party to use its influence in a house dominated by hundreds
of government and opposition MPs.49 The party has to make do with whatever MPs it
can get elected. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that most seats held by Liberal
MPs were taken from the Conservatives and that these seats were concentrated in rural
areas.
The Liberals in Parliament operated under severe constraints that gave them less op-
portunity to profile the party. Time in the House of Commons is dominated by the
government and the Official Opposition.50 The Liberals, lacking such recognition, had
limited opportunity to introduce their own bills, since they had to use the facilities avail-
able for individual backbench MPs to do so. This limited the Liberal Party’s visibility
and necessitated a certain opportunism and willingness to be disruptive from their MPs
which was not always forthcoming.51
Contrary to their own optimism, the Liberals were not an imminent threat to the two-
party system. They did, however, pose a significant spoiler effect, letting in one major
party or the other, or were perceived to do so. Both major parties, both Labour and
Conservative, claimed the other was let in by the Liberal advance and regularly accused
them of a spoiler effect. The Liberals, on their part, were not entirely sure whether to
side with either of the parties. Their election literature often portrayed the two major
parties as virtually identical, most famously using the slogan “Which twin is the Tory?”.52
However, there existed in the Liberal ranks a sense of being a progressive party which
led most members to develop a strong antipathy to the Conservative Party, although at
previous stages in the party’s history the same could be said for being anti-socialist and
therefore anti-Labour.53
Finally, we should make note of the fact that the Liberals did not even stand a par-
ticularly good chance of holding the balance of power in 1970. Even when the party was
on the rise, the majoritarian Westminster system was not disposed towards coalitions.
Neither major party seems to have even considered the possibility of allying themselves
with the Liberals. Neither, as noted in section 8.2.2 above, did the Liberals themselves.
Polls justified this stance: they revealed in the 60s that many voters would consider vot-
ing for the Liberal Party if they stood a realistic chance to win a majority and form a
government.54
The implications in terms of the model are as follows. The Liberal Party’s electoral base
is very dispersed in almost every sense and the party’s problems are largely a function
of it lacking a base. This is related to the electoral system. As argued in chapter three,
core voters in a First Past the Post System are restricted in their opportunities to defect
48. The Rose index is calculated by subtracting the sum of the differences between each party’s voteshare
and seatshare at a given election, divided by two, from 100. See R. Rose, ed., International Encyclopedia
of Elections (Washington: CQ Press, 2000)
49. Norton, “The Liberal Party in Parliament,” 151.
50. Ibid., 157.
51. Ibid., 153.
52. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 193; Steed, “The Electoral Strategy of the Liberal
Party,” 87.
53. Wallace, “Survival and Revival,” 57.
54. Curtice, “Liberal Voters and the Alliance,” 103.
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Table 8.1: Overview of the Independent Variables: the Liberal Party in 1970
Internal factors Measurement Expected Strategy
Electoral base attachment Weak Extension
Ideological attachment Strong Reinforcement
External environment
Electoral system First Past the Post Extension
Previous election Above average (+2,6%) Extension
by the geographical element of the system.55 In addition, it becomes more attractive
to go after unaligned voters who will decide the election. This is compounded in the
case of the Liberal Party by a geographical element: the party’s small electoral base is
relatively dispersed, which according to Golosov combines with the party’s size to put it
at a disadvantage.56 Therefore, the Liberal Party cannot afford to prioritise those that
already vote for it or those represented by its membership. The former, being rural, either
already live in rural seats won by the Party or in Conservative safe seats. The latter, being
more urban in nature, mostly live in Labour safe seats. The party cannot afford to be
picky. The Westminster system therefore leads, as with the major parties, towards an
extension strategy as the party’s only route to power is to appeal to those it can win over
to gain more seats.
8.2.4 Overview and expectations
Table 8.1 gives an overview of the values of the independent variables in the case of the
Liberal Party. As may be seen, propositions 3 (on electoral base attachment) and propo-
sition 4 (on ideological attachment) point in two opposite directions. Based on its weak
electoral base attachment, the party should be more likely to pursue an extension strategy,
whereas its strong ideological attachment should predispose it towards a reinforcement
strategy. Employing propositions 5a through 5c to split the effect, the party seems likely
to pursue a reinforcement strategy on the programmatic dimension and a reinforcement
strategy elsewhere. In addition, the FPTP electoral system, as argued above, constrains
a reinforcement strategy, which should lead to a shift towards an extension strategy in
the second cycle.
8.3 The 1970 General Election defeat
In 1970, the Liberals went into the election with a new leader. Following Grimond’s
resignation in 1967, the Parliamentary Party elected Jeremy Thorpe, MP for North Devon.
Thorpe had previously been involved in the party’s fundraising and over the campaign
55. See R. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing: how do parties target voters in election cam-
paigns?,” Electoral Studies 21, no. 3 (2002): 367–382.
56. Golosov, “Party nationalization and the translation of votes into seats under single-member plurality
electoral rules,” 123.
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proved to possess flair and showmanship.57 Over a range of by-elections during the 1966-
1970 Parliament and local elections, the party had not been able to sustain its gains of the
early 60s, with a by-election in Birmingham Ladywood in 1969 as the only exception.58
Although polls remained between 7 and 11 per cent of the vote, the electoral picture was
starting to look worrisome.59
In addition, the Liberals were facing serious structural challenges. Their financial situ-
ation had become so poor that they were only able to employ seventeen full-time election
agents acting on the party’s behalf in parliamentary constituencies to organise its cam-
paign efforts there.60 More worryingly, the party’s few distinctive policies were in danger
of being co-opted or outflanked. Groundbreaking by-election victories for Scottish and
Welsh Nationalists threatened the party’s support in Scotland and Wales by outflanking
it on its longstanding policy of devolution.61 In addition, a major point of distinctiveness
introduced by Grimond, the party’s support for joining the European common market,
was co-opted by both major parties.62
At the same time, the Conservative Party had moved to a more free-market position.
The 1970 election focused on the economy, contrasting this position to Labour’s Keynesian
economics. The Liberals were caught in the middle, having no clear profile on the issue.63
In the end, the Tory move to the right paid off: in a result that surprised the pollsters,
the Labour government was thrown out as the Conservative Party secured an outright
majority. In the event, the Liberal vote fell by slightly over one per cent from 8.6% to
7.5% of the vote. This is not much, and as can be seen in figure 8.164, the party was
in fact still above the average performance of the last five elections up to and including
1966 by 1,3%, down from 2,4%. Going on the operationalisation of the identity of the
defectors given in chapter four, they probably mainly lost non-core voters. However, this
was enough for the party to lose six of the twelve seats it had won at the previous election.
The defeat was “traumatic” for the Liberal Party.65 The loss in seats and the failure in
many seats to poll the 20% needed to stand a realistic chance at the next election dashed
the optimism about a Liberal revival.66 However, a point of light was that the trend
had been bucked in urban and sub-urban areas like Rochdale, Liverpool Wavertree and
Southport by hard-working and well-regarded local Liberal councillors.67 When compared
to the optimism described in section 8.2 above, the contrast with the national result is
painfully obvious. The 1970 election result therefore served as a reminder of a harsh
electoral reality: the Liberal Party was on the periphery of British politics, without a
57. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 196.
58. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 194; Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party,
1900-1984, 147.
59. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 194.
60. Ibid., 195.
61. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 195; Wallace, “Survival and Revival,” 63.
62. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 195.
63. Ibid.
64. Based on data from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
65. S. Mole, “Community Politics,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983), 258.
66. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 1900-1984, 151; Mole, “Community Politics,” 258.
67. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 196.
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Figure 8.1: Electoral performance of the Liberal Party, 1951-1970
solid base of supporters, at the mercy of the vagaries of an electoral and party system
that disadvantaged it. It was from this nadir of Liberal fortunes that the party departed
as it searched for a way to regain the momentum it had enjoyed during the Grimond
years.
8.4 The recovery strategy
The first stage of the model after an electoral shock is the ‘whether’-stage. At this point,
the question arises whether there was a recognition of the need to change anything at
all. Whether a party feels the need to change is the result of the existence of a coalition
for change among those actors making the key decisions, influenced by the extent of the
defeat and previous experiences. In addition, the fact that the Liberals were strangely
optimistic about the possibility of a breakthrough gives us even more reason to consider
the option that they did not feel the need for change immediately. One major factor that
might have impacted on this is the fact that even though the party lost half its seats,
definitely qualifying as a crisis, it only lost a single percentage point of its share of the
popular vote. This could strengthen voices for business-as-usual, since the development
of the share of the vote can be interpreted as a minor setback.
Let us consider the immediate reaction in the NEC to the defeat. Discussing the
campaign, the consensus seemed to be that morale was high despite the losses.68 Lack of
68. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the National Executive Committee Meet-
ing held 4th July 1970 at the National Liberal Club” (1970), p. 93-99, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party
Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 96.
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resources was a prime candidate for a diagnosis.69 There was also a discussion whether the
lack of unity was a strength or a weakness. Although two members of the NEC reported
that they would be moving for a review of strategy and organisation at the party council,
the NEC itself did not pass a resolution about this potential overhaul, and no resolution
was even proposed.70 The reaction of the NEC was therefore optimistic despite the huge
loss in seats. In fact, the resolution that was passed at the meeting was a reaffirmation
of Liberal policies and practices so far, including a reaffirmation of the policy rejecting
cooperation with either major party.71
In addition, the NEC reaffirmed its support for electoral reform, noting that the result
of the election proved the need to change the electoral system. Though framed in general
terms as opposition to a government without a majority of the voters behind it and the
denial of representation to “millions of voters”, this can be seen as part of the response
to the defeat.72 It was justified to blame the defeat in part on the electoral system that
disadvantaged the party. This would also reduce the necessity of further changes. The
1970 Assembly adopted an extensive resolution on party strategy and tactics, which lays
the groundwork for some of the early reaction to the defeat by explicitly stating its intent
“to maintain the independence of the Liberal Party in opposition to both Conservatism
and Socialism”.73
The party, then, seemed divided on whether its current course had to change in response
to the defeat. However, the defeat definitely showed that the electoral system posed great
challenges to the party and that a liberal breakthrough was certainly not as close as they
thought. However slow and scattered, a response to the crisis developed gradually over
the 1970-1974 period.
8.4.1 Organisational changes, 1970-1974
In organisational terms, the Liberals saw themselves as a very democratic organisation.
This owed much to their decentralised party structure and the space given to the multitude
of opinions within the party. Since members, in the eyes of the Liberal decision-makers,
already had a large say within the party, it is perhaps not surprising that further expansion
of membership influence was not really on the agenda. Although there had been some
bitterness over the ascent of Thorpe to the leadership, Stark notes that the matter of
leadership elections did not resurface until 1975, well after the 1970-1974 crisis.74
If there were struggles over the party organisation, it was largely between the various
institutional actors. The Liberal Parliamentary Party and the NEC butted heads more
than once over their relationship to eachother.75 The NEC resented it whenever the LPP
69. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the National Executive Committee Meeting held 4th July 1970 at




73. Liberal Party. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970” (1970),
LIBERAL/8/4, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 5.
74. L. P. Stark, Choosing a Leader: Party Leadership Contests from Macmillan to Blair (London:
Macmillan, 1996), 71.
75. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the NEC and Parliamentary Party held on
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went beyond the expressed statements of party policy without consulting the executive,
especially on the matter of political tactics. However, the matter was not resolved.
There were also concerns that the dispersed nature of the party organisation hampered
its effectiveness, particularly in campaigning. A report by retiring North Cornwall agent,
John Spiller, reported that the rarity of full-time agents contributed negatively to the
party’s electoral fortunes.76 This observed organisational weakness might be part of the
reason why the party took concrete steps to strengthen the coordinating functions of its
organisation. Most importantly, the party created a national membership scheme.77
These concrete reforms can be seen as part of the slight concentration of powers in the
hands of the national organisation. The move to create a national membership ensured
that the party knew where its members were and could more easily use them as re-
sources.78 In addition, the Assembly requested that the regional parties develop strategies
to be integrated into a national whole, with organisation tailored to this new strategy.79
These reforms, as well as the thrust of the Spiller report, represent a slight internal de-
democratisation, shifting power away from the basic unit of party organisation – the
association – to the national level. This forms part of an overall extension strategy, since
it increases the opportunity of influencing the democratic decision-making process for the
party elite at the expense of ordinary members.
8.4.2 Programmatic changes 1970-1974
One problem in analysing the programmatic component of the Liberal Party’s recovery
strategy is that there was limited opportunity for strategy. The party’s policies were not
very well-known to voters. In Parliament, the limited amount of time available under
the Ten Minute Rule for Private Members’ Bills posed an obstacle to implementing their
policies and making them known. It is illustrative of the lack of capacity for the LPP
to get things done that the Council archives contain correspondence with Conservative
Ministers directly about policy resolutions, rather than expectations on the parliamentary
party to try to get them implemented.
Especially when it comes to the parliamentary party, therefore, all this begs the question
whether there was anything strategic about the programmatic choices made in Parliament.
Occasionally, there is a definite sign of political strategy involved with the activities of
Liberal MPs, such as with three 1972/1973 bills on industrial relations and the opposition
Tuesday 24th September at the Cavendish Hotel, Eastbourne,” 112; Liberal Party. National Executive
Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held 29th June 1974 at 1pm at the National Liberal Club”
(1974), p. 168-176, LIBERAL/1/16, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic
Science, London, 174-176; Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the Joint Meeting
of the NEC and Parliamentary Party held 11th July 1974 at 6pm at the House of Commons” (1974),
p. 178-179, LIBERAL/1/16, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
London, 178-179.
76. John. Spiller, “Memorandum on Liberal Party Organisation.” (), p. 22-37, LIBERAL/2/9, Liberal
Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 30-31.
77. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held 28th of November
1970 at 10am at the National Liberal Club” (1970), p. 119-126, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives,
British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 123.
78. Ibid.
79. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970,” 5-6.
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to the government’s 1971 Immigration Act.80 These formed the basis of two party-wide
campaigns in those years supported by the NEC, trying to win over voters on these issues
and gain attention for key Liberal policy pledges.81 For example, the most extensive
focus of parliamentary activity, the Industrial Relations campaign, was concerned with
implementing 1970 pledges like industrial democracy in the form of works councils.82 It is
also connected with the first resolution reacting to the defeat in which the NEC called for
the party to strongly oppose the incoming government’s policies in this area.83 It could be
argued that this is part of a reinforcement strategy highlighting the party values, especially
since industrial democracy and co-ownership had been part of the new Liberal identity
rapidly built up by Grimond during his leadership, much like the concept of community
politics.
There is very little strategy amidst most of the resolutions of the party council. At any
particular Council session, a multitude of different resolutions were discussed. There seems
to be little in terms of a general direction emanating from these resolutions. They are
concerned with topical issues, or with policy details, rather than purposefully developing
certain areas of party policy.84 There is, therefore, a lot of “noise” involved in using the
Council and Assembly resolutions as indicators of programmatic changes.
There is one exception to all this: the party was very purposeful in its determination to
make the idea of community politics an absolute cornerstone of its political and electoral
agenda. Though the NEC did not mention the theme in its first meeting85, the 1970
Assembly passed a strategy resolution to make community politics the party’s “prime
strategic emphasis”.86 A NEC working party set up to implement the resolution then
focused primarily on community politics and urban areas.87 This led to the publication
of a community politics guide for those unfamiliar with the concept.88 A community
80. Liberal Party, “Liberal Candidates Handbook: Pathways to Power” (1974), LIBERAL/15/17, Lib-
eral Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 318; 326.
81. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Saturday,
March 20th, 1971 at 1pm at the National Liberal Club” (1971), p. 144-150, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal
Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 147; Liberal Party. National
Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Friday, 21st of May 1971, at 7:30pm at the
Municipal Annexe, Liverpool” (1971), p. 157-162, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives, British Library
of Political and Economic Science, London, 158; Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes
of the NEC meeting held on Saturday, 26th of June 1971 at 1pm at the National Liberal Club” (1971),
p. 163-169, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
London, 167.
82. Liberal Party, “Liberal Candidates Handbook: Pathways to Power,” 318.
83. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the National Executive Committee Meeting held 4th July 1970 at
the National Liberal Club,” 96.
84. See for example: Liberal Party. Party Council, “Resolutions Passed at the Meeting of the Liberal
Party Council held at Leeds on 28th of July 1973” (1973), p. 63-65, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives,
British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 63; Liberal Party. Party Council, “Resolutions
Passed at the Meeting of the Liberal Party Council held on 27 January 1973 at Birmingham” (1973),
p. 163-164, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
London, 163-165.
85. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Saturday, 26th of June 1971 at 1pm at
the National Liberal Club,” 167.
86. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970,” 5-6.
87. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held 28th of November 1970 at 10am at the
National Liberal Club,” 122.
88. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Friday, 23rd
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politics co-ordinator was appointed to lead the charge.89 This focus was subsequently
reaffirmed by the Council, which requested that the general election be fought around the
theme90, a point of view echoed by the 1973 Assembly.91 Andrew Ellis, a member of the
Standing Committee, produced an extensive paper for the Council containing detailed
policy implications to be explored for use in a general election campaign themed around
community politics in this way.92
The electoral manifesto presented in February 1974 cemented this by including a promi-
nent defence of the theme in its first pages.93 However fluid and diffuse the concept of
community politics is, therefore, it proved to be a major theme for the party and its
intensification forms the main part of the party’s programmatic recovery efforts. The
amount of trust the party had in community politics stems from both internal and ex-
ternal sources. First of all, it had been inaugurated into the ideological traditions of the
party relatively quickly, as it had gradually taken shape under successful former leader, Jo
Grimond. Secondly, since there was a greater degree of liberal success at the local level,
it seems logical that the party – with such a strong representation of councillors – would
search for the solution there. Both link up with the Liberal conviction that their ideology
was a strength to lead to this reinforcement strategy. Convinced as the Liberals appeared
that their ideology would win out in the end, a concept such as community politics which
had been linked to local successes seemed an obvious choice to focus on.
Oddly enough, the manifesto for the October 1974 election does not mention the com-
munity politics theme even once.94 The campaign handbook for activists and candidates
produced for that second election, however, mentions that various themes related to com-
munity politics “permeate all the policies (. . . ) in this handbook”.95 It therefore still
functioned as a basis on which party policy was built, but it was no longer referenced
very explicitly at least in the manifesto. Perhaps, having a shot at the balance of power
convinced the Liberals to render a more concrete policy offering as a potential coalition
of July 1971 at 7:30pm at the National Liberal Club” (1971), p. 170-176, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party
Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 176; Liberal Party. National Ex-
ecutive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Saturday the 21st of August 1971 at 1pm at
the National Liberal Club” (1971), p. 177-182, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of
Political and Economic Science, London, 179-180.
89. Liberal Party. Party Council, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Liberal Party Council held on Saturday
14 April 1973 at 1am at the Ship Hotel, Reading” (1973), p. 97-108, LIBERAL/2/4, Liberal Party
Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 103.
90. Liberal Party. Party Council, “Private Business Motions introduced at the Liberal Party Council
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Political and Economic Science, London, 19.
91. Liberal Party. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at Southport 18th - 22nd September” (1973),
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Party Council, dated 14 January 1974, revised 4 June 1974 (1974), p. 286-291, LIBERAL/3/2, Liberal
Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 286-291.
93. Liberal Party, “Change the Face of Britain: the Liberal Party Manifesto 1974,” 1974, accessed
November 21, 2017, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lib74feb.htm.
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deal. Nevertheless, it remains clear that the focus of the Liberal Party on its by-then
trusted theme of community politics had intensified as a result of the crisis, leading to
this reinforcement strategy. This is important for the analysis, since it is deviant from
the rest of the strategy. However, this deviation matches the pattern of the party’s low
electoral base attachment and high ideological attachment in such a way that it provides
support for proposition 5 that the former impacts upon the tactical and organisational di-
mensions more strongly, while the latter impacts the ideological dimension more strongly.
8.4.3 Tactical Changes, 1970-1974
The greatest shift in Liberal thinking as a result of the 1970 election result, however,
occurred in the field of political tactics. This had been a long-standing debate in the
Liberal Party on where to stand, although Steed considered this debate “sterile”.96 This
question arose because of the rule in the British electoral system by which polling beneath
12.5% of the votes in a constituency lost the party a 150-pound deposit.97 This would
make it expensive to run in a large amount of seats where the party stood no chance. In
addition to this, the expenses of supporting a campaign in each constituency also figured
into the equation.
It should be understood that the aim at this point was not in question: the party
dogmatically held to the idea of a majority Liberal government.98 The only question was
how to get there, via focus on winnable seats or with as broad a front as possible. The
Spiller report reveals that this debate was alive and well in the party after 1970. The
terminology is interesting because it corresponds almost perfectly with the descriptors of
both ends of the tactical dimension: a broader focus or a narrower one. Spiller himself
proposed a sort of compromise which seems to have originated from a Conservative tactic
he observed: a narrow front within a broad front, in which the party would fight every
seat (a costly endeavour) but concentrate most of its resources where it could win.99
The 1970 Assembly, in the strategy resolution of that year opted for “the broadest
possible front”.100 In 1973, the Assembly again reaffirmed this commitment, this time to
a “broad front”.101 It is good to remind oneself of the fact that it was altogether unclear
if the party could follow up on this intention in practice.102 After all, as has been noted
above, the Liberals hardly had the luxury of having many potential candidates due to
their size, and certainly not evenly divided between the constituencies which had the
power to decide their own candidates. In this case, they did follow up on the intention
96. Steed, “The Electoral Strategy of the Liberal Party,” 79.
97. Representation of the People Act 1918, 8 Geo. V. c. 64., section 26(1) and 27(1) as originally enacted.
98. As shown by the resolutions adopted by the Liberal Assemblies of 1970 and 1973 and the NEC:
Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970”; Liberal Assembly, “Res-
olutions adopted at Southport 18th - 22nd September”; Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the National
Executive Committee Meeting held 4th July 1970 at the National Liberal Club,” 95-97.
99. Spiller, “Memorandum on Liberal Party Organisation.,” 31.
100. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970,” 5.
101. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at Southport 18th - 22nd September,” 15-16.
102. As late as July 1974, the NEC doubted whether the 600-candidate target would be met. Liberal
Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Friday 26th July 1974 at
7:30pm at the Victoria Road Church Institute, Leicester” (1974), p. 138-145, LIBERAL/1/16, Liberal
Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 143.
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to pursue a broad front, leading to the broadest slate of Liberal candidates in years, with
the Liberals fielding 517 candidates in February 1974, and an almost full slate of 619 in
October that year.103 By comparison, the front of 1970 was rather narrower with a mere
332 candidates fielded, just over half of the seats.104
Centralised control over the party’s candidates was somewhat of a luxury. Though the
NEC set ambitious targets, their relative insignificance and reliance on volunteer activists
made it hard to find candidates. This is a significant fact, because it explains why the
Liberals did not move much on their selection rules. They simply could not, and not just
because of the high degree of control local associations had on selection. Even if they
had found more candidates, it was hard to predict what the parliamentary party would
look like, since the FPTP system made Liberal fortunes everywhere quite unpredictable.
The archival record underscores this: even though they had decided upon a broader slate
of candidates, the NEC minutes in mid-1974 note that it was hard to find candidates to
bring the party close to the full slate it intended.105 Nevertheless, the party succeeded,
perhaps because of the enthusiasm generated by the prospect of a breakthrough, which
was a possibility after the February 1974 result which saw the Liberals hold the balance
of power.
The Liberals, therefore, consistently opted for a broad front. In addition, the Assem-
bly directed that more attention be given to the major cities, where the Liberals were
not strong electorally.106 The resolutions do not include a reasoning for a broad front.
However, there is a likely candidate explanation. As seen earlier, the Liberals had a
strong tradition of individualism. They lacked a well-defined constituency. In such cir-
cumstances, attempting to broaden the base seems the logical solution, since this would
open up the possibility of gaining the durable support of the groups won over by this
strategy. This was certainly the case for urban voters: the party was not strong elec-
torally in the cities except perhaps occasionally in local elections, but its membership was
primarily urban. There was, therefore, a reasonable prospect that by focusing on winning
over voters outside the largely rural areas where the party already held seats, the party
would be able to help increase its core vote.
More importantly, however, the electoral objectives of the party itself began to shift.
While still committed to a Liberal government as the end goal, there was a large shift in
the attitude towards the other parties. In the 1970 strategy resolution and in resolutions
tabled at earlier Assemblies, the Liberals had still rejected any cooperation with the major
parties.107 Believing Liberal breakthrough to be around the corner, the Assembly defined
the party’s role as one acting both inside and outside the political establishment. This
began to shift over the 1970-1974 period.
As the party continued to succeed in by-elections between 1972 and 1974 and won
a local election victory in Liverpool in the 1973 local elections, becoming the largest
103. Steed, “The Electoral Strategy of the Liberal Party,” 86; Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party,
1900-1984, 158.
104. Steed, “The Electoral Strategy of the Liberal Party,” 81.
105. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held on Friday 26th July 1974 at 7:30pm at the
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106. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970,” 5.
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group on the local council amidst a national win of around 900 council seats, it looked
more likely that the Liberals would hold the balance of power in the new Parliament.108
The 1973 Assembly resolution on strategy declared that the party should look into the
possible scenarios for government participation or influence on government policy in case
the party held the balance of power.109 A November 1973 Party Council paper discusses
the possibilities at length. The document itself was open-ended, posing questions for the
party to consider. It did, however, state a rudimentary negotiating position, including
electoral reform.110 This allowed Thorpe, after the February 1974 election, to negotiate
with the Conservative Leader Ted Heath, although he was ultimately unsuccessful.
This sparked further discussion in the party. At Brantwood in June 1974, the Stand-
ing Committee discussed the issue again.111 This time, it was concluded that the party
should make clear the terms of its support before the general election rather than after-
wards.112 The same month, Thorpe infuriated the NEC by commenting in a broadcast
that he would enter into a government of national unity.113 Interestingly, while the NEC
privately reprimanded Thorpe, his action publicly forced a resolution of the NEC on his
terms.114 The Liberals ruled out any coalition with either the Labour or Conservative
Party separately, but agreed they would join a national government.115
Though the steps were clearly incremental, the shift from a total rejection of any co-
operation whatsoever to support for a national government and open discussion on other
options is significant. It presages later coalitions and inter-party agreements which the
Liberals would enter into with Labour and further down the line, the SDP-Liberal Al-
liance. This relaxation of its strict role assumptions must be seen as part of an extension
strategy – in order to increase the breadth of the party’s appeal, it could no longer re-
main in the margins with the balance of power in its sights. As part of a broader package
including the broad front and the attempt to make headway in the cities, it appears to
be related to the mechanics of the electoral system and their consequences for party com-
petition. After all, opportunities for a small party to make the difference were few and
far between, and to make a meaningful impact, the party simply had to shift its strategy.
The party’s low electoral base attachment might also have figured into its preference for
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a broad front.
8.5 Conclusion
What happened after the Liberal defeat of 1970? The diffuse character of the response, the
labyrinthine party organisation and the slow pace at which the recovery strategy picked
up make a judgment on the case relatively difficult. Many of the changes summarised in
table 8.2, especially those that concern the choice of coalition partners, only reveal their
true importance when seen as part of a development that continues after 1974 with the
Lib-Lab Pact, during which Thorpe’s successor David Steel led his party to support the
Labour government after it had lost its majority in 1977, and the Alliance with the SDP
from 1981, eventually merging into the Liberal Democrats in 1988. Overall, it can be
said that the Liberals followed a slow but sure shift away from the traditional position
of rejecting any sort of accommodation with the major parties, leading to an extension
strategy as expected on the basis of the identity of defectors and the constraints of FPTP.
This was not the case in all parts of the strategy, though: in the field of party programme,
the increasing emphasis on the idea of community politics, which had become firmly
entrenched in Liberal discourse, constitutes a reinforcement strategy, focusing more on an
issue that by now had become traditional.
The fact that the nature of the defeat as a crisis can be disputed due to the fact that
the loss of votes did not match the loss of seats makes the Liberal case a means of testing
the propositions on what makes parties decide whether to act. Though the literature has
called the 1970 defeat “traumatic”, the immediate action such a trauma would imply was
not forthcoming.116 The NEC, the Liberal Parliamentary Party and other organs seem to
have been intent on carrying on or at least not to make major changes.117 This may be
due to the limited loss of votes, which made it possible to direct the blame for the seat
loss to the electoral system rather than the party itself. More importantly, assembling an
internal party coalition for change was made more complicated by the complex structures
of the party organisation and the dispersed distribution of powers within them. Neither
the NEC, the LPP nor the party council could effectively take the lead on its own.
Here another factor comes into play as well: the party’s small size. The small size of
the Liberal Party, combined with the FPTP electoral system, severely constrained the
party’s options. In fields such as candidate selection, organisation or even tactics, the
party had a narrower array of alternatives open to it than the model assumed. This poses
the question whether the model can serve to explain the actions of small parties like the
Liberal Party or whether it is more suited to explaining the recovery strategies of major
parties.
The small size of the Liberal Party and its dispersed support base can nevertheless
by linked to the outcome of an overall extension strategy, especially in tactics. The
Liberal Party’s support is not just relatively small but also dispersed across the country
116. Mole, “Community Politics,” 258.
117. Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the National Executive Committee Meeting held 4th July 1970
at the National Liberal Club”; Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly
1970,” 5.
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both geographically and demographically. Quite apart from the fact that its ideological
individualism leads to the rejection of having a base at all, an extension strategy is the
logical result of its small size, especially since its electoral goals also involved forming a
single-party majority government. After all, the party, due to its small size, cannot be
picky about the voters it does or does not want. Wherever they won seats, be it in the
countryside or in the cities, such as in Liverpool, the Liberals tried to latch onto the votes
they won. Had they taken any different route, they would have lost their optimal course
of action. Seen this way, the decision to pursue a broad front and focus on being able to
campaign everywhere through a more coordinated organisation is indeed the result of the
Liberal Party’s relationship to its voters.
How, then, should the ‘odd one out’, the programmatic reinforcement strategy focusing
on the traditional issue of community politics, be seen? The resolutions of the Liberal
Assembly and the Party Council show that the programmatic efforts towards community
politics were strongly informed by party members simply believing this idea to be right
in ideological terms.118 In other words: the strong attachment to Liberal ideology and
the tradition of the party produced the strong focus on community politics. To many
Liberals, community politics had become the core of the party. In addition, community
politics was a convenient strategy to a party which was considerably more successful at
the local than at the national level.
This analysis provides evidence for proposition 5a through 5c formulated in chapter
3 that the programmatic strategy is determined by ideological attachment whereas the
organisational and tactical components are impacted more by electoral base attachment.
In the case of the Liberal Party, this is clearly suggested by the evidence. The way
the party related to its support in the country, both as a result of its dispersion and of
the disadvantages imposed by the electoral system, led to a strategy that ended up as
a tactical and organisational extension strategy. At the same time, the party’s strong
attachment to its ideological tradition led to the party championing what it regarded
as its traditional issues. This provides further support for propositions 5a through 5c
that the effects of electoral base attachment and ideological attachment on the recovery
strategy are differential, with the former impacting the tactical and organisational areas
and the latter impacting more strongly on the programmatic dimension.
118. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly 1970,” 5-6; Liberal Party
Council, “Private Business Motions introduced at the Liberal Party Council held 24th of November
1973,” 19; Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at Southport 18th - 22nd September,” 15-16; Ellis, “A
Community Politics Theme for the General Election,” 286-291.
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9 Comparative Analysis
9.1 Introduction
In chapters 5 through 8, evidence has been presented from four parties – the Dutch
CDA and D66 and the British Labour and Liberal parties – going through an episode of
electoral crisis. These cases have contributed vital data to this study’s understanding of
party change following an electoral shock. What remains is to conduct the comparative
part of the analysis and synthesise all this information in order to validate the model in
general and subject the specific propositions formulated in chapter three to an empirical
test. On this basis, the validity of the assumptions of the model can be judged and its
explanatory power ascertained.
To briefly reiterate the design of the study: case studies were conducted in four different
parties across two different countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, selected
respectively for their Proportional Representation (PR) and First Past the Post (FPTP)
electoral systems, which had suffered an electoral shock. In each of these two countries, a
party with high electoral base attachment and a party with low electoral base attachment
were selected. The methodological approach essentially consists of a number of different
Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) comparisons, comparing both within and between
the countries. In these focused comparisons, the differences between the cases will point
to the validity of each proposition and ultimately of the model as a whole.
In this chapter, therefore, the focus is on the similarities and differences between the
cases, rather than the specific details of each case. This naturally leads to a different sort of
argument that follows on from the facts of each case study, being concerned more with the
occurrence of events across cases than the sequence within a case. Where evidence from
each case study is used in this chapter, it is either to reinforce a pattern observed in the
comparative evidence as a whole, to illustrate the argument or to suggest opportunities for
refinement of rejected propositions. Because the details of each case, stated in the terms
of the concepts developed in chapter three, provide the input for this analysis, table 9.1
provides an overview of the results in each case.
This chapter starts by examining the propositions in section 9.2. Following this check,
the chapter will turn to the question of what this says about the model in general and
the assumptions it makes. Going through the model step by step, various assumptions
underlying the conception of party recovery strategies developed in chapter 3 will be
checked to see if they accurately represent the empirical reality. The model’s explanatory
power will be compared to that of a model based on the control variable of the identity
of the defectors, so as to demonstrate that institutional factors matter more to the choice
of a party’s recovery strategy than more rational and functional ones. Finally, section 9.4
delivers a short conclusion on the model’s overall validity and explanatory power, leaving
214 Martijn van Nijnanten - Parties under Pressure







Country Netherlands UK Netherlands UK
’whether’-stage
Size of defeat
as % of prev.
seats
37% 20% 65% 50%
Previous
crisis?
No No Yes, 1972 Yes, 1951
Diagnosed
crisis
Yes Yes, hesitantly. Yes Yes, hesitantly.
’how’-stage, first electoral cycle
Electoral base
attachment
Strong Strong Weak Weak
Ideological
attachment


















































Reinforcement Reinforcement Reinforcement Extension
’how’-stage, second electoral cycle
Electoral
system





































Reinforcement Extension Reinforcement Extension
Chapter 9. Comparative Analysis 215
the broader implications to be judged in the final chapter of this dissertation.
9.2 Examining the propositions
Let us now turn to examining each specific proposition to see how the model performs
at the task it was designed to do: to explain the variety of actions various parties take
following an external shock. The analysis moves from the general level to the specific,
presenting first the overall configuration of the variables, then noting specific evidence
from each case to further inform the assessment of the proposition. This has the benefit
of being able to highlight details and nuances from the case studies where they are relevant
and, in the case of rejected propositions, the ability to use information gained from using
the model in a heuristic manner to see whether and how they might be refined. It should
be noted, before each of these propositions in considered in turn, that not all of these
comparisons are ideally designed according to the principles of a Most Similar Systems
comparative research design, since by and large the cases were not selected to be similar
on all variables except for the dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, these
more focused comparisons will no doubt yield viable insights as we shall examine each
proposition in turn.
9.2.1 Proposition 1: relative size of the defeat
The first propositions (1 and 2) derived from the model do not concern the choice of
strategy, but the theoretical possibility that a party does not change at all. Though the
literature has provided a large degree of support to the idea that parties do change after
external shocks (see chapter two), this was still a step that had to be taken. The first
proposition is the one most straightforwardly derived from the earlier models of shock-
induced party change: that the larger the size of the defeat, the more likely it is that a
party will diagnose a crisis. It is, in effect, a restatement of the performance hypothesis
formulated by Harmel and Janda that the poorer a party’s performance towards its goals,
the more likely it is to change.1 The goal, in this case, whatever it may be, is mediated
by electoral performance. The size of each of the shock defeat as a percentage of seats
and votes lost is listed in table 9.32.
All parties, in the end, diagnosed a crisis and acted on it by formulating a strategy (see
chapters 5 through 8). Of course, this was more or less inherent in the case selection,
which only selected parties which had suffered a shock and were therefore likely to diag-
nose a crisis in the first place. Strictly speaking, therefore, the proposition could not be
approached by means of between-case comparison, since there were no cases in which the
parties did not act on the shock. However, there have certainly been differences which
could be seen to be significant in their relationship to this hypothesis. In chapter three,
1. R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 280.
2. Based on data from H. Döring and P. Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov),”
Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018,
http://www.parlgov.org.
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Table 9.2: Summary of propositions
’Whether’-stage
1. The higher the proportion of votes or seats lost in the shock electoral defeat
relative to the last election, the greater the pressure towards change will be,
and therefore the higher the probabolity that a party will diagnose a crisis.
2. When a party has previously experienced a defeat which meets the threshold
set for a crisis, this will strengthen the case for change and therefore increase
the probability that a party will diagnose a crisis.
Internal factors
3. Parties which have higher levels of electoral base attachment are more likely
to pursue the reinforcement strategy; those with lower levels the extension
strategy.
4. Parties which have higher levels of ideological attachment are more likely to
pursue the reinforcement strategy; those with lower levels the extension strat-
egy.
5. Electoral base attachment impacts the organisational and tactical dimensions
more than the programmatic dimension, while ideological attachment impacts
the programmatic dimension more than the organisational and tactical dimen-
sions, leading to the following concrete expectations:
a) Parties with a higher electoral base attachment tend to favour organisa-
tional reforms shifting power towards the membership, whereas those with
lower electoral base attachment tend to favour organisational reforms shift-
ing power away from the membership.
b) Parties with a higher electoral base attachment tend to favour their core
constituency, whereas those with lower electoral base attachment tend to
favour a broader constituency.
c) Parties with a higher ideological attachment tend to highlight their tradi-
tional values, whereas parties with a lower ideological attachment tend to
downplay their traditional values.
External factors
6. Parties under FPTP are more likely to pursue the extension strategy; parties
under PR are more likely to pursue the reinforcement strategy.
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Table 9.3: Percentage of votes and seats lost in crisis election
Party (election) Previous result Crisis result Percentage lost
CDA (1994) Seats 54 34 37%
% of votes 35,3% 22,2% 37%
Labour (1983) Seats 261 209 20
% of votes 36,9% 27,6% 25%
D66 (1982) Seats 17 6 65%
% of votes 11,1% 4,3% 61%
Liberals (1970) Seats 12 6 50%
% of votes 8,6% 7,5% 13%
the diagnosis of crisis represented the tendency towards change resulting from the shock
overcoming the party’s resistance to change. Since some parties took longer to diagnose a
crisis than others, in these cases apparently it was harder to form a consensus for change.
If these differences coincide with the numerical heaviness of the defeat, they would provide
some limited support for the first proposition.
The differences are significant. In the cases of CDA and D66, the national committees
of both parties started the process soon after the election and led up to a review that very
clearly defined the electoral performance as a problem.3 In the case of the Liberal Party,
the first post-election meeting of the NEC was more upbeat, noting that morale was high
despite the losses and apparently blaming these losses on the electoral system.4 After the
party’s defeat in 1983, leading figures in Britain’s Labour Party also appeared to have
trouble apportioning blame to their present approach, preferring to blame the press in
several sources.5
For the British Labour Party, the relatively small size of their actual losses seems a
reasonable explanation for this hesitation. However, in rank order of seat losses, the
Liberals come above one of the two Dutch immediate responders and still appear to take
longer to form a coalition for change. If we introduce votes into the equation, however,
this disappears. Going on votes rather than seats, both the Liberals and Labour lost
3. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie” (1994), in-
ventory nr. 1678, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal
Archief, the Hague; Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van
het CDA-Partijbestuur d.d. 6 mei 1994, gehouden in vergadercentrum ’Hoog Brabant’ te Utrecht,” Min-
utes of the National Committee, 6th of May 1994 (1994), PB/9453193V/ps, inventory nr. 1678, Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague, 4;
Democraten 66, National Committee, “Verslag Bijeenkomst "Aanzet Partijdiskussie Politiek" op maandag
4 oktober 1982,” Minutes of the Advisory Group, 4th of October 1982 (1982), inventory nr. 45, Archives
of Democrats 66, Algemene Ledenvergadering (ALV), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties,
Groningen University; B. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid,” Democraat 15, no.
7 (1982): 17–21.
4. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the National Executive Committee Meet-
ing held 4th July 1970 at the National Liberal Club” (1970), p. 93-99, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party
Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London.
5. M. Foot, “Manifesto Will Prove Right,” Labour Weekly, July 17, 1983, though these include members
of the outgoing leadership, they still appear to reflect a dominant pattern of thinking. Accessed at the
Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester; H. Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim,” Labour
Weekly, July 17, 1983, Accessed at the Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
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Table 9.4: Previous shock defeats at 33% vote or seat loss threshold
Party Number of previous crisis defeats (years)
Liberal Party 1 (1951)
Democrats 66 1 (1972)
Labour Party 0
Christian Democratic Appeal 0
significantly less at 11% and 25% of their vote shares respectively. Looking at the vote
shares of both Dutch parties, there is support for the proposition regarding the size of the
defeat. This might be due to the fact that it is easier to argue that no major change is
needed if one of two performance indicators – votes or seats – is not as bad as the other.
This, in turn, suggests that the resistance that parties have to overcome is rather high.
It appears that the effect is strongest when both votes or seats are impacted, leaving no
doubt as to whether the party’s electoral potential has been compromised and making it
harder to credibly apportion blame primarily to some factor outside the party. However,
since all parties in the end diagnosed a crisis, however hesitantly, a loss of either votes or
seats in excess of 33% still appears to constitute a sufficient condition.
9.2.2 Proposition 2: learning effect
The second proposition concerned a learning effect: if a party had experienced a shock
defeat before, it would be more likely to diagnose a crisis after suffering the electoral
shock under study. The same caveats apply here as in section 9.2.1. above: all parties did
diagnose a crisis. However, some did it faster and more explicitly than others. Does such
a learning effect exist in the four cases under study in this dissertation? To answer this
question, table 9.46 contains an overview of all the elections between 1945 and the crisis
under study at which a party had suffered a defeat above the 33% threshold in votes or
seats.
Matching this data up to what has been said above about the two parties which imme-
diately diagnosed the crisis and the two which experienced a bit more hesitation, there
does not appear to have been a learning effect. The Liberal Party appeared very opti-
mistic after the 1970 electoral defeat, as did the Labour Party – both fall on opposite
sides of the line. The same goes for immediate responders CDA (no prior crisis defeats)
and D66 (a single crisis in 1972). This would mean that the evidence does not support
proposition 2, which is therefore rejected.
9.2.3 Proposition 3: the impact of electoral base attachment
The relationship between electoral base attachment and the initial choice of strategy
appears to be rather murky. Proposition 3 states that parties with higher levels of electoral
base attachment are more likely to go with a reinforcement strategy, whereas those with
lower levels of electoral base attachment are more likely to pursue an extension strategy.
6. Based on data from Döring and Manow, “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).”
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CDA, 1994-1998 Strong Reinforcement Reinforcement
Labour, 1983-1987 Strong Reinforcement Reinforcement
D66, 1982-1986 Weak Extension Reinforcement
Liberals, 1970-1974 Weak Extension Extension
Since both the CDA and Labour have a high level of electoral base attachment in common
(the former through personal ties, the latter through the formal role played by the trade
unions, which was reinforced in both cases by informal norms), the expectation for them
generated by the theory is that they should pursue a reinforcement strategy in the first
electoral cycle. Similarly, both D66 and the Liberal Party have a lower level of electoral
base attachment, evidenced in norms against pleading the interests of a specific group of
voters, which is conducive to an extension strategy. How do these expectations stack up
against the observations?
As shown in table 9.5, both the high-attachment parties also started their recovery
strategies by pursuing a reinforcement strategy. Between 1983 and the 1987 election,
Labour pursued a reinforcement strategy on two out of three dimensions of the strategy,
with the puzzling exception of the tactical dimension (see section 9.2.5). Its focus on its
traditional values and issues, combined with the push for One Member, One Vote (OMOV)
measures to empower the membership, point towards a focus on the party’s core voters
that puts it in the reinforcement column. Likewise, though the CDA also attempted to
reach out to those of non-Christian faiths (thus also pursuing an extension strategy on the
tactical dimension), it conducted a Policy Review highlighting its Christian democratic
principles and also introduced some OMOV reforms to its organisation. Although both
parties also took extension-based measures, they still lean towards the reinforcement side.
This would mean that, going purely on the configuration of the overall strategies, these
two cases support proposition 3.
The resistance encountered in both cases is also evidence that electoral base attach-
ment impacted in some way. Though they both used their advantage in internal power
struggles, such as the introduction of a non-amendable policy review, the leaderships of
CDA and Labour were not always successful in their aims.7 Sometimes this resistance is
better explained by internal vested interests, as seen in the struggle they both faced for
OMOV and reform of the party organisation.8 However, at other times, it is the result
7. As described in more detail in the relevant chapters, in both Labour and the CDA it would take the
full two electoral cycles and multiple iterations of the organizational reforms before OMOV, for instance,
could be implemented. This can be put down mostly to internal resistance.
8. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Resumé van de vergadering van het CDA-
Partijbestuur d.d. 14 oktober 1994,” Minutes of the National Committee, 14th of October 1994 (1994),
PB/9453766V/ps, inventory nr. 1680, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA): Partij, 1980-2000, voorlopige
toegang, Nationaal Archief, the Hague; Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, “One Member, One
Vote: Realities behind the slogan” (1984), KNNK 2/1/55, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill
Archives Centre, Cambridge.
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of attachment to the party as in a privileged relationship with respectively a Christian
or working-class base. Even the reforming Labour leadership went out of their way to
maintain the link to the trade unions, with review after review being set up to resolve
this question, because they could not (and maybe did not want to) get around the influ-
ence of the unions in pushing for OMOV.9 The eventual external democratisation of the
leadership elections is related to this.10 On the other side of the Channel, the CDA was
criticised by its own members and national committee members for reaching out to those
of different faiths, as they felt it threatened the party’s Christian identity.11 This clearly
shows electoral base attachment works to condition the way parties respond to a crisis,
working at the level of the membership as well as the leadership.
While both high-attachment cases conform to expectations, the same cannot be said
of the low-attachment cases. Both D66 and the Liberal Party can be said not only to
lack a sizeable and well–defined base, but also to some extent to lack a desire to obtain
one. They are both liberal parties with an individualist idea of politics. However, both
parties pursued a different recovery strategy at the end of the first cycle. The Liberal
Party, though returning to its traditional issues as part of a strong focus on community
politics, also sought to broaden its base by increasing its chances of power, qualifying
its refusal to work with the major parties.12 It also concentrated some of the power in
its decentralised party organisation by increasing efforts at coordination at the national
level.13 This means that on two out of three dimensions, it pursued an extension strategy
as expected.
In a snapshot of the recovery strategy as it was just before the 1986 election, D66 does
indeed pursue a reinforcement strategy on two out of three dimensions, contradicting ex-
pectations. However, the picture is more complicated than that. At the start of the first
cycle, the programmatic efforts made by the party sought to broaden the party’s pro-
grammatic profile by downplaying the importance of political democracy and broadening
9. Labour Party, Franchise Review Group (Working Party on the Franchise), “Party Franchise for the
Selection and Reselection of Parliamentary Candidates” (1987), Franchise Review Group Papers, Personal
Papers of Dianne Hayter, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester; Labour Party, Trade
Union Links Review Group, “Trade Unions and the Labour Party: Final Report of the Review Group on
Links between Trade Unions and the Labour Party” (1992), Archives of the Trade Union Links Review
Group, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
10. Labour, TULRG, “Trade Unions and the Labour Party.”
11. Christen-Democratisch Appèl, National Committee, “Besluitenlijst van het Partijbestuur van het
CDA d.d. 17 november 2000,” Conclusions of the National Committee Meeting, 17th of November 2000
(2000), Anonymous Personal Archive consisting of National Committee Minutes, CDA Central Office,
the Hague, 4.
12. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Resolution passed by National Executive Committee,
29.6.74” (1974), p. 181, LIBERAL/1/16, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic
Science, London.
13. Liberal Party. National Executive Committee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held 28th of November
1970 at 10am at the National Liberal Club” (1970), p. 119-126, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives,
British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 123; Liberal Party. National Executive Com-
mittee, “Minutes of the NEC meeting held 30th of October 1971 at 1pm at the National Liberal Club”
(1971), p. 183-188, LIBERAL/1/6, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Sci-
ence, London, 186; Liberal Party. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at the Liberal Party Assembly
1970” (1970), LIBERAL/8/4, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
London, 5.
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its concept of democratisation.14 Combined with the extension strategy pursued on the
organisational dimension, this means that the initial form of the strategy leaned more
towards extension. This changed after the return of Van Mierlo, under whose leadership
the party chose to highlight political reform as its "reason to exist" instead. With all three
dimensions weighted equally, this change of direction puts D66 on the reinforcement side.
If we take the fact that initial efforts leaned more towards extension as an indication of
initial preferences, then this provides some limited support for proposition 3. However,
this can only be said to be the case if the electoral system or ideological attachment
produced the change of direction. We shall return to this in sections 9.2.4. and 9.2.6.
Because D66 does not conform to the expectation that a weak electoral base attachment
leads to an extension strategy, proposition 3 has to be rejected. However, what the
evidence above also shows is that while the simple expression of the relationship in the
proposition must be rejected, we have learned something about the complex reality behind
the model. Electoral base attachment does not appear entirely unrelated to the choice
of strategy, just not as straightforwardly as the model presumes. The case of D66 shows
this: the party did start off on an extension strategy, and its first-cycle strategy only
shifted towards a reinforcement strategy after the return of Van Mierlo to the leadership.
This suggests that there might have been some sort of relationship between electoral base
attachment and the choice of strategy: after all, the first steps the party made did follow
expectations. However, given the mixed picture of the case overall and the fact that by
the end of the first cycle, the strategy looked rather different (whether that is due to
electoral system influences or some other factor like the party’s strong attachment to its
ideology), this effect cannot be as strong as the proposition presumes. This more nuanced
relationship arising from the within-case evidence therefore provides useful information
in refining the model, while at the same time showing that the proposition does not cut
it and that such refinement is therefore needed.
9.2.4 Proposition 4: the role of ideology
When reviewing the evidence in all parties, the role of ideology stands out. Despite the
differences in electoral base attachment, all parties score high on ideological attachment,
as shown in table 9.6. Labour’s commitment to democratic socialism by the 1980s was
evident in the way in which the 1983 manifesto and unpopular commitments like unilat-
eral nuclear disarmament were defended.15 The CDA was seen as one of Europe’s more
principled Christian Democratic parties,16 and the Gardeniers evaluation report shows a
14. A. Nuis, “Het Democratisch Manifest: een nieuw hoofdstuk: de plaats van D’66 in 1983,” Democraat
16, no. 1 (1983): 9–16; Democraten 66, National Committee, “Beleidshoofdstuk Informatiebeleid,”
Democraat 15, no. 8 (1982): 17–18; Democraten 66, National Committee, “Adelt arbeid? Een visie op de
plaats van arbeid in een tijd van grote werkloosheid” (1984), Attachment to Democraat 17(2).
15. Labour Party, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes” (1983),
KNNK 2/1/20, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Foot, “Man-
ifesto Will Prove Right”; Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim.”
16. J.-E. Lane and S. O. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1994), 149;
D. Hanley, “Introduction: Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon,” in Christian Democracy in
Europe: A Comparative Perspective, ed. D. Hanley (London and New York: Pinter, 1994), 5; M. Ten
Hooven, “Een machtspartij met idealen: Een geschiedenis van het CDA, 1980-2010,” in De Conjunctuur
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CDA, 1994-1998 Strong Reinforcement Reinforcement
Labour, 1983-1987 Strong Reinforcement Reinforcement
D66, 1982-1986 Strong Reinforcement Reinforcement
Liberals, 1970-1974 Strong Reinforcement Extension
strong confidence in the ideological concept of the ’responsible society’. Both the Liberal
Party and D66 were convinced that their own set of ideas was the right one, with D66
figuring as ideologically attached to rejecting ideology.17 This presents a problem: since
we have no cases of low ideological attachment, it is impossible to approach proposition
4 through between-case analysis. However, the tentative evidence from the case studies,
when seen in relation to each other, does allow a few tentative conclusions and insights
about the relationship expressed by the proposition.
Recall that proposition 4 with regards to ideology was that parties with a higher degree
of ideological attachment are more likely to pursue a reinforcement strategy, while those
with lower degrees of ideological attachment are more likely to go with an extension
strategy. Here an immediate problem reveals itself for the hypothesis, since all parties
can be seen as strongly attached to their ideologies. Since all parties pursued different
strategies at the outset, judged on the whole, this leads to the tentative conclusion that
there is a problem with the proposition. After all, for the proposition in its most simple
formulation to be confirmed, all parties should have pursued a reinforcement strategy.
This is evidently not the case. However, without low-attachment cases, we cannot judge
whether this deviation is due to another variable having a greater influence or due to
ideology having no influence at all.
The within-case analysis presents more detailed insights that can be of use in making
this judgment when refining the model. Looking in greater detail at the cases, the influence
of ideology shows in each case in different ways. The idea that the party’s belief system
is a strength occurs in all cases except the Labour one. In this latter case, ideological
attachment was arguably weakest, since it was only shared by powerful parts of the
party rather than inherent in the party’s tradition. For the CDA, it was a continuing
belief in the relevance of the Christian democratic ideology that contributed to an overall
reinforcement strategy.18 For D66, the strength of its non-dogmatic identification and its
position opposed to the major parties of the day prevailed after the return of Van Mierlo,
van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch Appèl 1980-2010, ed. G. Voerman (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011),
170; G. Voerman, “Inleiding,” in De Conjunctuur van de Macht: het Christen-Democratisch Appèl 1980-
2010, ed. G. Voerman (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 9-11.
17. W. Wallace, “Survival and Revival,” in Liberal Party Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor (Oxford: Clarendon,
1983), 48; D. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),
171; M. S. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie: de Geschiedenis van D66, 1966-2003 (Den Haag:
SDU, 2003).
18. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 11-12.
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leading to comments such as “our line is old and good”.19 In the Liberal case, Liberal
activists were absolutely convinced that liberal principles, specifically the relatively recent
idea of community politics, would bring the party to power.20
In the case of D66, ideology is potentially a stronger force than electoral base attach-
ment at the outset, and this forms one of two candidate explanations for the fact that
despite its weak electoral base attachment, it still ended the first cycle on a predominantly
reinforcement-based strategy (the other being an early electoral influence). Though the
party was not very attached to the idea of having a base, it still formulated what was
essentially a reinforcement strategy in the first electoral cycle. In part, this might be due
to the fact that for D66, the aversion to the pillars was part of its programmatic basis,
clouding the distinction.21 As a programmatic party rather than an interest party by tra-
dition, one could say the ideological variable took precedence.22 Still, the same could be
said of the Liberal Party in the eyes of many Liberal activists and leaders, for whom the
programme naturally formed a sustaining motivation, and it bears keeping in mind that
the Liberals pursued an extension strategy.23
Insofar as we can test proposition 4, there is a problem with the stated relationship
between ideological attachment and the choice of strategy. However, the case studies
provide more complex ways in which ideology does seem to have some effect that can be
helpful in our understanding of party recovery strategies.This influence appears in two
ways: first, as the arguments offered above illustrate, ideology often serves to strengthen
existing pressures towards a reinforcement strategy. This was strongest, naturally, in
parties which were formed from mass-integration movements, where at least to some
the ideology was naturally tied in with its social base. The high degree of ideological
attachment strengthens electoral base attachment in these cases. In the case of D66,
meanwhile, its strong ideological attachment also strengthened the reinforcement strategy,
and was arguably even stronger than the pressure its weak electoral base attachment
contributed towards the extension strategy. Secondly, and this shall be the subject of
the next section, there is the possibility that ideology impacts more strongly on the
programmatic dimension. It is this latter conclusion which is the more important of the
two.
9.2.5 Propositions 5a through 5c: differential impacts
As noted previously, the picture as regards the first electoral cycle and the initial responses
of parties is rather messy, and no party pursued the same strategy on all three dimensions.
19. M. Ten Brink, “Campagneplan 1986: Concept Campagneplan 1986 t.b.v. Gemeenteraads- en Tweede
Kamerverkiezingen, oktober 1985,” Draft Campaign Plan for 1986 (1985), HB.DB-85/196A, inventory nr.
92, Archives of Democrats 66, Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on
Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University, 8.
20. Liberal Party. Party Council, “Private Business Motions introduced at the Liberal Party Council
held 24th of November 1973” (1973), p. 18-19, LIBERAL/3/1, Liberal Party Archives, British Library
of Political and Economic Science, London, 19; Liberal Party, “Change the Face of Britain: the Liberal
Party Manifesto 1974,” 1974, accessed November 21, 2017, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/
uk/man/lib74feb.htm.
21. Van der Land, Tussen Ideaal en Illusie, 15.
22. Ibid., 408.
23. Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party since 1900, 171.
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This is in part due to the nature of the reinforcement-extension distinction as a continuous
scale, which is simplified by letting the majority of the dimensions decide the strategy.
When we look at the first-cycle strategies of both parties as a representation of their initial
inclinations before an electoral re-evaluation, it turns out that taken as a whole, neither
proposition 3 on electoral base attachment or proposition 4 on ideological attachment fits
the observations entirely. However, this problem of the impact of various influences was
foreseen in the exposition of the model in chapter three, and another solution offered: dis-
aggregating the strategy into its component dimensions. This is where proposition 5 and
its sub-propositions 5a through 5c come in, based on the idea that ideological attachment
impacts more on the programmatic dimension, while electoral base attachment impacts
more on the organisational and tactical dimensions, respectively. This will be approached
by making comparisons between the cases based on the respective independent variables,
relating them to the dimensions in question.
Proposition 5a states that parties with a strong electoral base attachment tend to shift
power towards their membership, whereas those with weak electoral base attachment tend
to favour organisational changes shifting power away from them. In table 9.7, this expec-
tation is borne out, leading to the conclusion that this proposition must be confirmed.
Both CDA and Labour, in their first electoral cycle following the defeat, started pursuing
reforms to empower their membership with One Member, One Vote (OMOV) decision-
making. In the cases of the Liberal Party and D66, the trend was actually the opposite:
both parties concentrated an (admittedly limited) amount of power in the hands of the
leadership to ease coordination by the leadership. External democratisation was not pur-
sued, which is relatively unsurprising: in the 1970s or 1980s, the concept was virtually
unheard of in general.
The pursuit of OMOV in the CDA and Labour cases, in particular, supports the idea of
a relationship between these reforms and these parties’ strong electoral base attachment.
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In the Labour Party, the empowerment of the membership was a way for the leadership
to reach out to party supporters who believed the party had drifted away from their con-
cerns.24 For the CDA, the Gardeniers report gave much the same reasoning for rebalancing
the relationship between leaders and members in the favour of the latter, reasoning that
its large membership could be an asset in winning over the people in the country.25 This
matches the reasoning given in chapter three for assigning such reforms to empower the
membership to the reinforcement strategy: members, being part of the party’s most loyal
base of support, will help the party take decisions which makes the party more attractive
to its social base.
The within-case evidence is weaker when it comes to the other side of the equation,
but both D66 and the Liberals diagnosed to varying degrees that their decentralised
and dispersed party organisations hindered the breadth of the party’s electoral appeal.26
The fact that they acted accordingly (albeit circumspectly and not entirely successfully
because they also valued their respective party’s democratic principles) lends support to
the proposition, but it could be stronger.
Proposition 5b presents a serious problem. If we compare the proposition that parties
with a strong electoral base attachment should pursue a narrower tactical focus whereas
those with a weak electoral base attachment should pursue a broader one to the evidence
from the four cases, the picture as shown in table 9.8 looks nothing like the expected state
of events. Since only the Liberal Party and to a rather limited extent the CDA conform
to expectations, the only possible conclusion is that proposition 5b is to be rejected.
This is particularly problematic given that, theoretically speaking, this should be the
most straightforward relationship between electoral base attachment and any of the three
dimensions. The model presumes that if a party is strongly attached to its electoral
base, it should pursue a strategy that plays to this electoral base. Since the tactical
dimension represents the composition of the party’s intended audience, it is very odd
that on this dimension in particular, this does not appear to be the case. This problem
was encountered in almost all cases, leading to various possible ways to account for the
divergence from the model’s expectations. These will be considered in turn. The first of
these ways is that the preferences of the actor controlling strategy (often closer to the
parliamentary party) are more concerned with short-term demands of the electoral system
and therefore acting more opportunistically. This appears to have been what happened
in the Labour case, as suggested by leadership memos which suggest Kinnock was aware
of many of the weaknesses of Labour’s narrow appeal from the start.27
Another possibility is that the tactical dimension is more influenced by the question
who defected in the shock election. This does not appear to be the case, however. In
24. C. Clarke, “Reselection - Issues and Possibilities” (n.d.), KNNK 2/1/55, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Labour Party, Leader’s Office, “A Note on Re-Selection”
(1984), KNNK 2/1/55, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; N.
Kinnock, “Letter from Neil Kinnock to MPs opposed to Franchise Extension” (1984), KNNK 2/1/56, the
Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
25. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 11-12; 38-39.
26. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid”; Liberal Party, NEC, “Minutes of the
NEC meeting held 28th of November 1970 at 10am at the National Liberal Club,” 123.
27. P. Hain, “Memo on leadership strategy” (1983), KNNK 2/1/20, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK),
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
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the D66 case, the evaporation of the 1981 gains, which suggests that most defectors were
non-core voters, was followed up by narrower appeal rather than a broader one. In the
case of the Labour Party, the reverse is true: despite the fact that the party’s performance
in 1983 was far below its average performance over the past 5 elections and therefore likely
due to the defection of core voters, the party pursued a broader appeal. However, the
reality of partisan dealignment could well be a factor. Both Labour and the CDA were
aware that their base was growing smaller over time28 and, in the case of Labour, lured
away by the competition.29 This would make it a sensible strategy to try to broaden the
base, even if the parties’ internal characteristics inclined them in another direction on
the programmatic and organisational dimensions. Similarly, the Liberals were also faced
with an external reality which might have driven them to opt for an extension strategy
on the tactical dimension. They realized they could not win a majority outright, and
chose to entertain the possibility of a balance-of-power situation, potentially increasing
their viability in the eyes of the voters.30 This suggests that since the tactical dimension
is most directly related to the electoral arena, various aspects of the external environment
28. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” p. 13.
29. Labour Party, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Female Voters” (1985), KNNK 2/1/71,
the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Labour Party, “Report on
a Communications Strategy for Young Voters” (‘, 1985), KNNK 2/1/71, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
30. A. Butt-Philip, M. Steed, and W. Wallace, “What About the Balance of Power?,” Paper circulated
to the Liberal Party Council in February 1974 (1974), p. 365-371, LIBERAL/3/2, Liberal Party Archives,
British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, 365-371; Liberal Party. Liberal Party Organi-
sation, “After the Next Election: Report on the Standing Committee’s Discussion at Brantwood” (1974),
p. 277-280, LIBERAL/3/2, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
London, 277-280
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might have an earlier impact on this dimension.
This alternative explanation of the choices made by the CDA and Labour might work
for these parties, but it does not work in the case of D66. If the same logic as above
were extended to D66, its lack of a social base should lead to the party broadening its
base like the others, since its lack of a base was a serious liability. This difference can
possibly be explained by the central role in D66 of its programme. Arguably, for D66
the question of who to appeal to was secondary to its programme – and hence, since the
program was not going to change to accommodate a broader base, it led to a reinforcement
strategy.31 It should also be noted that towards 1989, D66 saw its way towards extending
its base with former VVD voters in a more opportunistic way.32 Perhaps the best way to
see the development of D66’s tactical strategy is to point out that D66’s character as a
programmatic party led to a strong preference against looking for a clear social base at
the expense of the party’s programme.
Let us, finally, turn to the relationship between ideological attachment and the pro-
grammatic parts of the recovery strategy. The same problem applies for proposition 5c
that strong ideological attachment leads a party to highlight its traditional issues whereas
weak ideological attachment leads to downplaying them as for proposition 4: since all four
cases show a high degree of ideological attachment, it is strictly speaking impossible to
use a between-case comparison to examine the proposition. When one looks at the first-
cycle programmatic strategies of the four parties as shown in table 9.9, all the observed
strategies at the end of the first electoral cycle are in line with the expectation that, based
on their high ideological attachment, they would pursue a strategy highlighting their tra-
ditional values rather than downplaying them. This shows support for proposition 5c in
the data, but at the same time this support can only be tentative without a case in which
ideological attachment is low showing the opposite tendency.
Disaggregating the strategies certainly has had some success. Propositions 5a and
5c give support, even with all the caveats applying to the latter, to the expected way
in which these characteristics of the four parties impacts certain parts of the strategy.
However, the rejection of proposition 5b does represent a problem, since complexity rears
its head precisely in the area that should theoretically have been the most straightforward
relationship. Because of this, the main statement of proposition 5 also has to be rejected,
since electoral base attachment was not seen to have a relationship with the tactical part
of the strategy. Only the Liberal Party case lined up fully with all three propositions.
However, the problem has been localised, which means that we know where it did and
31. Democraten 66, National Executive, “Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur,
gehouden op dinsdag 26 augustus 1986 te Den Haag,” Minutes of the National Executive committee
meeting held 26th August 1986 (1986), HB.DB-86/117, inventory nr. 98, Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur
(1970/1990), Archives of Democrats 66, Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Groningen
University.
32. Democraten 66, National Committee, “Verslag van het HB/Fractie-weekend, gehouden op 13 en 14
juni te Leusden,” Minutes of the Weekend Meeting of the Parliamentary Party and the National Commit-
tee held 13rd and 14th of June 1986 (1986), HB.DB-86/116, inventory nr. 98, Archives of Democrats 66,
Hoofdbestuur/Dagelijks Bestuur (1970/1990), Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties, Gronin-
gen University, 1.
33. With the caveat that initially the party tried to capitalize on topical issues, but never really suc-
ceeded.
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did not work, and where it must be refined. In general, this result underscores the need
for further research into the detail of party recovery strategies, especially in looking at
the complex relationship between the party’s tactical recovery strategy, their external
environment and their degree of electoral base attachment. Looking at the evidence
presented above from the within-case studies, this is exactly where the model should be
refined.
9.2.6 Proposition 6: electoral system
Sequencing is crucial to the examination of proposition 6. After all, the electoral system
is conceptualised as a constraint on parties’ initial preferences. This means that where the
initial preferences of a party lead it to adopt a course that runs counter to the demands of
the electoral system, the passage of time should see it shift towards the opposite strategy.
This is operationalised in a rough way by comparing the two electoral cycles following
the crisis: if the electoral system works as proposed, the second cycle should show the
strategy demanded by the electoral system, even if the first cycle ends up showing the
opposite strategy. Following the wording of the proposition, we have moved back to the
aggregate strategies, as the effect of the electoral system is expected across the board.
The configuration of the cases in table 9.10 appears encouraging, as all the second-cycle
strategies behave as expected: both Dutch cases end up with a reinforcement strategy,
whereas both British cases end up with an extension strategy. However, it also becomes
apparent that the British evidence is stronger than the Dutch evidence: Labour clearly
34. Significantly, before the return of Van Mierlo, the strategy looked more like an extension strategy.
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changed direction from a reinforcement strategy to an extension strategy, whereas the
CDA and D66, at least when comparing the strategies as they were at the end of both
cycles, do not change strategy. The operationalisation of the sequencing by comparing
the two cycles, therefore, does not seem to yield enough data to conclusively assess the
effect of the PR system. After all, if the strategy does not change between the first and
second cycles, we do not know whether the final strategy can be attributed to the electoral
system, the party’s internal characteristics, or both.
This is where the within-case analysis reveals its importance. When we zoom in on the
case of D66, we find a more nuanced picture that does potentially offer support for the
proposition. As was recounted in chapter 7, the first cycle in the case of D66 is unusual
because the chronology of the strategy suggests that the party first followed an extension
strategy, then switched to a reinforcement strategy. The pivotal event was the return of
the party’s first leader, Hans van Mierlo, to the leadership. The evidence surrounding the
ascension of Van Mierlo to the leadership suggests that this was due to expected electoral
difficulty, indicated by disappointing opinion polls. The evidence is still not as strong as
in the British Labour case, where explicit reference was made to the mechanics of the
electoral system in motivating crucial decisions. However, it does suggest an electoral
element to the change in strategy heralded by Van Mierlo’s return, which lends support
to the proposition.
Other single-case studies conducted for this dissertation further reinforce this conclusion
of a strong influence of the electoral rules of the game on the final form of a recovery
strategy. This is primarily found in the British cases, and particularly in the case of
the Labour Party. In 1983, the Labour Party, as evidenced by party opinion in its own
newspaper, was dominated by the left of the party, which strongly identified with a
socialist ideology, evidenced by commitments towards nationalisation of large parts of
the economy and unilateral nuclear disarmament.35 The party leader, Neil Kinnock, for
all his electoral pragmatism, was a prominent member of the Tribune Group, which had
historically been associated with the socialist left of the party, and his leadership campaign
35. Foot, “Manifesto Will Prove Right”; Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim.”
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papers show that at the start of his leadership, he held fast to his support for left-wing
policies such as unilateral nuclear disarmament.36 For a party in such circumstances to
be swayed by the electoral system, the effect must be strong indeed.
As it happens, Labour was swayed. The Kinnock Papers show that the leadership was
definitely aware at an early stage of the image problem Labour had and the decline of
its working-class base.37 Following another clobbering at the polls in 1987, not only did
the party change course; it did so very blatantly. For a party so dominated by activists
attached to its socialist identity as Labour had been (and still was in the eyes of many
Conference delegates) to state openly that its Policy Review had to appeal electorally to
those who had never supported it is a very strong sign.38 Further relating it to the electoral
system are numerous references in Shadow Cabinet discussions of the need to appeal to
areas where Labour was not strong, particularly in the South of the country.39 The early
form of external democratisation extending the franchise to affiliates was another example
of how far Labour was prepared to go.40 The same push to coming to terms with electoral
realities can be seen in the case of the Liberal Party, which had to face its inability to
win a majority due to the effects of the electoral system (and after 1970 dashed hopes of
a recovery, started doing so ever so hesitantly).41
Taking into account the mid-cycle change of strategy in the D66 case, the comparative
evidence ends up providing sufficient support for proposition 6. The electoral system
does seem to constrain the efforts of political parties towards recovery in the expected
way. However, the fact that this is clearer in the FPTP cases than in the PR cases does
point towards a need for further study, especially where the impact of PR is concerned.
One could speculate that because the PR system as it is in force in the Netherlands has
little in the way of mechanical and psychological effects, the constraining effect of this
system might be weaker than the effect of its British FPTP counterpart, even if there
does appear to be some effect. While this first asssessment of the proposition delivers
encouraging results, therefore, further research will be required to find out exactly how
the impact of PR works to constrain the choices of political parties, leading to a further
refinement of the model.
36. Labour, Leader’s Office, “Memo to Neil Kinnock on Leadership Campaign Themes,” 3.
37. Ibid.
38. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, “Moving Ahead: Statement to Conference 1987”
(1987), KNNK 2/2/1, the Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; L.
Whitty, “Policy Review and ’Labour Listens’: Note by the General Secretary” (1987), KNNK 2/2/1, the
Papers of Neil Kinnock (KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
39. N. Kinnock, “Neil Kinnock Address to PLP” (1987), KNNK 2/2/1, the Papers of Neil Kinnock
(KNNK), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Labour, NEC, “Moving Ahead”; Labour Party, Par-
liamentary Labour Party, “Proceedings of the Party Meeting Held on Wednesday 6 July 1988 at 11.30
AM in Committee Room 14” (1988), Parliamentary Labour Party Archives, Labour History Archive and
Study Centre, Manchester; Labour Party, Parliamentary Labour Party, “Minutes of the Party Meeting
Held on Wednesday 17 June 1987 at 12.00 Noon in Committee Room 14” (1987), Parliamentary Labour
Party Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
40. Labour, TULRG, “Trade Unions and the Labour Party.”
41. Liberal Party. Liberal Assembly, “Resolutions adopted at Southport 18th - 22nd September” (1973),
73A, p.15-16, LIBERAL/8/4, Liberal Party Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
London, 15-16.
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9.3 General validation of the model
Having examined each specific proposition in turn, let us now look at the model as a
whole. Does the way parties behave after an electoral shock that arises from the empirical
evidence match the terms of the model? This section subjects the model to such a check
moving through the various stages step by step. It will start by looking at the ‘whether’-
stage, then move on to the ‘how’-stage, discussing the general idea of the reinforcement
and extension strategies, the aggregate nature of the strategies and the sequential impact
of internal and external variables in turn.
The first step in the model is what is termed the ‘whether’-stage. At this stage, the party
considers whether the shock it has suffered is “worth the fuss”. As concerns the empirical
reality, the step is more an analytical distinction than a proper step in the thinking process
of political parties. It is significant, however, that there was an observable debate on the
question whether the party had to change anything about itself in the case of the British
Labour Party, which did show some hesitation to diagnose the 1983 defeat as a crisis.42 In
the CDA and D66 cases, where recognition of the crisis was instantaneous, the diagnosis
of an electoral crisis was contained in an influential evaluation report43– one could say,
therefore, that there was consensus reasonably fast in those parties. In general, this means
the ‘whether’-stage, while not as separate from the ‘how’-stage as it is in the model, is
part of the process in empirical reality.
The bulk of the analysis concerned what the model termed the ‘how’-stage. This stage
revolves around the choice between two strategies, which in turn give rise to party change
of a certain character. In theoretical terms, the model at this stage consists of several parts
that must be submitted to validation separately: the concept of the reinforcement and
extension strategies, the aggregate nature of these strategies and the distinction between
internal variables affecting preference formation and external variables influencing the
process later by acting as constraints on those preferences.
The reinforcement and extension strategies were introduced as a typology to structure
the diverse array of measures a party can take in a crisis. The central assumption under-
lying their formulation is that parties have to make up for their lost electoral potential,
and that their actions can be classified as either appealing to their core voters (the rein-
forcement strategy) or to non-core voters (the extension strategy). In practice, each party
will often mix elements of both strategies in their response, but various factors impact on
the precise composition of the mix of measures.
Do parties think of their actions in such a manner? If the question is whether the
parties explicitly referred to the core vote with every change, the answer must of course
be no. The parties in this study did not justify all their measures in this way. However,
in each case, the question of reinforcing or extending is posed in relation to actions across
all dimensions. This is the clearest in the case of the Labour Party, where the second
cycle saw an extension strategy that was explicitly targeted at voters who had never
42. Foot, “Manifesto Will Prove Right”; Frayman, “Political Defeat, says Jim”; G. Dunwoody, “Letter to
James Mortimer, General Secretary, the Labour Party” (1983), page stamped 000702, National Executive
Committee Archives, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester.
43. Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit en de harde werkelijkheid”; CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport
Evaluatiecommissie.”
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voted Labour (see chapter 6). Even where it was not explicit, the question of the party’s
relationship to its voters was posed in various ways.
Another matter related to the reinforcement and extension strategies is whether these
strategies can actually be thought of as strategies that are uniform on all dimensions. A
single glance at table 9.1 above answers this question: this is not the case. Among the four
parties under study, a unified reinforcement or extension strategy across all dimensions
was the exception rather than the rule. Within the dimensions, too, there was considerable
diversity, although uniformly reinforcing or extending strategies on a single dimension did
occur more often in chapters 5 through 8.
As a related matter, let us now look at the rival explanation that parties simply gear
their strategies to the votes they have to regain, in other words that the identity of
defectors matters more than institutional loyalties and electoral constraints. In chapter
four, we offered a simple operationalisation of this concept: taking the average of the
five last elections not including the shock election itself, we compared the last pre-shock
election to this average. If it was below average, the party would already have lost most
of its non-core votes, and thus would have predominately lost core votes in the shock
election. If it was above average, the party would likely also have lost non-core voters.
In the former instance, a strategy purely geared towards the functional consideration
of winning back the lost votes would be a reinforcement strategy and in the latter an
extension strategy. Since this effect concerns both the initial and the final forms of the
strategy, we will consider each of these in turn. However, if the initial strategy does
not conform to this expectation already, or at least not as closely as in examining the
institutional explanation represented by earlier propositions, then we can conclude the
parties’ response was likely not so much functional as institutional in nature, in other
words: that the party acted according to its institutional heritage rather than pursuing
the strategy that would win them back the votes they had lost.
Table 9.11 shows a mixed picture. Only the Liberal Party conforms entirely to the
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expectations based on the identity of its defecting voters. Since the shock result remained
above average, it is likely that its defectors were mostly non-core voters. The observed
extension strategy therefore makes sense. Likewise, the picture of the Labour Party in the
first cycle also conforms to expectations in that it started on a reinforcement trajectory,
as it had already lost most non-core votes in 1979 and its 1983 result was far below
the five-election average. However, its switch to an extension strategy from 1987 onwards
confounds the expectations, especially given the fact that the party’s modest gains in 1987
(3,2%) did not make up for its losses at all. Meanwhile, both Dutch cases do not behave
as one would expect, especially since both parties had evidence available to them in the
form of the Gardeniers and Van den Bos reports that non-core voters had a significant
part in their shock defeats.44
Although the operationalisation is arguably rudimentary and could be improved, on
the basis of the archival data it appears that there are better explanations available than
one purely based on the identity of the defectors (see section 9.2). The evidence for
institutional and electoral influences on the strategy is more compelling than that for a
purely functional one, especially if we consider that, as noted in section 9.2.5 above, D66
and Labour also pursued first-cycle strategies on the tactical dimension that run directly
counter to the expectations generated based on this proposition. The rival explanation
will therefore have to be rejected.
Finally, the discussion should turn to the way in which our model treats internal and
external variables. As already noted in chapter three, the distinction is not as crisp as the
model would have it. In the evaluation reports of the Gardeniers Commission (CDA) and
Van den Bos (D66), naturally external electoral considerations were also brought to the
fore.45 However, the general idea that institutional characteristics of parties in the form
of base or ideological attachment impact an initial formation of preferences while external
circumstances constrain the party from acting on these preferences finds support in the
detailed evidence from the cases. This is clearly seen in the CDA and Labour cases. In
either case, the party had at its disposal information suggesting the demographic decline
of its core vote, pushing it towards an extension strategy.46 In both cases, this information
finds only limited recognition in the overall strategy for the first electoral cycle outside
of the tactical dimension. In addition, in the Labour case, the constraining nature of
the FPTP electoral system is made clear by explicit references made to the effects of the
system being used as a rationale for the change of strategy in the second electoral cycle.47
This also appears, to a lesser extent, in the case of the Liberal Party.
In general, therefore, the nuts and bolts of the model appear to be reasonably valid.
While some of its workings are necessarily more sharp in the analytical distinctions than
44. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16; Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit
en de harde werkelijkheid.”
45. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16; Van den Bos, “Onze mentaliteit
en de harde werkelijkheid,” 17.
46. CDA, Gardeniers Commission, “Rapport Evaluatiecommissie,” 16; Labour, “Report on a Communi-
cations Strategy for Female Voters”; Labour, “Report on a Communications Strategy for Young Voters,”
p. 16.
47. Labour, PLP, “Proceedings of the Party Meeting Held on Wednesday 6 July 1988 at 11.30 AM in
Committee Room 14”; Labour, PLP, “Minutes of the Party Meeting Held on Wednesday 17 June 1987
at 12.00 Noon in Committee Room 14.”
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they are in empirical reality, one can say that parties generally follow the steps assumed
by our model. Most importantly, the identity of the defectors the party lost at a shock
election did not prove to be a better explanation than the institutional variables included
in the model also showed that this is not the case. The neo-institutionalist premises of
the model, therefore, appear to have been a solid foundation upon which the model could
be built. Of course there is work to be done - as the examination of the propositions in
section 9.2 above shows - but in general, the model appears to be on the right track.
9.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter was intended as a comparative analysis and synthesis of the four cases stud-
ied in chapters 5 through 8 of this dissertation. The bulk of the chapter was devoted to
examining each of the specific empirical propositions formulated to assess the explana-
tory power of the model. Having subjected each of these propositions to a comparative
empirical assessment, how should the explanatory power of the model formulated in this
dissertation be assessed?
As regards to the ‘whether’-stage, the expectation derived from the Harmel and Janda
model that larger defeats are more likely to lead to a diagnosis of crisis in the form of
proposition 1 was confirmed.48 A learning effect as proposed by proposition 2, however,
was not found. Parties do not uniformly seem to be more inclined to diagnose a crisis if
they experienced one before. It has to be kept in mind, of course, that all parties under
study did diagnose the crisis – but the variety of speeds at which they did so does not
seem to be related to a learning effect in the way that it seems to relate to the size of the
defeat.
The mainstay of the model, the ‘how’-stage, presents a picture that is more complex
than the simple propositions 3 (electoral base attachment) and 4 (ideological attach-
ment).When looking at electoral base attachment, D66 is the case that does not follow
the pattern. It has to be noted that the party did seem inclined to start on an extension
trajectory before the return of Van Mierlo, but if we take the end of the first electoral
cycle as the reference point as in all other cases there does not seem to be a simple effect
of the kind proposed. Still, the fact that D66 started off with an extension strategy does
provide some credence to the proposition. Proposition 4 does not hold up, even without
evidence from cases with weak ideological attachment: while all parties have a strong
ideological attachment, they do not, in fact, all follow a reinforcement strategy initially.
Taking all this into account, we can say that on the whole, there is still a case to be made
that electoral base attachment affects strategy choice in the uniform way proposed, while
the same cannot be said for ideological attachment.
Proposition 5 and its sub-propositions 5a through 5c, which disaggregate the effects,
perform much better. The programmatic and organisational changes in the first electoral
cycles line up perfectly with each party’s ideological and electoral base attachment, respec-
tively, as proposed in propositions 5a and 5c. Proposition 5c is particularly significant,
since it shows that the effect of ideological attachment is limited to programmatic change,
48. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 280.
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rather than uniform, as proposed by proposition 4. Proposition 5b, however, performs
much worse, and does not seem to show any pattern. Therefore, only propositions 5a and
5c can be confirmed, and the main statement of proposition 5 has to be rejected. This
presents a puzzle, since the tactical dimension, being directly about the party’s targetting
and therefore about thecore vote, should be a prime candidate to be related to electoral
base attachment. Possibly, there is some sort of influence of various external factors on
the tactical dimension in the first cycle.
Proposition 6 on the effect of the electoral system finds support in the data. All parties
move in the expected direction during the second electoral cycle, with the exception of
D66, which shows a similar shift in strategy before the end of the first cycle. This shows
that the way elections work is as important as foreseen by our model: the way votes
translate into seats is crucial. The difference between both cycles also indicates that the
conception of the electoral system as a constraining influence that comes in later to impact
upon the preferences formed through internal factors is probably correct. Nevertheless,
some problems remain, particularly as evidence for this effect in the PR cases is weaker
than the evidence arising from the FPTP cases.
Overall, the results present a mixed picture. This is in part due to the complexity of the
empirical reality, which accounts for the fact that the fit of the model is, at most, partial.
Its best performance, therefore, was not so much in the first tentative tests conducted
above but in its performance as a heuristic tool. This is most readily apparent in two
areas of our model. The first area is the impact of internal characteristics on the recovery
strategy while preferences are being formed. This is apparent even before the differential
effects propositions are introduced. Although the overall configuration of the cases does
not show a clear picture of a unified effect of electoral base attachment or ideological
attachment, in all four cases evidence can be found linking the initial form of the strategy
to either of these two variables. When instead of at the strategy as a whole, we look at the
component dimensions, the picture becomes clearer. High ideological attachment, present
in all four cases, seems to have led to a uniform preference towards a more traditional issue
agenda. Likewise, the organisational reform agenda seems to be informed by electoral base
attachment. The only exception to this is the tactical area, where the picture is puzzling,
but perhaps this is due to an earlier influence of the electoral reality on this dimension.
The impact of this electoral reality presents the second area in which the model has
performed well, both in examining of proposition 6 and as a heuristic device. The effect
of a First Past the Post electoral system is clearly as predicted, with the archival record in
the two British cases providing concrete evidence that the system pushed parties towards
an extension strategy by constraining the ways in which they could otherwise recover
electorally. The effect of the Proportional Representation system is less clear-cut – in
general, it seems to lead to a reinforcement strategy, but crucially, in both Dutch cases
the tactical dimension deviates from this overall pattern, showing a tendency to broaden
the electorate. It might be that the parties trusted their original base was covered by
other means, but this does not leave enough evidence to conclude that there is the same
strong effect of the PR system towards the reinforcement strategy as the FPTP system
seems to have towards extension.
Of course, our model has to be further improved. This is chiefly the case in further
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disentangling the internal factors from eachother. The most crucial problem to resolve in
this regard is that the actions taken by parties on the tactical dimension do not match
up to the expectations of proposition 5. This presents a puzzle because this should
theoretically speaking be the most straightforward link to electoral base attachment of any
of the three dimensions. The possibility of some sort of early effect of external conditions
might be worth exploring in this regard. In general, however, the model appears a good
start towards explaining the different forms party change can take following an external
shock. The overall conclusions of this study, and what these contribute to the overall
literature, form the focus of the final chapter of this dissertation.
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10 Conclusion and discussion
10.1 Introduction
This dissertation sought to address the research question “how do political parties respond
to an external shock in the form of heavy electoral defeat, and why do different parties respond
in different ways?”. As argued in chapter one, this is a theoretically as well as socially im-
portant research area. As further elaborated in chapter two, the party change literature
suffers from a problem of complex causality: the same cause, changes in the external envi-
ronment, can lead to a variety of outcomes in the category of party change. Distinguishing
between them is important especially where electoral shocks are concerned, since party
systems in Western Europe have grown increasingly unstable in recent elections.1 The
theoretical ambition of this dissertation, therefore, has been to develop and empirically
examine a new heuristic model as a starting point for building a new theoretical model
of shocks and change.
In chapter two of this dissertation, a survey of the state of the art in the literature led
to the conclusion that development of the theory on shock-induced change had stalled
and would benefit from a new approach. The chapter signalled two major problems: the
existing model of Harmel and Janda was being overstretched because it was being used
to examine the presence or absence of certain kinds of changes, which it was not designed
for.2 The second was that the literature acted implicitly on a conception of change which
was unidirectional, the one direction moving away from the party’s origins. This led to
puzzles in which certain kinds of changes were expected but not found on the basis of the
theory, demonstrating its limitations.3
Chapter three set out the terms of a new tentative model, which departs from what
the shocks literature had successfully demonstrated: that an external shock, by and large,
caused parties to change.4 Electoral shocks were chosen as the focus since they provided
the broadest possible “population” for the study by working on parties with all kinds of
goals, thus averting the need to “call” a party’s primary goal. The point of departure for
our model, inspired by works on campaign strategy, is that once electoral potential has
been durably compromised in a significant way, parties roughly have two paths available
1. V. Emmanuele and A. Chiaramonte, “Party system volatility, regeneration and de-
institutionalization in Western Europe (1945-2015),” Party Politics 23, no. 4 (2017): 382-384.
2. R. Harmel and K. Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 259–287.
3. F. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’: External Shocks, Party Change and the
Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats During ‘Purple Hague’, 1994-8,” Party Politics 13, no. 1
(2007): 84.
4. Although of course, the theoretical possibility that change would not occur should have been con-
sidered, and this was the focus of the discussion of the whether-stage. See chapter 3.
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to them.5 One is to appeal to their core voters (the reinforcement strategy), the other
(the extension strategy) is to reach out to non-core voters. These strategies are associated
with kinds of changes in the field of electoral tactics, party organisation, programme and
ideology. Since an electoral shock initiates a critical juncture in which there is increased
scope for change, these changes consist of more fundamental and far-reaching changes
than those made in a “normal” electoral strategy.6 Roughly speaking, the reinforcement
strategy represents change towards the party’s roots, since this would appeal to those
who had previously voted for the party. The extension strategy represents the hitherto
prevailing understanding of change away from the party’s roots and origins.
In specifying the causal mechanisms described by our model, a historical institutionalist
approach was chosen, building mostly upon the critical juncture framework as developed
by Collier and Collier and Capoccia and Kelemen.7 The general mechanism of production
by which parties will opt for (elements of) either strategy unfolds in two stages. At
the initial stage, preferences are formed based on the party’s internal characteristics as
institutions, developed over the course of their history. This is expressed in a first set of
two factors: electoral base attachment and ideological attachment.
Electoral base attachment in the form of formal or informal institutional rules drives the
party towards the reinforcement strategy, while lack of it points to an extension strategy.
This is a function of path-dependency as well as electoral arithmetic: the party’s history
increases the costs of changing away from its past trajectory. A similar argument was
presented for ideological attachment. Since parties can be to a lesser or greater extent
attached to their ideology, it follows that parties with a higher degree of ideological attach-
ment also have higher costs changing away from their past ideological commitments and
practices derived from them. This means the reinforcement strategy will be the preferred
strategy of parties more strongly attached to ideology, while the extension strategy will
be more likely to be adopted by a party that is more weakly attached. The second set of
factors proposed were external influences, which might make either strategy less viable by
imposing constraints on the preferences based on the party’s institutional characteristics.
In particular, majoritarian electoral systems were proposed to push parties towards an
extension strategy.
Our model was assessed empirically by means of a comparative research design con-
sisting of four empirical cases of parties suffering an electoral shock: the Dutch Christian
Democratic Appeal (CDA) between 1994 and 2002, the British Labour Party between
1983 and 1992, the Dutch Democrats 66 (D66) between 1982 and 1989, and finally the
British Liberal Party between 1970 and 1974. Using within-case evidence and between-
case comparison as evidence, the model was subjected to a first empirical assessment in
5. J. J. M. Van Holsteyn and G. A. Irwin, “CDA, naar voren! Over de veranderende verkiezingsstrategie
van het CDA,” in Jaarboek 1987, ed. R. A. Koole (Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke
Partijen, 1988), 69-70; R. Rohrschneider, “Mobilizing versus chasing: how do parties target voters in
election campaigns?,” Electoral Studies 21, no. 3 (2002): 368.
6. See G. Capoccia and R.D. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and Coun-
terfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 348.
7. R. Berins Collier and D. Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement
and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Capoccia and
Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures.”
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chapters five through nine. Following the synthesis of data from all four cases in chapter
nine, there are two areas in which the model shows promise. The first is its description of
the initial formation of preferences through the impact of the internal characteristics of
the party as an institution. While the picture is still cloudy, it is plausible that electoral
base attachment has a strong effect, while the role of ideology is limited to programmatic
change. The second is in the way the FPTP electoral system appears to have constrained
the actions of the parties in the two British cases, showing a strong influence of the
electoral mechanics on the actions of parties.
On the other hand, even in those two areas, the complexity of the causal mechanism
still poses puzzles. A major example is the way in which all dimensions except the tactical
dimension conform to expectations under proposition 5 (differentiated effect), while this
dimension should have the clearest relationship to electoral base attachment on the basis
of the theory. This will undoubtedly require further elaboration of the model in future
studies. This overall conclusion forms the point of departure for the concluding argument
and discussion presented in this final chapter of this dissertation.
The rest of this conclusion and discussion will unfold as follows. In section 10.2.1 below,
the question of what the model has taught us about parties under pressure is addressed.
In section 10.2.2, focus shifts to the contribution to the debate on party change and party
shocks in general. Finally, section 10.2.3 presents a number of suggestions for future
research building on the conclusions and contribution of this dissertation.
10.2 Conclusion and discussion
10.2.1 What have we learned?
Having summarised the argument so far, it is now possible to state in more general terms
what can be learned from this research. First of all, let us consider the first part of
the research question: how do political parties react to an external shock in the form of
heavy electoral defeat? Up until now, the state of the debate was that the answer must
be “change”. However, the sheer diversity of the response in even the limited amount of
cases studied in this dissertation has shown that this is too simple. The answer, then,
must be qualified and extended: political parties respond to an electoral shock not just
through ‘change’ in general, but through a wide variety of different changes to their tactics,
organisation, programme and personal composition.
The breadth of diversity of changes across the cases studied cannot be emphasised
enough. While some parties changed in the conventional direction assumed by much of
the literature, taking the extension strategy and looking towards newer policy issues, or-
ganisational innovations such as external democratisation, a broader electoral base and/or
a more diverse slate of candidates, there were others that changed in the opposite direc-
tion, empowering their members and playing more to their old loyalties in terms of base
and traditional issues. This challenges the one-dimensional nature of party change as an
event that occurs when anything about the party is changed from its past nature. In fact,
party change has been shown to be a more multi-facetted phenomenon that does not just
unfold in multiple areas within the party, but also unfolds in multiple different ways.
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In this way, this study has shown that the causal link observed in most of the literature
between an external shock and party change is too simple as a representation of what
happens to a party after a shock. Rather, it has been demonstrated that underlying this
general causal link observed between an external shock like a heavy electoral defeat and
party change, there is a causal process determining how a party can change in different
ways that is just as relevant as the link itself. It is this causal process that must be studied
to distinguish between the multiple forms party change can take and the various ways
parties can arrive at those changes.
In fact, there is such a great diversity within the broader category of party change
that the concept of the reinforcement and extension strategies, used in a solely aggregate
way, cannot fully describe the various configurations of party change arising as a result
of an electoral shock. Given the variance encountered in just four cases, it is unlikely
that any general unified conceptualisation of some sort of strategy could have done this.
In fact, the question is whether this would be necessary: propositions 5a through 5c,
which assigned different effects to various internal factors on various parts of the recovery
strategy, were considerably more successful in accounting for the complexity and variety
in party’s reactions to heavy defeat than the ones presupposing a unified effect, although
the puzzling deviation of the tactical dimension and the rejection of proposition 5b have
to be noted here as well.
A key purpose of the reinforcement-extension distinction was to solve the problem in
the literature that change in the direction of a party’s origins was sometimes mistaken
for continuity. By and large, this distinction has largely managed to solve this prob-
lem. This is visible especially in the case of the CDA, the subject of the earlier case
study by Duncan which figured prominently in the literature review.8 The observation
made there that there was no change in the programmatic area looks to be the result
of a one-dimensional understanding of change. Where Duncan’s study could not explain
using the existing models why the CDA supposedly maintained programmatic continuity
during the 1994-2002 crisis years, the model as applied in chapter five, by allowing for an
interpretation that sees the Policy Review as change, manages to provide an explanation
for both the organisational changes and the Policy Review by reference to ideological
attachment and electoral base attachment. This advantage was also shown in the case of
D66, where the adoption of a commitment to referenda actually showed a deepening of
the party’s commitments to direct democracy that capped off a reinforcement strategy
on the programmatic dimension.
There are still problems with the reinforcement-extension distinction. It makes the
assumption that parties think of electoral outcomes with every step of their recovery
strategy, since all actions of a party are interpreted based on their intended impact on
the composition of the party’s support base. In fact, though parties occasionally gave
electoral reasons for moves in the organisational and programmatic fields, they rarely did
so with very explicit reference to certain groups. Where they do so, it can be interpreted
as the strongest evidence of electoral calculations on decision-making, as in the case of
Labour’s references to winning over voters who never voted for the party. However, as a
reflection on the basic premise of the two strategies, this does raise the question whether
8. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’.”
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they actually represent a choice between former supporters and new supporters or signify
something broader.
Therefore, while the reinforcement-extension distinction served very well as a heuristic
tool and a frame of reference as well as a first step in theorising about the specific actions
of parties, perhaps what it represents is better seen as broader than the labels themselves.
Originally conceived as a strategy premised on core voters, the reinforcement strategy has
also proven a strategy of playing to the party’s presumed historic strengths – and resulted
in change towards a party’s roots. The extension strategy, which was conceptualised by
thinking about the kinds of actions that might make a party more appealing to non-core
voters, has also been shown as a strategy marked by diversifying the party’s repertoire –
and resulted therefore in the typical change away from a party’s roots. This conception of
the two strategies complements the original conceptualisation in a way that strengthens
the model.
Having concluded the discussion of the first part of the research question, the discussion
will now turn towards the second part. Why do some parties choose one path to recovery
and others another? The answer given by our model is that this is due to a combination
of preferences formed as a result of institutional loyalties to the party’s base and ideology
and constraints imposed by the external environment, particularly the electoral system.
This answer appeared to be reasonably accurate, but must perhaps be subjected to one
change: which path a party under pressure chooses from among the variety of options
available is due to a variety of internal and external factors.
In general, it can be concluded that our model has performed reasonably well in ex-
plaining the choices made by parties in light of the internal institutional inclinations of
parties and considerations arising from the constraints of the external environment. It
is significant that it has performed less well where it overestimated the unified nature
of various influences on the actions of parties in crisis. This culminated in a confusing
picture trying to compare the outcomes to each other in light of the various configurations
of variables, particularly internal factors, under study.
In the four cases studied, our model performs reasonably well in modelling the effects
of electoral systems. Going on the evidence from the cases of the Labour Party and the
Liberal Party, there remains no doubt that the majoritarian logic of the FPTP electoral
system with its districts that make it very important who exactly votes for you was
a prominent consideration. In essence, this provides new evidence for the centripetal
tendency predicted among others by Downs and in a different form by Kirchheimer’s catch-
all thesis.9 Some of the strongest individual pieces of evidence linking certain influences to
concrete parts of the recovery strategy were found zooming in on Labour’s Policy Review,
which was very much informed by the need to perform better in the South and in marginal
constituencies.
There is still some ambiguity on the impact of the PR system. While both Dutch
parties ended on a reinforcement strategy as predicted, they also started off with one.
9. A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 184; O. Kirch-
heimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in Political Parties and Political
Development, ed. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177–
201.
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This means we were not able to gauge whether this is due to internal or external factors.
The lack of concrete evidence of any considerations by decision-makers of the electoral
system in choosing which voters to appeal to, which did appear in both FPTP cases,
presents a difficulty. However, there is some very limited evidence in the form of the
return of Van Mierlo which, in the first electoral cycle between 1982 and 1986, swung D66
around from an early extension to a reinforcement strategy. Since this was motivated
in part by the lack of improvement in the opinion polls, there seems to have been some
electoral motivation. It is not, however, linked strongly enough to the PR system itself
to infer a causal effect from it.
In examining the causal mechanisms, however, a few characteristics of the model find
some support in the empirical observations. First of all, in all four cases, where the elec-
toral system impacted, it did so in a relatively uniform manner, across all four dimensions.
Second, and more importantly, in all cases the impact of external environments appears
to occur largely in line with rational strategic calculations by party decision-makers in-
volving conscious considerations of the extent of a party’s appeal and the votes needed to
gain a good electoral result. This can be seen in the CDA and D66 cases with the detailed
observations of Gardeniers and Van den Bos, in the Liberal case with the reports from
various regions, and in the Labour case in the conscious reflection on the need to win
over those who had not previously voted for Labour. In many of the cases, there appears
to have been detailed empirical evidence on which to base these considerations. This
confirms one theoretical premise of the model: that the external environment impacts as
an opportunity structure, making for a much more rational and strategic reconsideration
of the strategy a party should pursue.
It appears that the general assumption of the model that parties retain a measure of
path-dependency was correct as well, despite the complex picture arising from the consid-
eration of the impact of internal factors. Whether in the form of electoral base attachment
or ideological attachment, a party’s past commitments have been shown to matter in the
minds of party decision-makers. In all four cases, it initially was the electoral base at-
tachment and ideological baggage of a party that pushed it in an initial direction. Indeed,
these variables proved better at explaining party’s recovery strategies than a simple func-
tionalist rival explanation that assumed that parties would tailor their strategies to win
back the votes they lost. The presence of information known to the four parties that
made their strategies less advisable further shows the strength of this tendency. In the
Labour case, for instance, even in the face of studies suggesting the problems with using
employment as an issue, the party persisted, because that was ultimately what they per-
ceived their party to be about. In this way, parties show themselves to be path-dependent
institutions in optima forma: as the theory stipulated, their actions are informed even
after an external shock by structures infused with value that have developed over time. In
line with historical institutionalist perspectives, a party is shown to be path-dependent:
its past choices at certain critical junctures shape its choices in crisis.
It is unfortunately true that our model offered no way to explain why certain internal
factors impacted more than others in certain cases. However, this is in part due to the
limits of theory-building: it would require an impossibly detailed theory to model all
the various influences towards various specific outcomes. As this dissertation is the first
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tentative attempt at such a model, this was perhaps simply beyond its scope. There is
little doubt that on balance, electoral base attachment and ideological attachment, or
commitments related to them, led to pressures towards either strategy as expected. It
has not, however, been proven that the same variable played the deciding role every time.
Even disentangling the various dimensions and examining whether different independent
variables impact on different dimensions did not entirely mitigate this problem. The
conclusions ultimately lined up on the programmatic and organisational dimension, which
is a promising result. However, there remains the vexing matter of the most obvious
suspect, a link between base attachment and the tactical dimension, not materialising at
all. There is a possibility of mitigating this by weighing in external factors and stating
that parties anticipate the effects of electoral systems when operating on this dimension.
In fact, evidence in the Labour and CDA cases points towards the fact that evidence of
the external environment was part of the judgments that led to particular actions on the
tactical dimension.
Various parties also seem to weigh the different internal factors differently. For D66,
the ideological attachment to being non-dogmatic was a main driving factor towards
the reinforcement strategy they pursued on balance. For Labour and the CDA, it was
a mix of both, where ultimately base attachment lined up with ideological attachment,
making no difference. For the Liberals, the low degree of base attachment led to extension
strategies on the tactical and organisational dimensions and a reinforcement strategy
on the programmatic dimension. In the individual chapters, we had to resort to the
idiosyncrasies of each party to explain this, such as D66’s programmatic basis or the
unique links of Labour to the trade unions. However, as the reader might be well aware,
idiosyncrasies alone by nature do not suffice for a comparative conclusion that is more
generally applicable.
One wonders if there might not be an opportunity for party goals to re-enter the equa-
tion. Providing a rigorous way is found to make a reliable a priori call on the importance
of these goals, the concept of party goals could potentially be brought back in to explain
the different impacts base attachment and ideological attachment have in different par-
ties. To use the example of the D66 case: its goal would be policy (as it is based on its
programme). Therefore, as policy is its overriding goal, ideological attachment becomes
more important. This would have to be incorporated in a restatement of our model.
What, in conclusion, has this dissertation taught us about parties in crisis, and to what
extent? From the first evidence, the main theoretical links involved in our model seem
reasonably valid. There definitely seems to be an impact of electoral base attachment and
ideological attachment on a party’s initial strategy, and it broadly goes in the predicted
direction. However, our model has run into the problem of complex causality. It did not
succeed in clearly disentangling the impact of the various variables from each other, and
therefore still cannot explain the presence or absence of individual concrete changes fully.
The same applies to the effect of electoral systems, although it has been more successful
here. The British cases reveal a tendency of parties operating under FPTP to adopt
the extension strategy, pressured by a system which weighs votes differently. However,
there is too little evidence to conclude whether the opposite of a FPTP system, the PR
system, has a similar effect in the direction of the reinforcement strategy. If we can
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in fact extrapolate these tentative conclusions to parties in general, this has interesting
societal implications for the way parties and party systems could develop in the future.
Going purely on internal characteristics, electoral volatility would create a sort of self-
reinforcing effect where strong attachments to electoral base and ideology get stronger
and weak attachments get weaker. This sheds an interesting light on the fragmentation
of Western party systems, since it implies that parties will get increasingly "specialised".
This study, therefore, has been reasonably successful in what it set out to do, in both
ways inherent in the research question. It has demonstrated that party change occurs
in a variety of different forms in different cases. It has also provided a heuristic tool for
thinking about the choices parties make when put under pressure, showing that the nature
of parties as institutions is a defining influence from the very start. With the caveats
expressed above about the extension and reinforcement strategies taken into account, it
has provided some basis for further analysis of individual changes made by parties, and
pointed in the direction of possible explanations. Further research is required, both on
internal and external variables, and incorporating more cases, to further refine it so that
it can help reliably interpret what is clearly an increasingly frequent phenomenon: parties
suffering from heavy electoral defeats.
10.2.2 Contribution to the debate
Having established this answer to the research question, let us now turn to the significance
of these findings to various debates in the literature on political parties. It has already been
noted above that the apparent importance of internal characteristics of parties matches to
a large extent the characteristics of a historical institutionalist approach.10 This has, in
fact, been the dominant narrative in the shocks literature, which has always seen parties
as being resistant to change.11 In this sense, this dissertation has extended the observation
that party change is not something that just happens or must happen.12 Even when party
change happens, it is still shaped by the same patterns of institutional behaviour that
also constitute a party’s resistance to change. And even when that party change moves
away from a party’s roots, as in the case of New Labour, these institutional inclinations
are still taken into account, as when the importance of trade unions to Labour got a new
meaning when the old block vote system was abandoned for direct voting by affiliated
members of trade unions.
In its relationship to the shocks literature, this dissertation had two explicit goals: 1)
build a heuristic model as a starting point for building a full theoretical model which
could contribute to explaining why certain changes originate from shocks and others do
not, and 2) build a model which helps to account for change that essentially returns to
a party’s roots. Both had been shortcomings of the literature, as has been observed in
10. S. D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 1
(1988): 66–94; P. Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” American
Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–267; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena.
11. A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, trans. from the Italian by M. Silver
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1982]); Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of
Party Goals and Party Change.”
12. Ibid., 261.
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chapter two. In the first goal, much work still has to be done. Our model, by and large,
offers a basis for taking this agenda further. In particular, it has contributed towards both
its goals through its institutionalist approach through the influence given to past events
and loyalties. In relation to the first goal, it has been shown that through the role played
by electoral base attachment and ideological attachment, party choices made in crisis are
path-dependent, which explains to a large extent the variety of change encountered in
the four cases. As regards the second, the study has found that most cases started off on
an old and familiar path, which in most cases amounted to a reinforcement strategy, or
change towards the party’s roots. It is true that it could not account for all the observed
changes. As has been argued above, however, this is now a matter of improving the model
using the evidence generated by its use as a heuristic device rather than starting one from
scratch once again. It has definitely succeeded at the second goal, as showcased in chapter
five by improving on the account of Duncan in the CDA case.13
More generally in relation to the “shocks literature”, this dissertation returns a promi-
nent role to internal characteristics of the party. Previously, the literature had presumed
that the changes that resulted from an external shock were the result of a change in the
dominant coalition governing a party after the external shock had discredited the original
dominant coalition or of a dominant coalition addressing threats to the party goals.14 In
both understandings of change, party characteristics figured in the form of party goals
only in the chain of events leading up to change and determining the likelihood and ex-
tent of change, since the concept of goal-oriented change was not very well-developed.15
It can be easily seen in light of this entire research project how this leads to the problem
encountered by Duncan in the form of the absence of programmatic change as he saw it.16
By building a model around the institutional characteristics of a party and showing
it has a reasonable degree empirical validity, our model has in effect shed new light on
the impact of these characteristics beyond the decision to change. The interplay between
internal factors and the external shock that has marked the theory since Panebianco’s
observations on exogenous or endogenous change has been given a new expression in this
way.17 The prominence of previous patterns of behaviour does not stop after a party has
suffered a shock; rather, these patterns are reinterpreted and given new expression. The
occurrence of an external shock does not make external circumstances and rational vote-
seeking considerations dominant all of a sudden, even though in some cases their effect
was noticeably strong. An electoral shock does not necessarily produce an electoralist
logic that trumps the party’s institutional identity, as has been seen in the case of the
CDA persevering in its more traditional approach to the crisis even after the 1998 electoral
defeat. Rather, a party turns introspective in a crisis, being confronted with the question
what exactly it is and who it is for.
This is shown even in the case of New Labour, which is usually understood as a triumph
13. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’.”
14. Panebianco, Political Parties, 244; Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and
Party Change,” 278-279.
15. Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278-279.
16. Duncan, “‘Lately, Things Just Don’t Seem the Same’,” 83.
17. Panebianco, Political Parties, 242.
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of electoralist logic owing to the deep crisis the Labour Party was in.18 The case study
in this dissertation does show the importance of electoral considerations to the birth of
New Labour, but it also shows that progress was incremental, amounting to a continuous
balancing act between the party’s conception of what it was and who it was for and the
constraints imposed upon it by the electoral system in light of changing demographics.
This was in part due to power dynamics, as the factional battles between the leadership
and the influential hard left of the party signify. It was also due to the fact that having
been forced to reconsider its essentials, the party was also forced to come to terms with
its own past.
If the “shocks literature” is to progress towards a deeper understanding of why parties
change in the way they do, it seems it has to shift the balance from seeing parties as
organisations shaped by internal power dynamics and the pursuit of their goals to insti-
tutions shaped by their past choices and identities as well as these power dynamics and
goals. Power dynamics and threats to primary goals might be enough to explain the oc-
currence of change and the overcoming of resistance to change per se. A path-dependent
understanding based on institutional characteristics shaped by a party’s history, however,
shows promise when it comes to explaining the specifics of change. This is because it
extends the understanding of resistance to change to the kinds of changes implemented.
A party under pressure is not just in a struggle for power or a quest for its primary goals.
It is also continuously in a conversation with its own past, perhaps even more so than
during normal competition. It is in this conversation, it appears, that the changes that
result from these crises are shaped.
Interestingly, this concept of a balancing act between internal and external pressures
is not new to the literature on political parties. Though it does not figure in the party
shocks literature as such, it has appeared in various forms in other parts of the literature.
Rose and Mackie used it to model the performance of parties and particularly their failure
as a function of their success in negotiating this trade-off.19 The necessity of negotiating
these pressures for parties looking to survive also found expression in Bolleyer’s structure-
leadership dilemma, describing the challenges facing new parties in terms of a trade-off
between the demands of developing an internal structure and the leadership’s importance
in maintaining electoral performance.20 In both instances, there is a clear link to party
survival. That the concept of a trade-off resurfaces from the conclusions of this study
on parties under electoral pressure is therefore not entirely surprising. Neither should
it be a surprise that the strategies observed in this study, even when leaning in the
direction of one strategy, often also contained elements of the opposite strategy. Perhaps
the same arguments can be made for parties after electoral shocks as for new parties,
which potentially allows us to extend the argument to the reasons why parties survive
these shocks.
18. R. Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2001), 174, doi:10.1057/9780230598430.
19. R. Rose and T. T. Mackie, “Do parties persist or fail? The big trade-off facing organizations,”
in When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations, ed. K. Lawson and P. Merkl (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 534.
20. N. Bolleyer, New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 52.
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Moving on from the shocks literature, the importance of the external environment and
the structure of electoral competition also makes a link with the “gradual party change”
literature and particularly the party types literature. This started with Duverger who
linked the rise of the (socialist) mass party to universal suffrage.21 Kirchheimer stipulated
that parties changed (among others) to accommodate overall changes in the structure of
electoral competition in his catch-all thesis.22 He was followed by Katz and Mair in their
cartel thesis.23 Looking at Kirchheimer’s argument, the shedding of ideological baggage
by parties to appeal to a broader public has obvious parallels to the extension strategy.
In a way, the conclusions of this research project can be used to shed a new light on
the longstanding debates on party types. Koole observed that the debate had become
mired in an unfruitful dominant party type versus exceptions narrative.24 By linking up
the idea that party change does not just happen from the “shocks literature” with the
idea of responses to the environment, this research project allows us also to comment on
the conclusions of the party types literature. The fact, for instance, that parties did not
uniformly respond to a shrinking electorate by adopting a broader appeal – some pursuing
the reinforcement strategy even though they were aware of the demographic challenges -
sheds an interesting light on the catch-all party thesis. If parties are resistant to change, it
is evidently the crises that drive home the need to change to respond to the environment.
Now it has been shown that even some parties noted to be catch-all in orientation, such
as D66 , responded to a crisis in a decidedly non-catch-all way.
This is merely to illustrate the benefits case studies like the ones in this dissertation can
have on the debate in the gradual side of the literature. In focusing on the broader macro-
level patterns, the literature may avoid the problems with deciding what is and what is
not change,25 but it locks itself into a deterministic pattern that postulates one party type
as a dominant form. By looking at parties after an external shock, they can potentially be
made to act like test cases that lead to a more sophisticated understanding of party types.
In other words: in the future, looking at shocks might point towards reasons why some
parties do not conform to the supposed dominant type, leading to a deeper understanding
of how parties evolve over time. The occurrence of shocks provide case studies by which
the individual characteristics and contexts of parties can be described and linked to party
change. Potentially, reintegrating the concept of shock into the more extensive gradual
party change literature in this way could help a more sophisticated understanding of the
evolution of party types.
21. M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. from
the French by B. North and R. North (London: Methuen, 1954 [1951]), 66.
22. O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in Political Parties and
Political Development, ed. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966),
190.
23. R. S. Katz and P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emer-
gence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 13-14.
24. R. A. Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party,” Party
Politics 2, no. 4 (1996): 520.
25. As formulated in P. Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997), 49.
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10.2.3 Avenues for future research
In the previous section, several contributions to the party change literature have been
described. First of all, our model has gone beyond the existing theories in the “shock
literature” to attempt to explain the specific forms party change can take, and has done
so with mixed success. Secondly, also related to the “party shocks” literature, it has
introduced a neo-institutionalist perspective to what happens after a shock, in which the
party is not just in a power struggle but continues to be shaped by its characteristics as
an institution. Thirdly, it presents a case for integrating the concept of shock into the
“party types literature”, as it allows for a use of focused case studies.
This opens up various avenues for future research. First of all, the model must be
refined in order to deal with the problem of varying effects of internal factors like electoral
base attachment or ideology that has been described above. Admittedly, it is going to
be hard to build a model which accounts for all possible variations, but there is still
meaningful progress to be made towards a model that can account for most of them,
without making the model more complex than it already is. Future research needs to focus
first and foremost on disentangling the various effects of base attachment and ideological
attachment from each other. As has been noted, the introduction of party goals into the
model might be a good option for further development. By differentiating among the
various goals parties can have, it might become possible to model the different impacts
of the various internal factors more accurately. The individual agency of leaders such as
Kinnock in the Labour case and Van Mierlo in the D66 case might also be subjected to
further study and integrated further into the model.
In general, the refinement of the model should go hand in hand with testing the theory
in a broader array of cases. It is probably too early for a large-N approach, but adding
further electoral systems to the model (or indeed an extra FPTP case to attempt to find
further support for the conclusion about its strong impact) can help shed light on the
way the conclusion about the effect of the FPTP is to be read. In addition, such an
approach potentially increases the certainty with which we can say the conclusions can be
generalised – and will therefore only strengthen the model and provide further material
for refinement. In this context, the field of inquiry should also be extended to other
regions than Western Europe, since there is nothing in the theory underlying our model
that cannot be applied to other parts of the world - especially since figure 1.1 suggested
that the heavy defeats that have been the subject of this study appear to be a structural
feature of politics in many Eastern European democracies.
Once this is done, various avenues are truly open. As has been mentioned, one potential
use of the model would be in a case study to shed light on the development of party types.
Looking for cases around the time parties presumably developed into catch-all or cartel
parties, the approach used in this dissertation could be modified to examine the way in
which parties did or did not develop in the direction of the presumed dominant party
type at critical junctures in their existence. In doing so, it could help clear up whether a
dominant party type actually exists and help develop the typology of political parties.
Ultimately, a well-developed model might be able to branch out into the debate on
the success and failure of parties as well, asking the question why some parties brave
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a crisis while others diminish or fail. To do so requires the researcher to negotiate a
methodological minefield, since it would require a combination of research on electoral
behaviour as well as party behaviour. In effect, it would require researchers to ask voters
what certain reforms meant for them. This is difficult to study, but using a well-developed
typology like the extension and reinforcement strategies and a model of party behaviour,
the link could potentially be made.
All in all, however, the aim of this study has been to try to resolve an apparent impasse
in the development of theory on party behaviour following a shock, and it is here that it
might hope for its most lasting contribution to future research. Electoral shocks certainly
are not the only type of shocks that cause parties to change, as Harmel et al. observed.26
It is to be hoped that the way of thinking applied to this study of electoral shocks can be
applied to other types of shocks as well, such as dramatic failure to get into a coalition
or intense internal strife. This would first and foremost require a clear typology of shocks
that allows the research to get concrete, after which much the same avenue can be followed
for different kinds of shocks as the one followed in the construction of the theory in this
dissertation.
To use the shock of dramatic failure to get into a governing coalition, for example,
which would be an “office shock”, one might formulate versions of the extension and
reinforcement strategies that focus on traditional and new partners. By using the same
approach in which internal factors are constrained by external factors, propositions could
then be constructed about the impact of both. It would be truly interesting to see if
responses to other shocks follow a logic similar to responses to electoral shocks. In effect,
this would be a logical theoretical implication of the conclusions presented here, since it
has been argued above that what underlies the choices made by parties in crisis is their
nature as path-dependent institutions. It would be a challenge to that conclusion if this
were found not to apply when parties were put under pressure in a different way.
The circumstances of the political game that parties play are changing. To return to the
observation with which the introduction in chapter one started: any scholar of political
parties after a shock is likely to be confronted at any social or scholarly gathering with
different examples of parties under pressure. The social relevance of the field is increasing,
and understanding how parties react when put under pressure is essential to understanding
the way in which they work and in which they will develop in the future in the exercise
of their important figures. As Mair observed, parties have stayed around because of a
remarkable capacity for adaptation.27 As partisan dealignment continues and the structure
of democratic competition changes, so parties will continue to change. As the book is
closed on this study, it is to be hoped that it has stimulated a new way to approach this
development, and a new approach as to how political parties will change in the future.
26. R. Harmel et al., “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis,”
West European Politics 18, no. 1 (1995): 3.
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Partijen onder druk: verklaringen voor de keuzes van
partijen na een zware verkiezingsnederlaag
Het feit dat partijen onder druk staan is geen nieuw thema in de studie van politieke
partijen. Al sinds de jaren 1980 is er een levendig debat gaande in de literatuur over de
vraag of de politieke partij als vorm van organisatie in crisis verkeert. De uitdagingen
voor politieke partijen worden er niet minder op als gevolg van een toenemende electorale
volatiliteit, afnemende ledenaantallen en de opkomst van concurrenten die zeggen tegen
het "oude" politieke systeem te zijn. Deze uitdagingen zijn niet nieuw, maar nemen wel
in aantal toe. En toch bestaan politieke partijen nog steeds. Volgens politicologen als
Peter Mair is dit het gevolg van hun capaciteit om te veranderen. Deze capaciteit om zich
aan te passen aan veranderende omstandigheden, specifiek wanneer deze zich uiten als
een plotselinge schok, is het onderwerp van deze dissertatie. Anderzijds ziet de literatuur
politeke partijen veelal als instituties die als doel hebben om zichzelf in stand te houden.
Hierdoor wordt het verklaren van verandering een vraag op zichzelf.
De literatuur pakt het vraagstuk van deze partijverandering op verschillende manieren
aan. Enerzijds is er de literatuur die onderzoek doet naar geleidelijke partijverande-
ring, anderzijds literatuur die partijverandering ziet als gevolg van externe schokken. Dit
proefschrift plaatst zich nadrukkelijk in het laatstgenoemde genre, omdat deze aanpak
als voordeel heeft dat zowel de oorzaak van de verandering als de verandering zelf dui-
delijk afgebakend zijn. Toch beoogt het een probleem dat in beide genres voorkomt op
te lossen, namelijk het probleem van de "zwarte doos". Het is inmiddels vrij duidelijk
dat veranderingen in de omgeving tot partijverandering leiden, maar welke vorm deze
veranderingen aannemen is minder duidelijk. Dat dit problematisch is blijkt uit het feit
dat op grond van de literatuur al te vaak verwacht werd dat een bepaalde verandering
zich universeel door zou zetten, terwijl dit empirisch nog maar zeer de vraag is. Er is nog
weinig systematisch onderzoek geweest naar de verschillende vormen die deze verandering
kan aannemen. De onderzoeksvraag die dit proefschrift beoogt te beantwoorden is dan
ook tweeledig: hoe reageren politieke partijen op een externe schok in de vorm van een
zware verkiezingsnederlaag, en waarom reageren verschillende partijen op verschillende
manieren?
Het onderzoek naar partijverandering laat zich ruwweg in twee genres uitsplitsen: de
een ziet partijverandering als iets geleidelijks, de ander als het gevolg van plotselinge en
heftige "externe schokken". Beide zien echter externe factoren als deel van de oorzaak
van partijverandering. Dit is niet vreemd als men zich bedenkt dat partijen in wezen
instituties zijn - organisaties die met waarde geladen zijn en waarvan als zodanig het
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voortbestaan een prioriteit op zichzelf wordt. Een kenmerk van instituties is dat ze juist
een zekere weerstand hebben tegen verandering. Dit maakt het moeilijk verandering te
verklaren zonder een externe factor (mede) als oorzaak aan te wijzen. Dit proefschrift
volgt deze zienswijze. Het bouwt specifiek voort op het historisch neo-institutionalisme.
Het genre van de geleidelijke partijverandering kenmerkt zich veelal door het concept
van partijtypes die elkaar opvolgen als gevolg van ontwikkelingen in de samenleving. Hier-
bij was met name Duverger zeer invloedrijk. In zijn klassieker Les Partis Politiques (1951)
stelt hij dat de oude kaderpartijen van notabelen na de invoering van het algemeen kies-
recht concurrentie kregen van de van onderop georganiseerde massapartijen. Volgens
Duverger had dit type een aantal voordelen ten opzichte van de kaderpartij en zou dit
de oudere partijen dwingen zich eraan aan te passen. Dit concept van partijtypes vinden
we ook terug bij Kirchheimer (1966), die betoogde dat de oude massapartijen op hun
beurt veranderden in zogenaamde catch-all partijen met minder ideologische baggage en
een grotere potentiële achterban, en bij Katz en Mair (1995), die in de jaren negentig de
ontwikkeling van een kartelpartij meenden te bespeuren die onder andere partijfinancie-
ringswetten inzette om de concurrentie te beperken. Al deze bijdrages hebben gemeen
dat er veelal uit werd afgeleid dat het nieuwe partijtype ook dominant zou worden, maar
dit was altijd discutabel. Men kan daarom spreken van een probleem van complexe cau-
saliteit: er is te weinig aandacht voor de vraag waarom een bepaalde groep partijen zich
in de ene richting ontwikkelt en een andere in de andere. Hiervoor is een focus op het
individuele partijniveau noodzakelijk.
Deze individuele focus vinden we meer in het andere genre, dat zich richt op externe
schokken. De Italiaanse politicoloog Panebianco (1988 [1982]) is een eerste belangrijke
auteur in dit genre. Hij betoogt onder andere dat partijverandering zowel uit interne als
uit externe oorzaken voortkomt: wanneer een schok de bestaande partij-elite in diskrediet
brengt, komt er een nieuwe dominante coalitie op die de organisatie verandert. Dit is een
machtgebaseerd perspectief. Harmel en Janda (1994) voegen daar nog een doelgebaseerd
perspectief aan toe: als het zogenaamde primaire doel (stemmen, politieke ambten, beleid
of het maximeren van interne democratie) van een politieke partij in gevaar is zal er
ook verandering optreden. Hoewel Harmel en Janda in samenwerking met anderen hun
theorie ook kwantitatief hebben geprobeerd te toetsen, is het merendeel van de studies
die het model van Harmel en Janda gebruiken kwalitatief van aard in de vorm van case
studies naar individuele politieke partijen. Deze gevalstudies verschillen zeer van elkaar in
onderwerp en reikwijdte. Sommige auteurs verklaren alleen het optreden van verandering,
anderen een specifiek fenomeen zoals het ontstaan van de Conservative Partij van Canada
uit twee rechtse partijen. Dit is belangrijk omdat er problemen optreden zodra er specifiek
geprobeerd wordt te verklaren waarom bepaalde veranderingen wel en vooral ook niet
optreden. Dit is onder andere het geval in een gevalstudie van Duncan (2007) naar het
Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA), waarin hij verrast wordt door de afwezigheid van
programmatische verandering nadat het bestuurlijk georiënteerde CDA de macht verloor
in 1994. Het model van Harmel en Janda is invloedrijk: het blijkt goed te presteren als
het gaat om het verklaren van partijverandering. Gevallen zoals die van het CDA laten
echter zien dat het model te veel wordt opgerekt: het is niet gemaakt op het verklaren van
de aanwezigheid of afwezigheid van bepaalde veranderingen. Dit is opnieuw een probleem
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van complexiteit: we weten inmiddels dat partijen veranderen na een schok, maar zijn
nog onvoldoende in staat om te verklaren waarom dit verschillende vormen aanneemt.
Het doel van deze dissertatie is dan ook een nieuw model van partijverandering na een
schok te ontwikkelen dat wel de afwezigheid of aanwezigheid van bepaalde veranderingen
kan duiden. Dit tentatieve model wordt in hoofdstuk 3 gepresenteerd en maakt gebruik
van begrippen uit het historisch neo-institutionalisme. Electorale schokken veroorzaken
een critical juncture volgens de definitie van Capoccia en Kelemen: een relatief korte peri-
ode (ten opzichte van periodes van padafhankelijkheid waarin de partij stabiel is) waarin
actoren meer opties hebben en hun keuzes er daarom meer toe doen. Hierdoor kan een
schok potentieel een grotere verandering teweegbrengen dan onder normale omstandighe-
den mogelijk is (hoewel er geen verandering hoeft op te treden). In plaats van een kleine
aanpassing van het programma zou een partij in crisis ook kunnen overwegen ideologisch
te herijken, bijvoorbeeld.
Voor de definitie van schok volgt het nieuwe model Harmel en Janda: een sterke druk
vanuit de omgeving waardoor de doelen van een partij in het geding worden gebracht.
Ondanks dat partijen meerdere mogelijke doelen hebben, zijn er in een democratisch
bestel stemmen nodig om die te verwezenlijken. Daarom treffen electorale schokken alle
partijen, en richten we ons om te beginnen alleen nog op electorale schokken. Deze
schokken onderscheiden zich van gewone verkiezingsnederlagen door hun omvang, die zo
groot is dat het kiezerspotentieel van de partij mogelijk permanent wordt beschadigd.
Als een partij op normale voet zou doorgaan, zou een electorale schok betekenen dat hun
kiezerspotentieel permanent verkleind wordt. Voor de afbakening van de populatie van
partijen die een schok hebben ondergaan houdt dit onderzoek de vuistregel aan dat bij
een electorale schok minimaal een derde van de stemmen of zetels verloren gaan, of dat
er andere meer kwalitatieve redenen zijn om aan te nemen dat de partij-elite een schok
ervaart, zoals een aanzienlijk verlies in de oppositie.
Na een schok volgt er een besluitvormingsproces dat volgens het model in twee fasen
uiteenvalt: de ’of -fase’ en de ’hoe-fase’. Tijdens de ’of -fase’ staat een partij voor de vraag
of er iets moet veranderen. In deze fase volgt het model nog grotendeels de bestaande
literatuur, die immers vrij succesvol is gebleken bij het verklaren van het optreden van
verandering. Zoals ook in de literatuur genoemd treedt verandering op wanneer de druk
om te veranderen groter is dan de weerstand van een institutie (in dit geval een partij)
tegen verandering. Is die druk groot genoeg, dan volgt een diagnose van crisis. Het
diagnostiseren van een crisis is dus afhankelijk van omstandigheden die de weerstand
verzwakken en de druk verhogen. Allereerst kunnen we daarom Harmel en Janda volgen
en zeggen dat hoe meer de doelen van een partij in gevaar zijn, hoe waarschijnlijker het zal
zijn dat een partij een crisis vaststelt. Omdat alle doelen via de stembus moeten worden
bereikt, kunnen we dit vertalen naar de omvang van de verkiezingsnederlaag (propositie
1). Daarnaast stelt het model een leereffect voor: als een partij al eerder een nederlaag
heeft geleden die groot genoeg was om een schok te zijn, dan zal een partij ook sneller
een crisis vaststellen (propositie 2).
Is een crisis vastgesteld, dan belanden we in het hart van het model: de ’hoe-fase’.
Hierbij is de vraag aan de orde hoe een partij dan moet veranderen. Zowel machtgeba-
seerde als doelgebaseerde aanpakken schieten hier tekort. Hier komt het begrip van een
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critical juncture als een periode waarin de bandbreedte voor beslissingen ruimer is van
pas. Na een electorale schok zoeken partijen een strategie die het kiezerspotentieel weer
kan herstellen. Deze strategie is in wezen van eenzelfde aard als de electorale strategieën
die partijen volgen bij verkiezingen: een uitruil tussen het mobiliseren van de traditionele
achterban en het najagen (chasing) van zwevende kiezers. Omdat tijdens een crisis er
meer mogelijk is, staan er voor de strategie na een schok (de herstelstrategie) ruimere
middelen tot de beschikking van partijen. Bij wijze van analogie met marketing is het
zo dat waar een partij in normale omstandigheden alleen de verkoopstrategie aan kan
passen, in een crisis het mogelijk is om ook het product te veranderen. De strategieën
die gekozen worden in de ’hoe-fase’ zijn dan ook een uitruil tussen twee uitersten: een
strategie gericht op het kernelectoraat (de reinforcement strategy versterkings-strategie)
en een gericht op het verbreden naar kiezers die niet tot dit kernelectoraat behoren (de
extension strategy of verbredingsstrategie).
De middelen die een partij hierbij beschikbaar heeft zijn organisatorische, programma-
tische en tactische veranderingen in de partij zelf, die gericht zijn op een van deze twee
groepen. Organisatorisch kan een partij de invloed van de leden vergroten om de banden
met het kernelectoraat aan te halen of verkleinen om meer te kunnen verbreden. Leden
verbinden de partij immers met haar kernelectoraat. Op programmatisch gebied kan een
partij haar programma en beginselen herzien om aantrekkelijker te worden voor het kerne-
lectoraat (door traditionele waarden meer te belichten) of juist voor een bredere achterban
(door er juist minder nadruk op te leggen). Tenslotte kan een partij haar electorale tac-
tieken aanpassen door lange termijnmaatregelen die groepen die wel of niet behoren tot
het kernelectoraat meer aan te spreken. Hierbij kunnen doelgroepen, campagneplannen,
kandidatenlijsten en symbolen worden aangepast.
Hoe verklaren we de keuze van een partij voor de versterkings- of de verbredingsstra-
tegie? Een partij zal eerst een voorkeur vormen voor een bepaalde strategie. Daarbij
speelt mee dat partijen instituties zijn. Hun ontwikkeling is padafhankelijk, wat betekent
dat keuzes in het verleden geleid hebben tot bepaalde eigenschappen die met waarde ge-
laden zijn. Dat leidt tot de weerstand om te veranderen die moet worden overwonnen.
Het is aannemelijk dat deze padafhankelijkheid zo sterk is dat zelfs een schok hem niet
helemaal breekt. Daarom blijven de voorkeuren van een politieke partij voor een van
de twee strategieën tenminste deels afhankelijk van de historisch gevormde institutionele
eigenschappen. We onderscheiden er twee. Allereerst is er een binding met een bepaalde
electorale achterban (electoral base attachment). Partijen die door formele of personele
banden of informele conventies sterk gehecht zijn aan hun achterban zullen sneller de
voorkeur geven aan een versterkingsstrategie omdat die loyaal blijft aan de achterban;
waar deze band zwakker is, is het vaak juist aantrekkelijker om voor een verbredingsstra-
tegie te kiezen. Hetzelfde geldt voor de binding aan de ideologie van de partij, omdat
veranderingen de ideologie van de partij wellicht onder druk zetten. Niet allebei deze fac-
toren werken evenzeer in op alle verschillende dimensies van de strategie: omdat ideologie
dichter bij het partijprogramma ligt, is de verwachting dat de programmatische dimensie
meer invloed heeft op deze dimensie dan op de organisatorische en tactische dimensies.
Het tegenovergestelde valt te verwachten voor electoral base attachment.
Nadat de voorkeuren op deze manier zijn gevormd door interne eigenschappen, wordt
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de externe omgeving van invloed. Het is immers mogelijk dat de voorkeuren van een partij
door invloeden uit die omgeving onhaalbaar worden. Er zijn veel factoren die mogelijk
van invloed kunnen zijn, zoals het partijstelsel en het gedrag van concurrerende partijen,
maar dit proefschrift beperkt zich tot het kiesstelsel. De andere variabelen zijn achter-
grondvariabelen die daarnaast deels samenhangen met het kiesstelsel. Het kiesstelsel - de
manier waarop stemmen in zetels worden vertaald - is ook de meest voor de hand liggende
externe variabele. Het maakt immers uit hoe dat gebeurt. In een meerderheidsstelsel als
het Britse kunnen kiezers van het kernelectoraat beperkt worden in hun mogelijkheden
om effectief van hun vaste partij af te wijken, omdat ze dan wel in een kiesdistrict moeten
wonen waar de andere partij kan winnen. In een evenredigheidsstelsel als het Nederlandse
bestaat een dergelijke beperking niet. Daarom zullen partijen in een evenredigheidsstelsel
sneller hun achterban proberen te behouden met een versterkingsstrategie, terwijl voor
partijen onder een stelsel van relatieve meerderheid in enkelvoudige districten (First Past
the Post, FPTP) een verbredingsstrategie aantrekkelijker is (propositie 6).
Om het model aan een eerste toets te onderwerpen en te verfijnen werd gebruikt ge-
maakt van de vergelijkende en case study-methodes. Een dergelijke aanpak is namelijk
beter geschikt voor het aanpakken van het probleem van de ’zwarte doos’ waar de litera-
tuur tot nu toe tegenaan liep dan bijvoorbeeld een kwantitatieve. Vier partijen werden
geselecteerd uit de populatie van partijen die een crisis doormaakten: twee in Nederland
(een land met een evenredigheidsstelsel), twee in het Verenigd Koninkrijk (een land met
FPTP). De partijen werden per land geselecteerd op basis van electoral base attachment.
In elk land werd een partij geselecteerd die formele of personele banden met het ker-
nelectoraat had en een partij waar deze afwezig waren. Zo kan door deze casussen te
vergelijken een eerste toets plaatsvinden van de belangrijkste proposities van het model.
Ook leiden de studies van de casussen tot eigen inzichten, die het model verder kunnen
helpen verfijnen waar het tekortschiet. Het onderzoek in elke casus werd gedaan door
de bestudering van de archiefstukken van belangrijke organen als partijbesturen, partij-
congressen en fracties, in een enkel geval uitgebreid met persoonsarchieven van leiders en
interviews met betrokkenen. De resultaten van dit onderzoek worden gepresenteerd in een
hoofdstuk per partij en vervolgens samengevoegd in een vergelijkend hoofdstuk, alvorens
de conclusie wordt getrokken.
Tussen 1994 en 2002 maakt het CDA een crisis door, nadat de partij 20 van haar
eerdere 54 zetels in de Tweede Kamer verloor en voor het eerst in haar bestaan weinig
kans had om te regeren. Het CDA is een interessante Nederlandse casus omdat de partij
na haar ontstaan uit een fusie van drie confessionele partijen daar niet alleen veel personele
banden met organisaties uit de achterban aan overhield, maar ook een grote ledenaanhang
waar de partij trots op was. Getuige het invloedrijke evaluatierapport van de commissie-
Gardeniers uit 1994 zette dit vertrouwen in de achterban door tijdens de crisis. Dit
leidde tot de hoge mate van personele en informele electoral base attachment. Ditzelfde
vertrouwen strekt zich uit tot de ideologie: het CDA is volgens de literatuur ideologischer
dan de meeste Europese christendemocratische partijen en ook in de archiefstukken vinden
we het belang van begrippen als de antwoordfilosofie en de ’verantwoordelijke samenleving’
terug, wat de partij een hoge mate van gehechtheid aan de ideologie geeft.
Op basis van deze twee eigenschappen en het kiesstelsel is de verwachting dat het CDA
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twee verkiezingscycli lang een reinforcement-strategie volgt: een interessante tegenstelling
met wat men zou verwachten gebaseerd op de bestuurlijke oriëntatie van de partij. Over
het algemeen blijkt deze verwachting redelijk te kloppen. Al vanaf het begin van het
proces met het rapport-Gardeniers zet het CDA opvallend genoeg in op een versterking
van de eigen ideologische grondslag en meer ledenbetrokkenheid, hetgeen overeenkomt
met de verwachtingen. Dit leidde onder andere tot het invloedrijke Strategish Beraad
waarmee de partij probeerde haar ideologie hernieuwd toe te passen op de vraagstukken
van de jaren ’90 en de invoering van een stelsel van One Member, One Vote (OMOV) bij de
verkiezing van de partijvoorzitter en in het partijcongres. Het is opvallend dat het CDA op
tactisch gebied juist lijkt te willen verbreden naar onder anderen andersgelovigen, al ging
dit niet zonder weerstand vanuit delen van de achterban. Hoewel ook een Seniorenberaad
werd opgezet om de ouderen (een belangrijke groep) meer bij de partij te betrekken, werd
er naast verschillende initiatieven voor andersgelovigen ook ingezet op het aanspreken
van jongere en meer stedelijke kiezers. Dit gaat juist tegen de verwachting in. Dat zou
kunnen liggen aan het besef van een krimpend kernelectoraat dat we zien in het rapport-
Gardeniers. Deze externe druk zou de voorkeur voor reinforcement op dit gebied kunnen
hebben overstemd.
De Britse Labour-partij tussen 1983 en 1992 vormt op meerdere manieren een klassieke
casus. De transformatie die de partij doormaakt tussen 1983 en 1997 van een uitgesproken
linkse partij naar het gematigde New Labour van Tony Blair is een typisch geval van ver-
gaande partijverandering na een schok. Ook is de partij één van de duidelijkste gevallen
van formele binding met de achterban: de partij komt voort uit de vakbeweging en de
vakbonden hebben op alle niveaus van de partij vertegenwoordiging en inspraak, wat leidt
tot een hoge mate van electoral base attachment. In 1983 maakte Labour een traumati-
sche nederlaag door, waarbij de partij weliswaar maar een vijfde van haar zetels en een
kwart van haar stemmen verloor, maar dit verlies wel leed na vier jaar oppositievoeren.
Dat wordt vaak toegeschreven aan de linkse koers van de partij, die ontstond nadat in
de jaren zeventig een verschuiving van de macht van de overwegend gematigde fractie en
partijleiding naar de overwegend linkse lokale afdelingen van de partij had plaatsgevon-
den. Deze tendens werd nog versterkt door een afsplitsing van enkele prominente leden
op de rechtervleugel van de partij, die de Sociaal-Democratische Partij vormden. Hoe-
wel de literatuur over het algemeen oordeelt dat Labour pragmatisch omging met haar
socialistische ideologie, zorgde de positie van de linkervleugel er in de jaren tachtig voor
dat de partij toch een hoge mate van hechting aan de ideologie vertoont. Impopulaire
standpunten als eenzijdige nucleaire ontwapening en grootschalige nationalisering werden
stug vastgehouden.
Na de verkiezing van de linkse parlementariër Neil Kinnock als leider in 1983 gebeurt
er aanvankelijk wat op basis van de interne eigenschappen kan worden verwacht. La-
bour houdt vast aan haar eerdere standpunten over kernwapens en zet in op traditionele
thema’s als de gezondheidszorg, de sociale zekerheid en de rechten van de vakbeweging.
Ook voert de partij na veel discussie een democratisering door waarbij lokale afdelingen
hun parlementaire kandidaten niet meer laten kiezen door het bestuur, maar door een
combinatie van stemmen uit lokale vakbonden en gewone partijleden. Opvallend genoeg
spreekt uit de stukken van Kinnock’s persoonlijke archief een besef dat Labour een ima-
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goprobleem had. Op het terrein waar de partijleiding het meeste invloed had, de tactische
dimensie, is juist voor een verbredende strategie gekozen. Het logo werd onder andere
veranderd in een rode roos, waarbij expliciet werd verwezen naar het vermijden van ’ex-
treme’ connotaties. Nadat de partij in 1987 maar een zeer beperkte winst boekt, zien we
het beeld radicaal veranderen. Het partijbestuur van Labour komt met een verklaring
aan het congres waarin gewaarschuwd wordt dat als Labour geen stemmen wint in het
overwegend Conservatieve zuiden (en buiten haar achterban), de partij nooit meer een
verkiezing zal winnen. Het beeld verandert hierna radicaal en de partij streeft op alle
vlakken een verbredingsstrategie na. Het partijprogramma wordt radicaal vernieuwd met
als expliciet doel om kiezers buiten het kernelectoraat aan te spreken. Ook wordt het
stelsel voor kandidaatstelling opnieuw aangepast, waarbij niet-partijleden in de vakbewe-
ging persoonlijk mogen stemmen. Dat veel van deze maatregelen genomen werden met
expliciete verwijzing naar winst buiten het kernelectoraat geeft sterke steun aan het idee
dat FPTP de versterkingsstrategie beperkt en de verbredingsstrategie juist aantrekkelijker
maakt.
Democraten ’66 (D66), dat in 1982 voor de tweede keer in haar korte bestaan een zware
nederlaag moest verwerken nadat het een jaar daarvoor nog glansrijk 17 zetels won, is
interessant omdat de partij anders dan de voorgaande twee partijen juist een lage mate
van electoral base attachment vertoont. De partij is opgericht om de verzuilde politiek in
Nederland te doorbreken en keert zich tegen het stelsel van belangenpartijen: de partij
vindt dat kiezers op basis van programma moeten kiezen en wil hierin het goede voorbeeld
geven. In tegenstelling tot de Nederlandse partijen die uit de verzuiling voortkwamen heeft
D66 dan ook geen groot kernelectoraat en in zekere zin wil de partij dat ook niet. Wel
is de partij paradoxaal genoeg zeer gehecht aan de eigen ideologie, die bestaat uit een
afkeer van dogmatiek en ideologie. Het doel om het partijenstelsel te laten ’ontploffen’ en
de politiek te vernieuwen blijkt zeer sterk aangehangen te worden, zelfs als het de partij
een nadeel geeft ten opzichte van concurrenten. Zo hechtte de partij zeer aan het voor
de verkiezingen uitspreken van een coalitievoorkeur door de leden, zelfs al was dit een
nadeel in de onderhandelingen. Uit een evaluatie van de nederlaag van 1982 van de hand
van vice-voorzitter Bob van den Bos blijkt dat de partij zich goed besefte dat bepaalde
kenmerken nadelig waren, maar er desondanks niet geheel afstand van wilde doen.
De reactie van D66 op de nederlaag van 1982 lijkt in het begin grotendeels een ver-
bredingsstrategie te volgen. De partij produceert een ’Democratisch Manifest’ waarin de
opvatting van democratisering wordt verbreed van staatkundige democratisering tot de-
mocratisering in de gehele samenleving, en vergroot de coördinatiemogelijkheden van het
bestuur in de soms chaotische op OMOV gebaseerde interne organisatie van de partij,
onder andere door het bestuur in staat te stellen bij de poststemming voor de kandida-
tenlijst een stemadvies te geven aan de leden. In het begin zien we alleen op de tactische
dimensie een versterkingsstrategie, waarbij de stemmen in dezelfde hoek gezocht worden
als voorheen en de jongerenorganisatie van de veelal door jongere kiezers gesteunde partij
wordt versterkt. De peilingen blijven echter tegenvallen, en de partij besluit oprichter
Hans van Mierlo terug te halen als partijleider. Van Mierlo wordt zeer geassocieerd met
de politieke vernieuwingsagenda van de partij en zijn ’ontploffingstheorie’, en dat is dan
ook meteen merkbaar: de partij gaat juist meer inzetten op deze traditionele D66-issues,
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waardoor in 1986 met een overwegend op versterking gebaseerde strategie een overwinning
wordt behaald. Vervolgens gaat de partij tussen 1986 en 1989 grotendeels door op de in-
geslagen weg. Hoewel het beeld in deze casus complex is en op meerdere plekken tegen de
verwachting ingaat, vallen een aantal dingen op. De programmatische basis van de partij
is zo sterk dat die opmerkelijk genoeg een sterkere invloed lijkt te hebben dan de zwakke
hechting met de achterban. Daarnaast lijkt het erop dat de terugkeer van Van Mierlo en
de gevolgen daarvan wel degelijk het verwachte effect van een evenredigheidsstelsel laat
zien.
De naoorlogse geschiedenis van de Britse Liberale Partij is er een van grote moei-
lijkheden. De partij was aanvankelijk een van de twee grote partijen in het Verenigde
Koninkrijk, maar werd na de opkomst van Labour gemarginaliseerd. In 1950 stortte de
kiezersaanhang dramatisch in, waarna de partij zich in de marge moest herpakken. Ook
de Liberalen hebben een lage mate van electoral base attachment. Net als D66 mist de
partij uitgebreide formele of personele banden met de achterban en pleit haar individu-
alisme eerder tegen het cultiveren van een vaste aanhang. Daar komt nog bij dat na de
electorale instorting van de partij haar aanhang geografisch weinig geconcentreerd was en
vaak fungeerde als een proteststem voor ontevreden kiezers van de grote partijen. Dit
komt de ontwikkeling van een vaste achterban ook niet ten goede. De marginale positie
leidt daarentegen wel tot een sterke gehechtheid aan de ideologie. Opvallend genoeg wa-
ren de meeste Liberalen ervan overtuigd dat de doorbraak van hun ideologie nabij was en
was hun ideologie een grote motiverende factor. Daarnaast werden nieuwe ideeën zoals
het sterk lokalistische community politics aan het erfgoed van de partij toegevoegd, waar
de Liberalen zeer aan vasthielden. Tot slot blijkt de hechting aan de ideologie aan een
aanhoudende weigering om samenwerking met de Conservatieven of Labour te overwegen:
het doel was steeds een Liberale meerderheidsregering, hoe onrealistisch ook.
De bestudeerde schok is de nederlaag van de Liberalen in 1970. Na een heropleving in
de jaren zestig kampten de Liberalen onder hun nieuwe leider Jeremy Thorpe met grote
uitdagingen zoals een slechte financiële situatie em de overname van onderscheidende pro-
grammapunten door de grote partijen. Het stemmenaantal van de partij daalde slechts
met 1%, maar de partij verloor zes van haar twaalf zetels in het Lagerhuis. Het opti-
misme over een aanstaande Liberale overwinning werd de kop ingedrukt. De Liberale
reactie kwam wat langzaam op gang, waarschijnlijk omdat het beperkte stemmenverlies
de situatie ambigu maakte. De strategie die de partij vervolgens volgde bestond uit een
versterkte coördinerende rol voor de landelijke organisatie, een sterke focus op traditionele
Liberale issues en waarden waarbij voornamelijk werd ingezet op community politics, en
maatregelen om de aanhang te verbreden. In het kader van dat laatste is het opmerkelijk
dat de partij langzaam maar zeker opschoof richting samenwerking met andere partijen,
een ontwikkeling die zich later verder zou doorzetten. De herstelstrategie van de Liberale
Partij in de twee verkiezingscycli tussen 1970 en 1974, met organisatorische en tactische
verbredingsstrategieën en een programmatische versterkingsstrategie, laat daarbij sterke
steun zien voor propositie 5, omdat deze strategieën per dimensie overeenkomen met de
verwachtingen op basis van de hoge mate van electoral base attachment en de lage mate
van gehechtheid aan de ideologie.
De vergelijkende analyse in hoofdstuk 9 laat wisselende prestaties van het model zien.
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Veelal blijkt het empirische beeld complexer in elkaar te zitten dan het model voorstelt.
Wat de ’of-fase’ betreft moet opgemerkt worden dat hoewel alle partijen uiteindelijk een
crisis vaststelden, de Liberalen en Labour de ernstigheid van de situatie iets minder snel
leken te onderkennen. De op de eerdere literatuur gebaseerde propositie 1 dat grotere
verliezen leiden tot verandering lijkt te kloppen, hoewel de afwezigheid van gevallen waarin
geen verandering optrad betekent dat deze toets slechts tentatief kan zijn. Een leereffect
van eerdere schokken zoals in propositie 2 werd echter niet gevonden, omdat de partijen
die al eerder een schok ondergingen niet de twee partijen waren die snel reageerden.
Voor wat betreft de ’hoe-fase’, de eigenlijke kern van het model valt allereerst op dat
het beeld complexer is dan de eenduidige verwachtingen van proposities 3 (electoral base
attachment) en 4 (ideologie). Deze vergelijking vindt plaats op basis van de eerste cyclus,
omdat de beschreven effecten immers via de voorkeuren van partijen werken. Er is geen
enkele partij die over alle dimensies dezelfde strategie volgde, maar zelfs als we ons baseren
op de meerderheid van de dimensies om de strategie te duiden zijn er problemen. Zo volgt
D66 in het begin wel de verwachting van een verbredingsstrategie, maar slaat dit binnen
de eerste cyclus nog om nadat Van Mierlo terugkeert. Het feit dat D66 op deze manier
begon (net als overigens de andere partijen) geeft alsnog enige steun aan de propositie,
maar het effect is bij lange na niet zo simpel als voorgesteld. Zelfs zonder gevallen met
een lage mate van gehechtheid aan de ideologie (een gevolg van de casusselectie) komt
propositie 4 niet door de vergelijkende toets heen: hoewel alle vier de partijen dezelfde
hoge mate van gehechtheid hebben, volgen ze immers niet alle vier dezelfde strategie.
Het model presteert beter als we de dimensies los van elkaar zien: de organisatorische en
programmatische dimensies komen een op een overeen met de verwachtingen gebaseerd
op respectievelijk electoral base attachment en gehechtheid aan de ideologie. De tactische
dimensie echter vreemd genoeg niet, terwijl de attitude ten opzichte van de electorale
achterban vrij direct zou moeten samenhangen met de keuze van aangesproken groepen.
Uit de gevalstudies lijkt het erop dat verschillende externe factoren mogelijk alvast een
effect hebben gehad op de tactische dimensie in de eerste cyclus. Het model presteert
ook goed voor wat betreft propositie 6 over het kiesstelsel: het verbredende effect van
FPTP komt sterk naar voren uit de twee Britse casussen, en ook voor het effect van een
evenredigheidsstelsel is steun, hoewel dat effect waarschijnlijk minder sterk is dan gedacht.
Over het algemeen zijn we dichter bij een oplossing gekomen, hoewel we er nog niet zijn.
Dat blijkt ook uit een extra toets waarbij het institutionele model tegenover een simpel
alternatief model werd gezet waarin niet de institutionele kenmerken en het kiesstelsel,
maar de vraag of de afgevallen kiezers overwegend al dan niet tot het kernelectoraat
behoorden centraal stond. Het institutionalistische model dat in deze dissertatie is uitge-
werkt blijkt in deze toets beter te zijn in het verklaren van de strategieën van politieke
partijen dan dit alternatieve model. Partijen laten zich dus blijkbaar in hun keuzes na
een zware verkiezingsnederlaag meer leiden door hun geschiedenis en hun institutionele
karakter dan door de identiteit van de kiezers die de partij verlaten hebben.
Het onderzoek heeft dus geleid tot een aantal nieuwe inzichten op het gebied van par-
tijverandering. Allereerst wordt door de diversiteit van de reacties tussen en binnen
dimensies in de verschillende partijen bevestigd dat de opvatting van partijverandering
in de literatuur tot dusver te simpel is geweest. Partijverandering is een diverse catego-
296 Martijn van Nijnanten - Parties under Pressure
rie aan maatregelen en verschillende partijen pakken het op verschillende manieren aan.
Het onderzoek laat zien dat onder het simpele verband tussen schok en verandering een
complex causaal proces zit dat net zo belangrijk is als dat verband zelf. Overigens bleek
ook dat de twee strategieën die in dit onderzoek zijn geconceptualiseerd ook niet perfect
passen. Het onderscheid laat echter wel goed zien dat partijverandering niet alleen kan
leiden tot verandering weg van de wortels van een partij, maar ook tot een verandering
die meer in de lijn ligt van de historische ontwikkeling.
Voor wat het verklarende deel van de onderzoeksvraag betreft heeft het model, zoals
hierboven reeds aangegeven, goed gepresteerd. Het lijkt er inderdaad op dat een schok de
path-dependency van politieke partijen niet geheel wegneemt, maar eerder verzwakt. Het
proces van partijverandering onder schok is dan ook niet alleen een machtsstrijd of een
streven naar een bepaald doel, maar ook een continu gesprek met het eigen verleden. Ook
op het gebied van het kiesstelsel presteert het model zoals gezegd goed. Dat neemt niet weg
dat er nog problemen zijn. Ironisch genoeg loopt het model in zekere zin tegen hetzelfde
probleem van complexe causaliteit aan als de literatuur. Het model is er bijvoorbeeld
niet in geslaagd te verklaren waarom verschillende partijen verschillende factoren anders
lijken te wegen. Dit was onder andere het geval bij D66, waar ideologie een veel grotere
rol speelde dan electoral base attachment. Het zou kunnen dat het doel van een partij (bij
D66 kan men zeggen dat dit beleid is) toch een grotere rol speelt. Verder onderzoek is
dus nodig om het model verder te verfijnen. Een institutionalistische aanpak kan echter
zeker helpen om de veranderingen van politieke partijen in een steeds volatieler wordende
electorale omgeving beter te begrijpen.
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